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Abstract 
 
Introduction:  Internationally, there is increasing interest in the potential of 
information technology to enhance the quality and effici ncy of healthcare. Many 
countries are currently actively pursuing electronic health record implementations. 
However, the introduction of such systems often has significant consequences for 
users’ work practices and organisational functioning due to the complex processes 
involved in implementing and adopting new technology. Problems may be 
exacerbated in a national implementation context if users feel that systems are 
imposed and offer insufficient customisability due to a focus on achieving 
widespread interoperability. England has embarked on a large-scale national 
implementation of electronic health records. One of the procured systems was 
Lorenzo, which was to be built while it was being implemented. Investigating the 
implementation and adoption of Lorenzo is of particular interest as, in theory, the 
approach of “co-creating” a system in collaboration with the National Health Service 
(NHS) should help to increase software usability and thereby facilitate integration 
with work practices. I sought to understand the views and experiences of users as 
well as organisational consequences of introducing Lorenzo, and how these evolved 
over time in the complex environment of a national electronic health record 
implementation.  
Methodology and methods: I conducted a qualitative longitudinal investigation in 
purposefully selected secondary and community care settings which were 
implementing early Lorenzo functionality. I conceptualised the settings as case 
studies. Data collection was theory-driven in that it utilised a methodological 
framework, which was developed specifically for the purposes of my study and 
based on the existing theoretical and empirical literature. Using this framework with 
multi-sited ethnography helped me to examine the immediate environment in which 
Lorenzo was implemented without neglecting the organisational and political context 
in which local developments were situated. Data colle tion consisted of interviews 
with Lorenzo users and managers in case study sites; interviews with external 
stakeholders (including policy makers, system develop rs, and independent sector 
representatives) from outside NHS Trusts; non-participant observation of staff 
meetings and use of the technology; as well as a combination of field notes, 
documents pertaining to Trusts and wider political developments, and press 
statements. Data collection and thematic analysis were informed by a sociotechnical 
Actor-Network Theory-based approach highlighting the interrelated nature of 
technical and social dimensions. The study also drew on other related theoretical 
frameworks that helped to address some of Actor-Network Theory’s theoretical and 
practical shortcomings. Most helpful in this respect were Strong Structuration 
Theory, the Social Shaping of Technology, and the Tory of the Diffusion of 
Innovations (theoretically); and multi-sited ethnography and case studies 
(practically). I employed inductive and deductive analytical techniques utilising 
thematic tables for organising and interpreting the data. Individual case studies were 
analysed first in order to examine local dynamics, before cross-case comparisons 
were made and findings were integrated with data obined from outside case study 
sites. 
 iii  
Results: I collected data between 2009 and 2011 in three case study sites. The 
complete dataset comprised interview data from a tot l of 66 different participants 
within Trusts, 14 interviews with stakeholders from outside case study sites, 38.5 
hours of non-participant observation, 149 pages of press statements, 31 pages of field 
notes, and a range of national and local Trust documents. The three sites differed in 
demographics and local implementation strategies, and hence presented diverse 
stories of sociotechnical change unfolding over time within their complex individual 
contexts. However, there were also similarities, not least the fact that all were 
implementing the same system and that they were operating within constantly 
evolving political and economic contexts. Users found it difficult to integrate 
Lorenzo with their everyday work practices as the software was perceived to be not 
fit-for-purpose. Over time, these difficulties attenuated to some extent, particularly in 
the smaller-scale deployments in sites that had invested significant time and 
resources to adapt the software to fit with their everyday practices. Lorenzo 
implementation also had significant consequences for organisational functioning, 
which was often hampered by local restrictions in software customisability 
associated with national arrangements.  
Conclusion: I have developed a theoretically informed methodolgical framework 
and applied this to explore sociotechnical processes involved in the implementation 
and adoption of Lorenzo. In doing so, I identified potentially transferable theoretical 
insights into local and national developments over time and based on these proposed 
mechanisms involved in the implementation and adoption process. Overall, my 
findings help to explain why the adoption of Lorenzo was much slower and on a 
smaller scale than originally anticipated. The interplay between social (political, 
individual and organisational) and technical factors was central to implementation 
progress. At the root of many problems encountered were difficulties with 
integrating systems with work practices of users and more general organisational 
functioning. In relation to Lorenzo, co-creating national software with strong user 
involvement was hampered due to different requirements in individual settings and 
wider, political and economic constraints. Based on the English experience, there 
may be some important transferable lessons for similar ventures in other countries. 
Most importantly, national implementations need to build on a solid basis of local 
technology adoption by allocating sufficient time for individual users and 
organisations to adjust to the complex changes that often accompany such service re-
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Chapter 1: Introduction and background - the 
implementation of electronic health records (EHRs) 
1.1 Challenges facing healthcare and the potential of 
information technology 
Health systems globally face common challenges, including increasing population size; 
budgetary constraints; major demographic transitions with growing numbers of older, 
frailer people many of whom live with more than one long-term condition; the ever-
increasing amount of knowledge and array of new and expensive treatment options; and 
increasing public expectations.(1) As a result, healthcare systems are becoming 
increasingly complex with larger groups of diverse h althcare professionals working 
together, often over great geographical distances, to deliver patient care. These 
developments have led to growing international interest in the potential of information 
technology (IT, see Glossary) in facilitating efficiency and reducing the risk of error.(2) 
The underlying assumption of introducing IT in healthcare is that more efficient 
information flow will ultimately result in improved quality of care.(3)  
 
IT interventions in healthcare can take a variety of forms, ranging from basic patient 
administration systems (PAS, see Glossary), to sophi ticated systems aiding clinical 
decision making at the point of care. By far the most complex systems are electronic 
health records (EHRs), which are the subject of this t esis. EHRs have great potential to 
improve the quality and efficiency of healthcare delivery. Amongst anticipated benefits 
are: higher quality of care due to increased efficien y, better data quality (see Glossary), 
and improved availability of data for secondary uses (see Glossary).(4)  
 
The definitions of EHRs are many and varied (see Table 1.1. for some examples),(5) 
ranging from relatively simple patient management functionality in one setting to the 
more complex interoperable management and clinical systems that allow data sharing 
across care settings (see Table 1.2).(5) In the context of my study, I defined an EHR as a 
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compilation of patient information in digital format that can be shared between care 
settings and has associated management and clinical functionality (such as integrated 
decision support, see Glossary for definition). 
Table 1.1: Examples of definitions of EHRs and associated terms 
Electronic medical record, electronic 
patient record, computerised medical 
record, computer-based medical record, 
digital medical record 
Broadly equivalent terms used to describe 
digitally stored patient records, including 
those created on computer or transcribed 
or scanned from paper records. Usually 
refers to information from single providers 
(e.g. a diabetes clinic, a hospital), but often 
used interchangeably with EHR. 
Integrated care record A record that contains information from 
multiple providers of the patient’s care. 
Varies in how the information is integrated 
(e.g. centralised data storage versus 
linkage to federated data stores), how 
much information is integrated (detailed or 
summary), and the scope and providers of 
the information (e.g. an integrated diabetes 
care record versus a more generic shared 
care record). 
Continuity of care record  An evolving standard for a core (summary) 
electronic record that can be accessed by 
and added to by multiple health 
professionals caring for a patient, so as to 
support integrated and current care. 
Interoperable electronic health record  One term for complex EHR that can 
interface (see Glossary) with a range of 
records systems, databases and tools for 
Chapter 1: Introduction and background - the implementation of electronic health records (EHRs) 
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decision-making and communication. 
Personal health record Sometimes referred to as electronic patient 
carried medical records. These refer to 
records that are accessible by the patient 
themselves.  
Adopted from Car et al (5) 
Table 1.2: Levels of complexity of EHR systems 
Overall Health information in digital format 
Levels of 
complexity 
1 2 3 4 























Sharing of computerised information between different healthcare settings is often not 
possible. The more complex EHRs are likely to signif cantly transform the way patient 
information in hospitals is stored, holding and managi g information such as test results, 
notes from consultations and hospital stays, x-rays and the medications that patients 
take. Currently, much of this information is held eith r on local computer systems or on 
paper records, which further complicates sharing betwe n different settings. 
 
EHR initiatives are increasingly driven by broader political visions of achieving large-
scale interoperability (see Glossary). However, EHRs are often difficult to implement, as 
long-established ways of individual and organisational working have to be changed with 
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the introduction of such complex technologies; and customisation allowing tailoring to 
local needs is often limited.(6-8) This appears to be due to scale but also to perceptions 
by those on the ground that such IT systems are “imposed” by implementers. Small-
scale bespoke systems developed “in-house” and customised (see Glossary) to the 
specific needs of the organisation are often implemented with less difficulty, although 
such systems can also have problems integrating within the multifaceted healthcare 
environment where many different groups use various technologies in complex ways.(9)  
It is the interplay between these social (individual, organisational, macro1) and technical 
factors in large-scale EHR implementation (see Glossary), which is the focus of this 
thesis.  
1.2 International approaches to large-scale EHR imp lementation  
With the significant potential benefits of large-scale EHR systems in mind (particularly 
with regard to secondary uses and increased availability of information across care 
settings), several countries around the world have made plans to implement EHRs. 
However, strategies of introducing these systems vary significantly.(10) High-profile 
national EHR implementations are currently being pursued by England, the United 
States (US) and Australia. Coiera distinguishes betwe n “top-down”, “bottom-up” and 
“middle-out” implementation approaches, respectively (see Glossary).(9) Although 
somewhat stereotypical and simple, this division of approaches can be a helpful way to 
conceptualise different national strategies. I willtherefore discuss them in more detail in 
the following sections. 
 
England was the first country to announce plans to centrally implement a national EHR, 
and has therefore progressed furthest in terms of implementation efforts, followed by the 
US and Australia. The “top-down” approach pursued here is characterised by its 
politically-driven nature with the aim to store records centrally (see Section 1.3 for 
further discussion on the politically-driven approach). According to Coiera, with this 
approach existing healthcare IT systems may become redundant even if they work well 
                                                
1 Please note: macro-environment refers to wider social factors such as political and economic climate 
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because they are likely to be replaced by national systems. It is argued that the focus on 
long-term benefits may be at the expense of short-term benefits, as it may be difficult for 
national systems to respond to emerging local needs.  
 
The US “bottom-up” strategy, on the other hand, emerged from a de-centralised health 
system, with a strategy to develop local systems in line with national standards and plans 
to integrate these on a national scale. The aim here is not a centrally stored record but 
access to local records by different organisations, with existing systems being kept and 
then integrated. Although this approach may be ableto better deal with emergent local 
needs, difficulties may be encountered when trying to connect local systems and share 
data. Also, as the government is not as strongly involved, Coiera argues that this may 
result in a lack of leadership and coherent strategic direction. 
 
The “middle-out” strategy pursued by Australia is characterised by a mixture of the two 
approaches outlined above,(9) with technical standards deliberated by all key 
stakeholders (led by the government) before systems are procured. Here, the government 
is viewed as bringing together interests of different groupings, as a facilitator developing 
standards, and as helping local organisations to comply with these. Allowing 
organisations to keep local systems or helping them to choose new compliant systems, 
means more freedom and choice. According to Coiera, t is possible for the other two 
approaches to evolve to the “middle-out” strategy during implementation. 
1.3 EHRs in England and the National Programme for IT 
England was the first country in the world to annouce a national “top-down” 
implementation of IT systems throughout its National Health Service (NHS): the 
National Programme for IT (NPfIT). As this Programme is nationally driven and taking 
place in a highly politicised environment, it is important to consider how it evolved over 
time before outlining details relating to the EHR strategy. Therefore, the English 
historical and policy context will be described in the paragraphs below, outlining how 
the Programme was conceived and how it has evolved to where it is today. 
Chapter 1: Introduction and background - the implementation of electronic health records (EHRs) 
 
 18 
1.3.1 A brief overview of the NHS 
A detailed discussion of the history and nature of the NHS is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. I therefore confine myself to a summary of the most pertinent characteristics of 
the NHS, including its structures and most recent dvelopments that are most relevant to 
my work, in the paragraphs below. The NHS in England was established in 1948 with 
the aim to provide “free” national healthcare for all. It is the third largest employer in the 
world, funded by the taxpayer and managed by the Department of Health (DH). At a 
local level it is managed through 10 Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) and 
approximately 400 Trusts (see Glossary), whose responsibility it is to ensure that 
national plans are implemented locally and that local needs are reflected in policy 
developments. Trusts can take a variety of forms including acute Trusts, ambulance 
Trusts, mental health Trusts and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) (see Glossary for more 
details). The scale, complexity and often relative autonomy of these structures make it a 
uniquely complex organisational setting.  
 
This is exacerbated by frequent changes in the way these structures are organised. For 
example, there is an increasing move towards Trusts obtaining Foundation Status (see 
Glossary). Foundation Trusts have increased responsibility and are accountable directly 
to the DH. This increased focus on autonomy is somewhat at odds with the national 
“top-down” implementation approach as these Trusts can make decisions (e.g. relating 
to local IT developments) independently. This will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7. These governance structures and different levels of independence mean that 
the NHS is highly fragmented, consisting of a combination of diverse organisations that 
are sometimes in competition with one another.  
 
Services are provided in primary, secondary and tertiary care settings. Whilst United 
Kingdom (UK) primary care tends to have relatively high levels of computerisation with 
over 95% of practices now computerised, secondary ce is lagging behind (in many 
instances not having implemented basic administration systems). 
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1.3.2 IT in the NHS and the history of the National  Programme  
The introduction of IT within the NHS was relatively fragmented until 1998 with 
different organisations commissioning or developing their own IT services. This 
naturally depended on locally identified needs, priorities and resources, which meant 
that in some instances investments in IT were not made at all. Although EHRs had 
begun to be implemented to differing degrees, efforts were confined to local 
implementations in single organisations and no natio l guidance and coherent strategy 
on systems implementation and interoperability exist d. This resulted in a range of 
different levels of maturity of computerisation in different organisations, and associated 
concerns that local strategies and different system implementations would later mean a 
difficulty in integrating local systems.  
 
In 1998, the NHS Information Authority, then part of the DH, published a report setting 
out a long-term and more integrated IT strategy for England.(11) This was driven by the 
vision to create joined-up national IT systems across different care settings. The essence 
of the central vision is most commonly related to a speech by the then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair. This speech represents for many the starting point of the National 
Programme:  
 
“If I live in Bradford and fall ill in Birmingham then I want the doctor treating me to 
have access to the information he needs to treat me.” (Speech by the Prime Minister the 
Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, NHS 50th Anniversary Conferenc , London Thursday 2nd July 
1998) 
 
The NHS Plan, published by the DH in July 2000, outlined the strategy for 
implementing IT systems throughout the NHS in more detail.(12) It was followed by an 
announcement by Sir John Pattison (the then Directo of Research, Analysis and 
Information at the DH) in 2002 outlining the new national strategy for healthcare IT at a 
conference in Harrogate, and a seminar at 10 Downing Street chaired by Tony Blair to 
plan the project. The result was the development of a very ambitious 10 year strategy to 
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introduce national EHR systems throughout England.2 This is now commonly known as 
the NPfIT. The aim here was to replace local IT systems with national ones and link 
these together in an integrated way (see Box 1.1 for a more detailed timeline). 
Box 1.1: Key developments in England 
Timeline 
Before 1998: Patchy implementation of IT systems, particularly in hospitals.  
1998: The vision for the NPfIT was conceived to introduce national interoperable EHR 
systems throughout England 
2002: Detailed plans of the 10-year implementation strategy were released 
2005: NHS Connecting for Health (NHS CFH) was established as a designated 
governmental agency to oversee the implementation 
 
Key policy documents 
• NHS Information Authority. Information for Health. 1998. London, DH. 
• DH. The NHS Plan: a plan for investment, a plan for reform. 2000. London, The 
Stationery Office. 
• DH. Delivering 21st century IT support for the NHS: national strategic 
programme. 2002. London, DH.  
• The House of Commons Health Committee. The Electronic Patient Record. 
2007. London, The Stationery Office.  
 
Details of the NPfIT are available in several reports published by the DH over the 
following years.(13;14) In essence, plans in relation o EHRs included the following key 
components (please also refer to the Glossary): 
• National Spine, a database and messaging service holding basic system 
capabilities 
                                                
2 Some have argued that it was developed in a rushed way hurried by “political impatience to see result” 
and philosophically radically different from the Information for Health Plan, which is viewed as more 
realistic (source: confidential communication). 
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• National Network for the NHS (N3), a very large virtual private network (see 
Glossary) allowing electronic data exchanges between th  applications across 
organisations 
• Personal Demographics Service (PDS), containing demographic patient details 
• Images in Picture Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) 
• Summary Care Record (SCR), held on the National Spine and containing a 
record of essential clinical information 
• Detailed Care Record (DCR), containing comprehensive clinical information on 
individual patients (this was the focus of my study)  
• Secondary Uses Service (SUS) for integration of data from different sources and 
availability of data for audit and research purposes 
• Choose and Book, an electronic booking service givin  patients the possibility to 
choose both location and time of appointments 
• An Electronic Prescription Service (EPS), an electronic service allowing sending 
of prescriptions from primary care to pharmacies. 
 
The National Health Service Care Records Service (NHS CRS), containing both SCRs 
and DCRs (see Section 1.3.2), was central to the National Programme. It was planned to 
consist of a range of IT applications interacting with each other, eventually fulfilling the 
vision of national data sharing across different care settings with the help of EHRs.  
1.3.3 Governance and leadership structures 
In 2005, to ensure stronger leadership, the DH establi hed NHS CFH as a designated 
body charged with overseeing the implementation of the Programme. NHS CFH was 
responsible for setting standards concerning the imple entation and systems, and for 
providing a range of implementation resources to indiv dual organisations and SHAs. It 
also had overall responsibility for liaising with national software suppliers and 
accrediting software to be implemented as part of the National Programme. Since 2008, 
it held contracts with two Local Service Providers (LSPs) charged with implementing 
the national solutions. These LSPs were responsible for subcontracting software 
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developers and delivering the software solutions into Trusts. They included the 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) and British Telecom (BT), who in relation to the 
national EHR in hospitals, implemented software developed by Cerner (Cerner 
Millennium), iSOFT (Lorenzo Regional Care, henceforth referred to as Lorenzo), and 
CSE-Servelec (RiO).  
 
Originally, NHS CFH held contracts with a total of five LSPs in five implementation 
clusters. These included the North West and West Midlands cluster (with CSC as the 
LSP); the London cluster (with BT as the LSP); the Southern England cluster (with 
Fujitsu as the LSP); and the North East and the Eastern England clusters (with 
Accenture as the LSP). However, in 2007/08 two LSPs, Accenture and Fujitsu, pulled 
out of these arrangements early. Subsequently, BT took responsibility for implementing 
Cerner Millennium and CSE Servalec RiO (RiO) software in the London area, whilst 
CSC took responsibility for implementing Lorenzo software in the Northern part of 
England. The Southern area of England was left without an LSP and planned to 
implement a mixture of these systems. The LSPs were expected to work in close 
collaboration with Trusts and SHAs. In order to increase local ownership and 
involvement in decision making by local organisations, NHS CFH introduced the NPfIT 
Local Ownership Programme in 2007, devolving more responsibility in relation to the 
delivery of the IT solutions to the 10 SHAs.  
 
The cost of the NPfIT, of which the NHS CRS was the most fundamental component, 
has been estimated to be somewhere between £6-£12 billion.(5) The aim of nationally 
procured software through a limited number of service providers was part of a plan to 
keep implementation costs to a minimum through economies of scale and included the 
payment of large sums of money up-front to LSPs through national contracts managed 
centrally by NHS CFH. 
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1.3.4 Systems and implementation strategy 
In order to realise the political vision, England was divided into originally five and, with 
the exit of Accenture and Fujitsu three, so-called “implementation clusters” representing 
different geographical areas (see Glossary). These included the Southern region, the 
London region and the North Midlands and Eastern (NME) region of the country, each 
with their own designated Service Provider and associated software solutions including 
Lorenzo in NME and Cerner Millennium/RiO in London.  
 
As the Programme was characterised by the introduction of national software through 
NHS CFH as a centralised implementation agency driven by a political vision with 
limited capability for individual Trusts to choose or develop their own software 
solutions, the underlying assumption was that “one size fits all” through rigorous 
standardisation (see Glossary) of systems nationally. Anticipated benefits of this 
approach included increased efficiency, speed and interoperability of software systems. 
 
The implementation of EHRs in secondary care was plnned as a staged approach with 
software releases (see Glossary) being implemented incrementally with increasing 
capability. However, there were some differences betwe n clusters due to variations in 
software characteristics. Lorenzo, the NME solution, was developed “from scratch” as it 
was implemented and did not exist in its full form, whilst Cerner Millennium was a 
finished product that has been routinely used in the US as a healthcare and billing 
system. Although both solutions were implemented incrementally, there were some 
differences in scale of implementations. Lorenzo was planned to be deployed as a so-
called “soft-landing” on a small scale with a limited number of users and capabilities 
(see Glossary). Cerner Millennium, on the other hand, was distinguished by a “big bang” 
implementation (see Glossary), with whole organisations moving overnight from paper-
based to electronic solutions. Please refer to the Glossary for a more detailed description 
of these approaches.  
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1.4 The NHS Care Records Service and Lorenzo 
As can be seen, the EHRs within the National Programme are complex and consist of a 
range of systems. Hence, they are difficult to study, both in terms of functionality, but 
also in terms of geographical areas. For the purposes f my work, I therefore focused on 
one specific type of software (i.e. Lorenzo) in a specific geographical area (i.e. NME). 
The reasons for this focus were twofold. Firstly, the focus on NME allowed me to 
investigate the implementation of EHRs on a truly large scale as this was the biggest 
implementation cluster; and secondly the unique characteristics of the software allowed 
me to explore user involvement in design. The following paragraphs will explain these 
unique system and geographical characteristics in more detail. 
 
Lorenzo was a specific type of web-based EHR software introduced as part of the NHS 
CRS in the NME region of England. This cluster was previously divided into three 
geographical areas, namely the East & East Midlands, the North West & West Midlands, 
and the North East. However, one of the LSPs, which was planned to be responsible for 
implementing NHS CRS software in the North East and East & East Midlands 
(Accenture), pulled out of contractual arrangements i  January 2007, responsibility for 
implementing NHS CRS software in these regions was tr nsferred to the LSP of the 
North West & West Midlands (CSC).  
 
The NME cluster was the largest of the three NPfIT geographical areas and covered 
approximately 60% of the North of England. It included the following SHAs: 
o East Midlands SHA 
o East of England SHA 
o North East SHA 
o North West SHA 
o West Midlands SHA 
o Yorkshire and Humber SHA. 
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Altogether, these SHAs covered 89 PCTs, 87 acute Trusts, 28 mental health Trusts, five 
ambulance Trusts, and 10 specialist Trusts (including social and community care). 
 
Lorenzo software was unique in many ways, but perhaps the most important 
characteristic was that it did not exist in its full form when it was procured, as the 
original intention was to develop a system in collaboration with the NHS so that it would 
address the needs of users. This “co-creational” approach was taken to overcome often-
cited problems with lack of user involvement in software design in healthcare IT 
implementations.(15-32) 
  
Different software releases were available as soon as they were developed in India, 
where most of iSOFT’s (the developer’s) engineers were based. Although releases had 
to be implemented consecutively, organisations were to some extent free to choose 
which parts of releases they wished to implement according to their needs. The generic 
description of Lorenzo, as stated in the Lorenzo Product Description published by CSC, 
is displayed in Figure 1.1 below.  
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Figure 1.1: Generic Lorenzo product description 
 
Note: Generic Lorenzo product description illustrating the four different releases and associated 
functionality. 
 
An example of the user-interface of the application is provided in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 
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Figure 1.2: Example of Lorenzo screenshot with list of patients 
 
Note: Example of a Lorenzo software screenshot displaying a list of fictitious patients as presented to a 
user.  
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Figure 1.3: Example of Lorenzo screenshot with a clinic overview 
 
Note: Example of a Lorenzo software screenshot displaying a clinic overview as presented to a user. 
 
In order to deliver early benefits to Trusts, the LSP CSC delivered iSOFT Patient 
Manager (iPM, also developed by iSOFT) to some English Trusts. iPM was an 
electronic PAS system with basic functionality and Spine integration, installed as a first 
step towards the final EHR solution. It was designed to deliver some early benefits to 
Trusts but was planned to be substituted by the Lornzo solution eventually with CSC 
stopping supporting iPM in 2013. iPM was therefore referred to as an “interim solution” 
(please see Glossary for more details). In Release 1 (R1), iPM and Lorenzo were 
running in parallel and R1 interfaced to a limited extent with iPM.3  
 
Unlike the implementation of Cerner Millennium in the London cluster, the 
implementation of Lorenzo in NME was “soft” with paper systems being gradually 
replaced with electronic systems in selected settings. Incremental releases of Lorenzo 
                                                
3 In R1 iPM still dealt with all the reporting. Care Management (R2) was planned to take over the 
reporting functions from iPM replacing the iPM PAS with a Lorenzo PAS. 
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with increasing capabilities were planned to be slowly rolled out to other settings in the 
organisation. This set-up offered a unique opportunity to study processes in selected 
early implementing organisations in detail as they experienced the slow replacement of 
long-established systems with a nationally procured solution (Lorenzo) in the context of 
one of the first national EHR implementations worldwi e. These in-depth process issues 
would have been more difficult to study in “big bang” implementations such as Cerner 
Millennium, as this would have meant “studying chaos” resulting in potential problems 
of focusing data collection as events would have unfolded more rapidly. 
1.5 An evaluation of the implementation and adoptio n of the 
NHS CRS in secondary care 
At the time I began my PhD, The University of Edinburgh was commissioned to 
undertake a national mixed methods evaluation of the implementation and adoption of 
various NHS CRS systems (including Lorenzo) in secondary care funded by the NHS 
CFH Evaluation Programme (NHS CFHEP).(33)  
 
Whilst doing my PhD, I was also working on this large  evaluation project as the project 
co-ordinator and my supervisor (Professor Sheikh) was the Principal Investigator. This 
helped to ensure that my PhD was not an isolating experience as I had frequent contact 
with colleagues with whom I could discuss emerging findings and methodological 
issues. I was able to carve out my own niche, colleting a wider range of data that I 
analysed in more depth than was possible in the large-scale evaluation project (which 
focused on a wider range of software systems and policy recommendations). My PhD 
work allowed me to more explicitly draw on theoretical considerations with a focus on 
theory development.  
1.6 Chapter summary 
As I outlined in this chapter, increasingly complex arge-scale EHR implementations are 
now at the heart of many international efforts to improve the safety, quality and 
efficiency of healthcare. However, the introduction f systems often has significant 
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consequences for work practices and organisational fu ctioning, resulting in difficulty in 
implementing such systems. This is exacerbated by the focus on interoperability and the 
“top-down” politically-driven implementation approach in the English context, where 
customisability to local needs is likely to be limited. There is therefore a real threat that 
the introduction of the NHS CRS into secondary care will be “unsuccessful” 
(acknowledging that the notion of “success” itself depends on the viewpoint of the 
observer).(34) The implementation of Lorenzo as part of the NPfIT presents a unique 
opportunity to study the views and experiences of users and the consequences of the 
software for their work practices as well as general o ganisational functioning in the 
complex environment of a “top-down” national EHR implementation.  
 
Having outlined the context of the implementation and described the general set-up as 
well as software characteristics, I will now move on to examining the literature in 
relation to factors that have been repeatedly identfi d in helping to explain why many 
EHR implementations in the healthcare sector “fail” or have been labelled as such. In 
doing so, the focus of my thesis will not be on the simple dichotomy between “success” 
and “failure”, which has often characterised quantit tive investigations of IT systems, 
but on the more subtle underlying tensions and related processes. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review on EHR implementation 
and adoption 
2.1 Introduction 
Having outlined the complex national “top-down” implementation landscape of Lorenzo 
in Chapter 1, I will now examine the existing literature in order to determine which 
factors have repeatedly been identified as being important for the effective 
implementation of IT systems in healthcare. In line with the importance of interrelated 
social and cultural (henceforth referred to as socio-cultural) factors characterising such 
ventures (Chapter 1), I concentrated on social processes involved in and social 
consequences of the implementation and adoption of ew technology (see Glossary). 
This not only included exploring technical, individual and organisational dimensions, 
but also an examination of wider macro-issues (defined as environmental factors such as 
political and economic climate) as the context in which local developments were 
situated.(26;35)  
 
My literature review drew on principles of systematic reviews in that the searches were 
performed systematically and studies were examined th matically. The strict systematic 
review methodology in the traditional sense (i.e. with a focus on identifying randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) based on keyword searches) was not viewed as suitable for my 
purposes of gaining an insight into the socio-cultura  factors surrounding the 
implementation and adoption of EHRs due to the large volume of qualitative studies, 
case studies and anecdotal evidence.  
2.2 Detailed methods of the literature review 
I conducted searches of studies published in the last 10 years up to the 3rd April 2009 
using Medline and Embase databases. The following paragraphs outline how I selected 
the search terms and the studies included in the literature review. 
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2.2.1 Search terms 
I divided search terms into two groups – one relating o the technology in question (i.e. 
EHRs) and the other relating to the social processes urrounding the technology.  
 
The first group included descriptions of EHR systems in healthcare. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, these are many, varied and have been used relatively inconsistently in the 
literature. Nevertheless, as my focus was on the more c mplex end of the EHR 
functionality spectrum (see Table 1.2), I restricted my keywords to systems holding 
patient information electronically with a view to facilitating data sharing across different 
healthcare settings. This also reflected the way EHRs were viewed more generally in the 
context of the National Programme and therefore fitt d in well with the overall macro-
environment of my research. More specifically, terms in the first group were identified 
on the basis of a recent systematic review of the eH alth literature and included the 
following (also see Glossary for more comprehensive definitions):(5)  
 
• Electronic health record (this included “interoperable electronic health record”) 
• Electronic patient record 
• Computerised medical record/Computerized medical record 
• Hospital information system 
• Electronic medical record 
• Computer-based medical record 
• Digital medical record 
• Integrated care record 
• Longitudinal health record 
• Continuity of care record 
• Personal health record 
 
The second group of search terms focused on social processes surrounding the 
technology. In order to reflect the complexity, temporal and interrelated nature, I 
Chapter 2: Literature review on EHR implementation and adoption 
 
 33 
selected terms that related to the process of technology implementation. Here, I limited 
my search to those that had been identified as playing an important role in relation to the 
implementation and adoption of EHRs throughout the literature. Terms were based on a 
related paper by Cooper and Zmud, presenting a holistic set of terms surrounding 
implementation and adoption over time from initiation to routine use (and everything in 
between).(36) 
 










Terms within groups were combined using the Boolean operator OR and groups were 
combined using the Boolean operator AND. Searches were run on the 3rd April 2009 and 
the literature was re-visited periodically throughout my research (please refer to Chapter 
8 for a literature update). Detailed search histories can be viewed in Appendix 1. 
 
The initial searches yielded 1739 articles. After a first round of selection, and removing 
those that were judged not relevant from reading titles and abstracts only and deleting 
duplicates, 628 articles were identified. Due to the large volume of papers and the 
rapidly evolving nature of the field, I focused on those published after 1999 as these 
were most likely to considering EHR functionality tha  was to an extent comparable with 
the systems currently available; 546 references remained. The selection criteria outlined 
below were applied to these 546 references. The final number of references included in 
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the literature review was 71 (see Figure 2.1 for a flow diagram of the selection process). 
The methods of individual studies and associated quality considerations are summarised 
in Appendix 2, where I have also summarised my critical appraisal of each study. 
Figure 2.1: Flow diagram of the selection process 
 
2.2.2 Selection criteria of studies included in the  literature review 
In line with my focus on social processes surrounding technology implementation and 
adoption (see Chapter 3), I employed the following inclusion criteria for studies: 
• A primary focus on facilitators or barriers from implementation and adoption of 
systems in organisational transformation (the process). 
• A focus on people and organisational issues (e.g. social/technical issues and human 
factors, further described in the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis in Chapter 3). 
Papers identified through 
database searching 
(n = 1739) 
Records screened by reading 
through title and abstracts 
and removing duplicates 
(n = 628) 
Deleting papers with a date 
equal to or earlier than 1999 
(n = 546) 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility 
(n = 546) 
Studies included  
(n = 71) 
Papers excluded 
(n = 1111) 
Full-text articles excluded, 
with reasons 
(n = 565) 
Full-text articles excluded, 
with reasons 
(n = 494) 
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• Articles with lessons learned from implementations labelled as “failed” and 
“successful”. 
• Papers that reviewed other studies of implementing IT systems in healthcare settings 
and had multiple recommendations. 
• I did not limit myself to articles that focused on secondary care or EHR systems in 
particular. I also included papers from primary care nd those that focused on related 
systems such as computerised (electronic) decision upport systems (CDSS), 
computerised physician order entry (CPOE) or personal digital assistants (PDAs) as 
these are often part of an EHR, and the lessons between settings may be transferable 
(see Glossary for definitions of terms). 
 
I excluded articles that: 
• Focused on the impact of IT on the quality, safety and efficiency of care (as my 
focus was primarily on process issues). 
• Evaluated technology that is not commonly associated with core EHR functionality 
such as speech recognition, electronic signatures and tele-care applications. 
• Focused on personal health records (i.e. those that allow patients access to their own 
health records); my primary interest was on the use of EHRs in the healthcare 
setting. 
• Focused on the implementation of IT in developing countries due to different 
contextual circumstances. 
• Had a primary focus on coding and standards (see Glossary) as I was mainly 
interested in how the technology was adopted and imple ented as opposed to how 
data would be used from it – the latter was more lik ly to become important once the 
technology was more established. 
 
I also considered how the traditional systematic method to literature searching (i.e. based 
on RCTs and associated keywords) fitted in with my qualitative methodology and 
associated epistemological assumptions. Applying search criteria and selecting articles 
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from searches of databases based on keywords is an e se tially positivist approach but I 
drew on these techniques to thematically identify relevant studies. Although the overall 
positivist tradition does not fit with my ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
applying the systematic approach to literature searching helped to place my research into 
context. 
2.3 Results of the literature review: implementatio n and 
adoption of EHRs 
The literature review yielded a mixture of case studies, literature reviews and anecdotal 
recommendations or reflections on existing efforts to implement EHRs and/or associated 
functionality. Papers came from a variety of countries including: the US (38 papers), the 
UK (nine papers), Canada (six papers), the Netherlands (five papers), Germany (three 
papers), Sweden (two papers), Denmark (two papers), Norway (two papers), France (one 
paper), Finland (one paper), Australia (one paper) and New Zealand (one paper).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, definitions of EHRs were many and varied.(17;37) 
Accordingly, a range of different technologies and capabilities of components was 
investigated in the studies in a variety of implementation settings. As outlined earlier, I 
used the term EHRs as an umbrella term for IT applications that help to facilitate data 
sharing between different healthcare settings and associated management and clinical 
functionalities. I used the term “implementation” to refer to the process from deciding to 
purchase a system through to its routine use, whilst acknowledging that in reality it is an 
ongoing process and never complete. Similarly, I conceptualised “adoption” as the 
process of using the technology, from initial trying out to more embedded use. 
 
Methods employed in original research papers providing an insight into implementation 
and adoption processes were mainly qualitative, drawing on data obtained through 
interviews, observations and documents. A few quantitative studies were also identified, 
and some original research drew on mixed methods (mainly qualitative in combination 
with surveys).  




Several studies attempted to devise models of impleentation including those based on 
critical success/risk factors (with an ingredients-to-success-type of approach) and 
temporal stages.(27;31;38;39) However, for the purposes of my study, the introduction 
of technology into healthcare seemed to be most appropriately viewed as a process 
where technological and social factors shape each other during the various stages of 
implementation.(27;40-42)  
 
Overall, studies indicated that between 50-70% of IT projects in healthcare were 
“unsuccessful” (or labelled as such).(35;38;43;44) These “failures” were due to a 
number of interrelated technical and social factors, which will be discussed in 
turn.(20;22;31;38;42;44-50) Of particular importance seemed to be the complex social 
consequences for users faced with new technologies in the organisation situated within a 
wider macro-environment.  
 
I developed a model (Figure 2.2) to illustrate the dimensions and factors identified in my 
literature review. It has to be kept in mind that some factors are interrelated and may fit 
under two or more dimensions. Also, the complexity of the process and variations in 
context mean that the factors identified are not prescriptive for implementation 
“success”. 
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Figure 2.2: Dimensions and factors identified in the literature review 
 
Note: A graphical representation of the socio-cultural factors surrounding the implementation and 
adoption of EHRs identified in the literature review. Factors included in the overall dimensions are 
summarised at the bottom of the Figure. 
 
I will now discuss these dimensions in more detail, based on the findings from my 
literature review. In doing so, I will begin with the micro-environment (i.e. the 
technology and the user), before moving to the organisational and wider macro-
environment. 
2.3.1 Technical dimension (the technology…) 
Factors under the technical dimension relate to the design of the technology itself, which 
can play an important part in influencing adoption behaviour of users, as technical issues 
can lead to significant levels of frustration.(35;51) Equally, user satisfaction and 
adoption can also be positively influenced by a well-functioning technology.(16;25;52) 
The way humans and technology interact is commonly referred to as ergonomics or 










Local context of implementation 
¹Includes usability, performance and integration, adaptability and flexibility, cost 
² Includes attitudes, motivations, resistance and expectations, engagement and user input in design, trai ing and support, 
champions, integration with existing work practices 
³ Includes getting the organisation ready for change, planning, leadership and management, teamwork and communication, 
learning and evaluation, realistic expectations 
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human factors. The most important aspects in relation to EHRs in th s respect include 
usability, performance and integration, and flexibility and adaptability. I also included a 
small section on cost, which is a related factor.  
2.3.1.1 Usability 
Usability problems can be significant barriers to the implementation of IT in healthcare, 
as systems that are difficult to use are often reject d by users.(27;29;32;35;44;53) 
Conversely, if a system is perceived to be user-frindly and easy to learn it is likely to be 
adopted more readily than one that is perceived as difficult to browse and learn.(28;42)  
 
Usability issues are commonly conceptualised to be du  to a poor alignment between 
work practices of users and software specifications.(16;54;55) This can result in 
‘workarounds’ (see Glossary) and potentially adverse effects on patient safety.(52) For 
example, the increased availability of large volumes of data in electronic systems may 
mean that the record is difficult to browse for users.(52;56) Similarly, interfaces in EHR 
applications may require a large number of clicks for users to navigate them, which can 
significantly slow down work.(19;29;40;44;57;58) The difficulty for designers therefore 
lies in balancing the complexity of information need d for day-to-day healthcare 
activities whilst retaining a certain amount of interface simplicity to make the system 
usable.(30;52;54) In doing so they also need to bring together the often large amount of 
information required by healthcare staff in a limited amount of screen space.(31;52)  
 
Software and hardware usability can be improved by making the design as intuitive as 
possible.(27;47;59-61) This can, for example, be achieved through the increased use of 
graphics or “visual hierarchies”, but also through standardised symbols, alerts and 
reminders.(52;62) Testing and developing systems with users to identify issues have also 
been recommended to improve usability and avoid frustration.(52;63) More specifically, 
the basic design of an EHR should provide an overview (which means finding quickly 
what one is looking for), have a predictable structure (e.g. through use of headings, 
consistent buttons, tables and graphs) and be clinica ly relevant.(19) Conversely, barriers 
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to adoption in terms of usability include non-intuitive data entry, hardware design (e.g. 
lack of portability), time required for maintenance (e.g. repair), and the lack of some 
features desired by users.(64) 
2.3.1.2 Performance and integration 
Frequently, EHR users and managers need to rely on developers to tell them how the 
system should perform and what it can and cannot do in line with technical 
specifications.(53) As the introduction of technology in the healthcare sector is still a 
relatively new development, systems can, however, be immature and fail to meet certain 
standards.(44;51) When considering the necessary integration of systems into the 
complex and fast-moving nature of clinical work, there is a real danger that users can be 
frustrated and unhappy. 
 
In this context, the literature highlights that it is important that using the application does 
not take significantly longer than the system that w s previously operational (whether 
this was paper or electronic). Slow speed of system, and an associated perceived 
decline in human performance, has frequently been found to be a barrier to 
adoption.(22;28-31;40;42;44;45;52;55;58;62;64-68) System stability in particular can 
contribute to slow speed.(22;51) However, it is also important to keep in mind that an 
initial slowing down in work practices initially needs to be expected. This should ideally 
ease off as users get used to the new system and become more proficient in using 
it.(69;70)  
 
Any new technology should also integrate relatively asily with existing IT systems, 
which can be facilitated by developing standards for 
interfacing.(15;17;22;27;29;45;47;48;56;61;64;71;72) Problems with systems integration 
can slow down clinical work and result in user frust ation.(31;32;40;44;49;63;69;70) 
However, the literature indicates that there is an o going tension between 
standardisation to allow interfacing and keeping systems flexible enough to fit in with 
the complex work practices of users.(17;19;53;58)  
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2.3.1.3 Adaptability and flexibility 
As designers often lack insight into clinical practice and the day-to-day reality of 
delivering care, adaptability and flexibility to tailor systems to the context of use is 
considered important.(73) Whilst lack of systems flexibility to fit in with the nature of 
clinical responsibilities and local needs can be a barrier to adoption,(22;49;55;74) the 
opportunity for adaptation can facilitate adoption and user 
acceptance.(25;40;45;52;63;71) These factors are also important when considering that 
many systems are developed internationally. For example, Aarts and colleagues describe 
an in-depth qualitative study of a CPOE implementation in a Dutch hospital.(40) Here, 
the purchased US system needed to be (and was) adapted to the Dutch context through 
translation of terms and specification of different clinical pathways (see Glossary).  
 
However, as with systems integration mentioned above, this need for adaptability and 
flexibility needs to be balanced with standardisation and interoperability, especially in 
relation to large-scale systems.(28;75) 
2.3.1.4 Cost 
Several studies indicate that the cost of systems and the associated implementation 
process can prevent organisations from embarking on IT projects.(19;25;28;30-
32;44;47;53;59;63;67;70;74;76-78) This is particularly pertinent when considering the 
current economic climate.(79) Specific issues here include the high initial investment 
cost of systems, ongoing costs (e.g. for training ad maintenance) and a lack of 
quantifiable returns from these investments.(25;45;47;49;78) More specifically, there is 
currently no business case (see Glossary for definition) for EHR implementation and its 
cost effectiveness is based on estimation in the long term.(53) 
2.3.2 Social/human dimension (those that interact w ith the 
technology…) 
As outlined above, tailoring of systems to the context in which they are used is viewed 
as important and this can be facilitated by involving users in design and implementation 
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activities.(56;80) These considerations go beyond a sole focus on technical features to a 
recognition of the role of social factors surrounding technology implementation and 
adoption.(73)  
 
Users of EHRs may include clinical staff such as doctors and nurses (who are often the 
focus of studies reported in the literature) and also administrative staff and allied 
healthcare professionals. Different staff groups may be expected to use similar 
technology but their work practices, patterns of communication, backgrounds, place in 
the hierarchy and resulting needs are likely to vary.(27;46;55;56)  
 
The following paragraphs will explore the role of the user in EHR implementation in 
more detail. Areas of particular importance here ar ttitudes and expectations, user 
involvement in decision making and design, training and support, the role of key 
individuals, and integration of the system into existing work practices. 
2.3.2.1 Attitudes, motivations, resistance and expectations 
The literature indicates that EHR implementations can be characterised by a lack of user 
acceptance and satisfaction resulting in resistance using the 
system.(19;28;30;31;38;41;42;44;47;49;52;60;62;69-71;74;81) High levels of resistance 
among clinical users in particular can threaten imple entation as they typically have a 
high degree of professional autonomy.(22;31) 
 
Here, attitudes and expectations were found to play an important role, with users tending 
to have pre-conceived ideas about software and hardware capabilities, potential benefits 
of the technology, and its influences on work practices.(55) If, however, the product 
delivered and expectations do not align, this can result in negative attitudes and 
resistance using the new technology.(44;55;63) Attitudes to technology can be 
influenced by demographic and individual factors such as level of experience with 
technology, salary status, personal values and norms.(42;56;60;74;77) Negative attitudes 
are often also exacerbated by previous negative expriences with technology and the 
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many examples of “failed” healthcare IT implementations reported in the 
literature.(28;30;31;44;53;70)  
 
However, the literature also shows that attitudes and expectations can be managed. In 
this context, it is important to communicate effectively the potential value of the new 
system, potential dis-benefits, and anticipated effects on work 
practices.(25;31;32;35;42;44;45;49;51;56;58;61;64;81) Conceptually separating 
organisational and individual benefits as well as gins from different aspects of the 
system can be helpful, as different benefits may be motivators for different groups of 
stakeholders.(28;56;61) For example, studies have shown that managers tend to view 
EHRs primarily as a means to facilitate organisational processes, whilst clinicians tend 
to view them as primarily facilitating clinical processes.(18) As a result, clinicians tend 
to be most concerned with usability issues, whilst management tends to focus on 
business process issues.(30) Mapping potential changes in processes for different 
stakeholder groups before and after implementation can help to anticipate problems and 
align perspectives, as well as plan for mitigating action.(71;80) 
 
Several studies have supported the notion that if desired benefits do not materialise and 
the system is perceived to be of limited value to users, resistance is more likely to 
occur.(40;62;65) Conversely, an identified individual need for the system can facilitate 
adoption,(61;70;80) but this needs to be characterised by an alignment of relative efforts 
and benefits for different stakeholder groups.(19) For example, Van Ginneken argues 
that, in relation to EHR implementation, users will only use the technology if the 
resulting benefits are motivation enough to invest efforts to learn the system.(19) In this 
context, it is important that the relationship of benefits and efforts is relatively balanced 
for all stakeholders. For example, benefits of the system are most obvious if clinicians 
are inputting structured data directly but they are oft n reluctant to do so as it tends to 
increase their workload and may not yield visible benefits in the patient encounter itself.  
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It is reported that motivations for using a new system therefore need to be identified and 
systematically targeted, whilst concerns and barriers to use need to be voiced, openly 
discussed and addressed as early as possible in order to facilitate user 
ownership.(20;23;25-27;42;47;50;56;61;63;65;66;71) This needs to involve outlining the 
benefits of using the system for different user groups.(27;56;66;82)  
 
Concerns most commonly voiced amongst healthcare stff in relation to EHRs, and the 
NHS CRS in particular, include those relating to confidentiality and 
security.(15;19;27;31;50;51;67;70;72;74;76-78) Other concerns about IT in healthcare 
settings were found to relate to a fear of increased workload; worries that faults in the 
system may lead to threats to patient safety; concerns over how the system will influence 
individual roles and responsibilities; concerns that it will become outdated relatively 
quickly; and concerns over how it will affect doctor-patient 
relationships.(19;31;35;42;47;49;53;55;61;69;70;76;7 )  
2.3.2.2 Engagement and user input in design 
As attitudes and a lack of motivation can lead to resistance, active user involvement at 
every stage of the design and implementation process is considered vital to increase 
ownership.(15-32) Here it is important that users do not feel that the system is imposed 
on them and that the decision to implement was made without their 
consultation.(20;45;47;58;59;63;65;82)  
 
Design of the system should to be tailored to individual needs and this can be achieved 
through close collaboration between system designers, management and end-
users.(21;24;28;29;42;47;50;51;54;56;60;62;69;71;75;76) If requests or feedback can 
not be incorporated, users need to be informed and reasons why need to be 
communicated in order to mitigate frustration.(23;29;56;63) The importance of 
involving end-users is illustrated in a study by Erdley and colleagues describing the 
development of a new information system in US prenatal care.(73) This was 
characterised by a lack of collaboration between design rs and nurses (the users), 
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resulting in a “technically correct but unwieldy application”. Dagroso and colleagues 
describe a more successful user engagement model relating to the implementation of an 
obstetrics system in US secondary care.(23) During the roll-out (see Glossary) problems 
with the design and functionality of the system were discovered. As a response to 
complaints from users, the implementation team (see Glossary) reviewed the 
performance of the system, heavily involving users in the process. A new improved 
system was launched tailored to the needs of users, which increased user acceptance. 
 
Despite an increasing recognition in the literature that senior clinical input in system 
design and implementation strategy is important, other users’ needs, including those of 
nursing and administrative staff, have been somewhat neglected.(16;48;54;83) It is, 
however, important that a system fulfils a variety of requirements. In this context, 
Johnson and Turley illustrate how the cognitive needs of clinicians vary.(57) Study 
participants were asked to examine different cases on the EHR and were instructed to 
think aloud. The authors found that nurses tended to view the patient in observational 
terms (e.g. in relation to monitoring and documenting changes), whilst clinicians tended 
to view the patient in causal terms (e.g. in relation o diagnosis and treatment).  
2.3.2.3 Training and support 
Once a decision to implement a certain system has been made and process mapping (see 
Glossary) has occurred, training and ongoing support for users is important as this can 
facilitate adoption and user 
acceptance.(21;22;24;28;29;32;42;45;47;50;51;53;55;56; 8;61;62;65-68;76;77;84) 
“Well-trained” users also tend to be more satisfied with a new system and if a system is 
perceived as being easy to learn it is likely to be more readily adopted.(42;69) 
Conversely, if training is not adequate this can decrease confidence and inhibit user 
acceptance.(35;70) Most studies included in my literature review concluded that, in 
hindsight, training efforts should have received more attention.(28;47;56;63) Therefore, 
it is of primary importance to allocate sufficient time and resources for training in 
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advance. This should also involve helping clinical users to free up time e.g. by reducing 
their workload.(19)  
 
The literature indicates that ideally, special attention should be paid to target ward 
managers, senior staff and local leaders with thorough training so that they can help to 
train other staff.(56;61;71) In one case study discus ing the introduction of a 
documentation system in a Canadian hospital, for example, some nurses were trained as 
“change managers” and acted as coaches in the initial period after go-live.(39) This 
involved providing support and collecting feedback from users, which was then 
incorporated in the design of the system. The authors c nclude that drawing on these key 
individuals was vital as they, as peers of the user group, understood existing work 
practices. However, it is also important to recognise that training by peers may have 
unintended consequences as it may involve learning to use a system from a certain 
perspective as opposed to the way intended by management.(56) 
 
A variety of training approaches can be used including web-based formats, classroom-
based formats, reading material and one-to-one training. Most studies indicate that 
training sessions with the possibility to try out a system and one-to-one training sessions 
tend to be most effective.(21;23;27;35;55;70) This can be done in the healthcare setting 
itself or through simulated user scenarios,(51;61;71;81) with users preferring training in 
settings close to their work due to busy schedules.(29;69)  
 
However, it is also important to acknowledge that not all training formats and contents 
are appropriate for all types of users. Training therefore needs to be tailored to existing 
levels of experience, skills, needs and emerging problems.(27;29;41;60;69;84) Here, the 
literature indicates that an initial assessment of current skills and contexts before training 
commences and associated tailoring can be helpful.(47;51;52;64;66)  
 
Training needs to begin well before a new system is implemented and continue when it 
is more established to allow any problems that arise to be dealt with effectively. This can 
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help users to gain increasing proficiency and to adapt to potential software 
changes.(20;24;27;29;39;51-53;56;69;71;72) Similarly, whilst extensive user support 
during initial go-live is most important,(20;47;66;84) ongoing help also needs to be 
available when needed after go-live.(21;47)  
2.3.2.4 Champions 
The value of key individuals in facilitating the adoption of IT systems in healthcare has 
repeatedly been highlighted. These may include IT and clinical leaders, local champions, 
respected peers, opinion leaders, so called “super users” and “boundary 
spanners”.(19;20;22;24;27;35;42;44;45;47;51;60;61;70-72;80;83;85) The role of these 
key individuals may involve winning over others, feeding back emerging problems, 
facilitating user engagement, and communicating the vision.(24;35;42) Conversely, if 
champions themselves either are or become negative, then this can compromise 
implementation and inhibit adoption of other users.(35;40;76)  
 
As organic spread of adoption has been found to be most effective, key individuals are 
ideally peers of the user group.(56) This is slighty complicated by the variety of user 
groups in the healthcare environment, and one may therefore need to consider involving 
departmental leaders from different specialties.(22;85) Range of influence of key 
individuals seems important in this context. For example, Sicotte and colleagues 
describe how the influence of some project champions can remain local, whilst others 
may have a wider range of influence across implementatio  sites.(31)  
2.3.2.5 Integration with existing work practices 
As alluded to above in relation to many other dimensio s identified in this review, it is 
important that the new system is effectively integrated with existing work practices and 
professional responsibilities.(16;17;22;29-31;44;47;48;52;53;56;70;80) The literature 
illustrates how IT systems can significantly change how users work in a variety of ways. 
For example, clinicians may report an increased focus on data entry activities, which 
may negatively affect their attitudes towards the system.(28;30;74)  




Effective integration can be facilitated by a thorough analysis of existing individual 
work practices before the system is introduced and a recognition that these vary across 
individuals and settings.(15;16;19;20;24;27;37;42;49;52;58;60;85) System designs need 
to be configured accordingly, so that they fit in with existing routines and roles of 
different users.(29;35;57) During this process, sufficient time and resources need to be 
allocated so that healthcare staff can modify existing practices and develop new 
routines.(28;29;56;63;85) 
 
Integration into work practices is a large area and depends heavily on the setting and the 
technology in question. One particularly interesting example is provided by Morrison 
and colleagues in relation to changes in collaborative working as a result of the 
introduction of an intensive care EHR.(86) Team interactions using a trolley with paper 
notes were compared to using EHR functionality on a trolley by the patient’s bedside. 
The authors report how group formation during the ward round changed with the 
introduction of the EHR. When using paper records the healthcare team was oriented 
towards the chart, whilst four months after the EHR was introduced the consultant was 
oriented towards the screen and staff who could not see the screen tended to “wander”. 
One year after EHR introduction, staff increasingly focused on the conversation between 
the consultant and the patient as opposed to the record. With paper records, the 
consultant pointed to items on the record during the consultation, whilst four months 
after the implementation the consultant used the mouse. However, this pointing could 
only be seen by staff who could see the screen. A year after the implementation the 
consultant stood further back from the screen so that the staff was better able to monitor 
his expressions. The authors also report changes in conversational patterns: before EHR 
introduction, conversations were initiated through either leaning forwards or through 
handling the record. Afterwards, conversations had to be initiated verbally, which 
resulted in a general decrease of communication between the healthcare team.  
Chapter 2: Literature review on EHR implementation and adoption 
 
 49 
2.3.3 Organisational dimension 
Individual users and technology can be conceptually placed in a wider organisational 
environment.(45) However, despite having some characte istics of a “conventional” 
organisation, healthcare differs from other industrie  mainly in relation to the complex, 
socio-political hierarchical structures within and between organisations.(22;40) Findings 
from other industries may therefore have limited applicability and a thorough 
examination of the healthcare context from an organisational perspective is clearly 
needed when examining EHR implementation.  
 
On a Trust or hospital level, organisations are likly to vary in attitudes and levels of 
support from management; existing and previous technology implementations; sizes, 
hierarchies and structures; local policies, resources and business cases; champions, 
infrastructures (see Glossary) and layouts.(28;30;32;41;42;46;66;74) Equally, on a 
departmental or professional level, variations can include different staff and patient 
groups, procedures, experiences, support, attitudes, leaders and resources.(32;46)  
 
The literature shows that of particular importance when considering EHR 
implementations from an organisational perspective are: preparing the organisation for 
change, planning, leadership and management, teamwork and communication, learning 
and evaluation, and realistic expectations. These will be discussed in turn. 
2.3.3.1 Getting the organisation ready for change 
Many studies have shown that when implementing an EHR, the organisation needs to be 
adequately prepared for the change to come.(25;32;38;42;77) An assessment of 
readiness should include mapping of the following areas, so that specific organisational 
aspects that need attention can be identified and addressed before the new system is 
introduced:(20;21;25-27;35;38-40;46;60;66) 
• existing IT systems and infrastructure 
• technology experiences and history of change projects 
• aims, motivations, attitudes and needs 
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• potential barriers and concerns 
• financial and staff resources.  
 
Getting the organisation ready for change should, however, not only involve a 
recognition of the current state of affairs in relation to the organisation and its 
environment.(35;39;66;85) It should also be characterised by attempts to establish an 
inner-organisational feeling that something needs to change to which the technology can 
be the solution. In this context, James and colleagu s state that the key to “success” was 
to identify a business need for the IT system so that stakeholders felt that they were 
“building a solution, not just implementing a system”.(85)  
 
If concerns arise in relation to any of the aspects outlined above, they need to be 
addressed before any implementation efforts are started. The literature shows that in 
particular allocated time and additional staffing resources are often under 
estimated.(15;21;25;31;35;39;44;51;85)  
 
It is of concern that in relation to NPfIT applications some of the points outlined above 
have remained unresolved. For example, Nikula uses the notion of “change exhaustion” 
to consider the volume of innovation and changes one rganisation or individual can 
cope with.(18) In line with this, interviews conducted by Hendy and colleagues, with 
secondary care managers and clinicians about barriers to implementing the NPfIT 
indicate that some Trusts are still “recovering” from merging, which may make staff 
more resistant to change.(26) Other concerns in relation to the NPfIT include Trusts 
fearing the loss of existing IT systems and the timelines allocated for implementing 
NPfIT applications.(26)  
2.3.3.2 Planning  
Effective strategy planning is not only essential when preparing for the change but also 
during IT implementation. Drawing on lessons learned from similar ventures can 
facilitate this process.(17;50;75;81;84;85;87) 




During the initial planning phase, considering how a new system will integrate with 
existing work practices, as well as potential issue surrounding data migration (see 
Glossary), data entry, interfacing and design is particularly 
important.(22;29;61;78;84;85) Implementation timelin s need to be specified 
accordingly, but these need to allow enough slack to accommodate unanticipated 
issues.(22;24;28;31;63) Similarly, organisations should allocate extra financial resources 
for unexpected expenses such as extra staff for additional training or for supporting the 
initial implementation period.(75) 
 
Strategic implementation approaches naturally depend on the setting and the system in 
question, but the literature indicates that they commonly take the form of either 
introducing functionalities incrementally with increasing capabilities, or simultaneously 
with a so-called “big bang”.(19;47;84;88) An incremntal or phased approach seems to 
be better suited for complex organisations and system  as staff may feel overwhelmed 
by too many changes at once.(19;21;28;32;40;47;50;63;71;85) As part of this approach, 
some have advocated the initial parallel use of paper and electronic 
systems.(22;56;63;71) Naturally, there may be tradeoffs. For example, using parallel 
systems does not allow for the maximum potential benefits of either system to be 
realised, and often results in increased workloads for users.(19;29;56) Similarly, a 
stepwise approach introducing change gradually can m ke the change process very 
extended, which may result in difficulties in keeping staff motivated.(19) 
 
Piloting (see Glossary) and testing of a system is commonly viewed as important in 
order to assess how the technology is likely to be int grated in organisational practices, 
if designs need to be revised, and to test implementatio  strategies.(22;31;38-40;50) A 
risk assessment and devising mitigation strategies before implementation can further 
help to plan for worst case scenarios.(22-24) However, the literature also shows that 
planning of the implementation process needs to be sufficiently flexible in order to cope 
effectively with unexpected situations such as technological glitches.(22;27;41;72)  
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2.3.3.3 Leadership and management 
IT implementation not only needs to be a priority for management and receive sufficient 
financial support,(28;31) but skilled leadership and clear management structures are also 
important in supporting IT introduction.(15;20-23;25 31;35;39;40;42;44;45;47;84) In 
this context, management needs to have clearly defined responsibilities, act in line with 
the overall business strategy of the organisation, have an holistic overview of the issues, 
an understanding of the risks to implementation and the potential consequences of the 
system, whilst still being flexible and responding to emerging 
issues.(15;25;30;31;35;42;82)  
 
As mentioned above, staff ownership can be promoted through involvement in decision 
making.(30;39;61) In doing so, management needs to be willing to receive and 
incorporate feedback as well as be transparent in relation to decision making.(30;75) The 
literature indicates that whilst “top-down” approaches imposing mandatory systems are 
unlikely to be effective as they tend to alienate staff, a degree of management leadership 
is needed to ensure that systems are used.(35;56;88)  
 
Leaders further need to share and communicate both short-term and long-term goals, 
including a shared 
vision.(20;22;25;27;28;30;31;35;42;50;56;61;63;65;70;72;75;81;82;85) The literature 
shows that here, goals are ideally framed in relation o differences between the current 
and the future state, outlining the process of how t  “get there” before beginning 
implementation.(21;25;41;85) However, it is also important that during this process, 
goals are adhered to without increasing the scope of the project, which can result in a 
loss of focus (this is commonly referred to as “scope creep”).(21;44)  
 
Local implementation teams commonly lead EHR implementations ensuring that both 
staff and management requirements are reflected in the strategy.(27) These teams need 
to have sufficient resources and should be selected carefully based on a range of skills 
complementing each other. The literature shows that such teams should ideally include 
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an experienced project manager, clinical champions representing users, and managerial 
as well as technical members.(15;24;27;28;31;39;41;51;84) Changes in membership, 
lack of defined roles, negative attitudes, lack of leadership and skills, as well as a lack of 
close working relationships with users can inhibit mplementation.(29;44) Despite the 
central role of the implementation team, it has repeatedly been highlighted that a certain 
degree of individual and departmental independence is important as individuals need to 
be given sufficient autonomy in decision making.(21;28;81)  
2.3.3.4 Teamwork and communication 
During EHR implementation, effective communication, teamwork, cooperation and trust 
between all stakeholders is important to ensure that e system is implemented 
effectively.(20;22;25;42;45;65;68;70;72;74;85) This requires a particularly close 
working relationship between users, IT staff and managers.(38;73;82) Effective 
communication with users can, as stated above, facilitate engagement and 
acceptance.(25;27;50;65;66;84;85) It may involve keeping staff abreast of current 
developments and progress as well as receiving feedback of experiences.(21;39;82) 
Formal mechanisms of communication can include posters, regular newsletters and 
internal reports, but these are often unidirectional (i.e. from management to 
staff).(21;81;82) Raising awareness of the imminent change before go-live should 
involve explaining why the new system is to be introduced, how the change will be 
managed, and openly inviting feedback.(39;69;81) 
 
Effective communication and close collaboration between organisational stakeholders 
(including users and the implementation team) and system suppliers is also important 
when considering EHR implementations.(19;21;23;27;35;47;51;61;63;70;73;75;85) The 
literature indicates that this should ideally involve suppliers working alongside 
organisational staff incorporating requested changes.(27) As these parties are often not 
used to working together, team building exercises can help to build relationships and 
open channels of communication.(21;22;66;73) The importance of effective 
communication with suppliers is further reinforced by studies indicating that the most 
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“successful” implementations tend to be those where systems have been extensively 
customised to local needs.(54;62)  
 
Overall, agreed terms of communication (such as robust contracts), alignment of 
different goals and objectives, and open two-way communication channels between 
different stakeholder groups can be helpful in avoiding misunderstandings during the 
implementation process.(27;31;45;63;82) In the context of EHRs, this also involves 
facilitating communication and partnerships between often very different organisations 
that may need to share electronic information (e.g. primary and secondary care, or 
different specialties).(31)  
2.3.3.5 Learning and evaluation 
The literature has repeatedly highlighted that formal evaluation is important for 
identifying benefits, for monitoring progress and for identifying areas for 
improvement.(15;19-21;24;29;32;35;38-40;45;50;68;72;75;80;82;89) Hence, it has been 
argued that around 10% of the total implementation budget should be allocated to 
evaluation activities.(75) However, the majority ofimplementations lack robust 
evaluation activities, which is probably due to a lck of expertise in this 
area.(24;35;76;89) 
 
During evaluation activities, many have argued thatchange is best conceptualised as a 
learning process with opportunities to adapt, as uninte ded consequences are always 
likely to emerge.(22;27;31;32;40;44;56;65;74) Formative evaluation efforts that assess 
the achievement of goals periodically throughout the implementation period are 
therefore particularly appropriate as they can help to identify and address problems as 
they emerge.(31;35;42;75;89) McGowan and colleagues outline how such formative 
evaluation may be conceptualised by drawing attention to the following three 
elements:(89) 
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• Technology: Including an assessment of system capabilities, system reliability, 
and suppliers. It should also involve comparison with expectations and 
organisational needs. 
• Organisational: Including an assessment of existing work practices and 
organisational readiness before the system is impleented. Any barriers 
identified should be addressed. 
• Cost: Comprising a local cost assessment including the initial investment as well 
as maintenance costs. Additional staff resources, training and ongoing support 
should also be considered.  
 
The literature indicates that EHR evaluation should ideally combine qualitative and 
quantitative methods.(42;75;85) Qualitative enquiry is best suited for gaining an insight 
into processes (e.g. individual work and organisational processes), whilst quantitative 
methods can help to assess cost implications and potential quantifiable system impacts 
(e.g. effects on clinical outcomes).  
 
Overall, there is still a need for more rigorous evaluation activities in relation to EHRs, 
and quantitative evidence in relation to returns on i vestments is still 
lacking.(17;30;74;76) Barriers include the difficulty of finding appropriate evaluation 
expertise and problems with measuring the contested notion of “success”.(17;34;75) For 
example, outcome measures are difficult to determine i  the complex healthcare 
environment and tend to vary with different IT systems as well as across settings.(75;82)  
2.3.3.6 Realistic expectations 
Realistic goals and setting interim milestones can facilitate implementation as opposed 
to extreme ambition.(27;39;61;63;71;84;85;87) The need for realistic expectations is 
most commonly expressed in relation to timelines, including the need to acknowledge 
that organisational change is often longer than envisaged.(32;39;71;75;81;85) Delays in 
implementation timelines can, for instance, occur as systems need to be adapted to work 
in the complex healthcare environment and as staff get used to new work practices. 
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Therefore, a certain degree of realism as opposed to xtreme ambitiousness can help to 
ensure that stakeholders remain positive and do not become disillusioned.(31) In relation 
to the NPfIT, however, many have questioned the ambitious implementation 
timelines.(25;26;35) Pagliari argues that it is in the very nature of complex IT 
programmes such as the NPfIT to take longer and cost m re than anticipated.(75)  
 
Similarly, visions behind EHR implementations need to be realistic and leaders should 
balance pursuing goals with flexibility, acknowledgin  that programmes do evolve and 
that strategies may need to be changed along the way.(38;45;75;80) For example, the 
complete elimination of paper records is likely to be unrealistic and it may take time 
before users fully utilise all functionalities of a new system.(51;56;61) Equally, 
organisational productivity may go down initially and benefits may take a long time to 
be realised.(20;23;30;47;53;61;75)  
2.3.4 Macro-environmental dimension 
The technical, human and organisational dimensions discussed above are situated in and 
influenced by a larger environment including a web of other healthcare organisations, 
industry stakeholders (e.g. system suppliers), the media, governmental bodies and 
associated policy, professional groups and the general economic 
landscape.(22;26;32;35;46;50;51;72;76) The literature shows how these associated 
factors can shape EHR implementations in important ways.  
 
In relation to large-scale EHR projects, political and economic factors seem to be 
particularly important and will be discussed in more detail below. In relation to the 
former, several authors have argued that the real benefits of EHRs can only be realised if 
systems allow sharing of information across healthcre organisations.(19;28;47) Due to 
the often fragmented nature of healthcare systems, some have argued that this may be 
best achieved by a national approach to implementatio  setting common interoperability 
standards.(25;49;50;67;71;72;80) As described in Chapter 1, such national approaches 
are now increasingly pursued, but this also means that hey are often politically-
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driven.(77) A danger with such approaches is that tey may result in resistance by users 
as they are likely to be perceived as imposed.(87)  
 
Economic considerations are also important when imple enting EHR systems as these 
are often expensive and benefits may not be directly visible. Incentives for use are 
therefore important for motivating both individual users and healthcare organisations to 
adopt and implement systems.(70;77;80) Most studies ref r to financial incentives in this 
context (both in relation to individual users and organisations),(19;47;50;53;67;72;74) 
but some also highlight the potential of demonstrating improvements in the quality of 
care.(27)  
2.3.5 The notion of fit 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, it is important to consider the interrelatedness 
of the dimensions discussed in my literature review. Ammenwerth and colleagues put 
forward the notion of “fit” in this context.(43) The assumption is that the better the 
alignment (or “fit”) of human, technological and work process factors, the higher user 
levels of adoption are likely to be.  
 
However, the notion of “fit” does not need to be rest icted to technological and human 
dimensions. Several other authors have drawn on the concept to explain their findings, 
arguing that models relying on identifying factors for “success” fail to pay attention to 
dynamics between individual dimensions and the way the affect each other.(40-42) For 
example, Aarts and colleagues explain a CPOE implementation in a Dutch hospital as 
being characterised by a lack of fit between technological and environmental 
factors.(40) Similarly, Yusof and colleagues propose an IT implementation model that 
emphasises the importance of the alignment of human, organisational and technical 
factors.(42)  
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2.3.6 Methodological considerations 
Overall, my literature review indicated that evaluations of EHR implementations 
reported in the literature have in the main been quantitative, focusing on improvements 
(or lack thereof) in the quality, safety, and efficiency of care. However, such 
investigations are often based on largely unquestioned assumptions of the effectiveness 
of technology (e.g. that systems do improve efficien y and quality of care). They also 
fail to account for different periods of change and transformations over time, often 
coupled with continuous efforts to keep technology “working” as needs change.(3;66) 
For example, an implementation initially labelled as “unsuccessful” may in fact be 
labelled “successful” at a later point in time and different stakeholders may use different 
criteria of “success”.  
 
Qualitative studies can take these complexities into account. They are particularly well-
suited to study the complex implementation and adoption processes paying attention to 
the range of dimensions in which technology is situated (i.e. social, organisational and 
macro-environmental dimensions) without neglecting local contingencies.(90-92) 
However, in relation to investigating EHR implementation and adoption, qualitative 
methods have so far mostly been used as “add-ons” t quantitative investigations or for 
retrospectively explaining results of such studies. A  a result, many qualitative papers 
identified in my literature review lacked rigour.(17; 9-21;25;48;49;53-
55;59;62;65;67;70-72;76;78;80;83;84;89) They were also mainly based on reflections 
after a judgment on “success” or “failure” of the implementation had already been 
made.(23;24;38;39;51;61;63;68;73;75;81;82;85;87;88) This may be due to a lack of 
funding for qualitative evaluation activities with quantitative evidence of effectiveness 
taking priority over relatively time- and resource-intensive qualitative investigations. 
 
Nevertheless, some studies included in my review have consisted of original research 
employing qualitative methods.(15;16;18;22;26;28-32;35;37;40-
43;46;50;56;57;60;66;77;86;93;94) These studies tended to be conceptualised as case 
studies permitting a detailed insight into the variety of local processes at play. However, 
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many lacked a longitudinal dimension, resulting in a failure to provide insights in 
relation to developments over time. An exception was the work by Morrison and 
colleagues,(86) who gathered data at three different time points throughout the 
implementation of an EHR (one month prior to deployment, four months after 
deployment, and one year after deployment). Another valuable aspect of this study was 
that the researchers attempted to interview the same interviewees repeatedly, helping to 
trace changing attitudes over time.  
 
Another important component of good quality studies of the implementation process is 
formative evaluation, where emerging findings are fed back to inform implementation 
efforts in real time in order to identify and address any emerging problems as early as 
possible. An example of this is given by Rose and colleagues,(52) who used their 
qualitative findings to inform implementation strategy and EHR design through a 
combination of task analysis and focus groups with users. Similarly, Greenhalgh and 
colleagues,(35) conducted a qualitative evaluation informing systems implementation. 
Although this particular study had no explicit longitudinal element at the time it was 
conducted, a follow up study traced changes over time.(95) The authors conducted a 
combination of interviews and observations of stakeholders at four SCR Early Adopter 
(EA) sites (i.e. the first sites nationally to introduce this new system, see Glossary for 
more details). As a result of the findings, they recommend changes to the national 
consent model at the time, advocating a move from “i plied consent” where patient 
consent to view the record was implicitly assumed, to “consent to view” where patients 
were asked for permission every time their record was accessed.  
 
Triangulating data from different sources is important in order to confirm the validity of 
emerging findings. The main data collection strategy in studies identified were 
interviews, but some studies also drew on documents, ob ervations, meeting notes and 
video recordings. Greenhalgh and colleagues offer a good example of gathering data 
from a variety of sources including questionnaires, monitoring statistics, field notes, 
documents, interviews, and informal stories.(35) Here quantitative data were also 
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gathered and proved valuable in providing context to aid the interpretation of qualitative 
findings. 
 
Lastly, studies identified had a tendency to concentrate on one group of stakeholders 
(mainly either implementation teams or users) whilst neglecting the connections 
between the two. As mentioned previously, the impleentation of eHealth technologies 
is, however, often best conceptualised as a process where various stakeholders need to 
work together to re-organise the way they work, particularly in relation to major 
transformative IT innovations. This is evident in a ational implementation (such as the 
NPfIT), where the focus of enquiry should not only include the immediate environment 
(i.e. the technology, implementation team and users) but also the organisational and 
macro-environment (e.g. political and economic).  
 
I have summarised my critical appraisal of each included paper in detail in Appendix 2. 
Overall, the majority of studies were from the US, which may mean a lack of 
transferability to the English context due to the different healthcare system and socio-
political context. However, findings may to some extent be applicable as the focus was 
often on single implementations (i.e. the micro-context). Most included studies 
retrospectively reported on lessons learned from single small-scale EHR 
implementations. They also lacked clarity, rigorous methods, and consisted of discussion 
rather than empirical papers.  
2.4 Chapter summary 
In summary, the literature indicates that a variety of technological and social (including 
organisational and macro-environmental) factors need to be taken into account when 
considering EHR implementation and adoption. These factors are both interrelated and 
context dependent, somewhat complicating the conclusions that can be drawn. Even if 
all factors are adequately attended to, this does nt necessarily guarantee implementation 
“success” as local contingencies vary.(40)  
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Nevertheless, my literature review has also shown that social dimensions relating to the 
immediate use of the technology (and particularly user attitudes and integration into 
work practices) are often at the heart of problems encountered when attempting to 
implement complex technological systems, due to the oft n significant changes to 
established practices that are required. Factors relating to the immediate use of the 
technology also tend to permeate other dimensions identified as important.  
 
Problems may be particularly exacerbated in a natiol implementation context such as 
the English venture if systems are viewed as imposed by users and as having limited 
customisability due to the focus on large-scale interoperability. Investigating the 
adoption and integration of Lorenzo is of particular interest as, in theory, the approach of 
“co-creating” the system in collaboration with the NHS should help to address these 
problems. 
 
The focus of my study was therefore exploring the views and experiences of users and 
the consequences of Lorenzo for their work practices. As the process of implementation 
and adoption was placed within a complex web of other social factors (including 
organisational and macro-environmental), adoption issues were investigated in the wider 
setting, trying to disentangle the ways in which different factors were intertwined and 
influenced adoption behaviours locally. In order to c nceptualise this complex 
environment as well as the interrelatedness of technical and social dimensions, I viewed, 
in line with the literature, the implementation of Lorenzo as a process in which 
implementation and adoption unfold over time.  
 
The qualitative methods employed, which are described in Chapter 5, reflect this 
explorative nature of my study. In doing so, I built on the strengths of a range of studies 
identified in this literature review, incorporating a longitudinal real-time element and 
employing a range of data collection methods for purposes of triangulation. My detailed 
aims and objectives will be outlined in the subsequent chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Aims, objectives and research questions 
3.1 Introduction 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, there are many potential avenues to explore when 
considering large-scale EHR implementations, althoug  the central theme of interrelated 
social and technical factors pervades all of these. Within the context of the Lorenzo 
implementation, some of the factors surrounding the technology clearly stood out from 
the literature review and were therefore the focus of my study. These include the 
immediate environment in which the technology was used and integrated within user 
work practices (the micro-environment), the way the technology was introduced within 
the organisation (the meso-environment) and the natio l implementation strategy in 
which these developments were situated (the macro-environment).  
 
As the first two chapters have outlined, Lorenzo presents inherent tensions at all levels. 
On one hand, the implementation strategy of nationally procured systems meant limited 
user input into design, whilst on the other hand, the way the system was intended to be 
built from scratch provided a potential opportunity to increase user input and thereby 
facilitate the integration of the system within user work practices. Keeping these 
considerations in mind and my overall focus on exploring process issues as outlined in 
the previous chapter, my aims, objectives and reseach questions are outlined in the 
paragraphs below. 
3.2 Overall aim 
The overall aim of the research was to explore the views and experiences of users as 
well as organisational consequences of introducing Lorenzo and how these evolved over 
time in the complex environment of a national EHR implementation. 
3.3 Objectives 
The detailed objectives of my study were to: 
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• Explore the attitudes and early experiences of NHS staff implementing and 
using Lorenzo software as part of the national EHR implementation over time. 
• Explore how technological and social factors (individual, organisational and 
macro-environmental) shaped each other over time. 
• Identify  mechanisms by which different organisational and macro-
environmental factors shaped the implementation and adoption of Lorenzo over 
time.  
• Theorise about how the integration of the software could be facilitated and 
derive potentially transferable findings to other sttings. 
3.4 Chapter summary 
Having outlined my aims and objectives, I will now move on to delineate implications 
for the theoretical and methodological framework in answering these questions. Keeping 
in mind the importance of appreciating the interrelat dness of social and technical 
factors, and the complexities involved in investigating social processes on different 
levels (including micro-, meso- (i.e. organisational), nd macro-levels), I will draw on a 
range of selected theoretical and methodological approaches. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a range of interrelated technical and social dimensions on a 
variety of levels need to be considered when investigating the process of technology 
implementation and adoption in healthcare. My focus was therefore on exploring the 
complex interrelationship between social and technical factors, beginning in the micro-
environment (see Figure 2.2). Here, I was particularly interested in the views and 
experiences of users as well as organisational consequences of introducing Lorenzo and 
how these evolved over time in the complex environme t of a national EHR 
implementation.  
 
This chapter will outline the theoretical and methodol gical underpinnings of my 
research. As my focus was on exploring unfolding processes from the perspectives of 
organisational stakeholders on the ground, I will first outline how I approached my study 
from an interpretative angle drawing on hermeneutic principles. I will then, in 
attempting to anchor my study theoretically, move on t  describe how I used Actor-
Network Theory (ANT), an increasingly influential, but still deeply contested, approach 
to understand humans and their interactions with tec nology. As ANT did not fulfil all 
my requirements, I looked widely to identify other theoretical lenses and practical 
approaches that had the potential to address gaps identif ed in relation to ANT. These 
were many, often looking at either macro- or more specific social and technical 
processes and from various disciplinary backgrounds. I therefore drew on a range of 
theories to obtain a holistic picture of the implementation landscape, including micro- 
and macro-developments. 
 
I will explore how integrating ANT with these other theoretical lenses can usefully 
inform the design of investigations focusing on the implementation of EHR systems into 
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healthcare settings. In doing so, I will argue that it is necessary that efforts are informed 
by guidance on how to use conceptual considerations n practice. I suggest that 
combining a case study-based approach informed by multi-sited ethnography and 
drawing on ANT offers a method for a theoretically-informed, yet practically applicable 
approach to such research. 
4.2 Ontological considerations and epistemological approach 
Blakie defines ontology as “claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social 
enquiry makes about the nature of social reality” and epistemology as “assumptions 
about knowledge and how it can be obtained” (here, the sociological approach).(96)  
 
Ontological and epistemological views of the researche  influence how data is collected, 
analysed and translated into theory. Throughout my study I therefore attempted to be as 
explicit as possible about my assumptions and methodology (also see Sections 4.3.5 and 
5.5 where I elaborate on my assumptions in more detail). In terms of ontology, I viewed 
participants as knowledgeable whose knowledge could be accessed with the 
methodology employed, and interpreted by me. I assumed that reality exists in the minds 
of individuals and by investigating their perceptions I attempted to gain an insight into 
their subjective realities. 
 
As I was trying to understand participants’ views, I approached data collection and 
analysis with an interpretivist angle informed by hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is an 
epistemological approach that is concerned with theint rpretation of texts and 
language.(96) Texts are viewed as “records made of social life” and hermeneutics 
involves “the application of approaches that have been established to interpret 
them”.(96) The underlying assumption is that the whole of a phenomenon (i.e. the 
subject of investigation such as the implementation of Lorenzo) can be understood by 
examining its parts (e.g. the way it is integrated with user work practices). Hermeneutics 
involves the researcher continuously moving from this “whole” to the “parts”, trying to 
understand these and then refer back to the “whole” to achieve true 
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understanding.(97;98) This activity is characterised by understanding and explanation, 
involving attempts to disentangle how parts of a phenomenon contribute to the 
“whole”.(97) It may involve engaging with a text (this may be an interview), thinking 
how it fits in with the overall context and then re-engaging with it with the wider context 
in mind. This seemed particularly pertinent when cosidering the complex contextual 
circumstances in which Lorenzo was implemented as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
However, I not only focused on the texts themselves, but also on intended meanings of 
these texts. Interpretivism helped me to achieve this. This is because an interpretivist 
approach assumes that people constantly make sense of their worlds by attributing 
meanings to experiences. The researcher therefore needs to understand and interpret 
these meanings in order to make sense of why people behave in a certain way.(96) It is 
assumed that subjective meanings are often hidden but can be expressed and accessed 
through language which can be shared between individuals.(99) Again, this approach 
was particularly well-suited to my study as my literature review (Chapter 2) indicated 
that subjective experiences of various stakeholders can play an important part in shaping 
the process of EHR implementation (e.g. in relation o attitudes and work practices). 
 
Overall, interpretivist and hermeneutic approaches fit well with the in-depth qualitative 
exploration of stakeholder attitudes and experiences in adopting new 
technology.(97;98;100) Drawing on these perspectives allowed me to explore views and 
experiences of users faced with new technology, whilst paying close attention to the 
organisational context (including potential organistional consequences) and the macro-
environmental circumstances (i.e. the national “top-d wn” EHR implementation). 
Verbal and observational data were collected and interpreted by me on the basis of my 
understanding of the world, trying to disentangle th  complex and interrelated social and 
technical processes involved. 
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4.3 Theoretical underpinnings and practical implica tions 
Due to the complexity of the environment as well as the constantly evolving nature of 
processes, studying IT in healthcare is in many ways like trying to “hit a moving target”. 
It requires different social theories to those thatexisted before. On the one hand, there is 
the need to simplify reality, but the flip-side of this is that this simplification should not 
mask the fine nuances that characterise this complexity.(101) Law and Mol argue that 
researchers need to acknowledge this challenge, whilst paying attention to multiple 
possible scenarios. The aim is to try to find out how these different scenarios and 
associated viewpoints are related, which is in turn assumed to lead to insights into 
aspects of the complex picture one is studying. 
 
Several specific approaches have been developed to study humans and their interaction 
with technology in organisations. One of the most commonly cited perspectives – 
because it pays close attention to complexity – is the sociotechnical systems perspective. 
A sociotechnical system can be described as a system (e.g. an organisation such as the 
NHS) where technical dimensions (e.g. a specific IT system) and social dimensions (e.g. 
attitudes and relationships of stakeholders) are int rrelated. The extent to which these 
shape, fit and complement each other is believed to be important in determining how the 
overall system (or organisation) functions.(102;103) Central to this is the notion of 
“organising”.(104) It includes the assumption that a complex system is characterised by 
a constant process of change, in which related structures re-order themselves 
continuously.(105) In this context, an organisation is conceptualised as an accumulation 
of events and actions by different actors, taking the focus away from an organisation as a 
structure towards an organisation as a process. 
4.3.1 A very brief introduction to Actor-Network Th eory (ANT) 
ANT draws on the sociotechnical systems perspective, but its unique feature is its focus 
on inanimate entities (these can be technologies) and their effects on social processes. 
An actor is thus defined as the “source of an action regardless of its status as a human or 
non-human”. This is a radical notion in that it assert  that inanimate things (e.g. such as 
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technology) can also have agency.(106-109) An actor an however only act in 
combination with other actors and in constellations that give the possibility for action. 
Here, reality is assumed to be actively performed by various assemblages of actors in a 
particular time and place.(101;108;110;111) Inherent to ANT is therefore a move away 
from the idea that technology impacts on humans as an external force, to the view that 
technology has the potential to shape social interac ions.(109)  
 
ANT has its own ontological and epistemological positi n, in essence considering the 
world as consisting of networks.(112) These networks can include humans, things, ideas, 
concepts – all of which are referred to as “actors”. ANT assumes that the sum of non-
social phenomena can account for something that is social as a result of constellations of 
human and non-human actors constituting the network. It follows then that ANT is 
agnostic with respect to a debate which has divided many sociologists - it neither asserts 
that everything is socially constructed (social constructionism) nor that everything is 
pre-existent (realism).(111)  
 
Tracing of associations or relationships between network components (or actors) is a key 
activity in ANT.(113) The central aim is to investigate and theorise about how networks 
come into being, to trace what associations exist, how they change, how parts of a 
network form a whole network, and how networks achieve temporary stability (or 
conversely why some networks are unstable).(108;114;1 5) The aim is to gain detailed 
insights into how social effects such as power come into being.(115;116) This is vividly 
illustrated by a parable offered by Law who describes how objects such as a big office, a 
computer and a phone can serve to create the manager i  an organisation as the source of 
power.(117) The manager studied in isolation (as a person or “naked ape” as Law calls 
him i.e. without objects), as opposed to as part of a network, is viewed as relatively 
powerless.  
 
ANT assumes that if any actor, irrespective of its po ition, is removed from or added to 
a network, as is the case if technology is introduce  into an organisation, then the 
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functioning of the whole network may be affected.(103;108) However, networks are 
constantly evolving as social reality is assumed to be both complex and fluid.(118) The 
composition of networks tends to become particularly pparent when things in a system 
go wrong, whilst these inter-connections tend to be hidden when things are working 
smoothly.(109;112;116)  
 
Intermediaries and mediators can form connections or relationships between 
actors.(113;119;120) The difference between the two is that the outputs of 
intermediaries can be easily predicted on the basis of their inputs (a black box). In 
mathematical terms, the assumption here is that X directly causes Y, which would look 
like this: 
. 
Mediators, on the other hand, transform inputs intounpredictable outputs. This means 
that they can also transform actions, making something appen that is not necessarily 
related to what set it into motion.(116) In mathematical terms, the effect of X on Y is in 
this case influenced by some other variable (in this case Z):  
 
 
ANT assumes that the social world consists of many mediators, which tend to be the 
focus of analysis as they affect social outcomes in often unpredictable ways, and very 
few intermediaries.(115) 
 
Since ANT’s conception in the 1980s, Latour, Callon and Law have remained the most 
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criticisms, particularly relating to ANT’s radical ontological assumptions.(115;116) 
Challenging criticisms and intellectual exchanges have led to some evolution of the 
ways in which ANT is formulated,(118) but it essentially remains a “networky” view of 
the world in which objects can have an important role in shaping social 
relations.(115;116) 
4.3.2 How can ANT inform the study of IT implementa tions in 
healthcare settings? 
The ANT approach has practical relevance for investigating the introduction of IT 
systems in healthcare settings. For example, it can be used as a tool for sampling by 
helping to select relevant informants related to the technology in question. Similarly, it 
can serve as a roadmap, a way of expressing in simple terms (network terms) the 
complexity of what is “out there”, and as a way of making sense of social reality by 
investigating its constituent parts. 
 
Nevertheless, purist ANT studies (i.e. those that adhere to the strict and original 
principles of ANT without modification) remain uncommon and, even when used, the 
subject of considerable debate.(108;119;120) A casefor such “authentic” ANT studies 
(i.e. those that adhere to the strict epistemological and ontological principles of ANT 
without modification) continues to be made,(121) but I believe that such approaches are 
unlikely to be the most helpful way to study the introduction of technology in complex 
healthcare settings. I will outline my underlying ar ument substantiating this assertion in 
the paragraphs below. In doing so, I examine the value of the pragmatic application of 
the approach by drawing on existing studies using ANT to study technology 
implementation in healthcare settings.(106;109;119;22-128)  
 
A summary of valuable contributions of the ANT approach in studying EHR 
implementation and adoption, as well as potential implications for my study, is given in 
Table 4.1. The most pertinent issues are discussed in more detail in the following 
sections. 
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Table 4.1: Potentially valuable contributions of the ANT approach in studying 
EHR implementation and adoption 
Key notion Valuable contributions 
of this notion 
Implications for my 
study  
How my research 
would look if it 
was not informed 
by ANT 
Translations Detailed insight into the 
complexity of different 
forces at play when 
artefacts are introduced 
in a new context 
Insight into how 
software (designed by 
computer scientists) is 
integrated into the 
healthcare 
environment 
Might be tempted 
to neglect the 
design context and 
examine the 
adoption context in 
isolation 
Active role of 
objects 
How objects can 
actively transform 
established practices by 
influencing the way 
human actors are 
associated 
The software is 
viewed as actively 
transforming the way 
care is delivered 
rather than being a 
relatively passive 
piece of equipment 
Software may be 
viewed as passive, 







As a conceptual tool to 
guide the research 
process, frame the 
research questions, 
collect and interpret data 
and theorise about 
potential explanations  




associated with it, 
notion of networks 
can help to 
conceptualise 
connections and the 




may result in an a-
theoretical 
approach 
Chapter 4: Theoretical and methodological underpinnings 
 
 72 





Can help investigators to 
resist imposing a-priori 
differences between 
actors (e.g. human and 
non-human) 
Helps to recognise 
that objects can 
actively create 
unpredictable outputs  
Prior assumptions 
of dualism between 
humans and objects 
may distort data 
collection and 
analysis 
Enrolment Can help to explore how 
different 
stakeholders/actors are 
enrolled into a network 
and how relationships 
are formed over time 
Helps to map out 
interests of different 
stakeholders and how 
the most powerful 
(e.g. managers) try to 
enrol others (e.g. users 
in adopting the 
technology) 




Flux of reality 
and 
multiplicities  
Exploring how complex 
relationships between 
actors and effects come 
about through 
movements in the 
network (e.g. power 
relationships, social 
effects)  
Helps to conceptualise 
how change is a 
process and context 
dependent  
A rigid view of 






4.3.2.1 Fluidity of reality 
Conceptually, the ANT approach can be valuable in helping researchers to appreciate the 
complexity and fluidity of reality, which may be negl cted by assuming a more linear 
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and causal approach to studying IT implementations.(110;118;129) As a result, ANT 
helps to conceptualise how different realities are experienced and enacted by different 
actors, resulting in a nuanced picture of the dynamic relationships between actors 
without neglecting their interrelatedness. This is important when considering the fast-
moving and ever-changing area of healthcare itself, and particularly so in relation to 
government-led change initiatives and resulting changes in power relationships. 
 
Several authors have illustrated how ANT can be a useful tool for exploring changing 
power relationships in relation to both healthcare reforms and IT introduction.(115) For 
example, Lowe drew on ANT to explore changes resulting from a health reform in New 
Zealand.(130) Here, the organisation, in itself a network, was assumed to be situated in a 
larger network of politics and other organisations. Managers were enrolled and 
empowered by the government to achieve the aims of the reform. These managers, in 
turn, had to enrol individual groups within the organisation. The author describes how 
government policies focusing on quantification, emerging from concerns about 
inefficiencies in the health service, resulted in changes in the position of different groups 
in healthcare organisations over time (e.g. from doctors assuming dominant positions to 
an increasing influence of nurses).  
 
Lowe’s example refers to studying networks and shifting power relationships from a 
macro-perspective. However, networks can also be studied from a micro-perspective. 
This may be done longitudinally by comparing how different constellations of actors 
change over time. It is important that these changes in the network are investigated and 
documented as they can help to inform future implementations by giving an indication 
of where to focus efforts and which temporary effects can be expected to attenuate over 
time. For example, during early adoption of a particular technology, certain problems 
may be short-lived and ease off with increased use.  
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4.3.2.2 The active role of objects 
The ANT approach can also help to guard against simplistic assumptions in relation to 
the role of objects in shaping social realities. They are no longer viewed as passive 
“black-box” containers of information, but as playing an active role that is determined 
by their position in the ever-changing network. Therefore, another essential value of 
ANT lies in challenging assumptions of separation between material and human 
worlds.(116;131;132) This conceptualisation provides a good tool for investigating 
complex relationships between human and non-human actors in which boundaries in 
relationships are blurred.(115) 
 
One of the most prominent writers illustrating this active role of objects in healthcare 
settings is Berg, who investigated the position of the medical record in mediating social 
relationships between healthcare staff.(133) He describes how the record structures 
medical work through the processes of reading and writing, how it coordinates care 
across professional boundaries, and also how it contributes to sustaining power 
relationships between human actors. These analyses provide a helpful insight into the 
complexity of different forces at play, illustrating how artefacts can transform care by 
influencing relationships between human actors.  
4.3.2.3 Acknowledging multiple realities 
ANT’s focus on fluidity also means acknowledging that multiple realities can coexist, 
with reality being actively performed in different contexts and by different actors.(110) 
Social effects are assumed to emerge from these multiplicities. It follows that things (or 
actors, or tools) are what they are depending on the context in which they are embedded. 
This means that they can also be multiple, but these multiples are in some way related 
and can overlap.(110)  
 
Inherent to the notion of multiplicities is that these can be conceptualised in multiple 
ways and that they are, as a result, difficult to study. I consider below some ways to 
approach this in relation to different attributes, roles and perspectives of actors.  




Firstly, the notion of multiplicities helps to deal with different attributes of both human 
and non-human actors. This is an oft-cited criticism of the ANT approach: i.e. that it 
fails to take into account human intentions, interests of different groups, morals, 
learning, backgrounds, routines, culture and previous experiences of human 
actors;(111;115;116;131;134) and inherent attributes of objects (e.g. in line with their 
history).(111;116) Therefore, many have highlighted the need to recognise that different 
actors can play multiple roles in multiple networks at multiple time 
points.(10;115;117;134)  
 
Secondly, the notion of multiplicities can also help to conceptualise different roles of 
actors. Singleton and Michael give a helpful example referring to a case study of a 
cervical screening programme.(134) The authors describe that when this was introduced, 
General Practitioners (GPs) seemed to have two roles, including that of an enabler 
(enrolling other human actors into the network) and that of a critic (threatening the 
stabilisation of the network). In addition, acknowledging the multiplicity of networks 
themselves, the screening programme was also describ d as only part of a larger 
network and only a small part of the GP’s role in ge eral.  
 
Thirdly, the notion of multiplicities can help to conceptualise different perspectives of 
human actors and forms of non-human actors. For example, Bloomfield outlines 
tensions between those who manage the introduction of the IT system (e.g. managers 
and policy makers) and those who need to use it in their everyday work (e.g. healthcare 
professionals and administrative staff).(3;135)  
4.3.2.4 Exploring micro-processes in a complex enviro ment 
ANT does not a priori divide the world into micro- and macro-contexts or attribute 
agency to either individuals or social structures.(111;115;130) Rather, agency is 
assumed not to be limited to individuals, objects or ocial determinants, but as emerging 
as an effect of the interactions of network components.(136) These components are 
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assumed to consist of the same basic building blocks.(137) ANT therefore focuses on 
examining the micro-context (e.g. individuals directly interacting with technology) and 
uses findings to draw conclusions about the macro-context (e.g. the political 
environment in which individual practices are situated).(115;138) This is achieved by 
incorporating actors from both contexts into the same network.(115;116)  
 
As alluded to above, complexity is, however, difficult to study and it is important to 
recognise that one will never be able to capture the full picture of social reality.(101) 
Nevertheless, ANT can help researchers to “zoom in” on network building blocks at any 
point in time. This focus on micro-contexts can help to shed light on the subtleties of 
social reality and thereby help to make inferences in relation to wider social processes 
(“by zooming out”).  
 
From a micro-perspective, healthcare technology maybe viewed as a new component 
being added to an established network consisting of healthcare staff and existing objects 
(e.g. paper, medical instruments, other information systems). The integration of the new 
technology requires the formation of new connections and other more established 
network components to re-organise around this new actor. ANT can help to gain a 
deeper insight into the processes involved. This can then result in recommendations of 
how to make the new network (i.e. one now including both humans and technology) 
more stable and facilitate the effective integration of the technology into the healthcare 
environment. In doing so, barriers such as difficult es integrating the new software into 
work practices of users can be identified. This may then help to explain why an 
implementation was slower than expected or came to be labelled as a “failure” by some. 
Studies by Berg as mentioned above,(133) are good examples of investigations of these 
micro-processes.  
4.3.3 Potential challenges of using an ANT-based ap proach 
As with all other approaches to social theory, in attempting to answer the question of 
how social orders are created and maintained, ANT faces epistemological, ontological 
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and methodological challenges. These are, in line with potential implications for my 
study, summarised in Table 4.2 below. A more detaild discussion of the most important 
points is provided in the following paragraphs. 
Table 4.2: Additional factors to consider when using an ANT-based approach to 
studying EHR implementation and adoption 
Methodological issue How this may be 
addressed 
Potential implications for my 
study  
ANT does not a-priori 
divide the world into 
micro- and macro-
contexts or attribute 
agency to either 
individuals or social 
structures 
Broader contextual 
factors should be taken 
into account and may 
be viewed as other 
parts of the network 
Political, cultural and economic 
environments are important to 
consider when examining 
technology implementation and 
adoption 
The number of actors in 
the network is potentially 
infinite 
Researchers need to 
make rigorous and 
pragmatic decisions of 
where (and from 
whom) to start and stop 
data collection. The 
primary focus should 
be on answering the 
research question. 
Although the focus may be on 
exploring changes to work 
practices, views from other 
relevant stakeholders such as 
implementation team members, 
developers and governmental 
stakeholders may also be 
important 
Different actors can play 
multiple roles in multiple 
networks at multiple time 
points 
May be useful to view 
networks as consisting 
of several sub-networks 
and as changing over 
time 
Can examine how different 
networks align or fail to align 
(e.g. use of systems across 
different wards), how they are 
positioned in relation to larger 
networks (e.g. the hospital, the 
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historical, cultural, political 
environment) and how networks 
change over time (e.g. comparing 
early and later implementation 
stages) 
ANT is too descriptive 
and fails to come up with 
any definitive 
explanations or 
approaches of how 
exactly actors should be 
viewed and analysed 
Important not to lose 
sight of the wider study 
aims as ANT can be 
prone to getting lost in 
detail 
The focus of the study is on 
examining the changes in work 
practices as a result of the 
introduction of the software and 
all other activity should centre 
around this primary research 
question 
A truly detached observer 
does not exist as he/she 
always comes from a 
particular position in time 
and space and plays an 
active role in eliciting and 
constructing accounts 





It is important to keep a field 
journal and reflexive notes 
throughout data collection and 
analysis 
Human accounts, and 
often those of the most 
powerful, are privileged 
offering little insight into 
the material world 
Need to recognise 
individual differences 
between humans and 
acknowledge that 
artefacts have certain 
attributes and a history 
Take into account differences 
between actors by being explicit 
about their positioning and their 
history 
4.3.3.1 Is ANT a method or a theory…and does it mater? 
In fact, it may be precisely ANT’s practical applicability that led some to conclude that 
“ANT's main shortcoming is its being everything but a heory”, a criticism which has 
been partly attributed to its (allegedly inappropriate) naming.(108;116) The essence of 
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this argument is that the approach is too descriptive and fails to come up with any 
detailed suggestions of how actions and constellations should be analysed and 
interpreted.(99;116;120;139) It has therefore been proposed that ANT may be best used 
in a combination with other theoretical approaches.(138;140;141) The value of 
combining ANT with other theoretical lenses will bediscussed in more detail in Section 
4.3.4 below. 
 
It may be useful to consider the traditional notion of theory to explore this issue further. 
A theory should be able to explain “how and why” things occur by exploring their 
relationships.(139) Describing how things occur is straightforward using ANT, but why 
things occur poses a challenge. Other problems facing ANT include a difficulty testing 
propositions with empirical evidence thus making them difficult to refute. ANT can 
therefore serve to aid explanation,(115;116) but has limited capability in developing 
empirically verifiable evidence.  
 
Hence, it may be most useful to view ANT as somewhere between a theory and a 
method, or more precisely as an analytical technique that can be used to follow actors 
trying to understand what they do whilst constantly questioning often taken-for-granted 
characteristics of actors (such as that technology cannot actively transform social 
processes) and accepting the flux and changing nature of reality.(116;131) In so doing, 
ANT has been said to be “telling tales about how the world cannot stop 
transforming”.(131) In telling these tales, the approach can be useful in helping to frame 
the research question, guide data collection and begin theorising about potential 
explanations.(142)  
 
Qualitative research, the main method of data colletion in ANT, is generally more 
suited to theory development than to hypothesis testing, shifting the analytical focus to 
sense making activities, negotiation, differing actor perspectives and emerging effects. 
Yet, it seems particularly important for researchers not to lose sight of the wider study 
aims as ANT studies can be prone to getting lost in detail. For example, detailed 
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descriptions of individual work practices and ongoing examination of how different 
groupings conceptualise the EHR in different ways, without attempting to relate this to 
other relevant factors and the study questions, may be unhelpful, resulting in a lack of 
practical suggestions for improvement. 
4.3.3.2 Researching a fluid reality and multiplicities 
The challenge for researchers dealing with multiplic ties and a fluid reality is to achieve 
a balance between the focus of the investigation and cknowledging that multiple 
different realities can exist without letting these differences mask the complexity of 
relationships. The result is that ultimately a choie needs to be made between which 
context to study and which part to focus on (without neglecting the whole picture) as one 
can not possibly capture everything. This is likely to be determined by the research 
question, practical constraints and the focus of the study. Conceptually, it may therefore 
be useful to view networks as consisting of several sub-networks. For example, part of 
the larger network of a national EHR implementation may be healthcare professionals 
using a particular type of software (such as Lorenzo) in a particular setting (such as a 
Trust). One could then examine how these different n tworks align or fail to align (e.g. 
across different Trusts) and how they are positioned i  relation to each other and larger 
networks (e.g. the hospital, the historical, cultural, political environment).(134)  
 
This leads to another problem. Even if the focus of the investigation is on the micro-
context such as, for example, individual healthcare practices and their relationship with 
IT, the number of potential actors is conceptually infinite, leading to the question of 
what to include (or exclude) in the network as, for practical reasons, analysis and data 
collection cannot continue forever.(111;116) It follows that at some point researchers 
need to make decisions as to where to start and stop data collection. Again, the primary 
focus should be on answering the research question.(115) This may involve focusing on 
a particular network or aspect of a network in more detail (e.g. the micro-context if 
investigating work practices) and is particularly relevant in health services research as 
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time and resource constraints often limit the breadth nd depth to which networks can be 
examined.  
4.3.3.3 The positioning of humans and non humans 
Not surprisingly, the equal positioning of human and non-human actors in ANT has 
stimulated debate. It is not the purpose of my work t  delve into detail as to how the two 
differ, but during my reading, I found one actor that ANT has particular difficulty 
accounting for: the researcher. ANT views the researcher as agnostic (or detached), 
typically eliciting textual or verbal data from human actors through qualitative 
interviews and observations. Here, humans are seen as both informants (i.e. actors that 
generate accounts) and interpreters (i.e. the researcher as interpreting associations and 
components of the network).  
 
Alternatively, the researcher may be conceptualised as part of the network, as it is hard 
to imagine the existence of a truly detached observer as (s)he always comes from a 
particular position in time and space and thus must play an active role in eliciting and 
constructing ANT accounts.(115;116;134;143) Researchers also have considerable 
influence on how actors and informants are selected and this too needs to be taken into 
account.(115)  
 
This issue is again part of a larger epistemological debate in social science rather than 
being particular to ANT,(144) but it is nevertheless worth considering as other 
researchers utilising the approach will be likely to face similar questions. I do feel that it 
is necessary for researchers to acknowledge that they will be part of the network and will 
transform it as much as it will transform them as relationships develop throughout the 
research process, particularly if this involves qualitative methods. Researchers should be 
explicit about this involvement and show an awareness of how accounts are produced 
and how choices are made.(115) 
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4.3.4 Integrating ANT with other theoretical lenses  and practical 
approaches 
As outlined in Section 4.3.3, ANT has been subject to several major 
criticisms,(99;115;116;119;145) which I discussed in the paragraphs above (summarised 
in Box 4.1).  
Box 4.1: Limitations of the ANT approach 
1. The role of wider social factors  
ANT pays little attention to wider macro-environmental factors.  
 
2. Going beyond description 
ANT can help to describe how relationships between actors change, but has limited 
explanatory power. 
 
3. The positioning of human and non-human actors 
ANT networks are made up of a number of both human and non-human actors. These 
actors are however different in a number of respects and, furthermore, both have a 
history that is likely to have shaped them, which ANT fails to take account of. 
 
4. The problem of defining the network 
There is a difficulty determining where the network boundaries are as the number of 
actors in any given network is indefinite.  
 
5. The role of the researcher 
The role of the researcher in influencing and shaping the network is not accounted for. 
 
In the face of these limitations, ANT has restricted heoretical applicability, which led 
some to suggest that it is most useful if combined with other more accepted theoretical 
lenses that can help to address some of its shortcomings. This led me to consider other 
theoretical approaches which had the potential to address some of ANT’s limitations. In 
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doing so, I looked broadly, specifically searching to identify the issues summarised in 
Box 4.1. This broad search led me to consider theoretical lenses from a variety of 
disciplines, in trying to find those that could provide more holistic insights into the 
implementation landscape than was possible drawing o  ANT alone. I therefore 
specifically searched for more explanatory theoretical frameworks that shed light on the 
role of macro-environmental as well as organisationl factors shaping local 
developments, and those that took into account the specific characteristics of human and 
non-human actors. These came from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds including 
management, organisational studies, psychology, science and technology studies, and 
health services research. I have summarised those tat seemed valuable in addressing the 
majority of ANT’s theoretical shortcomings in Box 4.2 below.(92;113;138;141;146-152) 
Box 4.2: Brief summary of the most salient characteristics of some theoretical 
models that can complement ANT  
Strong Structuration Theory 
Separates structures from agents and argues that the two have a mutually shaping (or 
recursive) relationship. In doing so, it seeks to investigate the following: 
- External structures (social relations, institutions, power relationships, infrastructures, 
technology etc.)  
- Internal structures in agents (morals, attitudes, skills, thoughts etc.) 
- Active agency (why agents act in a certain way) 
- Outcomes (how external and internal structures change or stay stable and why) 
 
Greenhalgh and Stones’ model 
Builds on Strong Structuration Theory to comprise a t chnology dimension, which 
includes questioning where and how the technology has emerged, as well as determining 
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Social Shaping of Technology 
The way IT emerges is related and shaped by historical, cultural and economic factors. 
These social processes are assumed to consist of choices made by key stakeholders 
throughout the design, implementation and adoption c rcle of a technology. Different 
choices arising from particular interests (these may be stable or temporary) can have 
different consequences for different stakeholders – these are examined in the Social 
Shaping of Technology. Inherent to the approach is t e view that technology 




Focus on the attitudes of individuals adopting a new technology. The intention to use a 
technology is assumed to be determined by an individual’s attitude, the perceived 
subjective norm, the perceived usefulness of a system, and the perceived ease of use of a 
system. 
 
Normalisation process theory 
Focuses on how innovations become embedded within collective clinical practice over 
time and what inhibits and/or facilitates this process. Takes into account social and 
organisational processes to achieve routine use (including ways to achieve it) locally i.e. 
micro- and macro-processes. Assumes that normalisation (or routine use, embedding 
into day-today practice) is affected by: 
- “Interactional workability” – the way it affects peoples’ interactions and practices 
(including how people’s roles and work practices are ligned, what is possible to achieve 
in any interaction or practice, if the innovation fits with the general strategic goals of any 
interaction) 
- “Relational integration” – how interventions relate to the distribution of knowledge and 
fits in with existing relationships (how is knowledge distributed i.e. the knowledge 
required for an interaction: does it allow adequate knowledge for those who need it, 
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beliefs surrounding the value and risks of the innovati n as well as the knowledge 
needed to deal with it) 
- “Skill-set workability” – the effect of the innovation on the existing division of work 
(consequences for the allocation of tasks and the perceived legitimacy of this allocation, 
organisational ability/capacity to implement an innovation) 
- “Contextual integration” – the way the innovation integrates with the overall 
organisational context (organisational practicalities surrounding the implementation such 
as costs and risks, ownership and potential to change the innovation as well as allowing 
new practices to emerge) 
 
Theory of the diffusion of innovations 
Can help to explain why or why not certain innovations spread in and across 
organisations as well as how this spread may occur. A range of factors are assumed to 
determine how well the innovation is accepted and adopted and include the following: 
- Innovation attributes  
- End-user perceptions  
- Strategies on targeting/communicating with and engaging of end-users  
- Receptive context and planning  
- Attention to both macro- and micro-contexts 
 
Individual adopters of innovations are categorised into the following categories, which 
characterise the rate of adoption of innovations in organisations: 
- Innovators: those who adopt an innovation early 
- EAs: tend to have good connections with both innovat rs and the social system 
- Early majority: tend not to have contact with innovators and commonly have no 
interest in the theory underlying innovations 
- Late majority: adopt when the early majority has done so and have a more sceptical 
adoption attitude 
- Laggards: very slowly adopt only after everyone else has done so 
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Other important individuals: 
- Opinion leaders: individuals who can influence other members of a social system, 
considered crucial in the process of promoting the adoption of innovations 
- Innovation champions: charismatic characters that support the innovation 
- Boundary spanners: characterised by having both internal and external organisational 
relationships and an interest in the adoption of an innovation within an organisation 
 
These theoretical lenses can help to address some of ANT’s shortcomings in relation to 
the role of wider contextual factors, going beyond description, reflecting on how the 
technology itself has emerged, and questioning how b th human and non-human agency 
differs and is determined (addressing problems 1 to 3 in Box 4.1). They do not however 
address ANT’s more practical problem of defining the network. 
 
In the following sections, I will therefore outline how operationalising ANT can be 
facilitated by using case studies drawing on multi-sited ethnography (addressing 
problem 4 in Box 4.1). This builds on the issue that ANT and other theoretical lenses 
summarised in Box 4.2 lack guidance on how to define a d hence contain the network in 
question, as potentially data collection could be infin te.(111;116) Case studies drawing 
on multi-sited ethnography can help to address this problem and I will discuss how in 
the subsequent paragraphs.  
4.3.4.1 Case studies drawing on multi-sited ethnography 
So what exactly is multi-sited ethnography? “Traditional” ethnography is a typically 
qualitative research approach characterised by the in-d pth exploration of a particular 
setting with the researcher immersing him/herself in data collection and in participants 
worlds.(153) Multi-sited ethnography, and associated approaches, employ similar data 
collection methods (i.e. observations, interviews, and collection of associated material), 
but are characterised by breadth (at the expense of depth that defines the traditional 
ethnographic approach), drawing on data from different settings to help understand the 
nature of a particular phenomenon of interest from a broader range of viewpoints.(154-
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158) In doing so, multi-sited ethnography aims to gain an insight into both local contexts 
and the wider social system in which these are situated.(157;158) Local contexts (or 
multi-sited ethnographic sites) are, although different, to some extent assumed to be 
related and therefore purposefully chosen, which fits in well with Latour’s concept of 
associations.(157-159)  
 
Ideally, the result of a multi-sited ethnography is a holistic understanding of the complex 
environment surrounding technology introduction in organisations (e.g. wider political 
and economic factors). This is achieved by investigatin  the micro-context of 
implementation (e.g. a particular ward or hospital) in combination with related wider 
organisational and macro-factors that may affect the micro-environment (e.g. policy 
makers, software developers, and the media). The aim is to understand not only the 
richness and complexity of the immediate implementation setting, but also common 
influences across settings. In doing so, the approach can also help to focus data 
collection by sampling sites that are related through a common phenomenon of interest 
(e.g. the EHR implementation), whilst still paying attention to the complex nature of the 
wider implementation environment (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2). The notion of the 
researcher “following the thing” (i.e. the software) can be helpful in guiding data 
collection activity during this process.(160) For example, if one starts at a ward speaking 
to users, who mention a particular implementation team member, one may wish to 
obtain that person’s perspective. This implementation team member may mention 
another stakeholder such as developers or governmental stakeholders, which can then in 
turn be followed up. Researchers need to, however, make practical decisions in relation 
to the degree of depth when investigating these different perspectives, whilst paying 
attention not to privilege some informants over others.(154-156) 
 
Indeed, multi-sited ethnography has been employed in combination with ANT to 
investigate complex organisational change in healthc re and beyond.(158;161-165) For 
example, Bruni,(162) describes an ethnography of an EHR in an Italian hospital. 
Although this study did not go beyond the boundaries of the hospital, it was argued that 
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the software helped to facilitate the definition ofthe ethnographic space by the 
researcher following it, and tracing its relationship  with other actors over time. The 
author describes that the EHR was still a new addition to the network, “negotiating” its 
right for existence in the organisation. Effective ntegration of IT will only happen, it is 
argued, if it can be absorbed into the network of other existing actors. In a similar vein, 
Mol describes an ethnography of a disease.(166) It is suggested that this approach can 
help to capture the complex ways different parts of the body and the disease are enacted 
by different actors, in different places and at different times. 
 
Using ANT in combination with multi-sited ethnography can therefore help to focus 
data collection and inform strategic decisions throughout the conduct of the research. By 
following the technology as an actor and tracing its connections with various other 
actors organically, this approach can help to understand different perspectives that 
constitute components of the network and hold it inplace. Multi-sited ethnography can 
help to map both stakeholders and connections between these by examining their 
relationship to the technology, thereby allowing the implementation to be examined in 
its full complexity whilst still keeping focused. Here, the technology may be viewed as a 
central figure through which other components of the network are, either directly or 
indirectly, related. 
 
Individual organisations may be treated as case studies embedded into the multi-sited 
ethnography (Figure 4.1). This can help to discover local contextual contingencies whilst 
retaining the overall implementation picture. Cases can consist of specific groups of 
people satisfying specific criteria in specific contexts, whilst the case study as a research 
method consists of investigating a phenomenon (such as the integration of an EHR 
system in user work practices) within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence.(167;168) For example, a case may be an organisation, ward or community 
team implementing Lorenzo software. Selecting case(s) is ideally theoretically informed, 
on the basis of representing a particularly typical or atypical situation or context. 
Individual case studies can then be compared and contrasted to make theoretical 
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generalisations about a phenomenon (e.g. software implementation) to other settings. 
This may eventually be used to inform efforts in other contexts by exploring and 
theorising about existing and developing connections.  
Figure 4.1: Lorenzo software and how it may be connected to cases and multiple 
contexts  
 
Note: A graphical representation of the context of the Lorenzo implementation and various informants that
may be drawn upon. The circle illustrates the case (i.e. the Trust) and the immediate use of the software, 
whilst stakeholders outside of the circle present those that can provide an insight into the case without 
being necessarily directly related to it. 
 
Although somewhat related, the important conceptual difference between multi-sited 
ethnography and comparative case studies is that the former not only compares between 
settings (or cases such as organisations), but also investigates relationships between 
settings and with wider structures.(157) To what extent a case study of a technology (as 
the case) differs from case studies of organisations drawing on multi-sited ethnography, 
is open to debate and depends on the aims of the study in question. If this focus is on 
exploring work practices of healthcare professionals in the context of a national 
implementation (as in my study), it is important not t  conceptualise the technology as 
The case 
Lorenzo 
Developer – “I 
make it” Healthcare staff 
– “I use it” 
Trust – “I 
implement it” Government – “I 
commission it” 
Patient/Carers – “It 
holds my information” 
Media – “I write 
about it” 
Researcher – 
“I try to 
understand 
it”  
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the focus of the investigation (by conceptualising it as a case), but to place the 
organisation at the heart of the enquiry, without neglecting the wider factors that can 
shape it (and vice versa). Altogether, combining the two approaches can be extremely 
helpful: the in-depth case study approach illuminates the complexity and interrelatedness 
of factors influencing implementation and adoption f technology locally, and the 
breadth associated with multi-sited ethnography allows the wider contextual picture to 
be incorporated without over-emphasising its importance. 
4.3.5 My role as a researcher 
Having outlined how issues 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Box 4.1 can be addressed by drawing on a 
range of additional theoretical lenses and methodological approaches, I now, building on 
ontological and epistemological considerations discus ed above (Section 4.5), briefly 
reflect on my role as a researcher conducting the res arch. This is a related practical 
issue and can be addressed by a reflexive research approach, explicitly acknowledging 
that my presence may have an effect on existing networks and that my orientation can 
have major consequences for selecting informants and exploring relationships. This is in 
part the result of personal preferences (e.g. I am necessarily going to follow what I feel 
drawn to), ontological and epistemological assumptions (as outlined in the beginning of 
this chapter), and emerging results. I will discuss is ues surrounding reflexivity in more 
detail in Chapter 5. 
4.4 Chapter summary 
In the previous chapter, I outlined my aim to explore the views and experiences of users 
as well as organisational consequences of introducing Lorenzo and how these evolved 
over time in the complex environment of a national EHR implementation. With this 
focus in mind and building on the range and interrelated nature of social and technical 
factors identified in Chapter 2, I have outlined theoretical and epistemological 
implications above. 
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To reflect the complexity of the implementation and adoption process, I considered how 
drawing on an ANT-informed perspective can usefully inform my work. The main value 
of the approach lies in a more sophisticated appreciation of the fluid and multiple nature 
of reality, the view of the active role of objects in shaping social relationships, and a 
theoretically informed approach to guiding sampling a d data collection. 
 
I then attempted to apply the ANT approach to the context of my study, outlining both 
practical and conceptual challenges and potential ways to address these. As ANT did not 
fulfil all my requirements, particularly in relation to explaining theoretical insights 
gained, the role of individual, macro-environmental as well as organisational factors in 
shaping local developments, and practical ways to focus data collection, I specifically 
searched the literature for approaches that could address these shortcomings. Based on 
this, I developed a theoretically informed methodolgical framework to studying IT 
implementation in healthcare drawing on ANT and a range of selected approaches which 
address its shortcomings.  
 
Having explained the methodological rationale for my study, I will now move on to 
discussing the methods employed in my fieldwork. 
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Chapter 5: Methods 
5.1 Introduction 
In line with the literature, which highlights the interrelatedness of social and technical 
factors in relation to EHR implementation and adoption (see Chapter 2), I approached 
data collection and analysis by drawing on a sociote hnical systems perspective. I used a 
modified ANT-based approach, which pays attention to these complexities (see Chapter 
4).(106;107;109)  
 
In line with the importance of integration of the software into existing work practices in 
particular (see Chapter 2), I broadly approached data collection by examining the 
immediate sociotechnical environment in which Lorenzo (as part of a nationally 
procured EHR) was implemented without neglecting the organisational and macro-
environmental context. As my focus was on exploring process issues, my study was 
qualitative in nature and included a combination of face-to-face/telephone interviews, 
examination of documents and activity oriented observation. I aimed at exploring the 
views and experiences of users as well as organisational consequences of introducing 
Lorenzo and how these evolved over time in the complex environment of a national 
EHR implementation. I also incorporated a longitudinal dimension in order to examine 
changes over time. 
 
Many previous studies have investigated small-scale EHR implementations in local 
hospitals of “home-grown” systems (Chapter 2). The implementation of the NHS CRS is 
the first national EHR implementation in the world, posing new and complex 
sociotechnical challenges. Many other countries are likely to follow suit in the coming 
years, which makes real-time investigation of local processes important for facilitating 
local but also national and international implementation of EHR technologies.  
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This chapter will outline the methods I employed in more detail. I will begin by 
discussing my sampling strategy, before moving to a description of procedures 
employed and my approach to analysis. The chapter will conclude with some reflections 
on my role as a researcher in the process (building on Section 4.3.5), ethical issues, and 
considerations surrounding rigour and transferability of findings. 
5.2 Sampling 
In line with my overall methodological framework, sampling of cases, multi-sited 
ethnography informants and other participants was purposive (within the constraints of 
gatekeeper influence) by sampling human stakeholders related to Lorenzo (see Chapter 
4). This is a defining characteristic of interpretative qualitative research where the aim is 
to explore emerging issues and perceptions of individuals in order to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of their “worlds”. In doing so, I coneptually divided sampling into Trusts 
(the case studies), multi-sited ethnography informants nd participants in interviews and 
observations. Considerations relating to each of these will be discussed in turn. 
5.2.1 Sampling of Trusts 
Drawing on the case study approach helped me to examine three Trusts, conceptualised 
as cases, in detail. I approached a total of six Trusts, including two mental health, two 
acute, and two community Trusts. Three of these were approached directly by me, whilst 
three were recommended by NHS CFH. In order to ensur  ome degree of variation, I 
selected an acute (recommended by NHS CFH), a mental health (approached directly by 
me) and a community Trust (recommended by NHS CFH) representing distinct 
differences in settings and demographics, whilst at the same time being comparable as 
they were all implementing identical software (Lorenzo). This allowed an in-depth 
insight into the multi-faceted forces at play in each setting over time, and a detailed 
comparison of similar and disparate issues between s ttings.(169) This in-depth 
approach can be at the expense of breadth, but paying ttention to the complexity and 
interrelatedness of factors influencing implementation and adoption of Lorenzo locally 
Chapter 5: Methods 
 
 94 
(Chapter 2), as well as drawing on multi-sited ethnography, should have helped to 
counteract this (see Chapter 4).  
 
In line with the aims and objectives of my study (Chapter 3), I defined a case as a Trust 
being the first to implement Lorenzo as part of the National Programme (i.e. the EAs or 
first-wave implementing organisations in NME). In some instances, this included a 
single healthcare setting (e.g. a hospital), whilst in others that had implemented Lorenzo 
across different organisations, a range of settings were studied (e.g. different locales 
from which care was provided). Cases were selected to provide an insight into the local 
process involved in implementing and adopting the new software. Here, the concept of 
NHS Trusts as cases helped to set boundaries, whilst still allowing for the important role 
of organisational and macro-environmental context to be taken into account in shaping 
local processes.  
 
Trusts may be viewed as “critical cases” as they all faced a certain phenomenon (i.e. the 
introduction of Lorenzo). They were the first Trusts in the country to do so, which 
allowed me to develop and test theoretical propositions by drawing on all three and then 
postulating principles that may transfer to other Trusts that were yet to implement 
Lorenzo or other nationally procured software. 
 
In recruiting cases, I initially liaised with NHS CFH who provided me with key contacts 
of individual Directors of IT from one acute and one community Trust. Two mental 
health, one acute, and one community Trust were appro ched directly by me. All Trusts 
approached agreed to participate, but some did not as anticipated implement Lorenzo 
functionality during the period of my study due to changes in implementation timelines. 
It is also important to acknowledge that selection of cases was restricted to a small 
number of organisations that had begun implementation (during the recruitment phase 
there were only six EAs of Lorenzo altogether). Nevertheless, I was able to sample a 
range of different Trusts using the software in different settings including acute care, 
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community care and mental health. These Trusts also represented different sizes and 
scales of implementations with varying levels of early Lorenzo functionality. 
5.2.2 Sampling of multi-sited ethnography informant s 
In line with the multi-sited ethnographic approach and informed by ANT (see Chapter 
4), I also sampled a wider range of stakeholders outside the immediate Trust 
environment, who could provide an insight in relation to developments in case study 
sites. In doing so, I essentially followed the traces of Lorenzo through case study 
settings and beyond (the multi-sited ethnography informants). This meant that I not only 
sampled individuals that used and implemented Lorenzo within Trusts, but also 
stakeholders connected through the technology from the larger macro-environment. 
Informants were approached in person at relevant national conferences I attended during 
the course of my study. These included interviewees and documents from governmental, 
media, developer, independent sector, and LSP sources. Specific Trusts and Lorenzo 
itself were frequently mentioned in these. More detail d information on individual 
participants can be found in Chapter 6. 
5.2.3 Sampling of individual participants for inter views in Trusts 
In order to obtain a sufficiently rounded understanding of different perspectives, I 
recruited a variety of key stakeholders from within Trusts. This also involved sampling 
of deviant cases (i.e. those with conflicting viewpoints) in order to investigate whether a 
theoretical proposition either applied or needed to be modified in light of these.(170-
172) 
 
As Trusts varied in relation to local arrangements and preferences, approaches to 
recruitment of settings and participants were flexible, being negotiated with key contacts 
and gatekeepers at each Trust. In doing so, I initially recruited individual informants 
through the Directors of IT, who put me in touch with implementation team members 
and relevant Ward Managers/Heads of Services. These, in turn, helped me to approach 
individual users. Sampling of Lorenzo users was somewhat limited as the software was 
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initially only used on a very small scale. However, I ecruited a range of pharmacists, 
doctors (junior and senior), nurses (both junior and senior) and administrative staff.  
 
At the end of interviews, I asked participants if they could suggest any other potential 
interviewees and approached these in turn (snowball s mpling). Data collection 
continued until saturation (the point at which no new themes were emerging) was 
reached.4  
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter and elaborated further below, data from 
Trusts were collected at two time points. Sampling for the second round of data 
collection was again facilitated by gatekeepers, but in some instances individuals 
interviewed during the initial phase were approached directly by me (with permission 
from the relevant Ward Manager/Head of Service). Speaking to the same individuals 
during the second round was preferred, in order to investigate changes over time, but 
often difficult as dependent on the availability of informants.  
 
Overall, sampling individual participants was difficult in the busy healthcare 
environment and this was exacerbated by the exceptional circumstances in Trusts, where 
staff members were trying to get used to a new computer system. I therefore tried to be 
as accommodating as possible. 
 
Participants were contacted via email or phone to arrange a suitable date and time, or 
approached in person, if appropriate. Upon initial contact, participants were asked if they 
preferred the face-to-face or telephone interview format. They were provided with an 
information sheet (Appendix 3) and a consent form (Appendix 4) before data collection 
activity commenced. Participants who did not respond to my original email contact were 
contacted via telephone approximately one week later. A small number did not respond 
to my efforts to contact them, in which case I abandoned my attempts assuming they 
                                                
4 Although I acknowledge that this saturation related to the early adoption/implementation period only. 
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were not interested in participating. No individual overtly refused to participate, but 
some were not comfortable with the audio-recording, i  which case I took notes.  
5.2.4 Sampling of participants/locations for observ ations 
Observations were conducted in case study sites i.e. Trusts. Sampling of observation 
locations was again facilitated by local gatekeepers including Heads of Service, Ward 
Managers and Directors of IT.  
 
As the implementation of Lorenzo was limited to a small number of locations within 
each Trust, I took every opportunity to see the software in use. This involved “back-
office” use as well as use in clinics. I also observed some Lorenzo meetings between 
users and IT Managers. Throughout observations, I made a conscious attempt to study 
different types of staff using Lorenzo in different settings in order to get a sufficiently 
rounded understanding of the diverse user- and location-specific issues involved in 
everyday use. 
 
Observations of Lorenzo in-use were slightly complicated by the fact that the system had 
extremely limited functionality and was still in the development phases. Gatekeepers 
therefore were often hesitant to arrange observations, which I felt may have been due to 
the fact that they seemed to prefer me seeing the syst m “working well” as opposed to 
seeing difficulties encountered during early use. 
5.3 Procedures 
The observational component of my study received ethical approval from the East 
London and the City Research Ethics Committee on the 2nd of April 2009 (please refer 
to Appendix 5 for detailed information on ethical and site-specific approval). The 
interview component was part of the larger evaluation project (as referred to in Chapter 
1). It was submitted for ethical review to the same ethics committee but was classed as a 
service evaluation on the 9th of October 2008 (08/H0703/112).(33) 
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Overall data collection involved a combination of interviews, observations, and 
examination of documentary data over a period of 18 months. In line with my study 
aims, interviews and observations centred on topics exploring the views and experiences 
of users and the consequences of Lorenzo for their work practices and general 
organisational functioning in the complex environmet of the national EHR 
implementation (see Appendices 6 and 7 for interview/observation guides). I did 
consider the use of focus group discussions as a data collection method but decided that 
this was not feasible due to practical reasons (i.e. availability of clinicians, which also 
proved difficult with interviews and therefore confirmed this assumption). In some 
instances, interviews were however conducted in small groups of two or three 
participants.  
 
Throughout my study, I made a conscious effort to inform data collection through 
emerging results, by feeding back preliminary findings into subsequent data collection 
activities. This resulted in evolving interview/observation guides over time, with me 
focussing on certain pertinent issues in more depth, and a decreasing focus on contextual 
information as I was getting more familiar with the s ttings. 
 
I made the decision when to stop data collection in line with my emerging findings 
(when I judged that saturation was achieved) as well as the practical and temporal 
constraints that accompanied my work. In doing so, I drafted a grid of what I was aiming 
to collect in each Trust before commencing data colle tion. The initial aim was to obtain 
data from at least four implementation team members and four healthcare professionals, 
but I was able to (and indeed needed to) gather significantly more data. Nevertheless, the 
grid helped to monitor progress and facilitated comparisons between Trusts whilst still 
allowing for individual differences to be captured. This was further facilitated through 
drawing up overall questions to be answered across ca es, which were then further 
tailored to individual settings and groups of intervi wees (see Appendices 6 and 7). In 
doing so, I paid careful attention to not getting lost in too much contextual detail and 
thereby losing focus. The fine line between how much contextual data was relevant and 
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necessary to answer my study questions was guided by careful judgment on my part, 
facilitated by regular discussions with my supervisors.  
 
At this point, it is also important to note that although my work drew heavily on 
ethnographic principles, it was not ethnography in the traditional sense. In line with 
ethnographic approaches, I did attempt to explore the nature of social phenomena by 
collecting qualitative data from a small number of cases in detail.(153) However, the 
more traditional ethnographic work also involves a w y of immersing oneself in 
qualitative data collection and in participants and their environment by becoming an 
“insider”. For me, this was difficult to achieve due to a range of practical limitations 
including access, time and resources. Therefore “modified” ethnographic approaches are 
frequently advocated for studying sociotechnical systems (especially the complex and 
ever-changing social aspect),(125) but these are often characterised by relatively short 
visits to the field. I utilised such a modified ethnographic approach in my study. 
5.3.1 Interviews 
As the focus of my research was on exploring processes and experiences of individuals, 
interviews were employed as the primary data collection method. This allowed me to 
gain an insight into attitudes and perceived challenges amongst various stakeholders. 
Telephone interviews were used to complement face-to-face interviews as they are time-
efficient and suitable for individuals with busy work schedules and geographically 
scattered samples.(173;174)  
5.3.1.1 Data generation 
Interviews were conducted between February 2009 and November 2010. They were 
one-to-one, digitally audio-taped (in the majority of instances5), and semi-structured. In 
a few cases (n=4), they were conducted in pairs due to convenience or at participants’ 
request. Interviews lasted between 10 and 80 minutes, with a mean of around 45 
                                                
5 Interviews were not recorded if participants expressed that they would prefer this or when recording 
equipment failed. In these cases notes were taken. 
Chapter 5: Methods 
 
 100 
minutes. The shorter interviews included those that were conducted with busy healthcare 
professionals in their respective work settings, which meant that in some cases 
interviewees were called away to attend to a patient.  
 
I developed the interview guide based on my literature review and theoretical 
underpinnings (Chapters 2 and 4). It focused on general views on implementation 
strategy, system and use; and included between five and 28 questions (see Appendix 6). 
The number of questions asked varied between participants as some were not applicable 
to certain professional groups. Also, in the beginning of data collection, I tended to ask 
more questions surrounding context, which attenuated over time as I was getting more 
familiar with the respective contexts.  
 
My central concern was the identification of challeng s to the implementation and 
adoption of Lorenzo with a focus on changes to userwork practices. In asking questions, 
I used the interview guide as an aid to structure the conversation (see Appendix 6), 
whilst responding to new issues and those pertinent to a particular interviewee/context as 
appropriate. I increasingly moved towards free interaction with interviewees as I became 
more familiar with the topic, keeping in mind that this interaction had a specific purpose 
guided by the issues I needed to cover.  
 
In order to develop a suitably rounded understanding of the most pertinent issues, both 
negative and positive views from all key stakeholders were actively sought. I employed 
a non-directive style of asking questions as well as reflecting and probing to facilitate 
disclosure. Questions were open-ended and I kept fild notes and a research journal 
outlining personal ideas and conceptions in order to make the research process as 
transparent and reflexive as possible. Emerging ideas were fed back and discussed in 
monthly meetings with my supervisors as well as periodically with the wider research 
team of the larger evaluation study.(33) Participants were encouraged to raise any issues 
important to them which had not been addressed in the interview guide. 
 
Chapter 5: Methods 
 
 101 
A longitudinal dimension incorporated in interviews helped me to capture the temporal 
dimension of stakeholders’ experiences and process changes over time.(175) This deeper 
understanding would be difficult to achieve looking at snapshots of a large range of 
different organisations adopting the software. It is particularly important when 
considering the implementation of Lorenzo software, which is taking place over long 
timescales and in the context of a rapidly changing NHS and political landscape.  
 
Therefore, where possible, I conducted interviews at two different time points. Across 
Trusts, the second round of interviews took place once the use of the system was more 
established, with increased functionality and/or an expanded user base.  
 
More specifically, within Trusts the two data collection points included the following:  
• Site B (the acute Trust): shortly after the Trust went live with R16 on one ward 
(Time 1, T1, February 2009 - October 2009) and when the Trust had 
implemented Release 1.9 (R1.9)7 functionality across the Trust, approximately a 
year later (Time 2, T2, September 2010 – November 2010).  
• Site H (the community Trust): approximately a year after the Trust went live 
with R18 with half of the podiatry service (T1, July 2009 – February 2010) and 
shortly after the Trust had rolled out the functionality to the whole service, 
approximately six months later (T2, June 2010 – July 2010). 
• Site Q (the mental health Trust): approximately three months after the Trust went 
live with R19 (T1, December 2009 – February 2010) and approximately six 
months later (T2, August 2010 – November 2010), the tim  after which a certain 
embedding of the software was assumed to have takenplace.(176;177) 
                                                
6 R1 included requests and results functionality (e.g. lectronic requesting of radiology results) and 
recording of allergies. For more details in relation t  functionality of different releases please refe  to 
Chapter 1. 
7 R1.9 included the replacement of the Patient Administration System iPM. For more details in relation t  
functionality of different releases please refer to Chapter 1. 
8 R1 included clinical documentation functionality. For more details in relation to functionality of diferent 
releases please refer to Chapter 1. 
9 R1 included clinical documentation functionality. For more details in relation to functionality of diferent 
releases please refer to Chapter 1. 




As part of this longitudinal data collection, I attempted to conduct serial interviews with 
the same individuals in order to see whether any of their perceptions/perspectives 
changed as Lorenzo became more established and increasing functionality became 
available. However, not all interviewees were willing to be interviewed again due to 
busy work schedules. Others were difficult to get hold of or had left the organisation. 
Therefore, some additional stakeholders, who I had not spoken to during T1 were also 
interviewed. This helped me to understand the perspectives of those who were later 
users of the system with increased functionality and often shorter implementation 
timelines. Throughout, I made an active effort to obtain both positive and negative 
perspectives, searching for disconfirming data.  
 
Some participants, mainly local key gatekeepers, were interviewed more than twice as 
emerging data were fed back to them periodically and their feedback guided subsequent 
data collection. Overall, interviews conducted at T2 tended to be shorter than those 
conducted at T1, possibly due to a deeper understanding of contextual issues on my part. 
5.3.1.2 Participants 
Interview data were obtained from healthcare staff within the three Trusts (consisting of 
implementation team members and Lorenzo users), and additional stakeholders from 
outside the Trusts (including a mixture of governmetal, commercial and independent 
stakeholders).  
 
Implementation team members interviewed consisted of a mixture of Clinical IT Leads, 
IT Managers (both internal and sub-contracted), andTraining Professionals. Users 
included Ward Managers, Consultants, Nurses (both junior and senior), Ward Clerks, 
Administrative Staff, Pharmacists, Allied Health Professionals and Junior Doctors.  
 
More detailed participant information is provided in Chapter 7. 




Whilst interviews are well suited to provide an insight into individual meanings of 
experiences, observations can help to illuminate information flow and informal work 
patterns, relationships between participants and context, social interactions, and 
relationships between individuals.(106;124;178;179) They are therefore commonly used 
to complement interviews for purposes of triangulation. 
 
I employed an element of observation to investigate how context and individual 
perspectives (from interviews) aligned. In doing so, observational transcribed data were 
used to inform the rest of my analysis, and to contribu e to a deeper understanding of the 
sociotechnical processes involved.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that observations may be both “formal” and “informal”. 
This section will describe formal observational activity, whilst informal observational 
activity, captured in the form of field notes, will be discussed in Section 5.3.3 below.  
5.3.2.1 Data generation 
I employed a mixture of object/activity/person-orient d observations at the three Trusts 
with on-site questioning, where appropriate and convenient.(180-182) The concept of 
“following the thing” (i.e. Lorenzo) and its various associations with different settings 
helped to define the ethnographic space, as I was literal y following the computer and 
related activities throughout my observational activity. In some instances, I also 
followed a particular individual or activity (context of use) whilst taking notes.  
 
An observation recording sheet can be viewed in Appendix 7, but again this is intended 
for guidance only as notes depended heavily on the setting and local practicalities. My 
initial focus was on observing the natural occurrence of activities, whilst at the later 
stages of observations (when participants felt more c mfortable), I tended to ask some 
probing questions for clarification of activities and/or functionality. 
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The length of formal observations depended heavily on the cooperation of Ward 
Managers/Service Leads and the willingness of indivdual users to be observed. The 
presence of gatekeepers coupled with a highly politically charged environment 
(discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 and 7), meant that data collection was somewhat 
opportunistic depending on opportunities arising loca ly.  
 
I was likely to influence participants’ behaviour to some extent during my observations, 
but I did take care not to interfere with the naturl workflow (see Glossary) of activities. 
This was achieved through “keeping out of the way”, often spending time in corners, 
and only speaking to individuals when they initiated conversations. 
 
As observations were even more reliant on cooperation and access of a range of 
participants, these were not conducted at two distinct time points during the 
implementation. Although this was attempted it was not practically feasible as these 
sessions often took a long time to arrange. 
5.3.2.2 Participants 
The majority of observational data were obtained from observing healthcare 
professionals using Lorenzo. These included consultants, allied healthcare professionals, 
and administrative staff. 
5.3.3 Documentary data, field notes and other mater ial 
Documents can be a valuable source of data in a range of contexts (e.g. legal or 
historical), and particularly in researching policy mplementations.(183) Advantages are 
that they are easy to collect and can provide insight  into perspectives that are otherwise 
difficult to access. They are also neither intrusive to collect, nor subject to researcher 
bias and take little time commitment from participants10.(183;184) May helpfully 
classifies documents into those from primary and secondary sources.(185) The former 
                                                
10 Although documents may not be as prone to researchr bias as other qualitative data collection methods 
are, there may still be some degree of researcher bias in the way they are selected and analysed. Similarly, 
retrieving documents may require participants’ time. 
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are those that are collected by individuals who were at the event (e.g. me noting down 
field notes), whilst the latter are written by outsiders and typically for other purposes 
(e.g. policy documents). 
5.3.3.1 Secondary documents 
For this particular study, most documents were treated s “secondary data sources” i.e. 
they were not developed for the purposes of my research but for some other 
purpose.(184) Research aims can help to determine how documents as secondary data 
sources are selected, although issues surrounding authenticity (are they genuine?), 
credibility (are they free from errors?), availability (are they accessible to the 
researcher?), meaningfulness (do they make sense?), and representativeness (are they 
typical and do they represent what one is looking for?), need to be kept in mind.(184-
186) My focus was on the Trusts, drawing on multi-sited ethnography as appropriate 
(see Chapter 4). I was therefore interested in obtaining documents that were about 
Lorenzo and the Trusts from a range of different sources. 
 
Documents were collected in order to gain an insight into governmental plans and media 
perspectives (as these were often difficult to access in any other way), to gain an 
overview of local and national implementation activities, and in order to make better 
sense of other data by helping to place them into context.(187) As such, documents were 
mainly used as a complementary data source and to ai  understanding of interviewees’ 
perspectives. Context was particularly important in my study as the field is littered with 
jargon and interviewees often assumed understanding on my part, which was not 
necessarily the case at the time of interviews and observations. 
 
Trusts documents consisted mainly of descriptions of situations and concepts (e.g. 
product descriptions); plans of action (e.g. the Project Initiation Document, PID, see 
Glossary); overviews of organisational structures and processes; and monitoring of 
progress (e.g. Lessons Learned Reports). In addition, I collected overarching documents 
Chapter 5: Methods 
 
 106 
related to Lorenzo, published by governmental bodies such as NHS CFH and LSPs, as 
well as publicly available press documents.  
 
More specifically, as far as I was able to be selectiv , my main selection criteria for 
documents included the following:11 
• Those that provided context relating to the capabilities of the software  
• Those that provided context to the implementation strategy and anticipated 
benefits, both locally and nationally 
• Those that provided information on the organisational context, history and 
progress of implementation 
• Those that provided insights into the perspectives of takeholder groups that 
were difficult to reach with other data collection methods 
• Those that related to lessons learned and anticipated challenges of the 
implementation of Lorenzo from a variety of viewpoints. 
 
Collection of documentary data was opportunistic, dependent on the willingness of the 
source to share often sensitive information (as in the case of Trust and unpublished 
documents from NHS CFH and the LSP), and selective (as in the case of press 
documents and publicly available reports from NHS CFH). Common to all was, 
however, their intimate relationship with the National Programme and specifically 
Lorenzo software. 
5.3.3.2 Primary documents 
I also analysed primary documents drafted specifically for my study. I captured my 
ongoing involvement, developing relationships with participants, and emerging 
analytical thoughts in field notes. These also captured informal observations, which 
involved me jotting down impressions throughout data collection and feedback sessions 
as well as during conferences. For example, Winthereik and colleagues describe how 
                                                
11 Please note that publicly available and more general (i.e. non-Lorenzo specific) documents relating to 
the conception of the Programme were not subjected to detailed analysis but are discussed in Chapters 1, 
6, 7 and 8. 
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resistance to become involved in certain activities ( ncluding research) and difficulties in 
gaining access to participants are an essential part of the data.(188) I kept my field notes 
in line with these considerations. 
 
The process of drafting and analysing field notes hlped to gain an insight into the wider 
context of the individual cases, how different spatially disconnected actors were related 
and brought together through the technology (e.g. the implementation team and users), 
as well as the general set-up of the Trust and related bodies.  
5.4 Data analysis 
Having described the procedures employed in my study, I will now move on to describe 
my analysis. Interviews were transcribed by a professional transcriber verbatim using 
the following notations:  
 
Words Speech particles (er, um etc.)  
Inserted by me for explanation [] 
Untranscribable as difficult to hear (xxx)  
 
Once interviews were returned by the transcriber, I went through each transcript to 
check for accuracy, to anonymise places and names of people mentioned, and to insert 
comments for clarification if necessary. This was done by listening to the audio files 
whilst amending the transcript. 
 
Observations were not transcribed verbatim, but extensive notes, including participant 
quotations and drawings, were taken by me and subseq ently converted to Microsoft 
Word format.  
 
In line with my methodological framework (Chapter 4), analysis was interpretative and 
informed by hermeneutics. Broad themes and sub-themes were identified employing 
thematic analysis and drawing on my understanding of the literature (Chapter 2). Coding 
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took place simultaneously to collecting the data in order to feed emerging issues back 
into subsequent data collection activities.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that the inevitably interpretative process involved in this 
type of analysis is somewhat dependent on my own background and characteristics as a 
researcher (further discussed below). I hope that trough careful attention to detail in 
outlining the methods employed, the results obtained, and the explanations reached, the 
research process will become more traceable and trasparent.  
 
Analysis was time consuming and the large volume of different types of data meant that 
answering the research questions needed to be kept in constant focus. The large amount 
of data collected also meant that to some extent I had be selective in terms of which 
instances deserved more thorough analysis than others.(189)  
 
The detailed analytical steps employed are outlined  the subsequent paragraphs. 
5.4.1 Analytical steps 
Analysis was informed by the approach outlined by Miles and Huberman,(190) and also 
drew on some analytic concepts discussed by Mason including cross-sectional and non 
cross-sectional indexing (i.e. examining common as well as specific themes), and the use 
of diagrams.(187)  
 
The authors describe qualitative data analysis techniques more generally, drawing on 
considerations from different approaches, and not in the context of strict epistemological 
and ontological positions. This way of analysis tends to be more flexible than more 
structured techniques such as for example the Framework approach,(191) which can be 
restrictive and may lead to focusing on specific aspects whilst neglecting others. This is 
particularly important when considering the complex and constantly changing 
implementation environment of Lorenzo. 
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Miles and Huberman propose that analysis should involve the following steps, which are 
applied to my study in the following sections below: 
• Developing a coding framework 
• Coding the data 
• Examining coded data in more detail 
• Description of coded data 
• Explanation of coded data and drawing conclusions. 
 
The use of matrices facilitated the analytical process and also helped to integrate 
different sources of data and different temporal dimensions. 
5.4.1.1 Developing a coding framework 
The first step in the analysis involved developing an overall coding framework based on 
categories and sub-categories identified in the literature review (see Chapter 2). This 
involved creating definitions as to what each category included.(187) 
 
Categories and sub-categories were defined as follows:  
• History and context (including the background of the participant and the setting) 
• Technical dimension (including usability, performance and integration, 
adaptability and flexibility, cost) 
• Human and social dimension (including attitudes, motivations, resistance and 
expectations, engagement and user input in design, training and support, 
champions, integration with existing work practices)  
• Organisational dimension (including getting the organisation ready for change, 
planning, leadership and management, teamwork and communication, learning 
and evaluation, realistic expectations)  
• Macro-environmental dimension (including other healthcare organisations, 
industry, policy, professional groups, independent bodies and the wider 
economic environment) 
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Limitations of this approach include the danger of having categories that are too loosely 
defined, certain text fitting into more than one category, the subjective organisation of 
the framework, its limited explanatory power, and a limited ability to represent complex 
processes and interrelationships.(187) Developing a coding framework necessitated 
certain assumptions that shaped the way data were tr ated, but this initial deductive 
approach was necessary in order to facilitate indexing (i.e. dropping relevant parts of 
data in categories), develop structure, delineate the focus of my analytical activity and 
facilitate retrievability in light of the wealth of data collected.  
 
However, in light of the limitations of this approach, I also paid careful attention to 
allowing additional themes/sub-themes to emerge that were not necessarily present in 
the pre-established coding framework. This constituted the inductive part of my analysis 
and involved examining different data through different lenses (e.g. from different 
stakeholder viewpoints, looking for potential alternative explanations), focusing on the 
uniqueness of parts of data, and investigating processes that were too complex to be 
captured by the coding framework.(187) 
 
My approach to analysis therefore consisted of a mixture of deductive and inductive 
approaches.(187) This helped me to focus data collecti n (around answering the 
research questions, and not getting overwhelmed by the volume of data); whilst being 
open to emerging issues in the data. Throughout my analysis, I further constantly revised 
the coding framework in light of emerging themes from the data.  
5.4.1.2 Coding the data 
Coding the data was essentially a process of organising, by uploading relevant 
transcripts, notes and documents into NVivo8 and indexing these against both pre-
established and emerging categories.(192) In doing so, I paid careful attention to 
keeping an open mind to both confirming and disconfirming evidence of established 
themes and sub-themes.  
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Data from all sources and data collection times were initially coded in the same 
framework, which helped integration and retrieval of data, allowing for easier 
comparison across the dimensions of interest. Please refer to Section 5.4.1.1 above, and 
Appendices 8 and 9 for a more detailed description of the coding framework. 
5.4.1.3 Examining coded data in more detail 
Miles and Huberman describe several early analytic techniques that can be applied when 
examining coded data in more detail.(190) The techniques I have drawn on are 
summarised below. 
 
Firstly, I employed “pattern coding”. This involved grouping items in codes identified in 
the coding framework into smaller chunks or sub-categories that reflected different 
recurring patterns in the data (this is also recommended by Stake (189)). The process 
was characterised by flexibility, with emerging sub-categories being checked in 
subsequent data collection activities. Patterns were selected based on frequency of 
occurrence and significance. 
 
Secondly, I drafted “memos”. These are analytical ideas about emerging general and 
conceptual issues often linking together different codes identified throughout the 
research. They were noted in NVivo8, my field journal and separate word processing 
files designated for capturing emerging overarching ideas and developments over time. I 
also captured issues that I was unclear about and found puzzling in this way.  
 
Thirdly, I and my supervisors held “case analysis meetings” throughout my study. These 
consisted of discussing emerging findings. In line with suggestions from Miles and 
Huberman, the main issues discussed during these meetings included: emerging themes, 
potential explanations and hypotheses, alternative explanations, implications for 
subsequent data collection, and implications for updating of the coding framework. 
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Lastly, I created “interim case summaries” consisting of findings from each Trust in 
order to determine what issues needed further investigation. In line with 
recommendations from Miles and Huberman, this involved a description of the case (the 
setting and organisational characteristics), a description of activities (relating to the 
implementation), and an outline of emerging issues and potential relationships. These 
case summaries informed further data collection and lea  to additional refinement of 
codes. 
5.4.1.4 Description of coded data 
Data from different cases was coded in the same coding framework, but initially 
analysed separately by using the “query” function in NVivo8 to extract case-specific 
data. This helped to gain an insight into the processes, complexities and local 
differences, as well as changes over time within different Trusts.  
 
Emerging issues for each Trust were then entered in a tabular format recording key 
developments at T1 and T2 along the dimensions identified in the coding framework. 
This process helped me to gain an overview of the most pertinent issues (as expressed in 
summary statements in the tables), facilitated comparison, and helped me to pull 
together data from disparate sources. I followed a similar process in relation to cross-
case comparisons. Here, summary statements along the identified dimensions were 
recorded for each Trust and then compared across Trusts.  
 
Throughout this process, I took care not to take indiv dual sources at face value whilst 
trying to understand the circumstances under which the data were produced. Each of the 
sources tended to have a different perspective on the si uation at hand, which was often 
particularly evident in documentary data as these were produced for specific purposes 
and for specific audiences. 
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5.4.1.5 Explanation of coded data and drawing conclusions 
I then examined emerging issues in more detail (see Appendices 8 and 9). This involved 
recording potential causes for changes over time, tensions and underlying issues, ways 
in which effects may have been produced, and exploration of links between emerging 
themes.  
 
Examining sources in relevant codes included either looking for complementary 
contextual data (providing context to give an insight into the situation at hand), 
confirmatory data (confirming certain theoretical explanations developed from other 
sources), and disconfirming data (those that did not fit with developed theoretical 
explanations). Disconfirming data and inconsistencis between data sources were 
examined in most detail. These were initially captured in memos and field notes, which 
helped to reveal tensions and temporal relationships. Studying inconsistencies helped to 
refine my emerging theoretical explanations and helped me to appreciate the 
complexities of each individual instance. I also paid particular attention to how different 
dimensions were related and how changes in one affected the other.  
 
Examining differences between the first and the second phase of data collection was an 
important component of the analysis and helped me to trace how individuals and 
organisations adapted to the new system, how attitudes changed, and how the overall 
implementation developed. I therefore investigated any discrepancies between the 
different time points in most detail, in trying to disentangle how individuals and 
organisations had moved from one state to the other.  
 
Overall analytic themes were then selected on the basis of frequency (i.e. how often they 
occurred), similarities/differences (i.e. clustering themes that had common or uncommon 
characteristics), and significance (i.e. to what extend they were judged to be related to 
other emerging issues). Exploring relationships and integration with theory was central 
to this process, whilst I also recorded how I made choices and reached explanations. 
Practically, I tested emerging themes against the data by making “if-then 
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tests”.(190;191) This was visually facilitated by drawing diagrams of relationships 
between various stakeholders informed by ANT (see Appendix 8).  
 
Analysis within a multiple-case study design is important for the transferability of 
findings as well as for progressing to a deeper level of explanation and greater 
appreciation of contextual factors (see Chapter 4).(190) In cross-case comparisons, I 
therefore examined variations in each case and the relationship between different causes, 
effects and outcomes.(190) This involved comparing devised explanations from the 
first/second case with data from the third case andchecking if they still applied or 
needed to be revised.(187) Emerging similarities and differences between cases can 
provide important theoretical insights and were therefore given particular attention in the 
analysis stage. Whilst common themes across cases were examined as they were all 
coded with the help of the overall coding framework, I was careful to preserve “case 
dynamics” in individual Trusts reflecting local contingencies.(190) 
 
I then integrated my findings with wider multi-sited ethnographic sources (e.g. 
interviews with wider stakeholder groups, broader policy documents and field notes 
from conferences), in order to provide context to the case studies and obtain a more 
comprehensive picture of the implementation landscape.  
 
In line with my interpretivist stance informed by hermeneutics, my analysis focused on 
examining how participants interpreted the situation (as recorded in the transcripts) and 
how these different viewpoints integrated to produce the observed effects. Similarly, 
documents were viewed as socially constructed entiti s reflecting the social and political 
context in which they were produced.(185;186) This involved examining the 
relationships between authors and readers including intended effects, and integration 
with my own reading (a reflexive process).(185;186;93)  
 
However, reflexivity not only characterised my analysis efforts in relation to analysing 
documents. I attempted to make my position as explicit as possible throughout my work, 
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which is why I will now move on to outlining my role as a researcher and potential 
consequences for my research. 
5.5 My role as a researcher  
Central to the notion of reflexivity is an awareness of the circumstances under which the 
research is conducted. This involves a constant questioning of one’s own assumptions so 
that the way data are collected and conclusions are reached becomes transparent.(194-
197) 
 
I was a 28/29-year-old female researcher with a background in psychology. I often 
explicitly referred to this background in interviews, as I felt it might have made 
participants more relaxed that I “had no idea” about either healthcare professional work 
practices or computers; although it may have intimidated others. I was also closely 
associated with the larger evaluation project as the part-time project coordinator,(33) 
which may have given me some more credibility with the senior staff. I had previous 
knowledge of the area and some qualitative research experience. 
 
Participants were most likely to perceive me as a ‘tranger’ or an ‘acquaintance’ with 
little shared experiences.(194;198-200) I therefore att mpted balancing rapport whilst 
still keeping a certain amount of distance as I felt that this was most appropriate.(201) I 
was also likely to be perceived as an academic, a young married woman (my “brought 
self”) and as an observer or interviewer (my “situationally created self”).(202) 
 
Throughout my study, I reflected on the effect I may have had on data collection and 
analysis and captured this in field notes. For example, humans use “typificatory 
schemes” to make sense of the world and so do researchers in relation to approaching 
participants, collecting data, analysing and writing up.(203) I did have stereotypes of the 
“arrogant consultant” and the “hard working nurse” – a constant questioning of these 
was therefore important. I also considered the impact of my ontological, 
epistemological, methodological and analytical assumptions on my work.(196;204;205) 
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The way I approached the setting and the data was influenced by my background, my 
supervisors, my funders and the University as a whole. Capturing this involved 
acknowledging that I was entering the situation with a certain amount of “baggage” 
including pre-conceptions and my own experiences. This most likely affected both the 
conduct and the analysis of data.(200;204) 
 
Several authors have outlined the importance of reflecting on researcher emotions as this 
can influence the way data are produced.(194;206-208) I experienced anxiety especially 
when interviewing individuals in high positions and when under time pressure. Similar 
issues to consider here included my mood on the day, the impact of sympathy (liking or 
disliking participants) and whether I felt comfortable during the interview or 
observation.(206) These feelings during the research p ocess were therefore captured in 
field notes.(199) 
 
The positioning of bodies in my study was also important, and again captured in field 
notes paying attention to both my own and participants’ body language.(209) Similarly, 
notes were kept of what participants said both “on and off the record” with careful 
attention how these accounts differed and recognising existing hierarchies.(196;210)  
 
I also reflected on the fact that I was paradoxically using technology in my own work 
(e.g. NVivo, telephone) to investigate the consequences of technology for healthcare 
professionals’ work practices. This seemed slightly counter-intuitive as it was likely to 
impact on the way I collected and analysed data, shping the way particular activities 
were carried out. It might be argued that, for example, software to facilitate coding 
inhibits the expression of the naturally “messy” nature of qualitative data. Similarly, 
using a telephone may inhibit the natural face-to-face production of verbal data. 
Recognising these complexities was important, but there were also clear practical 
reasons for drawing on these technologies. 
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5.6 Ethical considerations 
Whilst considering my own role, I also reflected on ethical aspects of my research and 
the associated responsibility of collecting data from human participants.(200) Applying 
for ethical approval further sensitised me to arising ethical issues, by helping to reflect 
on why and exactly how I planned to carry out research ctivities.  
 
In line with my interpretivist stance I felt that, most importantly, it was my responsibility 
to ensure that my findings reflected participants’ voices.(194;197;204;211) I was aware 
that participants often placed a great deal of trust in me, for example when disclosing 
potentially sensitive information (such as criticisms of commercial companies or 
management).(196;199) It was my ethical responsibility not to abuse this trust.(212) 
 
I also considered how to position myself in relation to viewpoints and opinions 
expressed by participants, and to what extent to voice these as a researcher.(200;212) I 
attempted to address this by trying to understand different positions taking into account a 
variety of circumstances and backgrounds.(200;207;212) 
 
I was also aware of the debate surrounding ethical absolutist (universal ethical rules) and 
situational relativist views.(194;212) Personally, I adopted a situational relativist 
position that takes account of the circumstances when making ethical decisions. I 
therefore attempted to rely on my common sense, subjective judgment and my moral 
belief system throughout the conduct of my work.(199) 
5.6.1 Consent 
An important part surrounding ethical considerations is ensuring that participants are 
sufficiently informed about the study and on this basis consent to participating. 
Interviews and observations were voluntary in nature and conducted at times convenient 
for participants. Individuals were provided with information sheets and asked to sign 
consent forms before data collection commenced (seeAppendices 3 and 4). The 
information sheet explained the rationale of my study in lay-terms, outlined what 
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participation would involve and that data would be treated in the strictest confidence. It 
also provided participants with contact details of my supervisors and an independent 
researcher with knowledge of my study. 
 
Interviews and observations began with an informal chat to make participants 
comfortable (“Hello, how are you…?”). I also repeated the aims of my study, reminded 
participants that they could withdraw at any time and that they could withhold 
information they did not wish to disclose. I answered any arising questions and 
reiterated that interviews were audio-taped. If participants were not comfortable with the 
audio-taping, I took notes instead. They were also sked if they wished to see transcripts, 
which was, however, only requested by one individual. 
 
During this process, I considered that consent may not always be truly informed, as 
participants may not have strictly understood what my research involved.(194;212) I 
attempted to address this by being as explicit as pos ible in relation to my aims and what 
I planned to do with the data obtained. In addition, when considering observations, I 
may have observed patients or other healthcare staff who have not given explicit 
informed consent to be observed. I dealt with this by not noting anything about these 
individuals. There were no instances during my work where participants indicated that 
they did not wish to be observed. 
5.6.2 Confidentiality and anonymity 
As part of the broader ethical debate, it is also important to consider the protection of 
participants’ anonymity. In doing so, I treated recorded and transcribed data as well as 
notes from observations in the strictest confidence, anonymising each item by assigning 
participants and Trusts a number or letter. Recorded data were sent via secure university 
email for transcription or given to the transcriber in person. Recorded and transcribed 
data were kept in a secure place (a locked password-pr tected computer in a locked 
office at the University of Edinburgh and on my home computer).  
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As case studies often contain a large amount of detail, anonymisation is an issue 
resulting in Trusts being potentially identifiable, specially to those with “insider 
knowledge”. However, there is also a trade-off between anonymising contextual data 
and helping the reader to understand local dynamics. Whilst I made every effort to 
anonymise cases and participants, I therefore also acknowledge that those with insider 
knowledge are more likely to be able to identify locations and/or individuals. In order to 
reduce this risk, specific job titles of individuals, such as “the Chief Executive” for 
example, were removed and replaced with more generic d scriptors such as “Manager”. 
5.7 Quality in my research 
Although it has been argued that scientific criteria for rigour in quantitative research 
(such as validity and reliability) cannot be directly applied to qualitative research, 
several methods to ensure quality in qualitative research have been outlined in the 
literature. For example, Lincoln and Guba propose “trustworthiness criteria” including 
credibility (whether methods are appropriate to answer the research questions), 
transferability (whether the findings can be transferred to other contexts), dependability 
(whether they can be repeated), and confirmability (to what extent the researcher has 
shaped the study findings).(172) Methods employed to ensure rigour and quality in my 
study will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
Many have advocated the use of triangulation as a me ns of increasing credibility of a 
study.(170;172;187;189;213) The underlying assumption is that different ways of data 
collection, approaching the same issue from a variety of angles, should lead to similar 
conclusions resulting in a more holistic picture than could have been obtained relying 
solely on one method of data collection. It follows that triangulation can help to judge 
whether an observation is valid. If contradicting evid nce is found by drawing on 
different methods, the interpretations may need to be revised accordingly. A common 
way to achieve this is data source triangulation, which I also used in my study. Here, 
different types of data are collected in different contexts (e.g. including interviews, 
observations and documents). Whilst data sources can complement each other to result 
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in a more comprehensive picture, triangulation can also help to address weaknesses of 
each individual data collection method. For example, observations can help to gain an 
insight into more informal work practices, whilst interviews are well suited to access 
participants’ meanings constructed on the basis of experiences.  
 
Another way to increase quality in qualitative research is respondent validation, 
sometimes called member checking.(170;172;187;189;190;2 3) This involves 
participants helping to verify and/or revise emerging conclusions reached. I employed 
this strategy by feeding back emerging findings to both implementation team members 
and service leads periodically throughout my data colle tion period. I do, however 
acknowledge that this type of respondent validation represented a particular viewpoint – 
in this case, that of managers rather than users of the software. This was to some extent 
addressed by discussing emerging findings periodically with my two PhD 
supervisors.(172) This “fresh” perspective (of a doctor and a nurse by background) 
helped me to refine my analysis and explore the data from different angles. It also 
helped me to keep focused on my overall study aims.  
 
The use of theoretical sampling is also often advocated.(213;214) As discussed above, 
sampling was informed by my theoretical perspective (e.g. ANT, multi-sited 
ethnography, see Chapter 4), with my research questions in constant focus. This meant 
that participants and Trusts were initially sampled in line with their relationship to 
Lorenzo. It also involved drawing on a range of pers ctives in order to ensure that 
many viewpoints were represented.(170) At the later s ages, I focused on sampling 
deviant (or negative) cases in order to investigate whether a theoretical proposition 
either applied or needed to be modified in light of these.(170-172) Practically, I 
approached this by applying rival explanations and testing whether these explained the 
data better, ensuring that findings did not occur de to chance, searching for evidence 
that refuted explanations, and by following up unexpected findings.(190) 
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Transparency throughout the research is also often advocated as a method to help the 
reader ascertain the quality of a study.(170-172;187;190;213;214) In relation to method, 
this may entail a detailed description of the steps involved in collecting data, reasons for 
particular choices of methods and sampling strategies, and the involvement of the 
researcher. In relation to analysis, transparency means seeking potential alternative 
explanations and being explicit about how interpretations and conclusions were reached. 
This then allows the reader to assess whether conclusions make sense and how they 
emerged from the data. Lincoln and Guba refer to “thick descriptions” in this context. 
These can emerge from the researcher’s “prolonged engagement” with the subject of 
study and include detailed accounts of how the research was conducted, the context, and 
researcher involvement throughout the process.(172) I made a conscious attempt to 
address these issues by outlining steps involved in data collection and analysis in detail, 
whilst critically reflecting on my own position (as discussed in Section 5.5 above).  
 
With this in mind, there is, however, also a need to be pragmatic. For example, Barbour 
cautions that such methods to ensure quality need to be applied sensibly.(213) I 
attempted to address this by approaching data collecti n and analysis in a pragmatic 
rather than prescriptive way, whilst keeping an awareness of quality issues. This would, 
for example, be the case where my common sense (or disc etion) indicated that 
participants were too busy to conduct an extensive amount of member checking as their 
primary concern was the implementation at hand. In these cases, I deliberately tried not 
to irritate individuals with repeated phone calls and emails. 
5.8 Transferability 
Transferability is the qualitative equivalent to notions of generalisability and external 
validity often employed in quantitative research. It involves assessing the extent to 
which research findings may be transferable to other settings.(170;214) Critics of 
qualitative, and particularly case study research have, however argued that is difficult to 
generalise from such studies and apply findings to other contexts.(187;215)  
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In attempting to address these concerns, Flyvbjerg,(167) outlines that the ability to 
generalise from a case study depends on how it is sampled. Cases can be selected on the 
basis of being either typical or atypical. If the case is a typical (or critical, as in my 
study), one is able to generalise to other cases on the basis of developing detailed theory 
and then testing if it applies (theoretical generalisation). This can then help to either 
confirm or refute developed theory (i.e. concluding that something found in one case 
also applies to other cases means that it is likely to be generalisable).(167) If the 
developed theory does not apply to other cases or does not sufficiently explain the 
observed processes, then it needs to be modified.(167) Sampling atypical, or deviant 
cases, on the other hand, can help to suggest causes for certain phenomena and help to 
test out emerging explanations.(167) It follows that although single case studies can help 
to confirm, refute or develop previously made propositi ns, multiple comparative case 
studies are more powerful in relation to transferability.(189)  
5.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter has built on my literature review and my theoretical approach (Chapters 2 
and 4), by applying these and giving a detailed description of the methods employed. 
My methodological focus was on examining sociotechnical processes of change by 
investigating the views and experiences of users and the consequences of Lorenzo for 
their work practices within wider organisational and macro-environmental contexts.  
 
I began with outlining approaches to sampling Trusts (the cases or organisational 
contexts), multi-sited ethnography informants (the macro-environmental context) and 
individual participants (the micro-context). A range of qualitative data was obtained 
from these including semi-structured interviews, observations, documents and field 
notes. When outlining my approach to data collection and thematic analysis, I attempted 
to be as transparent as possible, carefully justifying decisions made throughout the 
process. I then moved to deliberations surrounding consent, confidentiality, ethics and 
reflexivity, which have shaped my approach. The concluding paragraphs have outlined 
how I tackled issues surrounding quality and transferability. 




The findings resulting from my data collection and analytical activities described here 
will be outlined in the following chapters. In doing so, I will initially describe case-
specific findings and sociotechnical processes of change locally (Chapter 6), before 
moving on to cross-case comparisons and integration with data obtained from 
informants outside the immediate Trust environment (Chapter 7).  
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Chapter 6: Findings from individual case studies 
 6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will report on the findings that have emerged from the data collection and 
analysis strategies in individual case studies outlined in Chapter 5. My overall aim was 
to explore the views and experiences of users as well as organisational consequences of 
introducing Lorenzo and how these evolved over time in the complex environment of a 
national EHR implementation.  
 
I will begin by summarising the overall data collected across cases and then move to 
presenting each case study separately, detailing data obtained and theoretical insights 
gained locally as I go along. I chose this format in order to reflect local dynamics as 
each case study represented a distinct story. Cross-case comparisons and integration 
with multi-sited ethnography sources will follow in Chapter 7.  
6.1.1 Summary of overall data gathered in case stud ies 
I gathered data from three Trusts with the following characteristics (Table 6.1): 
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Table 6.1: Characteristics of recruited Trusts 











B Acute Foundation (i.e. 
more autonomous) 
Rural 1,021 beds <£200m 
H Community Non-Foundation 
(i.e. less 
autonomous) 











Overall data collected in case studies comprised interview data from a total of 66 
different participants, 38.5 hours of non-participant observation, 149 pages of press 
statements, 31 pages of field notes, and 15 local Trust documents. 
 
I conducted a total of 88 interviews with 66 different participants within the three Trusts 
between February 2009 and November 2010 (17 with imple entation team members 
and 49 with Lorenzo users). A total of 41 interviews (with 27 different participants) 
were carried out in Site B (an acute setting), 26 interviews (with 19 different 
participants) in Site H (a community setting), and 21 interviews (with 20 different 
participants) in Site Q (a mental health setting). 16 individuals were interviewed twice, 
four individuals were interviewed three times, and one individual was interviewed four 
times. Those interviewed more than twice tended to consist of implementation team 
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members who were consulted during feedback meetings (as outlined in Chapter 5). 
Detailed participant information for each case study site is provided in Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2: Participant information interviews 
Interviews at Site B 
February 2009 - November 
2010 
Interviews at Site H July 
2009 - July 2010 
Interviews at Site Q 
December 2009 -November 
2010 
41 interviews with staff 
with a total of 27 different 
interviewees: six 
operational staff and 21 
users 
26 interviews with staff 
with a total of 19 different 
interviewees: five 
operational staff and 14 
users 
21 interviews with staff 
with a total of 20 different 
interviewees: six 
operational staff and 14 
users 
 
Observational data amounted to 38.5 hours with accompanying field notes. Observations 
lasted from 1.5 to 11 hours and were obtained from a total of eight different settings 
(including clinics, back office use, and strategic meetings between users and 
implementation team members). Differences in the number of hours spent on 
observations across Trusts were due to the often conflicting local priorities and the lack 
of availability of gatekeepers to facilitate my visits. More detailed information on 
observations in each Trust is provided in Table 6.3. 
Chapter 6: Findings from individual case studies 
 
 127 
Table 6.3: Observational data collected at the thre Trusts 
 Data collected at 
Site B February 
2009 - November 
2010 
Data collected at 
Site H July 2009 - 
July 2010 
Data collected at 






10 hours (including 
an inpatient surgery 
setting and an 
outpatient setting 
where the software 
was used) 
24 hours (including 
use of the software 
healthcare settings 
and staff meetings) 
4.5 hours of staff 
using the software 
 
As outlined in Chapter 5, I also collected a range of other material, including secondary 
documents and field journal notes. Secondary documents somewhat varied across 
Trusts, but essentially included overarching policy documents and product descriptions 
of Lorenzo, searches of press statements, PIDs, lesons learned reports and business 
cases. Press statements and overarching documents overlapped to some degree with the 
multi-sited ethnography informants, but I included them in the case studies due to their 
often intimate relationship with local developments. Details of both primary and 
secondary documents are provided in Table 6.4 below. 
Table 6.4: Summary of documents collected across Trusts 



















Chapter 6: Findings from individual case studies 
 
 128 




the 25th June 
2009 and 
repeated on 4th 
November 










and repeated in 
October 2010 
– 60 pages 
altogether 
Weekly 







repeated on 4th 
November 2010 
















































12 pages 5 pages 14 pages  
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6.1.2 Individual case studies 
Having outlined data collected across Trusts, I will now present my three detailed case 
studies. Each case study has a similar structure, beginning with an introduction and 
overview (including a summary of data collected loca ly), before moving on to describe 
the individual setting and implementation context. Sociotechnical processes of change in 
each Trust are then explored and each case study concludes with a summary of 
potentially transferable theoretical contributions. 
 
Throughout this chapter, common dimensions between case study sites have naturally 
emerged, particularly in relation to technological and macro-environmental factors. I 
will explore these in more detail in Chapter 7, and have here focused on discussing the 
different dynamics in each site. Where similarities occur, I have cross-referenced 
between relevant sections. 
6.2 “We call it Horenzo”- case study of Site B 
6.2.1 Introduction 
This case study describes my findings relating to the introduction of Lorenzo R1 and 
R1.9 in Site B, one of the first acute Trusts to implement Lorenzo as part of the National 
Programme through the LSP route. Please refer to Chapter 1 for a detailed description of 
the different releases. Data collection took place between February 2009 and November 
2010 and consisted of interviews with a total of 27 different Trust staff including users 
and implementation team members, as well as Trust and press documents. Detailed 
methods were described in Chapter 5, but a summary of data collected locally can be 
viewed in Box 6.1 below. 
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Box 6.1: Summary of data collected at Site B 
- 41 interviews with hospital staff with a total of 27 different interviewees: six 
operational staff and 21 users 
- 10 hours of observations and associated field notes including an inpatient surgery 
setting and an outpatient setting where the software as used 
- Researcher notes from the recruitment meeting 
- 77 pages from press searches 
- Trust documents including: Deployment History Timeline, PID, Electronic Patient 
Record Next Stage Business Case 
- 12 pages of researcher field journal 
 
I will discuss emerging issues and tensions in the following paragraphs. Section 6.2.2 
will set the scene of the implementation, briefly describing the organisation itself and its 
role in the National Programme. My analysis resulted in five over-arching themes, 
which I will discuss in detail in Section 6.2.3. How these themes have emerged from the 
data was outlined in Chapter 5. Section 6.2.4 concludes with a summary of potentially 
transferable theoretical contributions and the remainder briefly touches on the state of 
affairs at the time I completed my data collection. 
6.2.2 History and context of Site B 
6.2.2.1 The profile of the Trust 
The Trust was founded in the late 1990s and received Foundation status in 2010. 
Inpatient care was provided from three main hospital si es with a total of 1,021 beds, 
whilst outpatient care consisted of clinical support in GP surgeries, community facilities 
and satellite clinics. 
 
Services were delivered to a rural and disparate community of around 363,000 people 
covering an area of approximately 1,000 square miles. The healthcare organisations 
themselves were scattered with over 50 miles between some.  




The Trust employed around 5,000 staff and had a turnover of approximately £231m in 
2008/09. It was part of a grouping covering the NME area of England.  
6.2.2.2 Site B, the National Programme and Lorenzo software 
One Site B hospital was the first English hospital to pilot Lorenzo software. It started 
implementing R1 as a “soft-landing” (as discussed in Chapter 1, also see Glossary), 
initially running limited new functionality in parallel with paper processes. 
Implementation began in one surgical ward at the end of October 2008 after a series of 
missed deadlines (it was originally planned to be June 2008). This was followed by go-
live at another surgical ward at the end of April 2009 and an orthopaedic ward in June 
2009.  
 
Lorenzo R1 at Site B comprised Requests and Results (R&R, see Glossary) functionality 
including radiology, endoscopy, pathology and clinial documentation (CDC, see 
Glossary). The functionality was not Spine-compliant (i.e. connected to the national 
database that held demographic details) and was mainly used by junior doctors and 
nurses, who could order tests and input allergies in the record.  
 
At T2 interviews, the Trust had moved to using R1.9 which replaced iPM with the 
Lorenzo PAS in all services except Accident and Emergency (A&E, see Glossary). This 
was the first implementation of R1.9 in an acute setting ever, a Trust-wide undertaking 
with a user base of 3,500 staff. Initially, the go-live with R1.9 was planned to take place 
in March 2010, but it did not happen until June 2010 after a series of missed deadlines 
and for a variety of reasons discussed below. R1.9 was used in both inpatient and 
outpatient departments, mainly by administrative staff, to check patient demographics, 
and view clinic lists and referral letters. Its clinical functionality was limited. 
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R1 was, at the time of follow-up interviews (T2), still used on a limited number of wards 
only and had almost the same functionality as at T1 data collection, although it was now 
also possible to record surgical notes and use thes for discharge communications.  
 
The Trust’s short-term strategic direction was to “c ncentrate on the core system [R1.9] 
to get that up and running properly before we then go any further” (Interview, 
Manager). This meant rolling-out R1 across the Trust after implementing R1.9 and then 
introducing the more clinical functionalities such as ePrescribing, which had a planned 
go-live of March 2011 in three wards initially.  
 
A detailed implementation timeline can be viewed in Table 6.5 below. 
Table 6.5: Detailed implementation timeline at Site B 









statements and policy 
documents) 
2004   National Audit Office: 
Lorenzo originally due to 
go-live 
1/4/2006 iPM go-live – interim 
solution supplied by 
CSC, first large acute 
deployment with 3500 
 Replacing an old Siemens 
PAS with “big bang”  
iPM implementation, 
connected three hospital 
Sites for the first time 
21/6/2007 PACS go-live replacing 
radiography films 
  
April 2008 PID for implementation 
of wider Lorenzo 
functionality signed off 
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by Trust Board (see 
Glossary) 
16/6/2008   Site originally due to go-
live with R1 
Autumn 
2008 
  Site originally due to go-
live with Release 2 (R2) 
24/10/2008 Lorenzo R1 “soft” go-
live, first acute 
deployment, initially 
R&R in one surgical 
ward  
 A second soft launch 
planned to take place 
shortly 
14/01/2009 Lorenzo R1 “hard” go-
live (all radiology 
requests were now 
supposed to be going 
through Lorenzo) 
  
18/2/2009 Second ward went live 
with CDC, R&R and 
electronic discharge 
summary 
Planning to roll-out 
R1 across all 55 
wards 
 
June 2009 3rd ward went live with 
R1 in an orthopaedic 
ward 
  
July 2009   Planned implementation 
of Release 3 (R3) 
November 
2009 
 R2 due to go-live in 




  Planned implementation 
of Release 4 (R4) 
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July 2010 R1.9 go-live across 
three hospitals  
  
2012   Earliest date where full 
benefits from the 
integrated Lorenzo 
solution were to be 
expected  
2012  CSC will stop 
supporting iPM 
 
6.2.2.3 The Trust’s decision to become an EA 
Existing IT solutions before Lorenzo and iPM in Site B consisted of a mixture paper and 
electronic systems. The Trust had decided to move twards a more integrated solution 
and had been looking into several options in this re pect. According to Trust 
documentation, these included the following: 
 
1. Keep using iPM: This was not viewed as feasible as the system was considered 
to lack clinical functionality. Also, CSC was to withdraw support for iPM once 
comparable Lorenzo functionality became available. 
2. Take Lorenzo as a standard implementation through the National Programme: 
Trusts were expected to do this once R3 was fully developed. 
3. Become an EA of Lorenzo. 
4. Choose software outside of the National Programme and “go it alone” . 
 
The non-financial option appraisal, based on risks, benefits and the local business 
strategy, left the Trust with no clear preferred option. However, on the basis of financial 
considerations, the Trust decided to become an EA for both R1 and R2 (Option 3). The 
decisive factor here was the Deployment Incentive Fund (DIF) of £1 million for each 
organisation that piloted the first version of the software. This meant that the Trust itself 
expected to pay a comparably small amount of £215k for implementation-related 
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activities. In addition, the Trust believed that they would get more support from both 
CSC and NHS CFH, as well as more input into system d sign, when implementing 
Lorenzo through the LSP route. 
6.2.2.4 The composition of the implementation team and external support 
In line with these expectations, the Trust was able to draw on a variety of skilled NHS 
CFH staff including a Project Manager, a Test and Issues Manager, and a Test Script 
Manager. There was further a range of CSC staff on site including a Business Change 
Consultant, a Project Manager, a Reporting Specialist, four Product Specialists, a Data 
Migration Analyst, an Interface Analyst, two Testing Leads, Trainers and Floorwalkers 
(see Glossary). In addition, they sub-contracted a Project Manager from an independent 
provider organisation. 
 
For R1, the Trust’s internal implementation team consisted of eight permanent staff, 
including a Clinical Lead, and an additional 16 temporary staff (initially planned to be 
there for a period of 12 months). This team comprised a mixture of Technologists and 
Management Specialists including Project Management, Change Management, Security 
and Analytical Support, and Business Change Analysts (see Glossary). 
 
Other staff employed over the course of the project in luded Project Administrators, 
Cut-over Managers, Trainers, e-Learning Developers, Lorenzo Build Managers, Product 
Specialists, Business Change Analysts, Test Managers, Issue Managers, Information 
Analysts, Business Continuity Coordinators, Clinical Analysts, Communications Leads, 
Configurations Specialists, Application Support Advisors, Data Cleansing Specialists, 
Service Desk Managers and Operators, Benefits Analysts and Floorwalkers (see 
Glossary).  
 
The Trust also had a Steering Group and a Change Management Board overseeing the 
implementation and monitoring progress. Members included the implementation team, 
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representatives from commissioning, the SHA, NHS CFH, the PCT, CSC, patients and 
finance. 
6.2.3 Sociotechnical processes of change 
6.2.3.1 Lack of observable progress with many issues encountered using and 
implementing the software 
Although all interviewees supported the basic vision of “going electronic”, over time 
there were increasing doubts as to whether Lorenzo was the most appropriate system to 
achieve this vision. This development seemed to be du to a lack of observable 
implementation progress and the issues encountered wh n using and implementing the 
software locally, particularly in relation to R1.9. Difficulties and challenges were 
certainly expected by all, but it was the sustained ature of these that contributed to 
increasingly negative attitudes.  
 
“Well, I guess my views, you know, haven’t changed dramatically, I mean in the sense 
that, you know, I still believe in the system and I still think it, you know, ultimately will 
do a good job. I mean I guess what I’ve seen over th  last year has been sort of 
disappointing as far as the rapidity with which the Programme has evolved and has 
really become deployable…” (Interview, Manager). 
 
Negative attitudes were particularly apparent amongst the more frequent users who 
reported that it increased their workloads significantly. There was also a lack of 
understanding of how exactly Lorenzo could benefit pa ient care, which led many to 
conclude that the implementation was a general “symptom” of healthcare being 
increasingly bureaucratised.  
 
“(Laughs) The general trend is it’s crap but we are t ying to let people know to improve 
it, even we are struggling to use it because it’s so slow and... I mean I’m expecting it to 
be improved as a system because otherwise there is no point to use it, I think it should be 
changed if it’s not improving.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
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These developments were exacerbated by a feeling that issues with the software raised 
by both implementation team members and users were not addressed by the LSP over an 
extended period of time, meaning a lack of visible mprovement. 
 
“…we’d actually identified for CSC a series of fixes [see Glossary] that we required 
within certain time bands. So we’d identified something like 90 things needed fixing 
within two weeks, a further 120 needed fixed in six weeks then another batch in 12 weeks 
and another batch in 16 weeks. And that was all based on deals we’d done with the 
organisation but also understanding what the tolerance levels around workarounds 
were within the organisation. And either because of the noise or because of 
mismanagement within CSC or because of misinterpretation of the issues that required 
fixing we still haven’t got all our two week fixes yet. We’ve got very few of our six week 
fixes so, we felt the organisation could tolerate certain things for two weeks, it had to 
tolerate some of that stuff for four months. They’v had to tolerate all the six weeks 
issues for four months, the 12 week issues still aren’t fixed either.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
Implementation team members stated that this lack of improvement over time was due to 
a delay on the LSP’s part to respond to change requests and to provide appropriate 
expertise and support. As a result the relationship with the LSP and the supplier became 
progressively strained, characterised by repeatedly missed go-live dates as the software 
was simply not perceived as being ready for implementation. 
 
“Yes, and I think that we had quite a slow model, the service delivery model that’s used 
to respond to issues and I don’t really, well it doesn’t work. It was broken you know by 
the whole thing and we still haven’t got lots of things kind of settled yet in terms of 
where we’re going to get issues sorted out in [software] builds [see Glossary] so yes, its 
been quite a difficult time and it will be for a little while longer I think, yea.” (Interview, 
Manager) 
 
These problems may have affected the morale of users, with a number of staff reporting 
that they were “de-motivated” and that some of their colleagues had gone “off with 
stress”. This was often directly attributed to the implementation process. Others, notably 
the implementation team and the less frequent users, were found to be more positive 
towards the system characterised focusing on potential fu ure benefits. Implementation 
team members tended to rationalise negative attitudes amongst staff by stating that 
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typically “people do not like change”. They seemed to desperately try to stay positive in 
order to move the implementation forward.  
 
However, many negative perceptions were due to basic software performance issues, 
particularly in relation to R1.9. Here, users referred mainly to usability issues, whilst 
implementation team members tended to be most concerned with stability.  
 
In relation to both releases, users complained about the large amount of clicks and 
mandatory screens required when using the system. These were perceived to increase 
workloads and led many to conclude that Lorenzo was “not fit for purpose” and “lacked 
intuitiveness” as information was often difficult to find.  
 
“Two fundamental criticisms remain that the system is not, and what you see on the 
screen is not intuitive, in other words if you haven’t been taught, haven’t used it 
regularly enough to remember what all the sequences ar , so if you’re only dipping into 
it occasionally it is actually very, very difficult because it is, you cannot sort of 
automatically think well this is what I want to do next and look at it and say that’s what I 
do…the other criticism of it is the speed of the system that you don’t, when you expect to 
move from one field to another it is not instant and that is a big concern in a system 
where one feels instinctively that it ought to be.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Implementation team members generally acknowledged that speed and the large number 
of clicks required was problematic for users. This was further complicated by the fact 
that Lorenzo did not integrate with the Trust’s existing systems (including paper). As a 
result, work was often duplicated as records still had to be printed and users had to 
switch between electronic systems.  
 
“But of course they’re not integrated, all we’re doing is literally downloading stuff from 
Lorenzo into our radiology information system, it’s populating some of the 
demographics which saves a bit of time I suppose at this end potentially but beyond that 
it’s not, there’s no sort of integration.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
With R1, these issues had not been resolved over tim  leading to increasingly frustrated 
users. R1.9 had, in addition to the problems encountered with R1, a number of more 
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fundamental difficulties, which according to the implementation team, were due to a 
flawed data migration process and a general lack of system stability. Symptoms of the 
latter included freezing of screens, randomly loggin  out users, and lengthy document 
loading times (some users quoted 10 minutes).  
 
“Interviewee 1: Yeah or your cards are not working or it goes down, like it went down 
for a day the other day didn’t it. 
Interviewee 2: It’s logged me out a three times yesterday. 
Interviewee 1: It really is very frustrating; you jst can’t get on with your work.” 
(Group Interview, Administrative Staff) 
 
“He selects a patient, then clicks “link to encounter”, clinical note, create note, takes 
quite a while to load different screens until the note template/form comes up, he types in 
the name of the surgeon (his name) and the name of the anaesthetist at the top of the 
form into boxes, types in free text under the headings site/presenting 
complaint/comorbidity/diagnosis” (Observation researcher notes). 
 
Issues resulting from the data migration process were more fundamental. For example, 
they included the system displaying wrong information such as showing a patient was 
still alive when they had died. This, combined with the unpredictable nature of new 
problems occurring daily, led users to conclude that t ey could not “trust”  Lorenzo.  
 
“No I don’t trust it, on Saturday we had a patient died and on Monday the dietician 
came up and she said can you just tell me where this man is and I said “Oh he died on 
Saturday” but “he’s still alive on Lorenzo”, I said “you are joking” cause like ward 
clerks don’t work weekends, one of the staff had deceased him but they hadn’t gone into 
the final page so they just come out of it so that m n was still alive on Lorenzo, well all 
his appointments were still open everything. But she didn’t know that and the only 
reason I knew is because the dietician had come up and asked me where, so I had to ring 
the helpline and they said well that’s what happens but it’s not, do you understand what 
I mean? It’s not, you can’t trust it.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
In outpatient clinics, problems with R1.9 were still more pronounced as the PAS 
replacement affected the running of clinics. Here, data migration issues resulted in 
clinics being under-booked or over-booked, missing i formation on the system, and 
patients being booked in at the wrong time and in the wrong clinic. This had obvious 
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implications for patients, which were more noticeabl  with the introduction of R1.9 as 
users could not avoid using the software (as it replaced the existing PAS). As a result, 
outpatient clinics tended to run late, patients turned up without appointments, and/or had 
to wait for staff to find the appropriate information.  
 
Accordingly, all implementation team and LSP efforts concentrated on getting R1.9 
“stable”  in order to address fundamental organisational needs. However, the number of 
change requests due to the large user base meant that they found it hard to keep up.  
 
“I mean to be fair I mean we have to get 1.9 stable, I mean that is the absolute most 
important thing but, you know; I mean everything else sort of suffers. I mean we have 
finite resources and, you know, I mean we have to allocate those as best we can.” 
(Interview, Manager) 
 
This focus on R1.9 also led some R1 users to conclude that they were not listened to and 
lacked support as none of their problems were addressed. The following field notes 
illustrate this: 
 
“11.30am: We then went to ward [number] to interview the ward clerk (recorded), 
during the interview the Ward Manager popped in, they were both really negative 
although the Ward Manager was championing the system a year ago, this was because it 
had not improved at all over time, they are now using paper whenever they can, the 
ward clerk has to use the system and is really stres ed as it has tripled her workload, 
after the interview the ward clerk said goodbye to me and said it was nice to see me, I 
had the feeling that she was almost crying as she told me “I can’t even find out whether 
people have been discharged on the system, you have to tell them the problems we’re 
having…nobody seems to be listening to us.”  
 
Consequently, users often did “not bother” reporting arising problems, which may have 
resulted in the implementation team having a skewed picture of how many problems 
were actually experienced on the ground. Some users, who had initially championed the 
software were so frustrated with the lack of progress that they had become “negative 
champions”,(35) and the loudest and most passionate critics of Lorenzo.  
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“It’s rubbish it doesn’t work, it doesn’t do what its supposed to do and it’s hard to use 
and it’s not delivered anything that it’s promised and we’ve lost loads of patients, loads 
of patients have been lost, not from surgery but from other departments yeah, we call it 
Horenzo.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Again, less frequent (and often more senior clinical) users who could avoid using the 
system found the support to be adequate. 
6.2.3.2 Integration of work practices with the demands of the software versus integration 
with existing work practices 
As a result of the introduction of Lorenzo, users had to change existing work practices to 
accommodate the demands of the technology. Some question d whether this was 
appropriate, as they expected the new technology to integrate more effectively with their 
work practices. Implementation team members, on the o r hand, stated that existing 
work practices had to be “re-engineered” in order to deliver more efficient and higher 
quality care. This was, however, slightly complicated as mapping and planning of future 
work practices had to be carried out in relation to software that was still in development. 
As a result stakeholders had to make “b st guesses” of how it would affect clinical 
work.  
 
“I mean a lot of the R1 functionality works quite wll but on the other hand the clinical 
content is woefully inadequate, you know, I mean they’re working hard to try and 
develop clinical content but it, you know, without clinical content clinicians won’t use 
it… I mean we were really, you know, you can only sort of entice people for so long until 
they finally sort of get fed up and say well, you know, come back and talk to me when 
you’ve got something to work with and that’s a lot of what we’re having now.” 
(Interview, Manager) 
 
An additional complication was the often “messy” and unpredictable nature of clinical 
work, which the system could simply not accommodate. Many users commented that 
they were mandated to use the software, but they stated hat this resulted in lower quality 
care and less efficient ways of working. 
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“I don’t know if I like it as much as I thought I was going to. I think it’s longer; it takes 
longer than the other way, than the iPM obviously that was a lot quicker. It’s just the 
way you seem to be sort of going from one page then waiting for the next one to load in 
it just seems ages and ages and obviously when you’re b sy…” (Interview, Healthcare 
Professional). 
 
The perceived lack of integration with existing practices resulted from a range of 
usability issues, which did not attenuate over time. These were perceived to be due to the 
way Lorenzo was designed, i.e. by developers in India who, clinical staff thought, had a 
lack of insight into the nature of clinical work inUK healthcare. In this context, a 
number of issues were referred to frequently. 
 
Firstly, whilst the number of clicks and mandatory screens were designed to improve 
data quality and recording, ensuring that “things were done properly” (according to 
implementation team members), users stated that this decreased usability as it meant that 
more time was spent on administrative tasks and data input. This was seen as 
particularly problematic amongst clinical staff who stated that this mounting focus on 
administrative duties was detracting from their clini al responsibilities.  
 
“Well put this data in and put that in, well I’m sorry that’s not my job, you know, and 
putting demographics in isn’t a nursing task it’s a secretarial one, you know, putting 
ethnicity in it’s not my job it’s, you know, so tha was the ethos of it.” (Interview, 
Healthcare Professional) 
 
Secondly, the system seemed to make workflows more linear than was the case with 
paper systems. Users were accustomed to carrying out many different tasks in parallel, 
which the system did not allow them to do. For example, browsing letters and records 
was complicated as, on Lorenzo, individual patient tems had to be opened one by one.  
 
In addition to these more subtle but significant ways in which the system changed user 
work practices, there were also some basic issues with performance such as slow loading 
of screens, “long-winded” printing, and display of wrong information (as referred to 
above, particularly in R1.9).  




“To do it you have to click on the patient, click on the electronic patient record which is 
like not, it’s not up its just, you just sit there basically looking at the screen for a while 
then there’s a list of things that you can go into, y u can go into the patient details or 
you can go into like demographics but it’s all you know you press one button and then it 
takes a while to come in and then you have to get into another, its hard work.” 
(Interview, Healthcare Professional). 
 
Users developed ways to cope with these problems and to compensate for perceived 
shortcomings. Some of these were temporary, and indeed esired by the implementation 
team, due to the initially limited functionality avilable and due to running parallel 
systems (such as for example having to print a paper copy for the file). Other changes 
imposed by the system were more fundamental, including altered professional 
responsibilities and adjusted sequencing of care activities.  
 
In relation to the former for example, Lorenzo only allowed nurses who had special 
training to order x-rays. Other nurses had to ask the doctors to order these, if necessary. 
Both parties said that this arrangement was inconvenient as it created more work for 
doctors and nurses believed that some of their professional autonomy had been taken 
away.12 
 
“… for example you get a load of new doctors on the ward and you get a patient in with 
a specific condition you know automatically before th consultant even comes round 
what investigations that patient is to have, because there’s a protocol so you know what 
they’re going to have or you know, because you’ve experienced what they’re going to 
have so you could in effect order them and we did do, you know, if someone came in 
with renal colic I would order, you would just do it because that’s what you knew the 
patient was going to have.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Some avoided using the system entirely reverting to paper notes whenever possible. This 
was the case especially amongst senior clinical staff, which tended to either partially use 
Lorenzo, often asking their juniors to input information, or demanding paper copies.  
                                                
12 Although it has to be noted that officially most nurses were not allowed to order x-rays – they were 
doing it informally by completing the cards on behalf of a doctor 




“…medical staff sort of dig their heels in and then don’t do it, do they and if they can get 
out of doing it they’ll do it on paper…” (Interview, Administrative Staff). 
 
Refusal to use Lorenzo amongst some clinical staff was evident despite increasing 
engagement efforts of the implementation team. Thiswa  based on the assumption that 
once consultants would use the system others would naturally follow, thereby 
“harnessing the naturally existing hierarchy” on the wards (Interview, Manager). 
Engagement was, however, complicated by the fact tht the product in its final form did 
not exist and could therefore not be demonstrated or trialled. 
  
Others could not avoid using the system and appeared most frustrated. As mentioned 
above, this was particularly true in relation to R1.9, which contained the basic physical 
and organisationally essential knowledge that had to be accessed in order to provide care 
(e.g. where the patient was and which clinic they were booked into). The following 
paragraphs will explore some techniques employed by users to compensate for perceived 
problems in more detail. 
Getting around issues by doing things “incorrectly” 
Firstly, staff developed uses in ways which were not necessarily perceived as “correct” 
by Managers (or as officially sanctioned), but which would get them where they wanted 
to be in the short-term. This involved leaving SmartC ds (see Glossary) in terminals as 
the long log-in process was perceived to interfere with individual workflows. The 
following notes from observations illustrate this: 
 
“I asked why he has left the SmartCard in the computer when he went to operate, he 
said “shhh don’t tell anyone”, the SmartCard system is not ideal as it takes time to log 
in and out and there is no session persistence, he is aware that this is a problem, he has 
also lost his SmartCard several times before, other systems to address this problem may 
be needed e.g. distance scanning (this is possible with some of the handhelds, see 
Glossary), “officially” he said he should have locked the computer when he was away 
by pressing Control-Alt-Delete” (Interview, Healthcare Professional). 
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In some instances, such activities would be reflected in reports generated by the system, 
affecting managements’ ability to track activity levels. For example, users in outpatient 
clinics tended to book appointments in a way that, although less laborious for them, 
meant that these appointments would not show on the syst m as booked.  
 
“…so you’re getting a certain amount of ‘well I’ll just try anything that makes it look 
like it’s worked’ and then you get problems with back-end data because there’s a 
diversification of the numbers of processes that people are using cause they are just 
desperate to try and get from A to B in a day and they’ll try any route to get there that 
looks like it’s working to them.” (Interview, Manager) 
Use of other IT systems to compensate 
Administrative staff, who generated discharge letters, reported that the word processing 
facility of R1.9 was so poor that they would, in many instances, use Microsoft Word in 
order to send out letters in a timely manner. 
 
“Yeah, when we can if we can’t, we go to Word and type it in Word because you can’t 
afford to spend the time.” (Interview, Administrative Staff) 
Delayed input of information onto Lorenzo 
Users also entered information into Lorenzo in back offices typically after clinical tasks 
had been completed. For example, junior doctors took paper notes during ward rounds 
and then transferred these to Lorenzo after the ward round had finished. 
 
“Well what we do is we do a clinical ward round and they write the notes…. On paper, 
we don’t actually put anything into Lorenzo directly unless they decide that rather than 
use our paper flimsy they’re going to use Lorenzo for the discharge. We have an 
agreement that the prescription as long as they print it off and sign it, a printed out 
prescription can be used for discharges but they will have to do that manually at the 
time of discharge from the notes.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Staff stated that this was mainly due to the busy nature of care provided in wards, which 
could not accommodate Lorenzo at the point of care. Th y would therefore often delay 
data input, taking paper notes during clinical encounters as reminders. 
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“Well at the moment because we’ve sort of piloted i on the surgical wards we have tried 
to make an effort to use Lorenzo as much as possible. I mean we were asked to try and 
request investigations live on the ward rounds using a portable computer but 
unfortunately as I said because of constraints of time it wasn’t possible to use it that 
way, it just took too long because we, you know, we hav  a fair number of patients to see 
in a short space of time. And so the junior staff are making notes of who needs which 
investigation and then they’re requesting them via Lorenzo at the end of the ward 
round.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
Using other hardware devices than intended 
In line with the delayed data input, there were also some issues with handheld devices. 
The implementation team initially expected that information would be entered at the 
patients’ bedside but handheld computers were generally perceived as too bulky, heavy 
and slow. Therefore users tended to input information at desktop computers in the back 
office. 
Compensating for staff groups who refused to use the system 
Some nurses and administrative staff stated that they had to “fire-fight”  in order to deal 
with the system, whilst trying to meet the demands of managers, patients and senior 
clinicians. This resulted in a feeling of being de-valued and led some to suggest that 
nurses and administrative staff should have been targeted as the primary user base, as 
opposed to focusing engagement efforts mainly on seior clinicians who had the 
autonomy to refuse use or delegate to their juniors. These juniors were also often 
transient and inexperienced, which complicated the situation further. 
6.2.3.3 Different foci amongst organisational stakeholders 
All local stakeholders hoped that benefits of Lorenzo would be realised in the future, 
with a larger user base, more functionality and system  integration.  
 
“I mean the advantages are like if you can implement this whole system for the UK or 
whatever everybody can use it properly then there’s going to be a lot of good benefit I 
can see.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
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Users often hoped for benefits relating to the avail bil ty and accessibility of patient 
information, whilst implementation team members mainly referred to improved quality, 
coding, audits, security and secondary uses of data.
 
Throughout my fieldwork, implementation team members tended to be more positive 
than users, despite the numerous difficulties encoutered. This may have been due to 
different foci amongst the two groups: users concentrated on what Lorenzo was at 
present based on their experiences to date (i.e. a system that was not fit for purpose and 
created more work), whilst implementation team membrs focused on what Lorenzo 
could be in the future (i.e. a system improving the quality and efficiency of care). These 
different conceptualisations may be linked to the lack of basic agreement on the vision, 
potentially due to non-existent software and constant changes in the scope of the overall 
Programme itself. They may also be a symptom of a lack of efficient communication 
locally, which was complicated by the large scale of the R1.9 deployment. 
 
Users complained about the lack of observable benefits for them and for their patients, 
which they stated was central to the vision. Implementation team members on the other 
hand, worked hard towards solving existing problems. They argued that users should not 
focus on benefits visible in the immediate care enviro ment but on wider organisational 
benefits to the NHS as a whole.  
 
“Lots of people will say well the fact that it’s secure for the first time is worth 30 
seconds, the fact that it’s legible for the first time is actually worth a minute, the fact that 
it’s timely, i.e. it gets to radiology sooner is worth 15 seconds. And if you start to put all 
of that value together it actually exceeds the five minutes.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
However, in light of the increasing number of problems with R1.9, reverting back to 
using iPM was considered a potential organisational b ck-up strategy. Measuring 
benefits was perceived as difficult especially in the early stages of implementation, but 
seemed necessary to motivate users. Some argued that integration with the SCR would 
Chapter 6: Findings from individual case studies 
 
 148 
have helped to demonstrate early benefits to users, but this was hampered by a lack of 
engagement on part of the local health community.  
 
“If we were recording drugs on admission, if we were getting through the summary care 
record or through a GP system interface, drugs on referral, drugs on admission, current 
medication, then it would be a far better, or more joined up, process for us but for us to 
record drugs at admission and then in effect store hem and leave them until discharge 
and then try and make sense well they came in with th s and now we’re going to 
discharge with this, what do we do in the middle, gt the drugs chart out and work out 
this that and the other. Without having a continuous record all the way through the 
patient stay is a bit of a problem.” (Interview, Manager) 
6.2.3.4 Political pressure to show progress versus organisational and technical 
readiness to implement 
All stakeholders felt the political pressure to demonstrate progress, which often stood in 
stark contrast to the actual organisational and technical readiness to implement. For 
example, implementing R1.9 across the hospital while t e software was still being built 
meant that users had no opportunity to “play around” with the software during training. 
It also resulted in a training environment that was different from the live system due to 
new builds becoming available. There was further a gap between training and actual use 
of the system, which was attributed to the constantly changing go-live dates. As a result, 
users did not feel confident in using Lorenzo, stating hat they had to “make it up as they 
went along”, potentially contributing to unintended ‘workarounds’. 
 
“I think the training was, because I went to two lots of training and the second lot of 
training that I did I felt a bit more confident I thought alright this looks easy, I’m not 
going to have any problems with this at all. And then it went live and I thought it doesn’t 
look the same. So I’ve looked at it and thought right where do I go now, so the time 
taken to, I couldn’t even generate the list of patients at first and they kept disappearing 
and I’m like well where’s he gone, you know, and then it was just a matter of time but 
now I can get it up, I get the patients up.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
This political pressure intensified over time resulting in increasingly aggressive 
implementation timelines. It seemed to be the result of a governmental desire to 
demonstrate to the public that the Programme was progressing.  




“I suspect that it’s because the pressure that’s coming from [name of senior staff at the 
DH] and people like that. If [name of senior staff t the DH]’s saying that you know you 
need to sort this out before I’ll give you an RKM [Release Key Milestone] then if [name 
of senior staff at the DH]’s saying it then I know [name of head of IT]’s really important 
but she’s probably even more important than [name of head of IT].” (Interview, 
Manager) 
 
The situation was further complicated by the publicly debated “success” of 
implementation at this Trust in the media. The increasingly uncertain direction of the 
Programme as a whole, partly due to a change in government in 2010, spending cuts and 
contract re-negotiations reducing the scope of Lorenzo, may also have contributed. The 
following press statement illustrates this: 
 
“CSC's future in the £12.7 billion NHS IT Programme is in doubt after it failed to hit a 
critical end of March deadline to install Lorenzo Regional Care Release 1.9 at [Site 
B].” (eHealth Insider, 1st of April 2010) 
 
The local implementation team was therefore increasingly concerned as to whether 
implementing Lorenzo was the right decision. As future governmental strategies were 
uncertain towards the end of my data collection, there seemed to be a tendency to “wait 
and see” what would happen. This may, however, inadvertently have contributed to the 
lack of progress. 
 
“And that’s because we’re a bit uncertain as to what’s to come in the future, you know, 
the Programme is uncertain nationally, we need to get through November, we need to 
get through March before we start, you know, because of what [name of senior staff at 
the DH] said we need to get through those two big milestones before we actually, there 
might not be Programme after March. Or just the fact that we miss that milestone if 
[name of senior staff at the DH] does pull, pull the stumps in November because the first 
Trust doesn’t go live that was to go live.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
In addition, national contractual arrangements meant that the Trust, whilst being able to 
delay go-live locally to some extent, had a lack of influence in relation to software 
design.  




“This kind of slightly difficult contractual relationship where unless you throw it over 
the wall in the right format it’s not our problem… Yes and I actually know it’s not 
because your company is only going to make money if this Lorenzo system is credible for 
the rest of the NHS and it doesn’t look credible while you’re being very careful about 
whether you’re in it with us or not you know, you need to be over on our side of the 
fence, its needs to worry you as much as it worries us about getting this right and that 
has been quite a difficult relationship, I think onccasions even though we would count 
CSC as partners and even though we have CSC staff you know who have worked right 
along side, embedded in the project team to the point that you know we don’t think of 
people coming from different organisations.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
LSPs were, as a result of these centrally held contracts, viewed as being motivated by 
cash-releasing milestones as opposed to high quality implementations. Consequently, 
LSP efforts concentrated on implementing Lorenzo in as many Trusts as possible, as 
opposed to getting the system to work “properly”  in one Trust before moving on to the 
next. Many therefore reported that, as more Trusts went live, the support from the LSP 
and NHS CFH had steadily decreased, resulting in a lack of resources to resolve any 
existing problems as well as concerns over resources for future releases. This also 
contributed to a perceived lack of support for facilitat ng the sharing of implementation 
experiences with other EA organisations. 
6.2.3.5 A national solution versus software tailored to local needs 
It is important to recognise that, whilst some basic processes might be similar, the needs 
of the NHS vary significantly between organisations, departments and individual users. 
More specifically, interviewees repeatedly stated that differences in existing 
infrastructures and business processes of Trusts, a well as the existence of potentially 
competing local initiatives complicated the situation further. Hence, there is a difficulty 
balancing local needs of users and organisations with national requirements for 
standardisation. An emerging concern here was that t e Programme increasingly 
imposed common business processes across locations, c tributing to a lack of 
individual needs being met. 
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“Yes cause otherwise it might be something which is so specific that it, other people 
wouldn’t, couldn’t work with it, I can’t think of an example off hand but everybody has 
their own slight ways of working so you have to make sure that the core, the basic 
function is acceptable to everybody and then the more peripheral things you can 
customise here in the organisation.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
The various interests even within the Trust were sharply brought into focus by 
examining the viewpoints of different stakeholder groups. For example, implementation 
team members stated that the system had to fulfil the basic requirements of the 
organisation in order to sustain organisational functio ing, whilst users indicated that it 
needed to be customised to suit their work. Users also believed that they lacked input in 
decision making, including the choice of the system, and input in the design of the 
software.  
 
“…so the Trust should be able to configure the columns or some of these other things 
that, you know, are more beneficial to their busines process. And so without that lack of 
Trust level configurability it gets very hard so we have to go through all these 
committees, I want this to say this here and I want this to say that there, well we don’t 
like that and that’s part of the problem with this s ngle instance business and the lack of 
tertiary level configurability.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
All therefore increasingly believed that a “one size fits all” concept, characterising the 
Lorenzo implementation, was inappropriate. In this context, there were also some 
concerns that Lorenzo would be too tailored to early implementing organisations, 
rendering it unsuitable for the wider NHS. Conversely, stakeholders believed that some 
“top-down” element was needed to mandate use. In addition to senior organisational 
leadership and support, this should be driven from within the organisation through 
middle-managers. It is, however, concerning that some f these had turned into negative 
champions over time. 
 
“I think that probably the one other thing to do with lessons learned is that I think that 
sort of level of like middle tier of trust management needed to have got far more 
engaged both pre and post go-live cause it felt very much as though actually the control 
rooms and the command rooms were actually running the organisation when actually it 
wasn’t their job to do that.” (Interview, Manager) 
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6.2.4 Key themes  
A wide array of potentially transferable theoretical ontributions emerged from this case 
study. These are summarised in Box 6.2 below and discussed in detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
Box 6.2: Themes and tensions emerging from my analysis of Site B 
Technical dimension 
• R1.9 was not stable resulting in issues for users including freezing, crashing. 
• There were issues with software usability. 
• There was a lack of software usability improvement over time. 
• Staff had to change work practices and employ ‘workarounds’ to accommodate 
the system. 
Human/social dimension  
• There was no basic agreement on the vision, potentially due to non-existent 
software and constant changes in scope of the Programme. 
• There were different foci amongst different stakeholders. These included 
conceptions of what Lorenzo was versus what it could be in the future.  
• Tensions as to what extent users should have to change existing work practices to 
fit in with the technology and to what extent the technology should fit in with 
existing work practices. 
• There was a focus on clinical engagement from the start but senior clinicians 
could and did refuse to use the system. There was a lack of focus on other staff 
groups that could not refuse to use it. 
Organisational dimension 
• There was no opportunity to “play around” with the system as the software did 
not exist, and a lack of ability to plan for changes in work and business 
processes. 
• Fundamental issues with the system existed. The organisational focus on stability 
led to other parts of the implementation being neglected and contributed to 
Chapter 6: Findings from individual case studies 
 
 153 
negative user attitudes. 
• The Programme as an opportunity to improve business processes (i.e. changes in 
the way the organisation works) versus an IT project (i.e. “putting the kit in”). 
• Large-scale implementation versus getting it to work on a small scale first before 
attempting wider roll-out. 
• Some “top-down” element is needed to mandate use whilst still allowing for user 
input. This should come from both local management (ward managers and 
clinicians) and top-level management. 
• Communication between the implementation team, end users and senior 
managers is important but often difficult to realise on a large scale. 
• Lack of national funding versus the need for adequate resources to support the 
implementation. 
• Measuring benefits is difficult but necessary to motivate users. 
Macro-dimension  
• National contracts meant that the Trust had to rely on the LSP to change the 
software, and supply appropriate expertise and support. 
• National solution versus solution tailored to local needs. 
• National contracts meant a lack of Trust involvement in decision making. 
• The publicly debated “success” of the implementation and the pressure to go-live 
amplified by media. 
• Uncertainty in relation to the future strategy. 
 
As can be seen, the implementation of Lorenzo at Site B was characterised by a number 
of tensions, which made it uniquely complex. This became particularly apparent over 
time, as user base and software functionality increased and the national strategy evolved.  
 
Site B attempted one of the first Lorenzo implementations in an acute setting, with the 
finalised product being built as it was implemented. As a result, a variety of problems 
were experienced on the ground, including issues with user engagement, lack of ability 
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to plan for business changes, and a generally unpredictable implementation 
environment, in many ways paradoxically dominated by a technology that was in its 
final form just a vision. The lack of agreement in what exactly the software should 
constitute may have resulted in various stakeholder groups pulling in different 
directions. 
 
Organisational stakeholders seemed to have done everything as well as they could, with 
a few exceptions, such as for example in relation to engagement of non-clinical staff. 
They had, at least initially, strong and visionary leadership, engaged first-wave users, 
and had sufficient resources. However, they were presented with software that was not 
fit for purpose for either the organisation or the users. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
fact that Lorenzo allowed a degree of input in software development may be viewed as 
an advantage over other software, but it was not developed to be fit for purpose in a 
timely manner and local input in decision making was constrained by national 
arrangements. The organisation itself had limited authority to influence either the 
software design or the national strategy. Its fate was placed in the hands of other, more 
powerful, stakeholders. Over time, and despite desperate implementation team efforts to 
solve existing problems, this led to disillusioned users who had to change their work 
practices to accommodate software that was not perceiv d as usable resulting in 
increased workloads. It separated administrative and cli ical tasks (although generally 
administrative tasks increased), resulted in duplication of work that was often perceived 
as irrelevant, and highlighted professional tension (e.g. by those further down in the 
hierarchy compensating for those higher up). 
 
Overall, change at this Trust was technically driven and heavily influenced by the 
national implementation strategy. This resulted in a lack of progress over time and 
contributed to increasingly negative attitudes amongst all organisational stakeholders. 
The deployment also brought to the fore some more fundamental tensions in the national 
implementation as a whole, affecting developments local y. On one hand, policy makers 
emphasised that the Programme was intended to improve business processes, whereas 
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on the other hand, local business processes had to be changed in line with technological 
demands. 
6.2.5 The status quo when data collection was compl eted 
When I completed data collection, the future strategy of the Trust was uncertain. It was 
likely to be primarily dependent on the ability to stabilise R1.9, so that Lorenzo could 
support the basic needs of the organisation. Otherwis , the Trust would be forced to 
abandon the Lorenzo route, at least in the short term, and either revert to using iPM or 
implement another system.  
 
Once a future strategy is determined, implementation of any future system at this Trust 
is likely to be difficult due to user attitudes in light of past negative experiences. 
Nevertheless, the Trust also made significant progress in terms of infrastructure and 
gained IT Management experience. 
6.3 “It feels like our baby because we built it” - case study of 
Site H 
6.3.1 Introduction 
This second case study describes my findings relating to the introduction of Lorenzo R1 
in Site H, a community Trust where Lorenzo software was used in the first clinical 
setting ever by a small podiatry team. Data were colle ted between July 2009 and July 
2010. It consisted of interviews with a total of 19Trust staff including 14 healthcare 
professionals and five implementation team members, collection of over 600 pages of 
Trust documentation and articles in the media. A summary of data collected at this site 
can be viewed in Box 6.3 below. 
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Box 6.3: Summary of data collected at Site H 
- 26 interviews with hospital staff with a total of 19 different interviewees: five 
operational staff and 14 users  
- 24 hours of observations and associated field notes including use of the software 
healthcare settings and staff meetings 
- Researcher notes from the recruitment meeting 
- 60 pages from press searches 
- Trust documents including: PID, two Project Status Reports, several sets of minutes 
from Lorenzo Steering Group and associated meetings, I terim Evaluation Report 
- 5 pages of researcher field journal 
 
The following paragraphs will discuss how users andimplementation team members 
worked through initial doubts and uncertainties in relation to software usability, to 
developing a product that was viewed as fit for furthe  deployment. The findings are 
structured in a similar way to those reported in relation to Site B above. Section 6.3.2 
will begin by setting the scene of the implementation, briefly describing the organisation 
itself and its role in the National Programme. My analysis resulted in four over-arching 
themes, which will be discussed in detail in Section 6.3.3. How these themes have 
emerged from the data was discussed in Chapter 5. I will conclude with a summary of 
potentially transferable theoretical contributions derived from the data (Section 6.3.4) 
and describe the state of affairs at the time I completed data collection at this site 
(Section 6.3.5).  
6.3.2 History and context of Site H 
6.3.2.1 The profile of the Trust 
Site H was part of a large urban PCT that commissioned both regional and specialty 
services for approximately 383,000 citizens. At theime of data collection, it was the 
lead commissioner for four hospitals with a total budget of £511 million in 2007/08. At 
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the time of data collection, the organisation aimed to become one of the first community 
Foundation Trusts in England.  
 
The Trust had three divisions including: 
1. Children, young people and families 
2. Adults and communities: including district nursing, community podiatry and 
physiotherapy 
3. Specialist: including a dental hospital, specialist rehabilitation services and a 
learning disability service. 
 
As, Site B, the Trust was part of the NME area covering the north of England above 
London.  
6.3.2.2 Site H, the National Programme and Lorenzo software 
Ten podiatrists were the first individuals to ever use the newly developed Lorenzo R1 in 
a clinical context on the 3rd of September 2008. This was initially planned to be a three 
month pilot of the system but was, at the end of my data collection almost two years 
later, still ongoing. The complete podiatry team consisted of 19 members. At the 
beginning of my data collection, ten of these used R1, whilst the rest were still using 
paper systems. The remainder of the podiatry team st rted using R1 in May 2010. This 
meant that from this point onwards the service, comprising 11 different locations, was 
“virtually paper free” (Interview, Manager). 
 
The initial ten Lorenzo pilot users comprised a variety of individuals with varying levels 
of computer experience, including both junior and senior staff (e.g. the Head of Service), 
as well as members of the high risk team (i.e. those who treat patients with diabetes).  
 
R1 in Site H included electronic CDC forms, which were developed during regular 
workshops comprising the initial pilot users, NHS CFH staff, and CSC representatives. 
Forms included a scoring plan and an evaluation sheet (used at the patient assessment 
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stage); a discharge letter; a new patient letter; a request for treatment letter; and a general 
purpose letter that could be sent to other care providers via secure NHS Net Accounts 
(e.g. GPs). CDC forms supported recording and maintaini g medical histories, clinical 
notes, care events, demographic details, and task mnagement. 
 
Coding was facilitated through the identification of relevant Systematised Nomenclature 
of Medicine (SNOMED) terms (a list from which terms can be selected) and by 
incorporating Medipad (by tagging key words for coding). Podiatrists were issued with 
SmartCards, new desktops and laptops, as well as printers to support R1. Wireless 
networks had been installed in some podiatry clinics but not all.13 
 
Initial implementation in the early stages of the pilot included three forms, but at T2 all 
six forms were used. In addition, a podiatrist at the local hospital had started accessing 
Lorenzo, which was perceived to bring increasing benefits as data could now be shared 
between the two locations. In addition, the Lorenzo reporting functionality in had been 
developed further and the majority of content development work was finished. At T2 
interviews, the Site was waiting to move from the pilot version of Lorenzo to an upgrade 
(see Glossary) of the software incorporating changes made in other EA sites. After this, 
the Trust planned to replace iPM with the Lorenzo PAS by implementing R1.9. 
 
At the end of my data collection in July 2010, the Trust withdrew resources (including a 
sub-contracted IT Manager) for this particular Lorenzo implementation and considered 
implementing SystmOne instead of Lorenzo across the organisation. A detailed 
implementation timeline can be viewed in Table 6.6 below. 
                                                
13 Please note: a wireless connection was needed when a user wanted to walk around with a device using 
Lorenzo. If no wireless connection existed, the user had to plug in the device. 
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Table 6.6: Detailed implementation timeline at Site H 











03/04/05 Site H went live with iPM    











 Planned go-live  
25/09/08-
16/10/08 
 Planned project 
closure 
 
31/01/08   Full Lorenzo benefits 
expected by 2012 
06/03/08   Delivery dates for R1 
in Site H have slipped 
to July  
May 2008 Re-scoping of EA 
programme (initially had a 
scope of R1 covering 
learning disabilities and 
children’s community 
nursing; changed to podiatry 
service) 
  
16/05/08   National Audit 




software running four 
years behind schedule  
04/08/08  Planned R1 go-live   
03/09/08 Pilot of R1 started with nine 
podiatrists 
Pilot intended to 
last until the end of 
November 2008 
 
05/09/08   First ever 
implementation of 
Lorenzo four years 
after iSOFT first 
promised delivery  




Local interim evaluation of 
the introduction of R1  
Second evaluation 





Picture upload functionality 
being used 
  
July 2009   Planned 
implementation of R3 
02/11/09   Lorenzo has just 174 
“regular users”  
01/06/10 Whole podiatry service 
started using R1 
  
July 2010 IT Manager left, Trust 
considering to replace 
Lorenzo with SystmOne 
  
2012   CSC planning to 






2012  CSC will stop 
supporting iPM 
 
2016   SHA expects to 
complete roll-out of 
Lorenzo  
6.3.2.3 The Trust’s decision to become an EA 
Similarly to Site B (Section 6.2.2.3), interviewees stated that the financial incentives 
associated with the £1 million incentive payment may h ve contributed to the decision to 
become an EA. However, parallels to Site B also exist d in relation to perceptions 
surrounding iPM. Here, Site H implementation team members expressed that iPM did 
not effectively address the needs of community servic s and believed they required 
another application in order to “move the organisation forward”. In addition, the EA 
option seemed feasible as it was expected that clinica  benefits would be introduced 
relatively early.  
6.3.2.4 The composition of the implementation team and external support 
As already outlined in Section 6.2.2.4 above, the R1 implementation was managed 
jointly by CSC, NHS CFH and the Trust. However, as Site H deployed on such a small 
scale, only one Project Manager, who was seconded, worked on the project full time. 
The other internal implementation team members split their time with other IT projects 
across the organisation. Additional support was provided during initial go-live by 
internal Floorwalkers, two NHS CFH staff, and three CSC employees. 
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6.3.3 Sociotechnical processes of change 
6.3.3.1 Small-scale implementation allowing intensive user involvement and support 
As in Site B, both users and implementation team members supported the vision of 
nationally shared EHRs, although initially there were some doubts as to whether 
Lorenzo was the right system to achieve this. Most sta ed that, when delivered to the 
team, the software needed significant further development to be usable.  
 
“Electronic I think it needs to be done now, I think. I don’t know, I just think the day of 
paper notes is probably gone when there’s so much te nology around…If you think 
about it’s a very ancient way of doing things to write everything down when there’s so 
much technology out there… Good vision, but whether t is system could do it I don’t 
know.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
In addition, some argued that, over time and in light of national strategic developments, 
the original vision had changed somewhat from the initial expectation of fully integrated 
care records (i.e. one system used across providers), towards a more contained solution 
where only certain details could be shared across different local systems. 
 
“I think, for me I suppose the answer to that question has changed in the last 12 months. 
What would have been ideal is the shared care record vision which was one system like 
Lorenzo that [Name] is using which had an acute hospital front end, it had a hospice 
front end, it had a GP front end, you had a pharmacy front end, so effectively you’ve got 
one health care record with differing access levels depending on what domain or what 
environment the clinician or indeed the administrato  was in and until six to nine 
months ago I still believed that we could deliver that. […] I think the only way of doing 
that now is an expanded summary care record or something like that on the spine. Years 
ago there was a debate; it was colloquially referred to in the NHS as thin spine, fat 
spine. The thin spine argument said you’d have a central database for the entire 
population that’s entitled to use the NHS, all the patient population of England and that 
would maintain their name, age, date of birth, registered GP and that’s about it.” 
(Interview, Manager) 
 
However, over time, and as opposed to Site B, all local stakeholders maintained that, 
despite some initial issues, Lorenzo had developed to be fit for purpose and ready for 
further deployment.  




“Well when we first started using it, it was quite a slow, clunky system, there were a lot 
of clicks to get to where you needed to get and the machines we were using and the 
performance of the software generally was just a lot sl wer. Then obviously I’d missed a 
big chunk out where I wasn’t using it so I came back nd then there were certain steps 
that you needed to click that had been removed fromit and the whole thing ran a lot 
smoother. And for me obviously because I wasn’t with it right at the start and followed it 
through, through its transitional period the difference was much more noticeable from 
my point of view.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
This increased confidence meant that the system was rolled out to a larger, although still 
relatively small, user base (i.e. the rest of the podiatry team). The small-scale 
deployment was key in this context, albeit somewhat unusual when compared to other 
NHS CRS implementations (including that of R1.9 in Site B described above), 
particularly in the London and Southern areas. In Site H, a small team of users actively 
developed Lorenzo to suit their needs over an extended period of time. The “core” 
implementation team consisted of a dedicated full-time (although sub-contracted) IT 
Manager and the Service Lead, who herself was an active linical user of the system. 
This was viewed as important by all other users as he understood emerging problems 
and communicated podiatrists’ interests to the imple entation team and the LSP. The IT 
Manager was viewed in a similar light, often translting user requirements into “IT 
language” and ensuring that suggested changes were incorporated in software design. 
He had also spent a significant amount of time with users to understand their work 
practices. As a result, the project was viewed as a “team effort” with users actively 
helping to develop the system to suit their needs. The following researcher notes from a 
team meeting illustrate this: 
 
“The IT Manager continues [speaking to CSC people] “we need to have intensive 
workshops for all our forms to move things forward, we keep being told that what we 
want is not in R1 functionality and that we have to wait for R2, this is getting annoying 
for us, I am sure there is things we can do to make the forms better”, CSC people do not 
say much except “yes” and then leave the meeting at 14.30pm.” (Observation researcher 
notes) 
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“Podiatrists ask Manager and CSC people some question  “is it not possible to do 
this?”, The IT Manager asks the CSC people “is there a shortcut key for comments?”, 
CSC lady: “not that I know of”, IT Manager “or could you make a new ‘other 
comments’ box?”, CSC lady “this would have to be built as separate data items so it 
wouldn’t work, I would just do it the latex way”, the IT Manager explains what ‘the 
latex way’ means to the podiatrists, IT Manager “but I don’t know whether this is 
clinically viable, we need to think about whether we need to use the comments in our 
stats or just to inform, if we don’t use it for stats then it can be quite a low-tech option”. 
(Observation researcher notes) 
 
These two key individuals, in combination with the generally strong sense of the team as 
a cohesive unit and the “just getting on with it” attitude of users, allowed the 
development of a close relationship between implementation team members and users. 
Perhaps as a result of this close relationship, but perhaps also because it was possible on 
a small scale, it was decided to allow users an extra five minutes per appointment when 
they used Lorenzo. This required the Trust to employ locums, but users argued that it 
was necessary even at follow-up interviews as the system was still perceived to slow 
down work.  
 
The two champions may also have contributed to realising visible benefits early, as they 
knew what podiatrists needed, which in turn helped to engage users. There were some 
observable benefits, including ability to share information across different geographical 
locations, but as in Site B more significant benefits were anticipated with an increased 
user base and once Lorenzo integrated with the SCR.  
 
“But little things that I’ve already decided I like is again a patient from this particular 
clinic needed to be seen as an emergency the week before, we couldn’t fit them in till this 
Tuesday so I arranged for them to go to another clinic and I was able to access their 
records on Tuesday so I could actually see what had happened to them on the Friday. 
Now that wouldn’t normally happen, I would know they’d gone to another clinic but I 
wouldn’t know any more than that probably so that ws good and I like to be able to do 
that just to click on that patient, see that they have gone to another clinic, what had 
happened and I’d got that information in front of me. So I like the fact that I can access 
the information.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
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Despite this, however, users initially stated that using Lorenzo was “just more work”, as 
they had to populate the system first in order to get real benefits (which they referred to 
as “feeding the beast”). 
 
“And I think we found it difficult because we’re the only ones populating it so we 
haven’t got the added benefits of the medication coming up and the general medical 
problems coming up …once it’s populated I could see it b ing a lot better.” (Interview, 
Healthcare Professional) 
 
As in Site B, implementation team members focused on managerial benefits such as 
improved security, reporting for performance management, and the ability to monitor the 
patient population. 
 
Further contributing to engagement and satisfaction, and again, a luxury afforded by the 
small scale, was the ongoing and intensive support of users by a dedicated individual 
whom they trusted and who knew the software (the IT Manager).  
 
“I don’t know, like I said I’ve just come back and it’s like [Name of IT Manager] has 
gone, my whole world has collapsed. You know, because I’m not very good with 
computers it’s just nice because he understands where I’m coming from, you know, if 
you go to colleagues that’s fine but we’ve all got our work to do and they don’t want to 
be showing me or helping me, you know, but [Name of IT Manager] was different he’d 
just turn up.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
When the IT Manager’s contract as an external contracto  was not renewed, users were 
supported by the local IT department. However, this wa  perceived to lack knowledge of 
the product and therefore could often not respond appropriately to queries. This meant 
that users in some instances did not “bother reporting” emerging issues as they thought 
these would not be addressed.  
 
“He [referring to the IT Manager] was very concerned that the people that are 
supposedly going to be looking after it now don’t kow much about it, they’re not up to 
speed and I did actually made a phone call last week to the IT department on the number 
I was given as a follow on and they actually said to me I don’t know the first thing about 
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Lorenzo I’m sorry I can’t help you you’ll have to speak to [Name of IT Manager] and I 
said [Name of IT Manager] has gone so who helps me?” (Interview, Healthcare 
Professional) 
 
Pulling out the important support of the IT Manager was therefore viewed to “make the 
Lorenzo project destined to fail” as users increasingly reverted to using paper records 
due to not getting adequate support if they encountered problems. However, some 
implementation team members stated that this scenario would in some ways give 
Lorenzo a “real life market test” as the resource-intensive support of one designated IT 
Manager would not be scalable when the software would be rolled out on a larger scale. 
6.3.3.2 Making an implementation work on a small sca e versus the need to show 
progress 
The Trust decided to implement Lorenzo on a smaller scale than other Trusts before 
rolling it out to a larger user base. On reflection, stakeholders stated that this was the 
most appropriate strategy locally as they were initially presented with a system that was 
far less developed than expected. This meant that the originally planned two month pilot 
turned into around two years of development activity during which the software was 
tailored to meet user and organisational needs.  
 
“I think when we were told it was going to be a pilot we expected there to be more there 
to work with than there was and it’s been a real development process and I think 13 
months on we are ahead but I’m not sure how much furt er ahead than we thought we 
would be by this stage.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
This intense development activity meant that, over time, users who initially had mixed 
feelings towards the software became increasingly familiar with the system and 
expressed at follow-up interviews that they would not like to work without it. These 
developments were coupled with improved speed and lyouts of forms. 
 
“From when we first started to now there’s massive differences and I can’t imagine as 
[Name] was saying going back to paper notes.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
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However, this long and resource-intensive development period also meant a lack of 
observable implementation progress, i.e. a still relatively small user base. This was the 
case both locally, but also nationally, as discussed in Section 6.2.3.1 above, with the 
overall number of Lorenzo users still being limited. The resulting overall pressure to 
progress may have led to the change in strategic dire tion and the decision to implement 
an alternative system, which was generally perceived by the service as inferior to 
Lorenzo.  
 
However, paradoxically, it may have been exactly the national requirements and 
arrangements that contributed to the lack of progress initially. The environment in which 
the Trust implemented was similar to other Trusts and they therefore faced the same 
challenges. For example, as in Site B, users and imple entation team members 
complained about the slowness of the LSP incorporating change requests.  
 
“So we looked at that, looked at how you could reduce the number of click-throughs, the 
usability, the process flows, actually using what were forms and whether it was still 
appropriate and so there were some recommendations f r change around that. And I 
guess part of the criticism I think most people would have is the rate of delivery in terms 
of trying to get changes to these forms being made and into production.“ (Interview, 
Manager) 
 
As already described in Section 6.2.3.4 in relation o Site B, this lack of responsiveness 
was perceived to be due to LSPs being driven by payment milestones resulting in a lack 
of support for individual settings.  
 
“I don’t know how the contracts are written with CS and iSOFT and all these different 
things, I don’t know and it’s none of my business but what it looks like from a ground 
upwards perspective is that it’s written in such a w y that CSC don’t actually have to 
worry about the quality they’re delivering and whetr it actually works they just, all 
they have to do is to just basically just get bodies on the floor and it shouldn’t really be 
that way round.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
Some therefore suggested that a closer relationship with the software developers may 
have accelerated software development and implementatio  activity.  




Similarly, as discussed in Section 6.2.3.2, the fact that the software was still in 
development meant that re-designing business processes was difficult. 
 
“I haven’t even seen R2, I haven’t even had a chance to play with R2 so I don’t even 
know what it does I just know what I’m told it does. Every time I ask to be able to get my 
hands on it and play with it and just see how it all works there’s always reasons why 
that can’t be done…” (Interview, Manager). 
 
It seemed that, in light of this perceived lack of progress Trust management believed that 
the implementation was simply not value for money, which meant that resources were 
progressively withdrawn. The general political climate, uncertainty surrounding the 
strategic direction of the Programme as a whole, annou cements of spending cuts and 
scaled back Lorenzo functionality (as also discussed in Section 6.2.3.4) may have 
contributed to this decision. 
 
“I think there are several factors now that are impacting on us one which is the general 
election, the change of government and the financial constraints that the country now 
finds itself in, because of all of that there’s been a renegotiation of the contract with 
CSC and we’ve effectively moved or are in the process of trying to remove 350 million 
pounds worth of functionality…” (Interview, Manager). 
 
Withdrawal of resources was sharply brought into focus by the termination of the IT 
Manager’s contract, which meant that the local implementation had lost adequate 
support and an enthusiastic driver. The following researcher field notes illustrate this: 
 
“7th July 2010: just went over again to do my second round of data collection…the 
general feeling of uncertainty quickly become apparent with the chair stating “we’ll go 
with it and see what happens and what the PCT wants to do…we’ve put so much work 
into it now…hopefully it will work, as long as we gt enough support.” (Observation 
researcher notes) 
 
“I was sitting in a room next door to the meeting and chatted to podiatrists one by one, 
this time it was a mixture of those who had been usi g Lorenzo since the beginning and 
those who just started using it (the other half of p diatrists), the whole service is now on 
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Lorenzo and it seems to be going very well. The problem is that [name of IT Manager] 
has left quite quickly as his contract has not been xtended, everyone feels that the Trust 
does not want Lorenzo to succeed as the Trust wants to go with SystmOne instead, it is 
felt that this is why the most important support person was removed from the team, the 
new podiatrists are getting on quite well which is felt to be due to the fact that the system 
is now much more developed and due to the hard work of the early user podiatrists, 
everyone is disappointed and does not know what will happen, they feel that pulling the 
plug on Lorenzo now would be a major waste of money.”  (Observation researcher notes) 
 
The withdrawal of resources also resulted in serious concerns amongst those closely 
involved in implementing and adopting Lorenzo that their efforts may have been in vain. 
As a result, they lobbied for keeping the system, but all indicated that the final decision 
in relation to the future strategic direction was outwith their control.  
 
“Well they’re having lots of meetings where they’re pr senting both systems to different 
people within the Trust and we’re going to go along to those meetings to see what they 
say and try and influence, you know, peoples’ decisions and say look this is Lorenzo its 
worked for us why can’t it work for everybody else and then there’s going to be a 
decision made I guess with whatever they’re going to o with. But at least if they do pull 
it if they give us something else to work with we’ve all picked up one system really easily 
I’m sure it won’t be that hard to pick up another information system as long as it works 
in the same way, you know, that it won’t be the end of the world but it feels like our baby 
because we built it, but then you can’t be sort of precious about things like that can you 
because if one system works another one can work as well. It’s just a shame all that 
work and effort that we’ve put in really.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
6.3.3.3 Changes over time: improved usability and learning how to work with Lorenzo 
As opposed to Site B, there was a marked improvement in the usability of the system 
over time, although the most commonly experienced issues were similar (e.g. the layout 
of forms and speed). This was accompanied by a positive change in user attitudes and 
more effective integration into workflows.  
 
“When we first started it was really basic. If you were seeing a patient for the first time, 
when we first started using it, it hadn’t taken over completely from paper records it was 
in addition to it because that was too much of a big transition to make initially with us 
using it so we just had a new patient assessment form where we filled in basic details. 
We had vascular, neurological, other assessment forms that were additional to that but 
when we first started you couldn’t pull them through into that document by clicking on a 
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link you’d have to do, work your way through the document and then remember which 
parts of the assessment led you onto further investigations with the patient and then go 
into those forms.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
At T1 interviews (which were already well over a year into the implementation) users, 
much like those in Site B, stated that using Lorenzo i creased their workloads. This led 
most interviewees to conclude that the system was “not fit for purpose”.  
 
“Yes, we’ve seen a 33% plus improvement in performance since we went live. I’d expect 
another 10% to 15% before we could say it was good.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
As in Site B (Section 6.2.3.2), users complained about an increase in administrative 
activity spent on data input and browsing the system, due to a perceived lack of 
intuitiveness, the number of mandatory screens and a general slow performance. More 
specifically, the following frequently encountered issues were mentioned in this context: 
• The number of mandatory screens led many to conclude that paper was “much 
more flexible”, for example, by allowing completion of sections i the order 
preferred by the user.  
• Lorenzo was perceived to be long-winded and lacking intuitiveness. Users had to 
spend a long time browsing the system in order to find necessary information. A 
locally conducted interim evaluation supported these findings, concluding that 
“all the pilot users expressed frustration about the fact that it took several clicks 
to get to a particular screen or field in the system”. 
• Generated print-outs were perceived to be hard to read, making it difficult to find 
necessary information quickly. As in Site B, users had to print from Lorenzo 
which was viewed as “long-winded” and increased paper output at T1. As a set 
of researcher observation notes reads: “The podiatrist says to me “the thing that 
takes the longest is the printing and another thing is that now our paper files are 
overflowing as we add so much paper through the printing”, “it also takes a 
long time to recover after printing, I have to do the GP letter now and this will 
take forever”.  
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• Language used in Lorenzo was not perceived as being co sistent with other 
software applications, which complicated browsing further. For example, users 
reported that “finalise” and “finish” was used instead of “save” and “close”. 
• As in Site B, Lorenzo was perceived to have slow response times, particularly in 
relation to loading forms: “…with some patients if it was a heavy case it could 
take them 20 minutes to load a form…so it’s just not w rkable.” (Interview, 
Manager) 
• The long log-in times were stated to slow down individual workflows (see also 
Section 6.2.3.2 above). 
• Lorenzo did not integrate with wireless networking and the 3G connection used 
in home visits was perceived to be too slow: “The only time we’re not using it is 
if we’re doing home visits. We were set up to do it on home visits and I took it to 
my first patient’s flat of that morning and it took, if I remember correctly about 
20 minutes just to get onto the system from the pati nt’s house, something to do 
with the signals, I don’t know, and that was the first and last time. I didn’t, I’ve 
not tried it since because if you’ve got 12 patients to get round you’re not going 
to be wanting to be an hour.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
However, it also has to be noted that a minority repo ted that Lorenzo was intuitive to 
use, but these users tended to have limited previous experience with healthcare IT 
systems.  
 
Paper was omnipresent (e.g. in the form of post-it notes, diary sheets, appointment 
cards) and was, as in Site B, initially used in parallel to Lorenzo. The following 
observation notes illustrate this: 
 
“Podiatrist puts away paper notes on the desk and gets the notes for the next patient out, 
puts the pt number into Lorenzo and finds the patient, podiatrist leaves and comes back 
after five minutes… 
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Lorenzo is still on, on desktop and I see that there are little yellow stickers on the laptop 
(I try to read them but can’t make anything out of them, they seem to be passwords or 
something)… 
1.40pm: podiatrist examines the patient’s wound andre- resses it, now both the desktop 
and the laptop are on, 1.55: patient gets ready to leave and podiatrist goes out and 
comes back with a folder and looks at the appointmes and fills in the green 
appointment card and gives it to patient, patient laves.” (Observation researcher notes) 
 
At follow-up interviews, and contrary to developments in Site B, stakeholders reported 
that system performance had improved significantly over time, particularly in relation to 
speed.  
 
“I think the speed difference is massive from when w  first started to now, you hardly 
wait at all.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
In addition, some of the interim ‘workarounds’, such as printing forms completed on 
Lorenzo and attaching these to paper files, attenuat d when the whole service used 
Lorenzo. Over time, paper appeared to progressively loose its significance, increasingly 
being used as a “back-up system”.  
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above Lorenzo still slowed down user work practices, but 
this seemed to be accepted by most. It also may have been due to some interim 
‘workarounds’, still being present as a result of running other parallel systems. For 
example, users frequently opened iPM to search for patient identifier numbers that were 
then put into Lorenzo. The two applications could not be opened simultaneously, which 
meant they had to close iPM, remember the identifier number and then open Lorenzo to 
input it.  
 
“I don’t know, the system doesn’t allow you to do it. But it’s good to have the 
information there, it’s good when, you know, sometis we don’t have PAS numbers for 
patients so, you know, you could put an address search in and you can get your PAS 
number which then helps on follow on treatment. It’s also been good that sometimes the 
records going onto the wrong patient because the PAS numbers are incorrect to that 
patient so it’s picked up a few things like that buagain I can’t change that I have to just 
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write that information down, tell somebody else who works on PAS and then they can 
change it, so that’s been good.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Over time, users became more proficient at integrating Lorenzo with their existing work 
practices, learning to either compensate for perceived problems or to “work around” 
them. Strategies to achieve this were often similar to those described in relation to Site B 
above (Section 6.2.3.2) and will be discussed in tur . 
 
Firstly, in some instances users skipped certain parts of clinical activity in order to save 
time. This occasionally took the shape of not looking at previous treatment notes before 
the patient encounter. 
 
“I think the danger is that someone will pick up a p tient and will not have time or not 
be able to find all the information that they want so won’t bother. See now very much 
you get the notes out, you can open the notes, I mean there’s still a danger there now 
because it’s still up to people to actually, clinicans to open those notes and have a look, 
have a look at the medical history of the patient to see what you’re actually dealing with, 
have a look at the last two or three entries to see what’s been going on or the treatment 
plan and there, you open it up and it’s there, you know. On Lorenzo at the moment 
you’ve got to search for that.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Secondly, as also observed in Site B, some users would delay recording data on 
Lorenzo, typing up notes at the end of the day as opposed to after or during each 
encounter. Several users also took notes on paper and tr nsferred these onto Lorenzo 
afterwards.  
 
“…it’s very frustrating when if you’re in a clinic with time pressures, you’ve got a 
patient sat there, you need to be getting on to treat them, you know, you might have 
another few in the clinic waiting you’ve got to be able to pull that up easily, deal with it. 
So what we’re doing you see there is writing it all down and going into it when we have 
time later.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Thirdly, users developed techniques to bypass the strict ecurity arrangements imposed 
by the system. For example, in some clinics where two podiatrists treated the same 
patient, they tended to share SmartCards with one using the computer whilst the other 
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one interacted with the patient. In addition, and again also observed in Site B, 
SmartCards were often left in the computer, due to the long log-in times. 
 
“Some of the high-risk clinics we’ve managed to get a li tle bit faster but then you’ve got 
two people working together so one can drive the machine and one can treat the patient, 
so, you know, you can, but then you’ve got the issue of who’s card is in the machine and 
who’s treating the patient and that’s, you know, I’m sure Caldicott would have 
something to say about that.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Other techniques included performing another activity whilst waiting for the system 
(such as switching on the computer and making a cup of coffee), or inputting less 
descriptive data as this helped to speed up data entry.  
 
As in Site B, users learned to compensate for persist nt issues in system usability. For 
example, they allocated extra time at the end of consultations for correcting spelling 
mistakes, which were often not picked up by the Lorenzo spell-check function. The 
following observation notes illustrate this: 
 
“Podiatrist now completes the clinical note and the scoring plan, ticks several boxes, 
quite quick, reads through her typing again to check the spelling, corrects some spelling 
mistakes e.g. typed “hwen” instead of “when”, prints form.” (Observation researcher 
notes) 
 
Other ways of compensating for usability issues included “tricking the system”. Here, 
some users copied and pasted text from boxes they had completed previously, if Lorenzo 
did not allow them to move to the next item without filling out a free text box. 
 
As in Site B, users also reported preferring the us of desktops as opposed to handheld 
devices. Desktops were perceived to be quicker and e sier to use with a more familiar 
interface (including a mouse, a chair and a keyboard). Laptop use, on the other hand, 
was complicated due to a lack of space as clinics were often not designed with 
computers in mind. As a result, users in some instances had to input data standing up as 
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sitting down would have blocked the gangway. Some complained that this hurt their 
backs.  
 
“…desktop machines are faster, you’ve got a bigger screen, you’ve got, just more 
usable, more comfortable and you’re not stood up like we are most of the time at a work 
surface with your neck bent right down trying to type. And of course depending on 
where the light’s coming through the window you can’t always see the screen and 
you’ve got to try and keep it confidential as well and there’s people walking behind you, 
it is a nightmare.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Other issues mentioned at follow-up interviews were perceived as minor and mainly 
related to the way information was displayed (e.g. forms were too dark or buttons were 
cut off). Wave two podiatrists were still getting accustomed to using Lorenzo and 
reported that they needed some more practice. They did, however, not anticipate any 
major problems.14 
6.3.3.4 Some fundamental tensions remained  
Despite these positive developments over time, some fundamental tensions remained. As 
opposed to Site B, users in Site H tried to use Lorenzo during consultations. According 
to the PID (see Glossary), forms completed on the system were “based on 
contemporaneous data entry”. However, most users stated that simultaneous data entry 
whilst consulting was not feasible due to practical reasons (e.g. wearing gloves) and it 
was perceived to affect communication flow. For example, having to turn away from the 
patient to input data was reported to make the consultation more formal, resulting in 
patients being less engaged.  
 
“It means that it’s almost like a barrier to communication because you’re having to take 
your eyes off that patient and break that communication to look down at a laptop or a 
computer and I don’t think that’s terribly professional…” (Interview, Healthcare 
Professional) 
 
                                                
14 It has to be noted that wave two podiatrists had only been using Lorenzo for two weeks at the time of 
follow-up interviews. 
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Most computer-related activity therefore took place b fore the consultation (e.g. 
bringing up patient details on the screen) and after th  consultation (e.g. entering notes). 
During the consultation, users tended to take notes n paper.  
 
“What I’m doing at the moment is I write it down in rough, the major components and 
then when the patient’s gone then I go through the list and do type it all up. To me it’s a 
bit of an invasion of a patient’s privacy, because w ’re consulting, if you’re talking to 
them and then you turn that way and you’re tapping in you’re not paying attention to 
them all the time whereas, you know, with notes you’re ticking as you go along and 
you’re keeping eye contact so I’m just taking rough notes and then afterwards typing 
them in, doing the assessment on Lorenzo then.” (I terview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
I also observed some encounters where data were inputted into the computer during the 
consultation, but here conversations were structured according to the format of Lorenzo 
software that dictated the order in which questions were asked. In addition, the patient 
seemed to take a more passive role than in consultations where the computer was not 
used.  
 
When trying to use the system during the consultation and depending on the physical 
layout of the clinic, some users inputted data onto a laptop whilst sitting next to the 
patient, whilst others used desktop computers Working on desktops in larger clinics was 
particularly problematic; as the podiatrist often sat relatively far away from the patient, 
which impacted on communication patterns. This was more even more pronounced in 
patients who were elderly and hard of hearing. The following observation notes from a 
clinic illustrate this: 
 
“1pm: patient on bed and p is on laptop, p to patien  “I just want to update your notes 
as it has been a long time since we’ve seen you”. 
P is asking patient questions through the room whilst pt on bed and p on desk on laptop 
ticking boxes, pt seems quite hard of hearing and asks p to repeat quite a few of the 
questions, have to communicate across the room, paper notes are next to laptop.” 
(Observation researcher notes) 
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“Podiatrist “do you smoke?”, patient “no”, podiatrist types the answers into the system 
(maybe they are partly completing it real time), podiatrist “eyesight ok?”, podiatrist 
asking questions whilst sitting on screen and typing, speaking loudly through room as 
patient old and hearing not very good and room is quite big, patient repeatedly asks 
“what” and podiatrist has to repeat question. 
Podiatrist looking at some paper notes on the trolley next to the bed whilst talking to 
patient, rapport seems much better now and pt seems to understand better as not asking 
“what” anymore.” (Observation researcher notes) 
 
Despite these difficulties, implementation team memb rs continued to believe that the 
issue could be addressed with new technologies suchas pens, tablet software, voice 
dictation and trolleys.  
 
The second area of tension, much like developments described in Section 6.2.3.4, related 
to wider implementation progress. Despite having developed a system that worked 
locally, the length of time and resources required to achieve this resulted in re-
consideration of strategic direction. There was thus a fundamental tension between local 
needs and national pressure to progress. Interviewees stated that the most important 
issue here was whether any uniform organisational change programme could be 
implemented across the complex web of different NHS organisations.  
 
“Exactly, there is nobody at the top saying you will do this like this, everybody wants to 
do it their own way…we’re basically made up of hundreds and hundreds of 
organisations that hate each other and will not talk to each other, will not play ball 
together and if you’re going to call it red I’ll call it black just because you’ve called it 
red, and that’s what amazes me every day of the week… And if they’re all working the 
same way then IT can start working because IT is quite good in standardised 
environments but it’s not terribly good when everybody does things differently.” 
(Interview, Manager) 
 
Similarly to Site B, this highlights the need for balancing implementation progress 
nationally with investments in making it “work” locally (which is resource-intensive).  
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6.3.4 Key themes  
A wide array of potentially transferable theoretical ontributions have emerged from this 
case study (Box 6.4), some of which overlap with those identified in Site B. They are 
discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. 
Box 6.4: Key themes and tensions emerging from Site H 
Technical dimension  
• Lorenzo was perceived to be ready for further deployment at T2 but the national 
and local strategic direction was increasingly uncertain. 
• There are trade-offs for either, developing a system that is fit for use in 
individual settings and developing a nationally shared product. 
• Systems integration and benefits realisation (see Glossary) were perceived to be 
threatened by a potential new strategic direction. 
• The larger the user base, the more benefits are likely to be realised but users are 
motivated by benefits. 
• IT systems are unlikely to make individual care processes faster, but they may 
speed up overall organisational processes. 
Human/social dimension  
• Champions are vital and their influence should be harnessed. 
• Data input at the point of care may not be possible as it seems to impact 
adversely on healthcare professional and patient interaction. Efforts may need to 
concentrate on teaching the use of IT systems in the patient encounter as opposed 
to developing new software that is likely to have similar problems. 
• Buildings were often not designed with computers in m d. There is likely to be 
an increasing need to consider the logistics surrounding space when planning IT 
change programmes. 
• There was no issue with engagement in this small-sce deployment with heavy 
user involvement in system design. 
• The ongoing support from the IT Manager was extremely important, but 





• It may be difficult to implement one software system across the variety of 
different NHS organisations. 
• There was a difficulty planning for changes as the software was still in 
development. 
• The lack of senior management support resulted in a lack of commitment to 
deploy Lorenzo further. 
• It is important to find ways to “translate” between clinical and organisational 
perspectives. 
Macro-dimension 
• National contracts seemed to inhibit implementation, as there was a perceived 
lack of local input in decision making as well as a perceived lack of software 
customisability. 
• There is a tension between implementing software at a v riety of sites 
simultaneously versus getting the system functioning well at one site before 
moving on to others.  
• There was uncertainty amongst all stakeholders as to what would happen in the 
future, but government support was perceived to be important. 
 
This second case study described how Lorenzo was developed by a small number of 
users over time to suit their requirements. A long period of development resulted in 
improved usability and a system that was perceived to be ready for further deployment. 
During this process, users had to change their work practices in order to accommodate 
the demands of the new system. This appeared to work relatively well over time, as both 
social and technical systems merged, with technology being developed to better meet 
social demands and users flexibly accommodating technical challenges. The relative 
“success” of this implementation was most likely due to the small scale, somewhat 
limited software functionality, long development periods with heavy user involvement, 
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effective local leadership and support, and positive attitudes of users who “just got on 
with it” . 
 
However, despite these positive developments, some fundamental problems remained. 
One of these included the problem surrounding data input at the point of care, which, 
although intended by implementation team members, was not viewed as feasible 
amongst users. Despite accommodating the system over tim , they still very much 
distinguished between administrative and clinical duties, seeing them as separate 
activities. The key question in this context is whether new emerging technologies are 
likely to resolve this, or whether efforts should instead focus on teaching how to use 
existing technologies without disturbing communication in patient encounters.  
 
The long time needed to achieve alignment between social and technical dimensions on 
a relatively small scale characterised by intensive development activity, resulted in 
management reconsidering the sustainability of the implementation. In line with 
experiences of Site B, this was complicated by natio l arrangements and the ensuing 
time-consuming nature of technical change requests on he ground.  
 
Despite these constraints, users were able to “co-create” the system to suit their needs, 
which most likely helped to ensure engagement and positive attitudes. However, one key 
question relating to the fundamental requirements of a national implementation 
remained: would Lorenzo be viewed as fit for purpose in other settings? There is clearly 
a need to balance these different requirements.  
 
As in Site B, developments on the ground were further influenced by the intensified 
political pressure surrounding the implementation due to changes in strategic direction, 
increased spending cuts and re-negotiated national contracts. Making the software work 
on a small scale whilst at the same time having to show progress implementing beyond 
the service in question presented unique challenges. It eemed that over time the 
fundamental threat to implementation shifted from the initial sociotechnical challenges, 
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which were largely overcome, towards macro-environme tal challenges beyond the 
immediate implementation setting.  
 
Both sustainability and scalability of the small-scale successes were therefore barriers to 
larger-scale progress. For example, the implementatio  being supported by a dedicated 
member of contracted staff was one of the key facilit tors in the short term, but the 
resource intensive nature of these arrangements meant that long-term sustainability had 
been under-estimated, resulting in resources being pro ressively withdrawn.  
6.3.5 The status quo when data collection was compl eted 
When I concluded data collection at this Trust, the future strategy, as in Site B, was 
uncertain. A strategic decision was to be made by management, influenced by local 
resources and national implementation plans. Management would either decide to 
continue with implementing Lorenzo and deploy it to other services, or replace it with 
another system. Either way, the Trust had gained significant internal expertise and 
developed improved technical infrastructure whilst implementing Lorenzo. 
6.4 “It drives me mad so I just don’t do it” -  case study of Site 
Q  
6.4.1 Introduction 
My third case study describes findings relating to the introduction of Lorenzo R1 in Site 
Q. Data were collected between December 2009 and November 2010. They included 21 
interviews with implementation team members and users, 4.5 hours of observations, and 
analysis of a range of primary and secondary documents. Details relating to data 
collection and analysis can be found in Chapter 5. A summary of data collected locally 
can be viewed in Box 6.5 below. 
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Box 6.5: Summary of data collected at Site Q 
- 21 interviews with hospital staff with a total of 20 different interviewees: six 
operational staff and 14 users 
- 4.5 hours of observations and associated field notes f staff using the software  
- Researcher notes from the recruitment meeting 
- 12 pages of documents from press searches 
- Trust documents including: PID, two Deployment Verification Reports, Lessons 
Learned Report 
- 14 pages of researcher field journal 
 
My data provide an in-depth insight into the implementation of Lorenzo R1 as part of 
the NPfIT through the LSP route in the first mental health Trust ever. The journey was 
characterised by somewhat limited software capability but a relatively large user base 
from various professional backgrounds, resulting in uniquely complex challenges. As in 
the other case studies, I will begin by setting the sc ne of the implementation (Section 
6.4.2), followed by a discussion of five over-arching themes emerging from my analysis 
(Section 6.4.3), a summary of potentially transferable theoretical contributions (Section 
6.4.4), and the remainder briefly touches on the state of affairs at the time I completed 
data collection at this site (Section 6.4.5).  
6.4.2 History and context of Site Q 
6.4.2.1 The profile of the Trust 
Site Q, a mental health Trust, was established in 2002 and provided day care, inpatient 
care and community services from over 80 locations f r a population of approximately 
938,000. It employed around 2,100 staff and had a budget of £100million per year. The 
Trust gained Foundation status in 2009 and had its services commissioned through five 
local PCTs. Services were divided into Children and Young People, Adult, Older 
People, Learning Disabilities, and Forensic Services. 
 
Chapter 6: Findings from individual case studies 
 
 183 
During my study, it became apparent that record-keeping in the mental health setting 
significantly differed from other care settings (including Site B and H discussed above). 
This seemed to be due to different characteristics of consultations, where 
communication was extremely important, sessions tended to last longer, and both paper 
and electronic notes were narrative in nature. Similarly, there was often a close working 
relationship with social services and a range of complex cases were managed by a 
variety of different parties often over several years.  
6.4.2.2 Site Q, the National Programme and Lorenzo software 
Much like the other two Sites described above, the Trust implemented iPM before 
Lorenzo. The Trust Board approved a five year strategy to replace iPM and another 
existing clinical system with Lorenzo in September 2007.  
 
Site Q was the first mental health Trust to use Lorenzo and the fourth Trust to ever use 
the software. It went live on the 28th of September 2009 with R1 and deployed to all five
community teams of Children and Adult Mental Health Services (CAMHS). CAMHS 
was the smallest service and therefore strategically hosen so that any emerging issues 
could be resolved before implementing in the larger services.  
 
There were initially about 140 end users, the largest user base of Lorenzo R1 anywhere 
at the time (compared to one ward in Site B and nine podiatrists in Site H). This was still 
the case when I completed data collection at this Trust. Users consisted of a range of 
different staff groups including Nurses, Psychiatrists, Psychologists, Administrative 
Staff/Medical Secretaries, Occupational Therapists, Family Therapists, Counsellors and 
Social Workers.  
 
The Trust went live comparatively quickly, rolling out R1 over five locations in a period 
of two weeks. Despite this, the go-live came to many s somewhat of a surprise as not 
much had been reported in the media about this site beforehand. This is in stark contrast 
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with the high profile and often publicly reported and scrutinised Lorenzo deployments in 
other Trusts (as discussed above in relation to Site B). 
 
According to the PID, Lorenzo was planned to be imple ented by 2010 to achieve the 
“vision of a single Trust-wide computer system” (Interview, Manager). The first stage of 
the project included the following functionality (please also refer to Chapter 1 and the 
Glossary): 
• Core Lorenzo: electronic patient record views, limited task management 
functionality and patient lists 
• Risk Indicator Assessment Form: a CDC form completed at initial patient contact  
• Progress/Activity Notes 
• Electronic Discharge Summary15 
• Translator Request as part of the Request and Results (R&R) functionality 
• Order Communications for Pathology. 
 
At the time of my data collection, core Lorenzo functionality, risk indicator assessment 
forms and progress notes were used. At follow-up interviews, the functionality of the 
software had not been expanded but the Trust operated business as usual (see Glossary). 
R1.9 implementation was planned for March 2011, with an anticipated user base of 
1700, and R2 functionality for September 2011. A detail d implementation timeline can 
be viewed in Table 6.7 below. 
                                                
15 The target time with paper notes was seven days to reach the referrer. This is similar to the 18 week 
target in the acute setting. 
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Table 6.7: Detailed implementation timeline at Site Q 
Date Event from Trust 
documentation and 
interviews 



























CAMHS went live 
with iPM as the first 
service in the Trust 
  
April 2009  Planned go-live Lorenzo R1 
in CAMHS  
June 2009  Deployment verification 
(see Glossary) to assess the 
“success” of the new 
solution against a set of pre-
defined verification criteria  
 
July 2009  Planned go-live Lorenzo R1 
in community homes health 
team and inreach-outreach 







CAMHS went live 




  Site Q goes live 
with R1  
December 
2009 
 Planned go-live Lorenzo 




 Planned go-live of Lorenzo 
R2 at Older People, 





  Site Q has 43 
“regular users” 
of Lorenzo  






 Planned implementation of 
Lorenzo R4 
 
6.4.2.3 The Trust’s decision to become a Fast Follower 
As opposed to Site B and H, who were both EAs, Site Q was a so-called “Fast Follower, 
which meant that it did not receive the £1 million incentive issued by NHS CFH. 
Nevertheless, the decision to remain one of the first to implement Lorenzo software was 
pursued. Like Sites B and H, Site Q was keen to influe ce the design of the system to 
suit their needs, and viewed Lorenzo as an opportunity to improve existing systems and 
business processes. For example, their legacy system ( ee Glossary) needed replacing as 
it was too costly to maintain.  
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The Trust had considered adopting RiO, the NHS CRS software implemented in the 
London area, but concluded that Lorenzo would be preferable as RiO was a legacy 
system and had, compared to Lorenzo, limited functio ality. Another advantage of 
Lorenzo was perceived to be the fact that it had the potential to be developed whilst RiO 
was “hard-coded” (meaning that it was more difficult to change). 
6.4.2.4 The composition of the implementation team and external support 
As in the other two case studies outlined above, the implementation was managed jointly 
between Trust staff, CSC and NHS CFH. However, as opposed to the other Sites, who 
involved subcontractors and a range of staff from CSC and NHS CFH, the most 
substantial part of the implementation team at thissite consisted of staff employed by 
the Trust itself. Core team members are summarised in Table 6.8. 




Making key decisions and reporting to the board 
Senior responsible 
clinician 
Working with the senior responsible officer 
Informatics Director  In this case did not sit on the board and was represented by 
the Director of Finance 
Programme Manager Responsibility for Lorenzo project and related IT projects 
Implementation Project 
Manager (R1)  
Responsible for responsible training, support desk and day-
to-day management (CSC) 
Implementation Project 
Manager (R2) 
Responsible for training, support desk and day-to-day 
management (CSC) 
Education Training and 
Development Manager 
 
Head of Information 
Management Services 
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Service Desk Manager  
Two Product Specialists 
CSC 
Advising on system capability and supporting future 
business process maps for both iPM and Lorenzo 
Head of Service/Clinical 
Champion 
Representing interests of clinicians and responsibility for 
clinical engagement 
Business Change Lead  Communication and engagement, benefits realisation and 
business process redesign 
Infrastructure and Data 
Project Manager 
Responsibility for infrastructure, interfaces, data cleansing, 
data migration, data extract and testing 
Change and Access 
Project Manager  
Training, registration, support desk, business change and 
overall implementation 
Service Benefits Lead  
 
Supporting local ownership of business process redesign and 
responsibility for ensuring benefits realisation was owned 
and managed by the service 
Organisational 
Development Lead 
Developing the teams to enable them to implement and own 
the changes agreed after go-live 
 
The Head of Service and was seconded to take the role of the Clinical Lead for a period 
of nine months full-time. When my interviews began, this secondment period had 
finished and they were back in their substantive rol as Head of Service, with another 
Clinical Lead having taken their position.  
6.4.3 Sociotechnical processes of change 
6.4.3.1 The consequences of national arrangements for local implementation activities 
Due to this Trust being a Fast Follower, as opposed to an EA, the arrangements and 
motivation to implement Lorenzo tended to differ from the other sites (as mentioned in 
Section 6.4.2.3 above). Most importantly, the Trust had to draw mainly on internal 
resources to implement the software as they did not receive a DIF. All members of the 
implementation team worked for the Trust full time and no external contractors were 
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employed to support the implementation. This was viewed as important as it meant that 
the Trust could retain developed expertise.  
 
“But up to what we’ve done now I mean we’ve had quite a successful run so far in as 
much as A) we’ve used operational staff so we’ve not br ught in loads of contractors 
and the knowledge is going to disappear cause of course we need people in our 
operational services to be able to take this up andrun with it…” (Interview, Manager). 
 
Implementation team members’ existing networks (both governmental and commercial), 
skills and experience meant that the implementation initially appeared to proceed 
relatively smoothly. The Site had, at the time of my study, the largest user base of R1 in 
the country over an extended amount of time.  
 
However, the implementation team had to operate within the constraints of the National 
Programme, which have also been outlined in relation o the other two case studies 
above. Here, as discussed in Sections 6.2.3.2 and 6.3.3.2 above, the fact that the software 
was still in development resulted in a difficulty planning for business change.  
 
“But ultimately for me it was a case of we didn’t, the main issues for me from a clinical 
perspective is we had to do business processes without a system, I’d never repeat that 
again and I would say that to, I don’t care who it would be, even if it was the chief exec 
of the Trust I would be saying you get me the product then, you can influence, you get 
me the product and then I’ll do it.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
Similarly, as was the case in Site B (Section 6.2.3.4), this also contributed to a perceived 
lack of adequate training and support environment for staff, who missed the opportunity 
to “play around with the system”, and commented that there was a general lack of 
knowledge of the product nationally (see also Section 6.3.3.1).  
 
As also discussed in Section 6.2.3.5, the fact that e Trust implemented a national 
product meant that they had limited input into system design as changes to the software 
could only be made within the constraints of national contract. As a result, stakeholders 
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stated that they were somewhat powerless due to a perceived lack of input in decision 
making. 
 
“…the bottom line is that input has been defined within a national contract, it doesn’t 
matter how much I complain about it, it doesn’t matter how upset and annoyed CSC may 
be about it, the fact is it’s subject to a wider contract and I think until that, until some of 
those issues are addressed…how did we arrive at the si uation where the supplier is the 
one that’s responsible for the plan and the contract…we were told by the SHA well 
you’re not going to get anything else because you’re not the customer.” (Interview, 
Manager) 
 
Although support from NHS CFH and the SHA was perceived as valuable across case 
study sites, stakeholders in Site Q argued that these parties paradoxically inhibited local 
implementation progress as they acted in the interest of the overall national strategy. 
Consequently, the sharing lessons with EAs was viewed as difficult (as also discussed in 
Section 6.2.3.4), and national resources were perceiv d to be centred on Trusts that had 
the highest political profile (which was stated by managers to include Site B) as opposed 
to those that had made most progress. As in the othr case study sites (see Sections 
6.2.3.4 and 6.3.3.4), it was argued that the system hould be made to work “properly”  in 
one site before attempting wider roll-out.  
 
“I think that, yeah, I mean my view at the time of being in the project was that basically 
as a Trust I think we were ignored by most because ll the focus was on Early Adopters. 
But if you actually look at our deployment we actually deployed without any support 
from Connecting for Health, they were not involved in our testing cycles. We went down 
to one issues management clinic, our project manager would liaise with them as 
appropriate […] so it’s not as though they ignored us completely but in terms of offering 
us additional support we didn’t get any of that yetw  have been the largest deployment 
for Release 1, you know, across a range of profession , across a range of geographical 
locations and we did that without them…” (Interview, IT Manager) 
 
As discussed in Section 6.2.3.4, the political profile of implementations was often 
intensified by press coverage. Site Q therefore deliberately distanced itself from media 
attention in order to keep external pressures to progress to a minimum. 
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6.4.3.2 Lack of implementation progress over time 
During my 18 months of data collection, Site Q remained relatively static in terms of 
overall implementation progress, having approximately the same user base and 
functionality. Similarly to developments in Site B (Section 6.2.3.1), this lack of 
observable progress seemed to contribute to increasingly negative attitudes amongst 
both implementation team members and users, as the software did not deliver as 
expected.  
 
“The main issues going is forward around, obviously we had problems with the late 
delivery, the thing was two years, maybe three years behind schedule so we were doing 
things now we should have been doing two or three years ago. It’s just the level of 
confidence in whether we can get all the clinical documents that we need for mental 
health actually ready in time for when we need them, so if we need them in 18 months 
time we don’t have the confidence that they’re goin to be there and we’ve mitigated the 
risk as best as we can and we’ve got fall back arrangements but that’s the biggest 
problem, it’s just a confidence as to whether we can develop the documents and they’d 
be fit for purpose in time.” (Interview, IT Manager) 
 
Much like in the other case study sites (see Sections 6.2.3.1 and 6.3.3.2), this was 
coupled with an increasingly strained relationship w th the LSP, which was perceived to 
lack specialist knowledge of the software, understanding of business processes, and 
project management skills.  
 
“For instance when we first started mapping for 1.9 we had a project specialist who 
we’ve still got now that was sent in who was the only resource available, he’d never 
done any future step mapping before, he’d never been a product specialist in a large 
trust before and we had a big problem there because we’ve got the experience that’s 
coming now, with a second product specialist and she came in probably about seven 
weeks ago now and had we have had her knowledge right at the beginning then we 
wouldn’t be in, having to review these maps to the ext nt that we are. But to send into a 
large trust like us a product specialist that has not got any experience and for him to be 
told that you’re learning on the job, quite honestly I don’t think that’s good enough.” 
(Interview, Manager) 
 
Over time, implementation team members became progressively more frustrated with 
the lack of on-site LSP resource, which may have been due to the fact that an increasing 
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number of Trusts were going live and resource was diverted. As a result, Managers 
stated that they had to be “pushy”  to ensure the Trust would get adequate support, 
particularly in relation to incorporating locally requested software changes (also see 
Sections 6.2.3.1 and 6.3.3.2). Perhaps as a result of this, and similar to Site H (Section 
6.3.3.2), there was also a mounting feeling that a closer working relationship with 
iSOFT may have accelerated software development. 
 
This frustration and delay seemed to cascade down t users, who were increasingly 
losing faith in the local implementation. 
 
“Yeah when we go to Version 1.9, it merges. I think it’s due March yes. There’s a hat 
over there I’ll eat it if it happens but yeah I think it’s due March which should be 
interesting.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
As in the other case study sites, despite a general support for the basic EHR vision 
regarding perceived potential future benefits, there was increasing uncertainty 
surrounding the political direction of the Programme (see Sections 6.2.3.4 and 6.2.3.2) 
and mounting doubts amongst all local stakeholders as to whether Lorenzo was the right 
means to achieve the vision (Sections 6.2.3.1 and 6.3.3.1). Some also questioned the 
appropriateness of the large-scale “top-down” strategy and argued that the “one size fits 
all model” may not be appropriate (see also Section 6.2.3.5). Instead, it was argued that 
a strategy with a focus on interoperable systems complying with standards and allowing 
more local autonomy in decision making may be more eff ctive in the long-term.  
 
Uncertainty, frustration with the lack of progress, and progressively more negative 
attitudes were exacerbated by an increasing number of Trusts “pulling out of the 
Programme” and the often publicly debated implementation problems at EA sites 
(including those relating to Site B). However, in the short term, the Trust planned to 
continue “with business as usual”, whilst considering alternatives to Lorenzo as a 
“back-up plan”. 
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“Well there’s obviously, what’s making it difficult is, well obviously we are a fast 
follower rather than an Early Adopter and it would appear that there seems to be a 
major lack of confidence in the product because of the issues that have happened at 
[Place Name] and [Place Name] so, you know, at the same time as doing this project 
we’re looking at are there any alternatives because do we want to stay on the Lorenzo 
bus if you like because so many other Trusts have pull d out.” (Interview, Manager) 
 
Pursuing this short-term strategy of continuing busine s as usual seemed somewhat 
easier for implementation team members than for uses. As described in relation to Site 
B (Section 6.2.3.3), there tended to be different foci amongst these stakeholder groups. 
Users tended to be more negative and struggled to find any immediate benefits, with 
some feeling that the system was a “means of managerial control”, as current benefits 
were perceived to be mainly managerial in nature. When prompted, they mentioned 
improved legibility and accessibility of information as current benefits, but expressed 
that these could have been achieved with any IT system. Desired features included 
integration of Lorenzo with the SCR (also mentioned in Site B) and social care.  
6.4.3.3 Accommodating Lorenzo in everyday work 
Similar to users in Site B and early experiences in Site H, users in Site Q perceived the 
system to be “cumbersome”, “time-consuming”, “clunky” , as “not fit for purpose”, and 
as “not user friendly”. Some stated that as a national solution, Lorenzo was simply too 
complex “trying to be too many things to too many people” (see also Section 6.2.3.5). 
As a result, a lack of attention was paid to indiviual user demands. 
 
Several issues seemed to underlie these impressions. Firstly, as already outlined in 
relation to Sites B and Q (Sections 6.2.3.1 and 6.3.3.3), Lorenzo was used in parallel to 
paper and other electronic systems, which resulted in perceived duplication of work. 
This was likely to attenuate with increasing releases of the software, but for the interim 
the Trust outlined desired ‘workarounds’ for users. According to Trust documents, these 
included:  
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“…printing of Lorenzo notes and attaching these to paper files, creating written notes if 
there are issues with electronic notes (i.e. paper used as fallback), removing and re-
inserting the SmartCard [in order to switch between Lorenzo and iPM as these could 
not be opened in parallel], closing and re-opening forms, and looking up items in iPM if 
they were not displayed in Lorenzo”.  
 
Users reported frequently using these desired ‘workar unds’, but they were naturally 
viewed as time-consuming and as increasing workloads. Printing documents was 
perceived to be particularly problematic, due to the number of mandatory screens and 
buttons associated with this activity. One interviewe  described the process as consisting 
of the following steps (in the words of the interviwee): 
• “You say print document and the thing comes up on the screen 
• Then you hit print document and finish 
• That [screen] goes off  
• Another one [screen] comes up 
• You have to hit local and local printer 
• Then a print screen comes up 
• You hit properties and go into flip both sides 
• Then you hit print 
• Then you come out of it altogether” 
(Interview, Administrative Staff) 
 
Secondly, and again also reported in the other case study sites (see Sections 6.2.3.2. and 
6.3.3.3), there were basic performance issues mainly relating to slow speed. These were 
actively addressed by the implementation team over the period of my study, resulting in 
some, but according to users not significant, improvements over time. They included the 
following: 
• Display of incorrect information: This included, for example, templates not 
displaying despite having been created, a closed referral showing as open, and 
display of the wrong address. 
• Issues with printing: This included, for example, slow printing, inability to print, 
or form fields appearing as populated on the screen and printing blank. Users 
also highlighted that the layout of printed forms was inappropriate as these had 
many blank spaces and were difficult to skim-read.  
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• Loading of screens was perceived to be too slow. 
• Freezing screens: Some users reported that Lorenzo was “not responding” and 
that they were “being thrown out of the system”. This was particularly often 
experienced in relation to the spell-check functionality. Users tended to attribute 
these issues to Lorenzo itself, but implementation eam members stated that 
freezing of screens may be due to the Trust’s infrastructure (e.g. bandwidth, see 
Glossary). 
• Issues with the spell-checker: When users inputted clinical notes, they reported 
that the Lorenzo spell-check functionality would “jump formatting” and insert 
double spaces at inappropriate places. They also reported spending an 
“unreasonable amount of time waiting for it to type each letter”.  
 
Thirdly, users maintained that there were fundamental problems with the way the system 
was designed and integrated with their work. These were to some extent also 
experienced in the other case study sites (e.g. see Sections 6.2.3.1, 6.3.3.2, and 6.3.3.3). 
Implementation team members did not actively address these issues, as they 
concentrated on the more basic performance of the system. According to users, these 
problems included the following: 
• Mandatory screens and buttons: Users reported having to press a number of 
mandatory screens and buttons when navigating Lorenz , making the application 
“long-winded”. 
• Layout of electronic forms: Certain items on forms were viewed as inappropriate 
and/or repetitive, yet mandatory; leading some to conclude that completing the 
electronic record was a “tick box exercise”. For example, questions on the 11 
page long risk indicator assessment form had to be completed even if there was 
no apparent risk to a patient. Some of the questions were also not viewed as 
appropriate for children, such as those asking whether a nine year old girl was 
pregnant.  
• Language: The language in the system was not consiste t, which contributed to a 
perceived lack of intuitiveness when browsing. 




As a result of the issues outlined above, using Lorenzo was viewed as time-consuming 
resulting in more, and particularly administrative, work for users. Some quoted that 
activities would take up to five times as long.  
 
“Somebody rang me, 5-10 minutes on the phone, and it takes you, one time it took me 
over 50 minutes to do it all because it’s a phone call, going downstairs to get the file 
cause you still have to have the file, finding the file, bringing that up then logging on, 
waiting, cause I just did this one thing and then putting it all on, trying to print it and it 
took 50 minutes and that was just a patient had rang me to say that they needed to 
cancel the session (laughs).” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
Consequently, users compensated to accommodate the syst m within their everyday 
work. Many of these ‘workarounds’ were also observed in Sites B and H (see Sections 
6.2.3.2 and 6.3.3.3), and, in relation to Site Q, included the following: 
• Delayed data entry (also observed in Sites B and H): As the software was 
perceived as slow and users were busy, notes were often inputted at the end of 
the day, or in some instances days after the consultation had taken place. The fact 
that clinical staff used desktop computers to record information may have 
contributed to this, as it meant they were less flexib  in terms of where notes 
could be written. Paper notes were frequently used, both during consultations and 
as reminders when inputting data into the system. As in Site H, clinical users 
commented that simultaneous data input whilst consulti g was not feasible.  
 
“He then puts the SmartCard into the keyboard and picks up a folder of patient notes on 
his desk, on top of the folder is a small notepad pge with some scribbles on it, he then 
looks at his paper diary (like a book and full of scribbles) and looks up when he saw the 
patient, “ah 2pm on Friday” (it’s Monday today), he says that he jots down notes on 
paper “to jog my memory”, it is a girl with an eating disorder” (Observation, 
Healthcare Professional). 
 
• Using Lorenzo as little as possible (see also Site B): This, for example, included 
looking up previous treatment notes on paper as it was perceived to be easier to 
browse than Lorenzo. Some users also skipped Lorenz entries altogether, 
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especially when they perceived the activity to be reco ded not to be important 
(e.g. a patient phoning up to confirm an appointment).  
 
“I fill about 5% of Lorenzo in and the other 95% just doesn’t get done because I just 
emotionally can’t bear to try to do it cause after 15 minutes I just want to throw the 
computer out the window, it drives me mad so I just don’t do it.” (Interview, Healthcare 
Professional) 
 
• Cross-referencing to paper files: If electronic forms were too laborious to 
complete, some users entered “refer to paper file” to avoid duplication of work 
and entry of the same information into multiple systems. This was in some 
instances perceived to be a potential safety issue. 
 
“So you end up, because you can’t cut and paste so you can’t say look OK this is the 
same let’s cut and paste it into here, you end up having to write it multiple, multiple 
times or you end up having to cross-reference and I actually think it is safer for the child 
to have all the risk stuff clearly and concisely written in one place. The nature of the 
form means that one place isn’t the form so I actually write it very clearly in the 
progress note or the assessment form and I always in the boxes that open up I just put 
please refer to… form, which then increases the amount that the risk indicator is a tick 
box exercise.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
• “Lumping” of administrative activity: Users tended to “lump” administrative 
activity in order to avoid going through the lengthy log-in process multiple times. 
Again, this contributed to delayed data entry. 
 
“The length of time it takes to actually get that note in there is just such hard work and 
you end up lumping things together because you think I’m not going to open it up again 
and put a second phone call in, you know, I’ll do it a day later when I’ve done three 
calls that day and just throw them all in together. I end up keeping a paper note to 
prompt me because I haven’t got time. I tend to do it all in one big chunk, so I end up 
doing a paper note saying, you know, don’t forget to write these up. You go in and think 
right rather than do separate Lorenzo’s for these two phone calls I’ll throw them all in 
one which works better.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
• Planning for a slow system (see also Site H): Some users stated that whilst they 
waited for pages to load, they tended to complete oth r tasks such as making a 
cup of tea or making a phone call. 




“Yes you might take a phone call or do some other paperwork, some writing or 
sometimes you’re just sitting there waiting.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
• Using other systems to compensate (see also Site B): As the Lorenzo spell-check 
and formatting functionality was perceived to be poor, some used Microsoft 
Word to draft their documents and then copied and pasted them into Lorenzo. 
 
“Yea. It is so laborious, so it’s much quicker to ginto Word, write it in word and then 
copy and paste it... For me if I’m writing something really long I need to be able to think 
as well and it’s hard to then go back and read it right through, I mean I do but I tend to 
scan it in a way just to see that it makes sense and like you said Word will correct it for 
you, so it takes half the....” (Interview, Healthcare Professional). 
 
• Leaving SmartCards in terminals (see also Sites B and H): Despite the fact that 
computers were located in a locked office, users were instructed to take their 
SmartCard with them when leaving their desk. However, this did not always 
happen due to the lengthy log-in process.  
 
“Leaving it in the computer you can only, with Lorenzo it does happen yes because 
people don’t want to keep logging in…you can’t get in our office without a pass so who 
you work with is going to steal, they’ve got their own SmartCard, why would they want... 
I could understand if you was where the public were and they could get at your desk 
yeah but I think where it’s just clinical staff I don’t think you need to.” (Interview, 
Administrative Staff) 
 
Altogether, it seemed that whilst implementation team members concentrated on 
addressing more basic performance issues, some “softer” usability problems were not 
necessarily considered. However, these tended to bemost distressing for users as they 
were not anticipated to disappear with increased functionality, or to be addressed by the 
implementation team. This may have contributed to negative feelings and may have de-
motivated staff using the system. 
 
As a result of usability problems in Site Q, I observed several unintended effects. These 
included the following: 
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• The effect of Lorenzo on paper: Due to the limited capabilities of the system, 
paper was still viewed as the primary record. However, its use had somewhat 
shifted towards being a proxy for Lorenzo entries. For example, paper notes were 
often kept as reminders of what had to be inputted. Users also expressed that, 
since the introduction of Lorenzo, paper records were more distributed 
throughout the care setting, as different users would take them to their desks to 
attach the Lorenzo print-outs. This in turn resulted in staff having to increasingly 
“chase” paper records in order to find files. 
• Consequences for the nature of notes: Users stated hat electronic notes were 
“more formal” and shorter. Some argued that this meant they were“more to the 
point” , whilst others stated that Lorenzo notes lacked detail. 
• Delayed data entry into the system meant that Lorenzo was often “not as up-to-
date as paper records”.  
• Knock-on effects on other activities: As users spent an increasing amount of time 
entering electronic data, lower priority activities would often not get done (e.g. 
filing). 
• Consequences for the time spent with patients: Some users stated that, since the 
introduction of Lorenzo, they spent less time on cli i al activities and more time 
“doing admin” and “battling with the computer system”. The increased time 
spent in front of the computer negatively affected job satisfaction. 
6.4.3.4 Fundamentally different viewpoints within the organisation 
Despite increasing frustration over time amongst all, it was striking how managerial and 
user interviewees had fundamentally different viewpoints, particularly in relation to 
implementation progress. This was most apparent at T1 interviews and seemed to be 
deeply rooted in a lack of insight into the others party’s world, as well as different 
assumptions and expectations. As can be seen, there were some parallels with Site B, as 
described in Section 6.2.3.3, where I discussed the diff rent foci amongst diverse 
organisational stakeholders. I will discuss a few areas of tension identified in Site Q 
below. 




Managers tended to express that the implementation had, at least initially, progressed 
relatively well, measuring “success” on the fact that users were, despite some 
“moaning” , using the system in their everyday work. The implementation team worked 
extremely hard to implement Lorenzo with the vision n constant focus, as they wanted 
the system “to work” feeling it “would be shame [to abandon it] after all the effort and 
time and resource that’s gone into it”. (Interview, Manager) 
 
Conversely, users struggled to accommodate Lorenzo in their everyday work, feeling 
that it was not fit for purpose, increased stress lvels and contributed to generally low 
morale in the Trust.  
 
“It just feels like there’s a system been introduced that actually hasn’t been introduced 
to marry what goes on here, here’s a system, this is what we do now you follow, get 
yourself organised into the system rather than let’s see if the two can compliment each 
other. Because if anything this is against our work, it’s not aiding at all.” (Interview, 
Healthcare Professional) 
 
Some users even stated that they “hated Lorenzo” and that it was a symptom of the 
general mounting pressure on the Trust to curb spending as well as a sign of the 
increasing “bureaucratisation of healthcare” (as also expressed by users in Site B, see 
Section 6.2.3.1). They tended to measure “success” on the lack of observable benefits to 
themselves and patients (as discussed above), which as coupled with a feeling that the 
system increased workloads and did not visibly improve over time. However, resisting 
was not an option for most as use was viewed to be a “directive from the Trust”. Despite 
my active effort to sample more positive users, conflicting views remained.  
 
“It’s a fairly universal thing really. I do not know of a clinician anywhere that isn’t 
struggling with it.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional) 
 
It therefore seemed that the means managers used to measure “success”, namely based 
on use itself and managerial benefits, resulted in negative attitudes amongst users as use 
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was compulsory resulting in low morale and feelings that the system was a symptom of 
managerial control. The underlying tension involved assessing to what extent users 
needed to be initially “forced” to use the software in order to realise future benefits, and 
at what point unhappy users over an extended period of time meant that Lorenzo was 
simply not fit for purpose. This was, however, complicated by the fact that the Lorenzo 
application was immature and therefore it could be argued that it would not be fit for 
purpose until it was fully developed. 
Assumptions and expectations 
There further seemed to be a divergence in the fundamental assumptions and 
expectations of managers and users. These included the following areas of tension: 
• How the system integrated with care activities: Here, implementation team 
members stated that the implementation was an opportunity to re-design existing 
business processes whilst users expressed that the syst m should “fit in with 
what we do” (see also Site B Section 6.2.3.2). 
• The implementation strategy: Managers stated that tey intentionally began 
implementation in the smallest service in order to tease out any emerging 
problems before commencing further roll-out. Users agreed that a stepwise 
implementation strategy introducing incremental parts of functionality was 
appropriate, but some stated that piloting should have been done on an even 
smaller scale.  
• Internal resources: Users maintained that they would need additional resources in 
order to cope with the increased pressure associated wi h use, mostly expressed 
in terms of “more time” and “more staff”. Managers, however, stated that 
internal resources were adequate. In this context, particular tensions were 
apparent in relation to administrative capacity. Senior Psychiatrists stated that 
they needed administrative staff to input their notes into Lorenzo in order to free 
up time for clinical activities. However, administrative staff maintained that in 
order to achieve this, the administrative capacity would need to be increased, 
which was not the case. 
Chapter 6: Findings from individual case studies 
 
 202 
• Standardisation: Whilst some implementation team members argued that mental 
health settings were more standardised than other car  settings, users stated that 
standardisation was particularly difficult here as cases were often highly 
individual and involved a large number of disparate staff groups.  
 
There was clearly a need to align these diverse perce tions in order to achieve an 
integrated approach to implementation. My findings indicate that different assumptions 
and expectations between the two parties resulted from a breakdown in communication, 
leading both to somewhat “pull”  into different directions.  
Engagement and communication 
Perhaps partly due to the relatively large-scale of the implementation, users also often 
stated that they were not listened to, whilst implementation team members maintained 
they had done everything in their power to ensure that staff’s concerns were addressed.  
 
“But I’ve had a lot of frustrations with it and conti ue to have. I don’t really feel, cause 
we’ve handed information through the system to the Lor nzo representative [each team 
has one of these to feed back problems], I don’t really feel any changes have been made 
really, I don’t know no, there was a slight change to the template.” (Interview, 
Healthcare Professional) 
 
The perceived lack of user engagement may be due to the way they were represented at 
managerial levels. A Clinical Lead was present and highly valued in ensuring that the 
design of the system reflected the reality of clinial processes. In line with this, and 
similarly to Site H (Section 6.3.3.1), the Clinical Lead viewed their role as providing a 
link between management and clinicians. However, they were not an active user of the 
system and only represented a fraction of the user base, namely the more senior 
consultants. Therefore, the implementation team mayhave had a distorted picture of 
attitudes and concerns amongst the more frequent, and not necessarily clinical, users.  
 
Similarly, implementation team members may have had a distorted picture in relation to 
the extent of problems experienced (also described n Site B Section 6.2.3.1). For 
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example, users expressed that logging software issus added to their workload as calling 
the helpdesk in some instances literally took “hours” . As in Site B, this may have led to 
certain problems with the software not being reported. Some users also indicated that 
there was “no point”  reporting issues that support was already aware of, such as the 
slowness of the system. 
 
“…we know we’re supposed to report all the errors but if you’re struggling with a 
system that puts you behind in your work then you’ve got to find extra time to report 
things and it’s stuff that isn’t happening occasionally it’s happening every time we log 
onto Lorenzo. You end up either not reporting it because it’s just normal to you or not 
reporting because you simply don’t have the time and e ergy. So I think the helpdesk 
have had less calls than they technically should have done… Yeah I think they have a 
micro-picture but not the full picture of what it’s actually like.” (Interview, Healthcare 
Professional) 
6.4.4 Key themes  
A wide array of potentially transferable theoretical ontributions emerged from this case 
study, which are summarised in Box 6.6 below. Some f these overlap with findings 
reported in case studies B and H above. They are discussed in detail in the following 
paragraphs. 
Box 6.6: Key themes and tensions emerging from my an lysis of Site Q 
Technical dimension  
• There needs to be a balance between user input in des gn and a solution that 
organisations can work with to plan business changes. 
• Local configuration was limited due to the national ture of the software – some 
local requirements may therefore not have been addressed. 
• Observable benefits for users are important to encourage use. 
• As the system was still in development, some fundamental usability issues 
existed.  
• The Trust implemented a “half-finished” solution and users developed 
‘workarounds’ for issues that may not necessarily persist in the future. 
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Human/social dimension  
• All stakeholders supported the basic vision, but the product was not perceived to 
have delivered. 
• There were significant differences in attitudes andperceptions amongst 
implementation team members and users.  
• Usability issues resulted in increased workloads for users. 
• Some issues of integrating the software with existing work practices were likely 
to attenuate but not others. 
• There were also some “softer” issues with usability where staff needed to use 
‘workarounds’ to compensate. These ran deeper and were not necessarily 
addressed/prioritised by implementation team members although being most 
worrying for users. 
• Users suggested that Lorenzo was a symptom of the incr asing bureaucratisation 
of healthcare and benefits were mainly managerial in nature. There were no 
perceived direct benefits to users and patients.  
• There were different views between implementation team and users in relation to 
engagement. Engagement of all staff groups was difficult as there were so many 
in this setting.  
• The lack of knowledge of the system may have resultd in inadequate support. 
• The Clinical Lead was not an active user and did not represent all user groups. 
Organisational dimension 
• Issues surrounding the creation of standardised processes created areas of 
tension. 
• There were different views amongst users and implementation team members in 
relation to implementation scale.  
• The system did not exist so planning for training was difficult. The large user 
base and a lack of knowledge of the system meant tht raining was not 
perceived as appropriate. 
• There were different definitions of resources amongst staff and implementation 
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team members: staff focused on capacity, whilst the implementation team 
focused on funding. 
Macro-dimension  
• NHS CFH was increasingly viewed as inhibiting local implementation. 
• Commercial and contractual arrangements were perceiv d to inhibit local 
progress and sharing of lessons between Trusts. 
• The national allocation of resources was diverse and often not tailored to Trusts 
and progress. 
• The national implementation was viewed to result in a lack of local autonomy. 
• The lack of political direction and the economic reession resulted in uncertainty 
in relation to the future direction. There was an increasing lack of belief in the 
product and the national implementation strategy over time.  
• There was an increasingly strained relationship with the LSP. 
 
As in Sites B and H, despite all stakeholders supporting the vision of an integrated 
national EHR, there were increasing doubts as to whether this could be achieved within 
the constraints of the national strategy and the software in question. In particular, the 
progress of implementation at this Trust was somewhat hampered by a lack of national 
resources, slow product development, and specialist product expertise.  
 
Developments led to frustrations amongst all stakeholders, but particularly users, who 
had to use software that was not fully developed, not fit for purpose, and did not bring 
any observable benefits over an extended period of time. In many ways, the software 
increasingly dominated the way they worked, resulting in some undesired ‘workarounds’ 
and unintended consequences for recording activity (e.g. delayed data input), job 
satisfaction and patient care (e.g. less time spent with patients). Many unintended effects 
were likely to attenuate to a degree over time with increasing software functionality, an 
expanded user base, and more embedded use. However, some of these effects were 
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likely to remain, particularly when considering the immaturity of Lorenzo in relation to 
usability.  
 
Differences in perceptions between implementation team members and users were 
particularly striking at this Trust, possibly due to the uniquely complex nature of the 
mental health setting. These may be the result of fundamentally different assumptions 
and expectations as well as a lack of communication between the two groups. Whilst the 
implementation team measured “success” in relation to use, users argued that it should 
be measured on the basis of observable benefits. Communication between the two 
parties was somewhat hampered by the lack of effective “boundary spanners” who could 
translate between the two worlds. However, this may also be due to the scale of the 
implementation, as active user engagement on a large scale is by definition extremely 
difficult. 
 
Investigating the first implementation of Lorenzo into the mental health setting also 
raised unique challenges, associated with both data entry and the feasibility of a national 
solution to suit different needs. In this setting, a range of diverse staff groups were 
required to use one IT system in an extremely sensitive environment. Challenges of 
using computers during the consultation observed in Site H were therefore exacerbated. 
Based on my findings, the extent to which computers will ever fit in with the deeply 
personal relationship between patients and mental health staff is questionable.  
6.4.5 The status quo when data collection was compl eted 
As in the first two case studies, the future of Lorenzo at this Trust was uncertain when I 
completed data collection, being primarily dependent on the future strategic direction of 
the government. The ability to obtain adequate natio l resources to support local 
implementation, faster software development cycles, and additional specialist support 
were identified as necessary to pursue the Lorenzo route as otherwise the Trust was 
forced to consider an alternative system. As in theother two case studies, 
implementation team members expressed that they had developed significant internal 
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expertise that would facilitate effective implementation of either Lorenzo or a different 
system. 
6.5 Chapter summary 
I focused on exploring the views and experiences of users as well as organisational 
consequences of introducing Lorenzo and how these evolved over time in the complex 
environment of a national EHR implementation.  
 
Overall, the three case studies have illustrated very different stories of sociotechnical 
change unfolding over time within their complex indivi ual contexts. Although these 
stories were to some extent different, reflecting loca  contingencies, there were also 
several similarities, not least the fact that all were faced with the same system and placed 
within a constantly evolving political context characterised by national arrangements 
affecting local developments.  
 
Drawing on theoretical insights gained from individual case studies, the following 
chapter will explore similarities and differences between Trusts and potential underlying 
factors in more detail. In doing so, I will make comparisons across cases and place these 
within the wider contextual implementation environment by integrating data obtained 
from multi-sited ethnography sources.  
 
I identified the following over-arching themes across case studies, which will be 
discussed in detail: 
1. Macro-influences: different Trusts, but similar problems  
2. Starting points and different developments over time – the role of scale and 
progress in organisational coping  
3. Software characteristics and their consequences 
4. Individual coping: intended and unintended ‘workarounds’ and their 
consequences.




Chapter 7: Comparison of sociotechnical processes o f 
change across cases and integration with the macro-
environment 
7.1 Introduction 
Having described the processes of sociotechnical chnge in individual case studies in 
Chapter 6, I will now make more detailed comparisons across Trusts. In doing so, I 
explored similarities and differences between Trusts over time. The cross-case 
comparisons broadly involved comparing the dimensions f my coding framework 
(column 1 in Table 7.1) across Trusts (see also Chapter 5). In doing so, I investigated 
developments in individual Trusts (columns 2, 3 and 4 in Table 7.1), relationships 
between Trusts (columns 5 and 6 in Table 7.1) and developments over time (row 2 in 
Table 7.1).  
Table 7.1: Cross-case analysis table 
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This analysis allowed me to examine both local and national processes (by exploring 
changes over time across micro- and macro-dimensions), as well as the interrelated 
nature of social and technical dimensions both within and across Trusts. In this chapter, I 
draw on the relevant theoretical frameworks, but will more explicitly address theoretical 
considerations and contributions in the following chapter.  
 
My aim was to explore early views and experiences of users and understand the 
consequences of the system for their work practices as well as general organisational 
functioning. Drawing on these experiences and insight , I sought to generate a detailed 
picture of the implementation landscape characterising this unique attempt to implement 
and adopt nationally procured software. 
 
This chapter will also incorporate findings from multi-sited ethnography informants to 
complement case study findings. These allowed me to gain a detailed insight into the 
complex contextual circumstances surrounding the natio l implementation and include 
data obtained from various additional stakeholders r lated to developments in Trusts (the 
macro-environment). Data were obtained from interviews with governmental 
stakeholders (n=3), developers (n=2), LSP (n=2) and independent sector representatives 
(n=7). As already described in Chapters 5 and 6, interviews were complemented by a 
range of overarching policy and related documents including Lorenzo product 
descriptions and screenshots, documents by NHS CFH and the DH, and publicly 
available policy documents cited throughout my thesis.  
 
ANT helped me to investigate the micro-processes of ociotechnical change (i.e. how 
stakeholders and Lorenzo were interrelated and “re-assembled” to form a new network 
over time).(115;138) I drew on Strong Structuration Theory and the Social Shaping of 
Technology to conceptualise the mutually shaping relationship between macro-contexts 
and these local sociotechnical processes.(138;141) Tracing developments was informed 




by the Theory of the Diffusion of Innovations and Normalisation Process Theory, which 
facilitated interpretation of how micro-processes fitted within a larger organisational 
context and how they “normalised” or failed to “normalise” over time.(92;150;151)  
 
Four themes relating to these theoretical frameworks (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 8) 
emerged from the analysis: 
1. Macro-influences: different Trusts, but similar problems (here I drew on Strong 
Structuration Theory and the Social Shaping of Technology) (138;141) 
2. Starting points and different developments over time – the role of scale and 
progress in organisational coping (here I drew on the Theory of the Diffusion of 
Innovations and Normalisation Process Theory) (92;150- 52)  
3. Software characteristics and their consequences (here I drew on the Social 
Shaping of Technology and Greenhalgh and Stone’s Model) (138;141) 
4. Individual coping: intended and unintended ‘workarounds’ and their 
consequences (here I drew on ANT).(115;138)  
 
I attempted to develop an overall illustration of the relationship between these themes, 
which is shown in Figure 7.1. 




Figure 7.1: Overall illustration of the national implementation landscape 
 
Note: A graphical model of the overall implementation landscape derived from my findings. Central to 
this is the circular relationship between local and national developments. Arrows indicate consequences 
for… and shaping of…elements of the model. 
 
I will now discuss the four themes identified and their relationship in more detail. 
7.2 Macro-influences: different Trusts but similar problems  
Despite the demographic and strategic differences (e.g. in terms of characteristics and 
implementation approaches) between Trusts (see Chapter 6), the macro-environment in 
which implementations took place resulted in similar local challenges being 
experienced. Strong Structuration Theory and the Social Shaping of Technology helped 
to conceptualise the mutually shaping relationship between macro-contexts (including 
the changing political and economic landscape, the national contractual situation, and 
the pressure to progress) and local sociotechnical processes.(138;141). I will explore the 
mechanisms involved in Sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.3 below and further elaborate on the 
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7.2.1 The changing political and economic landscape  
Since the conception of the Programme over a decade ago, it has been characterised by 
many changes, not only in relation to strategy, but also in relation to central leadership 
and a reduction in funding in light of an economic re ession.  
 
As a result of the bleak economic climate,(79) centrally funded resources were 
increasingly withdrawn and the more advanced functio alities of centrally procured 
software were excluded from contracts in early 2010 in order to save money.(216) This 
has been coupled with repeatedly missed politically-set deadlines and resulting changes 
in the implementation timelines. Financial concerns came on top of previous problems 
relating to contractual negotiations which resulted in two LSPs leaving the Programme 
early (see chapter 1) and contributed to publicly announced plans of the then-opposition 
parties to “abandon” the Programme.(217)  
 
The change in government in 2010 meant that, despite planned changes, the future 
direction of the national strategy was, at the time of writing, relatively uncertain. The 
coalition government had not, despite declaring budget cuts and an estimated £20 billion 
in NHS efficiency savings, published a detailed IT strategy for the NHS. At the time of 
writing, it announced an increased focus on systems choice for local organisations and 
an opening of the software provider market to a larger number of accredited commercial 
suppliers.(79;218;219)  
 
In addition, major re-structuring of the NHS as a whole was planned to take place at the 
time of writing. This included the abolishment of SHAs and PCTs, placing the 
responsibility of commissioning local services on GPs, and increasing the number of 
Trusts with Foundation status.(79) The National Audit Office published its third review 
of the NPfIT in mid 2011, concluding that “progress with the delivery of care records 
systems continues to fall well below expectations” and that “the Programme is not 
providing value for money because there had been few successful deployments of care 




records systems in acute Trusts”.(220) This was followed by similarly fierce criticisms 
by the Public Accounts Committee.(221) A public consultation on future NHS IT policy 
in England was at the time of writing taking place, with an announcement on the 
outcome expected at the end of 2011.(79) 
 
In line with these developments, central leadership of the Programme over time 
somewhat lost momentum as NHS CFH was integrated within the DH’s Informatics 
Directorate. This lack of clear strategic direction contributed to uncertainty about the 
future strategic direction of the Programme expressed by many interviewees: 
 
“Well I think the jury’s really out on it, the, it’s interesting that the minister who’s now 
got responsibility for NHS IT is new to the health field or at least, this is Simon Burns, 
rather he was in health earlier in his career but as I understand has had no, you know, 
involvement for some years. So to some extent the politicians who are quite vocal in this 
area such as Steven O’Brian the Conservative MP he’s now gone off to, he’s a minister 
in international development and Norman Lamb who was the Lib Dem health 
spokesman he’s I believe the main policy advisor to Nick Clegg so it’s some new faces 
so what is the new government going to do, I think we wait to see.” (Interview, 
Independent Sector) 
 
As described in Chapter 6, these developments resulted in a lack of resources to resolve 
existing problems locally, a perceived lack in facilitating the sharing of lessons learned, 
and increasing concerns over resources and support for future releases. Therefore, 
stakeholders across Trusts progressively questioned th  adequacy of the national 
implementation strategy and highlighted the need to balance local needs with national 
requirements for standardisation.  
7.2.2 Contracting for health: contractual tensions and resulting 
powerlessness on all parts 
Although there were clear reasons behind large-scale n tional contracting, primarily in 
relation to containing costs, these arrangements contributed to perceived powerlessness 
for stakeholders on the ground. All Trusts expressed a lack of involvement in decision 




making relating to software changes and implementation strategies due to the contractual 
set-up that largely excluded them. As a result, local organisations were not able to 
customise Lorenzo according to their individual needs and influence deployment 
timelines in line with organisational readiness. Interviewees from NHS CFH and the 
independent sector were aware of these difficulties: 
 
“A perfect example with Cerner is with the [name of Trust] bought Cerner before the 
Programme and then when the Programme was coming along they got agreement to, 
well they decided to carry on, now that’s very, very sensible, they’ve made Cerner 
Millennium work, why have they been able to do that, because with their local control 
and local customisation and the local integration that they’re able to do that the 
contract explicitly excludes, how stupid is that, they can make Cerner do, the 
Millennium product work to the best of its ability. The Millennium product is actually a 
pretty bloody amazing product but the contract has constrained it in the UK. I think 
[Name] said this wonderfully on a slide yesterday, he said take a product that works 
well then surround it with information governance, constrictions, surround it with 
contractual constrictions, surround it with delivery restraints based on the contract and 
you end up with a product nobody wants or can use, completely bonkers.” (Interview, 
NHS CFH) 
 
“…the Programme was not going to get involved in some of the change issues that 
organisations needed to take account of, that was going to be down to the organisations 
but he was procuring and would introduce a system that would deliver the technology to 
enable that change. Now that’s all well and good if you engage the people who are 
going to be using the system in that process but that clearly didn’t happen, I’m not sure 
it could happen given the scale so, you know, that, ow that’s now materialised is you 
have LSPs who are tied to a very strict contract, they’re not necessarily willing to give 
more than they can because it may not be sort of commercially viable for them to do that 
and you’ve got a disengaged user community that feel that these things are being 
inflicted on them rather than being embraced by them which in my view is, you know, 
sums up, you know, where we are at the moment.” (I terview, Independent Sector) 
 
Organisational stakeholders also generally viewed LSPs as being motivated by cash-
releasing milestones, resulting in overly ambitious implementation timelines and a lack 
of attention to the time needed for systems to embed. This was perceived to lead to 
limited efforts in progressing local implementations.  
 




However, my interviews with stakeholders outside thimmediate Trust environment 
also indicated that contractual arrangements contributed to perceived powerlessness 
among developers and LSPs, who perceived pressure to d liver, stating that contracts 
inhibited communication and relationship building with Trusts.(222;223) 
 
“…but actually the contractual relationship is between the Trust and whether it be the 
system integrator or the application provider, that would be a much better model 
because then the Trust would know exactly what they’re getting from the supplier and 
the centre’s role has been limited to, you know, providing, you know, doing things to 
help shortcut the procurement stages and providing, you know, national advice and 
guidance rather than having absolute central control over these contracts.” (Interview, 
Independent Sector) 
7.2.3 Pressure to progress 
All stakeholders were under significant public and political pressure to show progress, as 
public perceptions of the Programme as a whole becam  increasingly negative. The 
media were said to contribute to this by focusing o delays, spiralling costs and technical 
problems occurring during implementations. 
 
“…a lot of things aren’t in our direct control, a lot of the bad press if you like impacts 
us quite heavily yet we don’t, it’s not in our gift if you like to do a huge amount about it, 
so some of the delays that have, experienced so far.”  (Interview, Developer) 
 
As a result of this pressure to progress, I observed some tensions between case study 
sites arising from the perceived distribution of national resources. In both Sites H and Q, 
stakeholders argued that national support centred on th se Trusts that had the highest 
political profile, which included Site B, where deployments of R1.9 functionality 
occurred. Political impatience may thus have inadvertently contributed to problems 
experienced locally (e.g. Site B) by prematurely progressing with implementations. 
 
“Yes, I give him [referring to senior staff at the DH] chapter and verse on why it’s 
wrong and where it’s wrong and it’s all blindingly obvious in my mind if you look at it 
properly and, you know, trying to do too much too quickly is the biggest problem.” 
(Interview, NHS CFH) 





“..it’s the same people telling us [Place Name] will be delivered in March, they told us 
that [Place Name] would be delivered two years ago, [Trust] was going to be delivered 
in November, well that’s now next July…and when youtalk to people from other, 
particularly the Early Adopters, the pressure they were under to sign off was 
horrendous, you know, they were saying if you don’t sign this off the Secretary of State 
for Health is going to have to stand up in parliament and explain why so just sign it, you 
know, that kind of pressure is horrendous.” (Interview, IT Manager, Site Q) 
 
In keeping with Figure 7.1 above, many of these natio l developments were the result 
of attempts to address problems encountered on the ground (hence the circular 
relationship). For example, as stakeholders increasingly questioned the “top-down” 
implementation model and associated contractual arrangements as well as political 
pressure, over time it slowly changed to a more localised approach.(219;224) 
7.3 Starting points and different developments over  time – the 
role of scale and progress in organisational coping   
As described in Chapter 6, the way Trusts dealt with the challenges arising from this 
complex environment differed. This was particularly apparent when examining 
developments over time and can be informed by drawing on the Theory of the Diffusion 
of Innovations and Normalisation Process Theory (see boxes in Figure 7.1 labelled 
“developments on the ground coped with differently” and “organisational coping”). 
These helped to conceptualise how micro- sociotechnical processes fitted within the 
larger organisational context and how the use of the technology was “normalised” or 
failed to “normalise” over time (see also Section 8.3.2).(92;150;151) 
 
Despite fundamental demographic differences, the thr e Trusts implemented (at least to 
begin with) the same software, all gradually replacing paper systems, but with somewhat 
different functionalities tailored to their particular setting. Initially, Sites B and H 
followed a small-scale implementation approach, goin  l ve with one ward and nine 
users respectively, whilst Site Q implemented on a larger scale, going live with 150 
users. As time progressed, it became apparent that Site Q, despite the initial “head start”, 




remained relatively static over a sustained period of time without visible progress either 
in terms of a larger scale roll-out or significantly improved software functionality. Site 
B, on the other hand, due to political and hence media pressure to progress, implemented 
increasing software functionality as time went on. However, this led to significant 
problems in the organisation, mainly due to a lack of organisational ability to plan for 
software that had never been implemented in this setting coupled with the large user 
base. In contrast, the Site H deployment remained small-scale with no further 
functionality being implemented over a relatively long period of time. Here, all efforts 
concentrated on making Lorenzo work, this being achieved through intensive 
development activity in close collaboration with users. However, this took time, so much 
so that the overall strategic direction was reassessed in light of resources spent, with 
hospital management seriously considering switching to an alternative system outside of 
the government Programme.  
 
[Manager] also tells me that they “have had a bit of a problem in the Trust because the 
Trust wants to move away from Lorenzo towards using SystmOne, so we are looking for 
evidence that it is worth keeping Lorenzo”, this is why they are very interested in our 
results and I am asked to see the Head of IT in the afternoon to report our results to 
date, there is a board meeting in March 10, “I am probably not supposed to tell you this 
but I am not very good at keeping secrets”, she also tells me that SystmOne is not good 
and that she doesn’t want to stop using Lorenzo as it is much better, she feels that they 
have worked very hard to get Lorenzo where it is now and that there have been 
significant improvements. (Observation notes, Site H) 
 
As a result of the perceived lack of progress in system development over time, users in 
Site B were increasingly frustrated; at Sites H andQ, management became increasingly 
frustrated in relation to the scale of the implementation (i.e. the limited overall number 
of active users). There seemed to be two different notions of progress across cases, both 
of which needed to be fulfilled for an implementation to be considered “successful”. 
User satisfaction appeared to be closely linked to perceived system development 
progress, whilst political and managerial stakeholders tended to focus on scale (relating 
to both functionality and user base). Site B illustrated that progress in relation to system 




development had not been achieved, whilst developments in Site H indicated that 
progress in relation to scale had not been achieved. Site Q could be placed somewhere in 
the middle with an initially promising implementation in relation to scale but lacking 
progress in relation to software development over time. There seem to be trade-offs with 
both types of progress as illustrated in Table 7.2 below. 
Table 7.2: Benefits and trade-offs in relation to the two different types of progress 
 Benefits Trade-offs 
Progress in relation to 
scale 
Satisfying the political 
drive to demonstrate 
progress to the public – i.e. 
numbers of users 
 
Keeping in line with 
contractually set milestones 
Lack of software 
development activity 
 
Lack of attention to “good 
quality” implementations – 
organisations and users 
may not be ready 
 
Intensive support for users 
and two-way 
communication is difficult 
Progress in relation to 
software development 
Happy users as software is 
suited to the way they work  
 
Effective support and two-




Not satisfying political 
drive to progress 
 
 
As indicated in Table 7.2, progress in relation to scale can have significant implications 
for those on the ground as two-way communication betwe n managers and users is often 
not realised in larger scale deployments (e.g. Sites B and Q). As my findings show, here 
information was often cascaded down to users but feedback from users was frequently 




not effectively communicated and incorporated by management. Accordingly, 
(particularly in Sites B and Q) users were negative, rationalising changes as reflecting a 
rising focus on bureaucratisation, curbed spending, a d increased managerial control. 
This resulted in low morale especially amongst the more frequent users who could not 
avoid using the system (i.e. junior doctors, nurses and administrative staff), and who did 
not see any visible improvements in performance over an extended amount of time. The 
PAS replacement at Site B exacerbated negative perce tions as stability problems 
resulted in a large number of frustrated users.  
 
“No I’m still not seeing enough people [referring to patients in a clinic], no matter how 
many people you see you are still not seeing enough, I think that’s the thing. We were at 
a meeting and someone said we’re supposed to have five or 10% increase each year, 
you know I’m seeing people I’m not creating a product here that I can soup up a 
machine and make it quicker, you know an hour is still an hour but they are always 
wanting more anyway so you sort of get used to that I think.” (Interview, Healthcare 
Professional, Site Q) 
 
Initially, negative attitudes were also present in Site H, but here users became more 
positive over time as they stated they had developed a system that worked for them and 
brought increasing benefits. This was most likely due to the small-scale deployment, 
which meant that communication between users and a designated IT Manager was 
efficient and constant, characterised by a close and personal relationship. Once this 
individual left however users faced the ‘official’ routes of communication much like 
those present in larger scale deployments.  
 
“Yeah well if they take him [referring to IT Manager] away then what have we got? We 
haven’t got anybody to sort of support us and feed us anymore and that’s the most 
expensive part, the cog of the wheel really, take the centre bit out what have you got, 
that’s what it feels like to me.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional, Site H) 
 
Despite these fundamental differences in organisation l characteristics and type of 
progress, all three Trusts were in a similar positin towards the end of my data 
collection, reconsidering their strategic direction n relation to systems choice. This may 




be due to the fact that they faced similar macro-influe ces (discussed in Section 7.2 
above) and software issues (discussed in Section 7.4 below).  
7.4 Software characteristics and their consequences  
As a result of the national procurement, all three Trusts had to cope with similar 
technological issues (see box in Figure 7.1 labelled “c ntrally procured technology with 
certain properties”). Strong Structuration Theory helped to explain how software design 
had significant local sociotechnical consequences for its use in context.(225) The 
processes involved are further explored in Section 8.3.3. 
 
The biggest challenge in this respect was that Lorenzo was still in development, which 
affected planning of work and business processes, training, as well as user engagement. 
It also resulted in a range of unanticipated problems for both organisational functioning 
and individual contexts of use. 
 
“…my understanding is that we didn’t get fantastic information about that [referring to 
the system] because there are so many areas in configurability and there would be 
people who understood in detail that bit of it or that bit of it but not necessarily anyone 
or any kind of bible that could give you that overvi w of it because we got a system in 
development and certainly some of the decisions we made on the basis of, you know our 
best guesses, given the information we had, turned out to be not so smart.” (Interview, 
Manager, Site B) 
 
The immaturity of the system also meant that users ac oss professions and different 
Trusts faced similar usability issues. These included, amongst others, freezing of 
screens, a long time to load documents, a lack of intuit veness, long log-in times, 
inappropriate layouts of forms and print-outs, and the perceived inconsistency of 
language. Over time some of these issues were addressed, but most users in Sites B and 
Q commented they were not addressed sufficiently for the system to be considered 
usable. Users in Site H, on the other hand, suggested that over time system performance 
had improved considerably, possibly due to the intensive support by a dedicated IT 
Manager and the close involvement of users in development. As a result, users in Sites B 




and Q tended to be relatively negative towards Lorenzo, whilst users in Site H became 
more positive over time. 
 
“When compared to Cerner he said that it was “clunky” (i.e. has a lot of unnecessary 
clicks in usability terms) but is a more mature product, also it exists as opposed to 
Lorenzo, he finds it “puzzling as to why they are implementing something that does not 
exist”, he has “no idea why they went for Lorenzo” (Researcher notes, Interview, NHS 
CFH). 
 
Users further complained about the large number of clicks and mandatory screens in the 
system, which was felt to increase workload; this was a problem encountered in all three 
case study sites and persisted over time. This indicates that slowing of workflows 
needed to be expected and planned for by all stakehold rs as things may not necessarily 
have improved over time. At Site H it was addressed by allowing users an extra five 
minutes per appointment when they were using the software. However, the other two 
sites did not address this issue, which may have exacerbated negative user attitudes. 
 
Developments at Site B were somewhat different. Despit  similar usability issues, the 
deployment did not initially appear to affect organisational functioning. However, when 
the hospital implemented extended software functional ty replacing the local PAS, 
stability issues caused a fundamental disruption. As a result, all efforts there focused on 
resolving these as opposed to usability issues.  
 
“Yes and until we get the R1.9, the PAS base stabilised, we can’t roll-out the other stuff 
and we’re desperate to do that because that’s the point at which Lorenzo starts to add 
value, at the moment, benefit? None!” (Interview, Manager, Site B) 
 
Usability issues were addressed by management when orga isational functioning in Site 
B was compromised. In Site H, on the other hand, usability was the focus of efforts from 
the beginning. Further roll-out was considered once existing problems were addressed 
and users were relatively happy with the software. It therefore seems important to build 
on a solid base of usable software before considering further deployment. However, this 




was at odds with the context of the considerable poitical pressure to increase the scale 
of the implementation (outlined in Section 7.2.3 above). 
7.5 Individual coping: intended and unintended ‘wor karounds’ 
and their consequences 
ANT helped to conceptualise micro-processes of sociote hnical change as users 
accommodated the new technology.(115;138) I will explore the processes involved in 
more detail in Section 8.3.4 concentrating on cross-case comparisons below. 
 
Across Trusts, users had to employ temporary ‘workar unds’ that were accepted by the 
organisation due to the initial running of paper-based systems (see box in Figure 7.1 
labelled “individual coping”). This was perceived by users as unnecessary duplication of 
activity, but accepted by most as it was expected to at enuate in due course. Site H 
illustrated that this did indeed happen when Lorenzo was rolled out, which meant a 
reduction of printing activity. 
 
“There are some annoying delays between having completed the form and printing it, 
there are some unnecessary pages in between”, he had to click several boxes e.g. “print 
local” and “print preview” before being able to hit the actual print button, ticking these 
boxes is compulsory. (Observation researcher notes, Site H) 
 
In addition, all users had to change existing work practices to fit in with the demands of 
the technology, resulting in ‘workarounds’ that were unintended by management. Across 
Trusts the most common techniques to achieve this included using other systems to 
compensate for perceived shortcomings (e.g. Microsoft W rd or paper), partial use, and 
“tricking the system” (e.g. if users could not move to the next item without completing a 
free text box, some would simply copy and paste text from other boxes). Most of these 
‘workarounds’ were what has been classified as “essential hindrance 
workarounds”.(226) These were used to get around perceived problems in the system 
that were seen as making use very time-consuming. Most were also viewed as essential 




as they were designed to save time on administrative tasks, thereby freeing up time for 
provision of more direct patient care. 
 
However, there were also some more fundamental changes i  work practices imposed by 
the system, which appeared to be of greater concern to users as they were not expected 
to attenuate over time and could often not be addressed by ‘working around them’. 
These varied across Trusts, but often represented changes in perceived professional 
identities resulting from the way Lorenzo re-structured care activities. For example, 
many clinical users reported an increase in administrat ve tasks, which they commented 
was not what they “signed up for” as it meant they spent less time on clinical activities. 
 
“I mean the fact that there’s no jobs in the NHS at the moment is the only reason why 
people would have stayed and morale has been, people are just not feeling job 
satisfaction because as I say when you should be seeing patients you’re actually sitting 
at a screen that is going interminably slow.” (Interview, Healthcare Professional, Site 
Q) 
 
Therefore, most users carefully ‘guarded’ the interactions with patients, by keeping them 
as personal as possible. This was particularly apparent in settings where computers were 
originally planned to be used during the clinical encounter (Sites H and B), which was 
not perceived as appropriate as users stated it affected the therapeutic relationship (Site 
H). In other cases, Lorenzo was not viewed as quick and flexible enough to be used in 
the fast-moving clinical setting (Site B). Consequently, clinical and administrative tasks 
tended to be separated and handheld computers were us d as little as possible. As a 
knock-on effect, data entry into Lorenzo was often d layed, which meant that the system 
was not as up-to-date as it was initially planned to be. This issue is likely to remain and 
pose significant challenges in future deployments as clinical users are likely to resist if 
IT is perceived to negatively affect the quality of interactions with patients.  
 
“So I think for some of it I tend to try and ask questions and then save it all in my mind 
until the end. Now really and truly we shouldn’t dothat either but I just think, I’m 
thinking patient care and giving them the time, especially if you want to sit and listen to 




a patient or talk to them and if they take you onto a different subject and you’re not on 
that bit to click you’ve got to remember that information whereas on the treatment 
record card we’ve got now, you know, if they start lking about medication you can go 
to medication quite easily, you could write that in.”  (Interview, Healthcare Professional, 
Site H) 
 
Similarly, users stated that the balance between security measures and the complex day-
to-day service demands characterising the healthcare environment resulted in a system 
that was not fit-for purpose and access cards needed to log into the system were often 
shared or left in terminals. Again, this is likely to be of continuing importance resulting 
in compromised security measures. 
7.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has drawn on both case study data and dditional stakeholder interviews in 
order to provide insights into the environment in which the implementation of Lorenzo 
took place. In doing so, I focused on exploring the views and experiences of users as 
well as organisational consequences of introducing Lorenzo and how these evolved over 
time in the complex environment of a national EHR implementation.  
 
As ANT did not fulfil all my requirements, particular y in relation to explaining 
theoretical insights gained, and the role of indiviual, macro-environmental and 
organisational factors shaping local developments, I searched the literature for 
approaches that could address these shortcomings (Chapter 4). Drawing on relevant 
theoretical frameworks and applying these to my findings provided insights into how 
national arrangements affected the way Lorenzo was procured, implemented and used 
locally. Here, ANT helped to explore the micro-processes of sociotechnical 
change,(115;138) whilst the use of other frameworks helped to place micro-processes 
into context, by explaining the role of internal structures of human agents, and 
conceptualising the environment in which sociotechni al processes were situated and 
unfolded over time. Particularly helpful in this respect were Strong Structuration Theory, 
the Social Shaping of Technology, and the Theory of the Diffusion of 




Innovations.(138;141;150) I will critically reflect on the usefulness of theoretical lenses 
used in the subsequent chapter. 
 
My findings illustrate that, despite their differences, Trusts faced similar technological 
challenges arising from macro-environmental arrangements surrounding the nationally 
procured software. These were coped with in diverse ways by different organisations 
(e.g. scale), but coping of users was broadly comparable across settings (e.g. adopting 
‘workarounds’). I also highlighted the mutually shaping relationship between these two 
types of coping, outlining consequences of both organisational coping for individual 
users and vice versa. In conceptualising how sociote hnical change occurred, and how it 
related to individual and organisational coping as well as national progress, I developed 
an overall model building on existing theory (Figure 7.1). 
 
Having integrated my findings across cases and with the multi-sited ethnography 
sources, I will now place them in the context of the evolving literature (building on 
Chapter 2), before examining the contribution of mystudy in light of the theoretical 
lenses employed in more detail. 
 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
 226 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have outlined how I developed a methodological framework 
based on sociotechnical theory (see Chapter 4), and applied this to explore the views and 
experiences of users as well as organisational consequences of introducing Lorenzo, and 
how these evolved over time in the complex environme t of a national EHR 
implementation. 
 
In this chapter, I seek to integrate the findings of individual case studies and cross-case 
comparisons described in Chapters 6 and 7 with the more recent developments in the 
literature and examine my findings in light of the th oretical lenses used in more detail, 
critically reflecting on the contribution of each to my study in Section 8.4.2. In doing so, 
I will explore evolving empirical directions and relate these to the progress and 
challenges encountered throughout the national imple entation of Lorenzo as 
experienced in the three case study sites. This will also involve exploring some 
remaining tensions relating to macro-environmental developments, and the 
consequences of technology for the therapeutic nature of care.  
 
This chapter will further discuss how, throughout the study, I found myself increasingly 
drawn to a critical perspective in terms of theoretical stance, as power relationships have 
played a more prominent role than originally anticipated (further explored in Section 
8.4,1).(227;228) I will conclude with the strengths and limitations of my study before 
moving to discussing the practical implications emerging from my work in Chapter 9. 
8.2 Literature update 
I followed the literature throughout my research and updated my literature review 
(Chapter 2) periodically. In doing so, I developed an emerging understanding of the 
existing empirical evidence, and applied it to the English approach to implementing 
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Lorenzo. This allowed me to contextualise my findings and to refine the model I 
developed in Chapter 2. 
 
Keeping in line with the structure of dimensions identified in Chapter 2, I examine my 
findings in light of the evolving literature. Figure 8.1 below presents an updated model, 
which illustrates the shifting nature of the implementation landscape over time by 
integrating a temporal element (including the desired future state i.e. some kind of 
diffusion and “normalisation” of the technology).(92;150;151) It also more explicitly 
shows how the overall dimensions identified are not only interrelated but also have 
consequences for each other, which is consistent with the overall sociotechnical 
approach.(115;138) In addition, I identified a number of other factors under these overall 
dimensions, which I discuss below. The dimensions outlined in Chapter 2 helped to 
provide a general framework, as they were broadly supported by the additional literature 
as well as the findings of my own work. 
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Note: An updated graphical representation of the socio-cultural factors surrounding the implementation 
and adoption of EHRs identified in the literature review (Chapter 2). Factors included in the overall 
dimensions are summarised at the bottom of the Figure. 
 
Overall, there is still a lack of research investigating how adoption of EHRs can 
successfully be promoted.(229) This is particularly true in relation to national and large-
scale ventures as these are still in their infancy. The findings of my study have 
contributed to understanding of these issues in a variety of ways, which I will outline in 
turn.  










Local context of implementation 
Time – stages of design, implementation, adoption, embedded use 
F
uture state 
¹ Includes usability, system performance, integration and interoperability, stability and reliability, ad ptability and flexibility, 
cost, accessibility and adaptability of hardware 
² Includes attitudes and concerns, resistance and workarounds, expectations, benefits/values and motivations, engagement and 
user input in design, training and support, champions, integration with existing work practices 
³ Includes getting the organisation ready for change, planning, leadership and management, realistic expectations, management 
and user ownership, the implementation team, complexity and management in the NPfIT, teamwork and communication, 
learning and evaluation 
4 Includes progress, other healthcare organisations, ndustry, policy, professional groups, independent bodies, the wider 
economic environment, and international developments 
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8.2.1 Technical dimension  
8.2.1.1 Usability 
My findings support the notion that usability problems can pose significant barriers to 
adoption of EHRs. Issues encountered in my case studie  in particular related to the 
difficulty users experienced navigating Lorenzo due to its complexity and in obtaining 
an overview of a patient or particular care activities. These problems have been 
frequently identified in previous studies of the more complex IT systems in healthcare 
such as EHRs.(31;230;231) 
 
The literature suggests that the best way to achieve application usability is through a 
close collaboration between the designers of applications and end-users.(232;233) This 
may take the form of continuously testing prototypes in different groups of end-users 
and subsequent re-design if necessary.(234-237) However, in my case studies this close 
collaboration was, due to the nature of the nationally procured software and the 
associated contractual relationships, clearly not possible in most cases. This may have 
contributed to the lack of progress in systems development and consequently also 
hampered progress relating to implementation scale. Where a close relationship between 
users and developers was realised (Site H), the applic tion was viewed as more usable as 
suggested changes by users were more readily incorporated. 
8.2.1.2 System performance 
System performance, characterised by the immaturity of Lorenzo, was found to play an 
important role in my case studies. The most common complaint in this respect was the 
slow speed of the application, system downtime, and lo g log-in times. This resulted in 
usability issues and caused frustration amongst mosusers. The literature supports these 
findings highlighting that using a new system should not be significantly slower than the 
system that was previously operational, irrespectiv of whether this was paper-based or 
electronic.(31;230;231;238) My findings build on this, suggesting that emerging 
problems relating to systems performance can to some extent be counteracted by giving 
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users more time to compensate for increased demands on their time imposed by the 
system, as was the case in Site H.  
 
System performance is strongly related to system usability but I discussed these 
separately as usability issues for users may not necessarily be a consequence of system 
performance. For example, system performance may also have managerial or technical 
consequences that are not necessarily visible to end-users.  
8.2.1.3 Integration and interoperability 
My findings further show that the integration of Lorenzo with existing systems played a 
more important role than originally anticipated, as the parallel running of systems 
(including paper as well as other electronic system) was found to duplicate work 
thereby slowing users down and contributing to negative attitudes. This is a fundamental 
problem with individual commercial systems (such as Lorenzo), as these are often not 
designed to integrate with other existing systems. Lorenzo, despite having initially been 
conceptualised as an integrated solution to be usedacross care settings was, at the time 
of writing, increasingly combined with other systems. This was due to changes in the 
strategic direction of the overall Programme meaning that the market was likely to open 
up so that hospitals could choose other software suppliers (further discussed in Section 
8.2.4).(219) Therefore, issues surrounding integration and interoperability of systems 
were likely to become increasingly important. The lit rature echoes these concerns, 
highlighting the importance of developing standards and interfaces to connect systems, 
but these often have obvious cost and time implications.(31) 
 
NHS CFH had developed standards for interfacing of systems,(239) which vendors 
supplying systems had to adhere to. Standards were also devised to authenticate the 
identity of users (see Glossary), to ensure the secure transfer of information across 
applications, and to specify technical requirements.(240;241)  
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8.2.1.4 Stability and reliability 
In my study, stability and reliability issues were f quently regarded by users as causing 
delay and frustration. However, according to implementation team members, Lorenzo 
software itself was relatively stable, but existing networks and infrastructures to support 
the software were often not fit for purpose. They were also different from the 
environment in which the software was tested, contributing to an inability to plan for 
mitigating actions. This, in combination with constant system upgrades, tended to give 
users the impression that the system “crashed”. Despite the relative perceived stability of 
Lorenzo on part of the implementation team, users tnded to be concerned about this 
“crashing” , resulting in a “lack of trust”  in overall system performance.  
 
These concerns have also been highlighted in the literature, cautioning that it is 
important to acknowledge that no system can ever be “fail-safe”, even if it is perceived 
as relatively stable.(242) It is therefore necessary to have systems in place and 
disseminate a plan of action of what to do in such situations. This will mean devising 
alternative forms of accessing and storing data in collaboration with application 
designers and may take the form of reverting to paper processes if necessary. It may also 
require training on what to do in such situations so that staff do not become de-skilled in 
using paper systems as a back-up.(242) 
8.2.1.5 Adaptability and flexibility 
In line with my literature review,(93) the need fora system to be adaptable and flexible 
in order to suit local demands was found to be extremely important in my study. 
However, my findings indicate that this also needs to be balanced with standardisation 
and interoperability considerations, especially in relation to national systems such as 
Lorenzo.(140;243) There are of course obvious trade-offs relating to an extreme focus 
on either: a system that is too extensively customised to one organisation may result in 
difficulty exchanging information with other organisations, whilst a system that is based 
on the premise of interoperability (such as Lorenzo) can lack fitness for purpose locally.  




Stakeholders in Trusts participating in my research were concerned about the cost of 
implementation, which had, despite being theoretically “free” , more local cost 
implications than initially expected. This took, for example, the form of having to hire 
additional staff to allow for implementation activies (e.g. technical specialists and 
project managers), and compensating for Lorenzo’s lcal consequences for care 
activities and organisational functioning (e.g. clinical and administrative locums). Such 
higher-than-expected EHR implementation costs are frequently found in the literature, 
and particularly long-term net returns from these investments are still a concern in this 
context.(31;230;244) Costs therefore need to be carfully planned for and net returns 
may indeed not materialise. 
8.2.1.7 Accessibility and adaptability of hardware 
Another very important factor, which was not given enough prominence in my original 
review of the literature, was the need to provide aquate workspace for users of the 
new application. The lack of access to computers has previously been identified as a 
barrier for use, which is also supported in my case studies.(230;231;234;235;245) For 
example, problems involved healthcare professionals w iting for computer terminals to 
become available, which slowed down work. A fundamental problem leading to this 
situation was not only due to issues with access but also due to a lack of attention having 
been paid to considering the positioning of computers in individual settings, particularly 
in buildings that were often not designed with computers in mind.  
 
A related issue was the use of handheld computers, which in my case study sites were 
often not used as intended by management (i.e. during the clinical encounter) due to, 
amongst others (see Section 8.2.2), practical and space-related problems (e.g. slowness 
of such devices and difficult positioning on the lap). Similarly, the use of SmartCards as 
a means for logging into Lorenzo was found to be problematic as it took a long time. 
These issues are likely to be of remaining concern, as they were often viewed as 
interrupting clinical care processes, interactions with patients and individual workflows.  
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8.2.2 Social/human dimension (those that interact w ith the 
technology…) 
8.2.2.1 Attitudes and concerns 
Although significant efforts were made by the government to assess patient and user 
attitudes, public surveys indicated that there was a widespread unfavourable attitude 
towards the Programme as a whole, especially amongst doctors.(140;246) Clinicians 
tended to support the underlying aims of shared EHRs, but not the national 
implementation strategy.(247) This was also illustrated by my findings, indicating that 
the overall vision of shared records is indeed still upported by most. There were, 
however, persistent concerns, heavily influenced by early negative experiences with the 
software itself. Central attempts were made to address some of these, for example in 
relation to security and confidentiality, by initiatives such as the NHS Care Record 
Guarantee, which set standards to protect confidentiality.(241)  
 
It has, however, been pointed out in the literature that if work is disrupted through 
security measures, this can decrease user motivation to carry out a certain task.(248) 
Role-based access features (that define the level of access to patient information 
according to profession, see Glossary) can help address these issues, but may result in 
reduced user satisfaction due to the limited amount of information provided by the 
system to each individual user (resulting in an inability to access information), and 
lengthy log-in times.(31) My findings have confirmed this as users tended to view 
lengthy log-in times with SmartCards as disrupting their work practices. As a result, 
cards were often left in terminals, which in turn compromised rather than promoted 
security and confidentiality. 
 
Of similar concern are changes in professional ident ty illustrated in my study. This 
related to a perceived difficulty of integrating Lorenzo into the process of “caring”, 
which is typically defined by the very nature of human interaction and touch. Caring for 
patients’ emotional needs is often viewed as an integral part of healthcare professional 
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work.(249) It is also this interpersonal element of care that often motivates individuals to 
enter the profession in the first place, being reflected in core healthcare professional 
values.(249-251) The literature echoes these concerns highlighting that the introduction 
of technological systems can have significant consequences for the therapeutic 
relationship between healthcare professionals and patients.(252;253) Indeed, this was 
also expressed by my participants (and especially clinical users) who stated that they did 
“not sign up for this”, when they reflected on the increasing emphasis on administrative 
tasks that was perceived to accompany the introduction of Lorenzo. 
 
This is illustrated in the literature, where mounting organisational pressures are often 
cited as creating increasing conflict between professional, social, institutional and 
personal values in the caring professions.(251;254;255) For example, Maben and 
colleagues found that when nurses qualified they had a strong set of professional values, 
but when faced with organisational reality, they found these difficult to implement in 
practice due to growing workloads associated with the organisation’s increased focus on 
achieving governmental targets.(256) However, it is precisely emotional and 
interpersonal care that makes the relationship between healthcare professionals and 
patients both rewarding and flexible (e.g. in terms of being able to listen to and tailor 
treatment to individual needs). The increased focus on tandardisation may therefore in 
fact contribute to inhibiting the fulfilment of wishes of both healthcare professionals and 
patients. My findings support this notion, indicating that in some instances technology 
can indeed distract from individualised patient care. This points to the importance of 
conceptually distinguishing the nature of providing care (which may be facilitated by IT) 
and the process of caring (which is in its very essence interpersonal by nature). 
 
In relation to the NHS CRS, it has therefore been argued that there is a need to address 
such existing concerns and map out exactly how new technology can accommodate 
these.(257) However, it also has to be kept in mind that attitudes amongst parties can 
change over time as the technology becomes embedded within everyday practice.(258) 
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This was illustrated by the longitudinal component in my study and particularly in 
relation to Site H.  
8.2.2.2 Resistance and ‘workarounds’ 
My findings have supported the notion that negative attitudes and the feeling amongst 
users that change is externally imposed can lead to partial use (i.e. only using parts of 
the system that are perceived as useful), workarounds, or avoidance of using the system 
altogether (“non-compliance”).(223;226;243) Some authors have argued that resistance 
to technology itself is rare; rather, the problem is more often resistance to the 
management introducing the technology.(248) In the context of my findings this was 
expressed through a questioning of the adequacy of the national implementation strategy 
and users’ perceptions of increasing bureaucratisation of healthcare in general, whilst 
most stakeholders supported the overall idea of EHRs. 
 
High levels of resistance among senior clinical users in particular were found to threaten 
implementation in my study, as this staff group tended to have high degrees of 
professional autonomy. This is supported throughout the literature.(31;259) For 
example, Doolin describes the implementation of an information system that monitored 
the performance of doctors into a hospital in New Zealand (which may admittedly have 
been more threatening to users than Lorenzo software). Here, doctors resisted use which 
ultimately resulted in changing the system itself.(260) 
 
However, resistance and workarounds may also be viewed in a different light. In this 
context, Ferneley and Sobreperez argue that resistance to use technology has 
traditionally been viewed negatively, but is not necessarily so.(226) It may, for example, 
be a response to an inadequate system and can, in certain situations, be adaptive (e.g. 
helping to compensate for inadequate technology).(140;231;259;261) ‘Workarounds’ are 
viewed as a result of the demands/rules that an organisation imposes through a system, 
which cannot be accommodated in everyday practice. Ind ed, this was the case in many 
changes to professional practice observed in my study, where users have tried to 
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accommodate a system that was perceived to be inadequ te, not viewed as central to, 
and/or disruptive to their work as it compromised time they could spend with patients. 
‘Workarounds’ here were mainly due to perceived unjustified “system blocks” by the 
user such as having to tick a box before moving to the next field,(262) or the general 
slowness of Lorenzo. When these issues were too disruptive, staff tended to revert to 
using paper and often entered information into the el ctronic system later. 
Organisational stakeholders stated that this ‘workar und’ in some instances had a knock-
on effect on the effectiveness and integrity of Lorenzo such as records not being up-to-
date. This highlights potentially adverse consequences resulting from some 
‘workarounds’ in this particular setting. Previous studies have investigated the potential 
consequences of workarounds for the safety and quality of care, but the mechanisms by 
which effects are observed are likely to vary across settings and may not be transferable 
to other IT applications.(263;264)  
8.2.2.3 Expectations 
Users had pre-conceived ideas and expectations about the potential benefits of Lorenzo 
as well as the software and hardware design. These w r found to influence adoption 
behaviour negatively, as often expectations and the product delivered did not align. This 
misalignment of expectations and actual experience is echoed in the literature.(265-267) 
In my study, users expected Lorenzo to facilitate care when in fact in most instances it 
was perceived to hinder it. At the same time, benefits to users and patients were limited. 
Greenhalgh and colleagues state that this mismatch of expectations and reality tends to 
be the case with “off-the-shelf” systems as these have not been extensively customised 
to suit local needs.(140)  
 
It is, however, important to keep in mind that in the context of the National Programme 
there are numerous groups of stakeholders making it difficult for all expectations to be 
met.(140;226;268) My case studies illustrate that cer ain groups, such as administrative 
staff (often the most frequent users of Lorenzo), tended to be neglected in management 
efforts relating to expectation management. This wafurther complicated by the large 
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scale of the implementation and a “strategic optimism” on the part of policy makers, 
presenting EHRs as the definitive solution to improve the quality and efficiency of 
care.(258) My findings illustrate that this resulted in ambitious aims, aggressive 
timelines and perhaps excessively high stakeholder expectations, failing to pay attention 
to the complex and unpredictable nature of the natio l venture. The literature supports 
this notion by outlining the often high expectations of managers and implementers, who 
tend to make certain assumptions that may not necessarily be reflected in reality. These 
include, for example that safety and efficiency of care can be improved through 
increased availability of information, that clinical information will be entered at the 
point of care, and that clinicians support the national strategy.(223;247;261;268-270) In 
contrast, many users in my study viewed the expectations from management as 
unrealistic and too ambitious. This again was exacerbat d by early negative experiences 
of system use. 
8.2.2.4 Benefits, value and motivations 
In order to manage expectations, it is important to consider and explicitly state the 
potential value to stakeholders, the potential trade-offs and anticipated effects on work 
practices. Here, Klein and Sorra argue that the degree of fit between an innovation and 
user values is important.(271) To strengthen “innovation-value fit” users need to be 
involved in the decision to introduce an innovation. It is assumed that if new systems 
address an identified user need, bring associated benefits, and fit in with existing work 
practices, this creates a “user pull”  and makes adoption more likely.(223) My study 
indicates that this has not always been achieved in relation to Lorenzo, as users and 
organisations expressed detachment from the nationally-led procurement process, 
resulting in a lack of both organisational and user pull. 
 
The literature further indicates that users need to be able to identify individual benefits 
to themselves and their patients (not only to the organisation or healthcare in 
general).(223;267) In this context, it is important that the relationship of benefits and 
efforts is relatively equal for all stakeholders.(230) For example, secondary use benefits 
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(i.e. reporting and performance measures) of the system are most obvious if clinicians 
are inputting structured data, but my study has shown that clinicians were often reluctant 
to do so as it was perceived to increase their workload and did not yield visible benefits 
in the patient encounter itself. The benefits of structured data entry were perceived to be 
primarily organisational and governmental. 
8.2.2.5 Engagement and user input in design 
In relation to the NPfIT as a whole, a more participatory approach to development and 
implementation has repeatedly been advocated.(5;247;257;272) For example, Catwell 
and Sheikh suggest that this should be characterised by early user involvement and 
development of a shared vision, formative evaluations and testing of prototypes to assess 
whether the system is perceived as usable, potential re-design so that it fits with users’ 
needs, summative evaluation and benefits identification once implementation completed, 
and incorporation of issues identified along the way.(272)  
 
Engagement and user input in design is clearly important,(223;236;247;257;270;273-
275) but in line with my findings, this may be difficult to realise with a nationally 
procured solution such as Lorenzo (see also Section 8.2.1.5). The result of the focus on 
interoperability was limited local input in system design and a resulting application that 
did in many instances not fulfil user and organisational needs. In addition, the organic 
development of engagement was hampered from the start as organisations and users 
were mandated to implement and use Lorenzo. The literature indicates that a potential 
way forward may be implementing a combination of standardised core solutions and 
customised elements, corresponding to particular users and environments (so-called 
configurational technology).(276;277)  
8.2.2.6 Training and support 
Training is clearly important, but also often difficult, particularly in relation to a non-
existent solution like Lorenzo, that constantly changes as new builds become available. 
Across my case study sites, this system immaturity had significant consequences for user 
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confidence and resulted in problems planning for anticipated changes for both users and 
organisations. For example, the much desired dummy training giving users the chance to 
play around with the system was often simply not possible as the technology was not 
available. The situation was further complicated due to the large scale of the 
Programme, limited resources, and tight implementation imelines, which restricted 
intensive training and support. Although the literau e highlights the importance of 
training, 
(21;22;24;28;29;32;42;47;50;51;53;55;56;58;61;62;65;6 ;68;76;77;84;179;278) these 
circumstances were truly unique as the nature of the national EHR implementation 
meant that case study sites were in many cases pioneer ng and encountered many 
unanticipated situations that could not be planned for. 
8.2.2.7 Champions 
My findings support the importance of key individuals in EHR 
implementations,(36;279) and particularly senior clini al and managerial staff, in getting 
other staff “on board”. However my findings also indicate that some non-clinical staff 
groups have so far been neglected such as, for example, administrative staff, who used 
Lorenzo most frequently but did not have representatives from their profession in 
strategic meetings whilst clinical representatives were more common. Insufficient 
attention has also been paid to preventing the rise of “negative champions” due to 
delays in software development.(35) My findings support the notion that these can pose 
a significant threat to implementation “success”. 
8.2.2.8 Integration with existing work practices 
As discussed in Section 8.2.2.2 above, users often found it hard to integrate Lorenzo into 
their day-to-day work practices, resulting in partial use, workarounds, or avoidance of 
using the system altogether.(223;226;243)  
 
This again illustrates the repeatedly highlighted role of user input in design as well as the 
need for adaptation and customisation, in order to effectively integrate systems with 
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existing work practices.(140) Nevertheless, even if effective work process mapping 
occurs (which again is difficult with a system that is being developed as it is being 
implemented), it will never be possible to plan for all changes as these are often 
unanticipated and emerge from the situation at hand. Some have stated that there is 
therefore always a need to try out a new system in practice and then keep re-configuring 
it based on local experiences.(243) This was, however, in many instances not possible 
across my case study sites due to the lack of localinput in software design and the often 
delayed incorporation of software changes. The rigidity of the nationally procured 
software also made it difficult to re-engineer busine s processes in a way that meant 
increased efficiency locally (at least in the early stages). Users therefore had to change 
their work practices to fit in with the technology. It also seemed that there was a lack of 
attention paid to examining informal work practices that characterise the dynamic and 
ever-changing hospital environment,(280) such as for example the informal x-ray 
ordering by nurses described in Site B.  
8.2.3 Organisational dimension 
Individual work practices were placed within and influenced by a wider organisational 
and environmental setting.(180;181;281) A word of caution is, however, needed at this 
point as the NHS is not one organisation, but rathe a f derated increasingly autonomous 
grouping of care providers.(282) This became increasingly apparent throughout my 
research as hierarchies and organisational arrangements, as well as implementation 
approaches, differed significantly within and across Trusts. It is precisely because of 
these differences that examining the organisational dimension (conceptualised as the 
Trust environment) in light of my emerging findings is helpful. I will do this in the 
subsequent paragraphs. 
8.2.3.1 Getting the organisation ready and planning change  
It seemed that all three Trusts studied were generally well prepared for the introduction 
of Lorenzo. They “ticked all the boxes” identified as important organisational “success” 
factors including strong visionary leadership and a “risk taking climate” (see Chapter 
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2).(277) Similar to individual work practice plannig mentioned above, organisational 
planning was, however, hampered by the fact that Lorenzo software was still in 
development. As a result, many consequences for organisational functioning, such as for 
example problems experienced in Site B when the PAS was replaced, were 
unanticipated. 
 
A mixture of implementation approaches were employed d pending on the Trust in 
question (as outlined in Chapters 6 and 7). This heterogeneous way of implementation 
helped to suit organisational locales, but may prove problematic in the future as Lorenzo 
functionality may branch into several local version resulting in a lack of ability to 
integrate the functionality across organisations. 
8.2.3.2 Leadership, management and realistic expectations 
A lack of management support is one of the most important factors contributing to the 
“failure” of IT implementations in healthcare.(230;268) In my case study sites, local 
management and leadership structures seemed to be in place, but national leadership was 
often lacking with changes in key national figures including senior staff at NHS CFH 
and changes in strategic direction (further outlined below in Section 8.2.4). This, 
coupled with ambitious national expectations relating to implementation timelines, 
resulted in increasing levels of frustration in case study sites.  
 
Originally, NHS CFH had put in place clear management standards and structures for 
the NPfIT as a whole, thereby providing strong national leadership capacity. However, it 
is of concern that the role of NHS CFH as a designated implementation authority is at 
the time of writing unclear following its integration into the DH’s Informatics 
Directorate. A central agency with designated respon ibility for setting standards and 
ensuring interoperability of systems is particularly important with the increasing focus 
on local autonomy in systems choice.(219) 
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8.2.3.3 Management and user ownership 
In relation to Lorenzo, users themselves were not ivolved in procurement decisions, 
which may have contributed to the negative attitudes observed in my case studies. In this 
context, the management literature promotes the notion of employee participation in 
achieving higher returns for the organisation.(36;28 83) However, the issue here is 
that there is often an emphasis on short-term profits and individual measures of 
performance. This leads individuals to do what is be t for them in the short term rather 
than what is best for the organisation in the long term.  
 
Similarly, some authors have argued that participatory development in government 
initiatives may not be as participatory as it may seem, as eventually certain objectives 
need to be achieved.(284) The result is that these objectives may at some point become 
far "too important" to be participatory. This was also reflected in my case study sites, 
where implementation was driven politically rather than locally. As a result, 
organisations were required to implement and users w e required to use the application.  
8.2.3.4 The implementation team 
Trusts were responsible for setting up local Lorenzo implementation teams. However, it 
became apparent during my study that there was a lack of competent health informatics 
and project management expertise in the NHS, which resulted in Trusts employing often 
costly sub-contractors to manage implementation activities. As a result, expertise was 
often not retained within the organisation, which in turn hampered long-term progress as 
individuals moved on. This was illustrated by my case study of Site H, where the 
“success” of the implementation was threatened by the departure of the sub-contracted 
IT Manager. 
8.2.3.5 Complexity and management in the NPfIT 
The organisational complexity of the Lorenzo implementation was further illustrated by 
the presence of informal hierarchies across my casestudy sites such as, for example, 
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clinicians being relatively autonomous. Much of theexisting literature, however, focuses 
on hierarchical managerialist models, which may not necessarily be relevant to the NHS. 
 
Due to these informal hierarchies, management and lea ership in the NHS tend to 
increasingly shift towards achieving through consensus.(277;285;286) Räisänen and 
Linde argue that this shift is characterised by the increasing number of multiple projects 
taking place in one organisation led by Project Managers.(285) Although this 
“projectification”  increases participation of various groups, projects are taking place in 
increasingly larger organisational environments. This means that new tensions can arise 
with different projects competing for resources and priority. The resulting challenge for 
management is to keep control over these different structures whilst still allowing for 
participation and empowerment of different groups.(277) 
 
In my case studies, the implementation of Lorenzo tended to be conceptualised as a 
project both locally and nationally. The competing nature with other ongoing initiatives 
and priorities was illustrated throughout my findings. There are several implications of 
conceptualising such large and transformative initiatives as projects.(284) These include 
the characteristics of conveying manageability, and, most importantly, a start and an end 
point. However, some of the more critical thinkers have argued that this view may in 
fact not fit with the messy nature of reality, in which changes are often ongoing.(284) 
There is therefore a need to recognise on both organisational and national levels, that the 
implementation of Lorenzo is a process as opposed to a project and that implementation 
is likely to be ongoing. My case studies indicate that this has so far not been achieved, 
which is also reflected in the often unrealistic exp ctations referred to in the paragraphs 
above. 
8.2.3.6 Teamwork and communication 
My findings clearly show that nationally held commercial contracts may inhibit 
cooperation and trust between different parties, and particularly between local 
organisations and software developers. These contracts also tended to hinder teamwork 
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and communication across early implementing organisations, with Trusts wishing for a 
more open approach to sharing lessons learned. Chesborough outlines how a more 
productive alternative approach in relation to technological innovation may be 
conceptualised.(287) In doing so, he promotes an “open innovation” as opposed to a 
“closed innovation” model. Closed innovation is characterised by companies 
developing new technologies, but failing to effectively integrate these into existing 
business models. The open innovation model allows other firms to capitalise on these 
technologies through licensing agreements. This means that innovative technologies are 
more effectively utilised and integrated as experience and systems are shared to benefit 
both companies and customers. The Lorenzo implementatio  may be conceptualised as a 
closed innovation approach, where large-scale contracting inhibited sharing of lessons 
between implementing organisations and commercial companies. 
 
In relation to teamwork within organisations, some authors caution that teamwork itself 
may create groupings of those that are viewed as belonging and those that are viewed as 
not belonging.(288) This may, in some cases, lead to tensions between groups and 
reinforce occupational divisions such as between managers, clinicians and 
administrative staff. My findings have illustrated that such tensions may be reinforced 
by technology introduction as occupational groups and power structures (e.g. between 
administrative staff and consultants) became more visible with the implementation of 
Lorenzo. 
8.2.3.7 Learning and evaluation 
In relation to IT implementations in healthcare, most authors advocate the use of a 
flexible evaluation model (i.e. being open to emerging problems that arise from 
contextual contingencies) based on sociotechnical theory.(104;289) This approach 
proved extremely useful in my study, but I found a lack of theoretical underpinnings of 
methodologies in the existing literature, particularly in relation to large-scale EHR 
implementations such as Lorenzo. I therefore developed a methodological framework 
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based on sociotechnical theory to guide my data collection (see Chapter 3). This 
approach may also be applied to other contexts. 
8.2.4 Macro-environmental dimension  
My findings have shown that there is a need to align several different stakeholder 
perspectives to ensure “successful” national and local implementation. The literature has 
also highlighted this need in the overall context of the NPfIT.(95) Stakeholders in 
relation to Lorenzo include not only clinicians and healthcare organisations, but also 
commercial and political parties, as well as designers, independent organisations and the 
media. The focus should not be on attempting to streamline these perspectives but on 
supporting the achievement of the common aim of integrated EHRs by means of 
accommodation rather than consensus (i.e. parties do not necessarily have to agree as 
long as they are coherently working towards a common vision).(290) 
 
When examining macro-factors in relation to Lorenzo, it is important to acknowledge 
that the developments in my case studies have taken place within a wider transformation 
of the NHS and the NPfIT. This complexity was not adequately reflected in my initial 
literature review, as existing studies were conducted in a variety of other contexts. 
 
Overall, it is important to acknowledge that there w re important “successes” in the 
Programme as a whole, including, amongst others, the implementation of PACS (which 
brought immediate benefits to users), GP systems, and the building of both national 
(Spine, N3) and local infrastructures as well as the development of standards (e.g. the 
interoperability toolkit).(291) In addition, the Programme helped to develop health 
informatics expertise within the NHS, although there is still a need to build on this.  
 
However, my findings indicate that local developments were heavily influenced by the 
changing financial climate, with a resulting tightening of NHS budgets in general and, 
more specifically, publicly debated concerns about the escalating costs of the 
Programme.(292-294) As a result, there was a considerable political debate about 
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changes in strategic direction. Despite the general buy-in into the central vision of the 
Programme and EHRs in general, the flux of the politica  landscape in particular, led to a 
considerable feeling of uncertainty in relation to the future strategic direction amongst 
stakeholders on the ground (see Chapters 6 and 7). This, in turn, resulted in a “waiting to 
see what happens” attitude amongst organisations and users, leaving the larger strategic 
decisions to the more “powerful” governmental stakeholders.  
 
Specifically, progress at the time of writing had been hampered by a lack of central 
guidance from the coalition government elected in 2010 (as mentioned in Section 
8.2.3.2). Initial plans were announced but the implcations of the future IT strategy for 
those on the ground were, as of August 2011, still tentative.(79;219) Part of the 
discussion was the role of NHS CFH, whose responsibility was integrated with the DH’s 
Informatics Directorate. The coalition government did not, despite announcing budget 
cuts and an estimated £20 billion in NHS efficiency savings, publish a detailed IT 
strategy for the NHS, but indicated that the future of the NPfIT would be characterised 
by increased local input in decision making and an opening of the supplier 
market.(79;219;221) In line with the constantly changing nature of the NHS itself 
(outlined in Chapter 1) these changes were not envisaged to occur in isolation. They 
were accompanied by a plan to establish new regulatory structures to monitor progress 
and quality, increased control by local GPs coupled with a decreased input from 
commissioners and the government, and abolishment of SHAs. This new strategic 
direction in relation to IT and the general re-struc uring seemed to reflect an increasing 
move towards the NHS as a collection of autonomous organisational units, as opposed to 
one unified organisation. Conceptually, although placed within the context of a national 
implementation, this move seemed somewhat at odds with a “top-down” implementation 
strategy that attempted to implement a programme gov rned by the “one size fits all” 
assumption. My findings have illustrated that these tensions were often hard felt on the 
ground, with organisations striving for more autonomy whilst being faced with centrally 
procured software lacking customisability. 
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My research indicates that it is the combination of change reforms supported by IT 
strategies that can maximise the chances of “successfully” implementing new systems, 
but the new governmental strategy clearly aims at major re-structuring of the NHS and a 
separate IT reform. This is of concern, as two disjoined strategies may have undesired 
consequences with those on the ground finding it difficult to prioritise. Many have 
therefore questioned whether another resource-intensiv  reform should be the current 
priority of an NHS that is already struggling to meet demands.(295) In addition, in line 
with my findings, the NHS is already suffering from what has been described as ”change 
fatigue”, which may be exacerbated by such developments and there is thus a real 
danger that both individuals and organisations simply cannot accommodate changes 
effectively.(296)  
 
These changes in strategic direction have not only been influenced by local 
developments (Chapter 7), but also by more publicly raised concerns relating to 
information governance and security from various clini al bodies.(297;298) Several 
reviews and recommendations published over the last few years in relation to the NHS 
IT strategy from a variety of governmental and non-g vernmental stakeholders 
advocated an approach permitting more local input and choice.(222;292;293;297-301) In 
doing so, practical ways to address emerging problems have been 
proposed.(222;293;294;302;303) The central recommendation here was introducing 
clinical benefits early whilst continuously assessing both risks and benefits. A move 
towards a greater number of centrally accredited interoperable systems from which 
Trusts could choose was viewed as essential to increase local autonomy of Trusts. This 
also involved the ability to keep well-functioning existing systems as opposed to having 
to replace these with national solutions. My findings illustrate that these 
recommendations were indeed realistic and desired by Trusts as they were likely to 
allow some early local benefits to be realised. The increased emphasis on local 
autonomy was also likely to permit more local input in implementation activities and 
system choice, which in turn can facilitate local problem solving and engagement. 
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However, it is important to recognise that this approach is likely to result in a new set of 
challenges, particularly in relation to systems interoperability (as discussed above). The 
more localised approach is in many ways similar to the IT strategy that was in place 
before the Programme was conceived. Back then, some parties argued that there was a 
greater need for integration as systems needed to be interoperable to bring the desired 
large-scale benefits. In addition, there was a general f eling that if money to deploy 
systems would be devolved to Trusts, sufficient IT investment would simply not be 
made.(304) Therefore, it was suggested that a central solution would be more 
appropriate. Both of these issues are still of concer  in relation to any future strategy. In 
this context is also important to recognise that this new strategic approach, should it 
materialise, has to date been largely untested and will need careful planning and 
flexibility to suit the evolving needs of the NHS. 
8.2.4.1 National implementation approaches 
These macro-environmental developments outlined above are of course situated in an 
even wider environment. In the literature, national EHR implementation approaches 
have received increasing attention over time as, in the hope of achieving significant 
potential benefits, many countries are actively pursuing the implementation of EHRs 
that can be shared across care settings. Strategies here vary in the degree of 
governmental control in the process of achieving lar e-scale interoperability of EHR and 
related systems (see also Chapter 1). They range from implementing centrally procured 
systems characterised by rigorous standardisation (as in England), to centrally setting 
standards for “meaningful use” facilitated by government funded incentives (as in the 
US).(9;305-309) Some countries have also employed a mixture of these approaches 
(such as Australia) where government support is combined with local choice and 
responsibility.(9;310-312)  
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, there were clear reasons f r the “top-down” approach taken by 
England, with major anticipated benefits emerging from the rigorous standardisation of 
systems. Cost savings were expected by large-scale procurement of systems, and the 
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strategy emerged from an identified need that central guidance was necessary to 
coherently lead the increasingly fragmented NHS into the 21st century (at least in 
relation to IT). Nonetheless, my findings have shown that, in the English context, the 
balance between achieving potential long-term benefits by seamless large-scale systems 
integration without compromising evolving individual user and organisational needs 
proved difficult to achieve. The anticipated benefits have remained elusive, with systems 
increasing individual workloads and in some instances ompromising organisational 
functioning. In support of this, a range of international experiences also indicate that, 
even when investigating benefits in longer-term EHR implementations, direct net returns 
on these investments are unlikely to be realised, particularly not in the short-term.(244) 
This is likely to be exacerbated in a national context due to its complexity and scale. The 
main tension, which also characterised my study, is finding a balance of achieving local 
benefits and adoption typically offered by “home-grown” systems, with a more rapid 
and cheaper implementation of commercial EHR system. This has so far still only been 
achieved on a relatively small scale characterised by extensive customisation of systems 
to suit local needs.(313) 
8.2.4.2 Overall progress of Lorenzo implementations 
Having outlined international developments and progress of the National Programme 
overall, I will now focus my attention back on Lorenzo. In relation to the English 
venture, my findings have indicated that many stakeholders were increasingly critical of 
the “top-down” implementation approach, possibly in light of an observed lack of 
progress experienced in relation to Lorenzo implementations. Overall, implementing 
Lorenzo was much slower than anticipated and implementations were characterised by 
often publicly debated problems, combined with the limited scale and functionality 
deployed.(314) As of December 2010, by which time th  implementation should have 
been completed and my data collection period came to an end, eight out of 219 Trusts 
(4%) were live with limited clinical functionality. R1 was still used on a relatively small 
scale in one mental health Trust, two community Trusts, and three acute Trusts. R1.9 
was implemented in two acute Trusts and one community Trust.  




My findings can help to suggest potential reasons fr this lack of progress. In doing so, I 
draw on the experiences at early implementer sites and their surrounding environment. 
The complex national arrangements and the nature of the software emerging from these 
arrangements meant that users and organisations foud it difficult to accommodate the 
technology over time and therefore the implementation progress in terms of scale was 
limited (see also Chapter 7). Underlying mechanisms will be explored by drawing on the 
relevant theoretical frameworks in the following sections. 
8.3 Integration with theoretical frameworks 
The following paragraphs will tease out the contributions of my findings in more detail 
by drawing on the various theoretical frameworks, which informed my analysis and 
interpretation of results (Chapter 4). To provide structure, these deliberations are 
organised along the dimensions emerging from cross-ca e comparisons (see Chapter 7). 
In line with my overall aim, the overall focus was on exploring the views and 
experiences of users as well as organisational consequences of introducing Lorenzo and 
how these evolved over time in the complex environme t of a national EHR 
implementation.  
 
In line with ANT as the main theoretical framework, I paid particular attention to how 
users and Lorenzo were interrelated and how they “r-assembled” to form a new 
network over time. In doing so, the aim was to map-out network connections as far as 
possible as the new actor (Lorenzo) was integrated with existing practices. As these 
developments were situated in larger organisational a d macro- environments, these 
were also viewed as part of the network. 
 
In light of ANT’s limitations, mainly in relation to its lack of attention to wider social 
factors, the problem of going beyond description, the positioning of human and non-
human actors, and the problem of defining the network, my analysis also drew on other 
relevant theoretical lenses (see Chapter 4). These included Strong Structuration Theory, 
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Greenhalgh and Stone’s model, the Social Shaping of Technology, Social Psychology, 
Normalisation Process Theory, and the Theory of the Diffusion of 
Innovations.(92;113;138;141;146-152) 
8.3.1 Macro-influences 
As my findings have shown, in relation to the “top-down” implementation of 
Lorenzo,(9;224) macro-contexts such as political, cu tural and economic factors clearly 
had significant consequences for how the technology was used and implemented over 
time. This also illustrated the value of collecting data beyond the immediate Trust 
environment from multi-sited ethnography informants. Strong Structuration Theory and 
the Social Shaping of Technology helped to understand hese macro-issues.(138;141)  
 
For example, Strong Structuration Theory conceptually separates social structures (such 
as NHS organisations, or the political environment) from individual agents (e.g. NHS 
staff using Lorenzo), assuming that the two have a mutually shaping relationship.(141) 
This, in turn helped to explain how the macro-environment was influenced by micro-
factors (and vice versa) over time. The NPfIT is a nationally driven strategy, with 
organisations being strongly encouraged to implement c trally procured EHR software 
like Lorenzo.(26) However, it soon became clear that is entirely “top-down” approach 
would not work as originally envisaged.(315) Healthcare professionals across sites 
began to resist using software that was perceived as lacking fitness for purpose and 
organisations began to demand greater flexibility and more input in terms of systems 
choice and implementation strategy. As a result, the Programme’s general direction 
changed to allow for more local choice and flexibility in relation to EHR implementation 
and use, supporting the existence of a mutually shaping relationship between micro- and 
macro-factors (as described in Chapter 7). However, many ongoing deliberations and 
political debates relating to large-scale IT implementations assume that these factors are 
relatively stable, neglecting this dynamic relationship between national and local 
developments.(27;31;38;39) In relation to Lorenzo, this was in turn reflected in strategic 
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planning where politically set implementation timelin s were at odds with organisational 
readiness to implement. 
 
Literature surrounding the Social Shaping of Technology has highlighted the 
significance of macro-factors in shaping the technology itself, and associated 
implementation and adoption activities.(138) From this perspective, technology is 
viewed as being influenced by choices made by key stakeholders throughout the design, 
implementation and adoption circle. Different choices are assumed to arise from 
particular interests and can have various consequences for the various stakeholder 
groups. Viewed in this light, the design of Lorenzo may be seen as having been shaped 
by both political and economic interests. For example, the large number of clicks and 
mandatory screens in the system may have been the result of a strategic focus on 
collecting standardised data across healthcare settings for secondary uses purposes (see 
Chapter 7). Similarly, the complex security arrangements associated with the use of 
SmartCards may have been the result of an increased national focus on the security and 
confidentiality of clinical information, possibly resulting from increased law suits and 
public discussions surrounding data security more generally. These “inscribed 
properties”16, resulted in additional workloads and significant changes in work practices 
for those on the ground as they tried to accommodate Lorenzo in their everyday work. 
8.3.2 Developments over time 
As outlined in Section 7.3, temporal developments have played an important part in my 
research, also highlighting the value of the longitudinal dimension in my data collection. 
In this context, contrasting changing experiences and perceptions of stakeholders within 
and across case study sites proved useful in illustrating the fluidity of the 
implementation and adoption process. Drawing on the T ory of the Diffusion of 
Innovations helped to conceptualise how individual behaviours fitted within a larger 
organisational context and how change spread (or failed to do so) over time.(150;151) 
                                                
16 The term “inscribed properties” refers to assumptions made throughout the design and reflected in the 
software itself. 
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Normalisation Process Theory helped to take these developments a step further, by 
helping to explain the extent to which Lorenzo was embedded within individual 
practices and how the technology was routinely used (or not) within the organisational 
settings.(92;152) Factors identified in these models to either inhibit or facilitate diffusion 
and/or normalisation were consistently found in my three case studies (Chapter 7), 
providing an explanation as to why the implementation and adoption of Lorenzo was 
slower and on a much more limited scale than originally anticipated.  
 
For example, Lorenzo was, in most cases, viewed by users as having no (or in Site H 
limited) advantages over paper records, and was not perceived to improve the quality 
and efficiency of care. It was often seen as a “tick box” exercise reflecting the increasing 
control of management, and was perceived to affect the clinician-patient relationship 
adversely, so clashing with what was described as the essence of professional practice, 
delivering good patient care (also see Section 8.2.2). Lorenzo did not fit in easily with 
individual work practices and collaborative work from the perspectives of users, often 
radically changing these unfavourably. These perceptions were amplified by the fact that 
the system was still very much in development and could therefore not appropriately be 
demonstrated or trialled out, resulting in a lack of knowledge on how to work it. 
Tailoring to local contexts of use was, due to the national procurement (and despite the 
assumed configurational nature of the software), only possible to a limited extent, which 
in turn meant narrow potential for re-invention for both users and organisations and 
resulted in the software not fulfilling local needs in most cases. This rigidity did also not 
allow new practices to emerge locally, resulting in a lack of motivation amongst 
stakeholders to drive the change forward. Where the pot ntial for re-invention was 
present (Site H), and where additional resources were made available to allow more 
effective embedding with individual and collective practices, the software was more 
readily adopted and seemed to have begun to be “normalised”.(92) In other case study 
sites, the diffusion of the technology in the organis tions was slow, often not going 
beyond the early users. Normalisation did not occur, as on reflection most stakeholders 
concluded that the system simply “did not work”.  




However, even in Site H, where perceived issues with the software were addressed over 
time and the use of Lorenzo was beginning to become routine, the diffusion of the 
innovation throughout the organisation was slowed down, as it had lost its innovation 
champion (i.e. the IT Manager). Here, “contextual integration” of the software was 
inhibited due to organisational practicalities surro nding the implementation i.e. the 
costs were outweighing the benefits. 
 
When one organisation pushed for organisational diffusion due to political pressure (Site 
B) but lacked embedded use of the software locally, significant adverse consequences 
for overall organisational functioning were the result. This may have been due to the fact 
that this roll-out was building on a limited EA user base of often not very enthusiastic 
users without letting the innovation spread organiclly (i.e. go through stages of 
innovators, EAs, early majority, late majority, and laggards). 
8.3.3 Software characteristics and their consequenc es 
I explored the consequences of Lorenzo for both indiv dual and collective work 
practices and relationships of organisational stakeholders. In doing so, it became 
increasingly apparent that the design of the technology had significant consequences for 
its everyday use. Drawing on the Social Shaping of Technology and Greenhalgh and 
Stone’s model helped to explain the relationship betwe n the design of the implemented 
product and implications for its use in context.(138;141) 
 
For example, the design of Lorenzo was heavily shaped by the developers, who had to 
make certain assumptions as to what they thought the users wanted and needed. This 
was complicated by the lack of insight on their part into the reality of clinical practice in 
an entirely different country (as they were based in India). The design of the software 
reflected this and problems were encountered accordingly when it was implemented into 
clinical settings, resulting in a perceived lack of fitness for purpose amongst users.  
 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
 255 
Similarly, technologies are clearly shaped by their historical backgrounds. Lorenzo 
software did not exist in its full form at the time it was commissioned. The intention was 
that this would result in increased input from staff on the ground, but the immaturity of 
the system resulted in a range of basic usability issues and knock-on effects for those on 
the ground. These included, for example, a lack of ability to plan implementation 
activities (as the product did not exist) and related issues with stakeholder engagement 
(as the software could not be demonstrated to users). As a result, some resisted use or 
used the application in ways other than intended, actively influencing their relative 
position in the network. They shifted their position from passive recipients of the 
technology to actively shaping how the technology was implemented by slowing down 
the ambitious implementation timelines (as mentioned above).(141)  
8.3.4 How Lorenzo shaped individual and collective work practices  
In investigating how exactly Lorenzo actively shaped both individual and collective 
work practices i.e. the micro-context, ANT proved particularly useful.(115;138) 
Conventional systems were replaced by the new software and this resulted in radical 
changes to the way the healthcare team operated. As outlined in Chapter 7, the 
introduction of Lorenzo not only resulted in increas d workloads but was often also 
perceived as lacking usability. Users devised various ways to compensate for the 
increasing demands on their time and perceived shortcomings of the technology. These 
coping strategies had several direct and indirect knoc -on effects. These are considered 
below, in turn, in relation to collaborative working, patients, paper records, managerial 
outputs and recording activity: 
• Collaborative working – hierarchical structures and communication: The new 
technology impacted on the ways in which the healthc re team interacted. This 
was in some instances seen as a positive consequence, but in other situations as a 
negative development. In relation to the former, some users felt that using the 
system helped to make communication more effective over longer distances (e.g. 
in Site H). On the other hand, users also reported that the system changed the 
way the healthcare team interacted in negative ways. Thi  was mainly expressed 
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in relation to changing professional roles and respon ibilities with an increased 
emphasis on administrative tasks as was observed in Sites B and Q. It was seen 
as particularly problematic by clinical staff who expressed concern that the 
resulting displacement of administrative duties on t  their shoulders was 
detracting from their more pressing clinical responsibilities. 
• Time with patients: The introduction of the new system was perceived to reduce 
the time healthcare professionals could spend with pa ients, leaving clinical staff 
frustrated, as direct patient care was seen as more central to their role and 
professional identity (Site Q). In some instances, the technology also reduced the 
perceived quality of the interaction with patients. Using computers whilst 
consulting was, for example, felt to impact on the communication flow with the 
patient, rendering the consultation more formal andless engaging (Site H). 
• Other systems such as paper: It also became apparent that the introduction of the 
new system not only impacted on individuals, but also had an effect on paper 
records (which were still used in parallel). Here, paper was often found to be 
more distributed across geographical locations within healthcare settings. For 
example, different users would take paper files to their desks at different times to 
file the electronic print-outs whereas before the introduction of the system all 
paper records were held centrally in the reception area. As a result, other users 
needed increasingly to “chase” paper records (Site Q). 
• The medical record itself: Similarly, data entry itself was impacted upon, this in 
the main manifesting as delays in transcribing the record as it was often delayed 
with the introduction of the new system. This was due to the software being 
perceived as slow and as impacting on the communication flow with the patient. 
Notes were therefore often typed up at the end of the day or, in some instances, 
days after the consultation had taken place. Paper notes were used in the 
meantime as reminders. As a result of this delayed data entry, the new computer 
system was found to be less up to-date than systems hat were previously in 
place.  
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• Managerial reports: Managerial outputs were also affected by the introduction of 
the new electronic system. When staff employed workarounds, this would in 
some cases result in inaccurate reports being generat d by the system further 
down the line, impacting on managers’ ability to track activity levels. An 
interesting example given in Site B was that users in outpatients would book 
appointments on the system using a route that was less laborious, but which 
meant that, although these appointments would show on their screens as booked, 
they would not show on the rest of the system as booked. As a result, the 
managerial outputs became unpredictable to the extent that these in a number of 
instances no longer reflected the reality of what actu lly happened. 
 
These observed effects seemed to be due to the relative rigidity of electronic 
coordination introduced with Lorenzo. Here, specific ndividuals and tasks had to be 
categorised in some way to allow the electronic system to coordinate them. However, in 
reality both activities and individuals were often found to belong into more than one 
category, which made this categorisation difficult. For example, nurses without special 
training in Site B were not allowed to order x-rays with the new system, but they often 
filled out the forms for doctors to sign them later. This shared task did not fit in with the 
categorical nature of the system as it assumed that a task was either done by nurses or by 
doctors but not shared by both.  
 
Technological representation clearly requires some lev l of abstraction, but somehow 
these abstractions needed to be meaningfully translated back into reality, which did not 
always happen.(228) For example, ticking certain boxes in the system asking if the 
patient was pregnant, may have been appropriate for some groups of patients but not for 
others such as children. It therefore seemed that te reality Lorenzo attempted to 
represent was not perceived as adequate as it was too detailed and directive (i.e. by 
making several parts of activity compulsory that were in reality often skipped). This 
resulted in demands on users that could simply be not always fulfilled and did not allow 
for flexible working and emergent practices.(228;316) It also did not allow for natural 
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collaborative groupings between human actors to emerge, but appeared to impose 
hierarchical structures and roles, which were not perceived to fit with the day-to-day 
work of users.(317)  
 
It also seemed difficult for users to accommodate prioritisation in the electronic system. 
Here, priorities mainly focussed on providing adequate patient care, whilst from a 
systems perspective they tended to centre on recording data, and ensuring security and 
confidentiality. This seemed to result in a ‘clash of priorities’, which meant that users 
often decided to put patient care (often conceptualised in terms of time they spent with 
patients) before the demands of Lorenzo. This was ex cerbated when the technology 
required them to complete tasks that were perceived as “unnecessary” and 
“duplicative” .  
 
However, despite these helpful insights, ANT does not account for the internal structures 
of agents such as attitudes. Indeed, attitudes havepl y d an important role in my case 
studies. They were often shaped by experiences of use (and not attitudes towards 
technology per se), which affected the intention to use the technology.(146;149;318) 
This may be explained by a perceived lack of usefuln ss and ease of use, but these 
varied amongst different user groups depending on their respective contexts. For 
example, different attitudes led to different levels of use. Those who thought the 
technology was helpful and those who could not resist use, used it; whilst those with 
more autonomy and negative attitudes tended not to.  
8.4 Some critical reflections 
Throughout my research, I felt increasingly drawn to the critical perspective, which is 
commonly used in information systems research.(100;319) The following sections will 
examine my results and interpretations drawing on critical theory. This will be done by 
critically reflecting on power relationships between stakeholders and the role of 
theoretical perspectives that have informed my study. 
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8.4.1 Power relationships between stakeholders 
There is a range of ways to examine my findings from a critical perspective (e.g. in a 
more general sense of questioning stakeholder assumptions including my own), but one 
of the most pertinent pervading my results related to power relationships between 
stakeholders. In this context, the critical perspectiv  can help to interpret the limiting 
conditions in relation to power and control that are thought to influence 
behaviour.(96;260;320-322) However, the critical pers ctive can be extreme, 
highlighting the need for a balanced approach. Here, I found it helpful not to be guided 
by a critical stance in terms of data collection, but to keep an open mind by drawing 
mainly on an interpretative approach informed by hermeneutics. In line with this, Doolin 
argues for a combination of interpretative and critical approaches in information systems 
research.(321) In relation to power, for example, Doolin argues that researchers should 
not assume that technology simply empowers some and disempowers others. Instead, it 
needs to be seen as both being shaped by and as shaping social relations located in a 
wider environment. This should involve trying to understand meanings, contexts and 
processes as perceived from different perspectives (th  interpretative perspective); and a 
questioning of assumptions taking into account the rol  of power in the social and wider 
political environment (the critical perspective). 
 
I believe it is worth reflecting on this retrospectively as imbalances of power became 
increasingly visible during my research (Chapter 7). These power imbalances appeared 
to be amplified by the implementation of Lorenzo as some stakeholder groups were 
more actively engaged in (or indeed more able to actively resist) activities when 
compared to others. There were differences, for example, between occupational 
groupings (e.g. administrative staff and consultants), but also between the government 
with its centrally negotiated contracts and local Trusts who lacked involvement in 
decision making. Perhaps I sympathised with this stance due to the “top-down” 
imposing nature of the Programme, but perhaps also due to my close involvement with 
those that had to cope with the consequences of the national implementation locally. By 
drawing on ethnographic principles my awareness of power imbalances seemed to be a 
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result of “going native” and seeking to understand perspectives of stakeholders on the 
ground.  
 
Viewed in a critical light, Lorenzo itself may be viewed as having emerged out of 
particular governmental interests reflecting national attempts to influence social 
structures surrounding healthcare delivery, and as  means of exerting 
control.(227;228;321;323;324) These interests may hve been mainly economic in 
nature, which was also evident in the promise of large-scale cost savings and the focus 
on benefits through secondary uses of data, often at the expense of individual, and in 
particular, pastoral care (as discussed above).(325) In light of my findings, the general 
validity of these implicit governmental assumptions behind quality improvement 
initiatives and standardised treatments may, however, b  questioned as they have at 
times compromised rather than facilitated the efficien y and quality of care.(254;255)  
 
As a result of this unequal distribution of power, many non-governmental stakeholders 
may be viewed as relatively powerless with little control over national developments. 
For example, although public concerns surrounding potential security issues with 
national EHR solutions have been ongoing since the conception of the Programme, the 
government pressed ahead with the roll-out, leaving the public in a marginal role and 
with little power over decision making in terms of strategic direction. This was further 
complicated by the use of both medical and technological jargon, as well as the 
continuous secrecy under the guise of commercial sensitivities (e.g. surrounding 
contracts). But it is not only the general public who may be viewed as relatively 
powerless. Individual behaviours that may be viewed as being controlled also include 
those of healthcare professionals (who are told to rec rd information electronically and 
use a particular software to do so), patients (who are told to adopt health promoting 
behaviours and agree to have their information recorded electronically) and the medical 
institutions themselves, which often (and again due to contractual arrangements) had no 
decision making power in relation to implementation strategies and the product.  
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In line with the above argument, individual users may therefore be perceived as 
relatively powerless. However, as discussed above, the atypical hierarchical structure of 
the English NHS and the often significant professional power amongst some groupings 
in this sector meant that certain individuals could (and did) resist use. As a result, they 
became powerful as they could influence the national implementation strategy (see 
Chapter 7).  
8.4.2 Theoretical considerations 
The critical perspective can further help to reflect on the ways in which EHR 
implementations have been conceptualised and investigated to date. This includes my 
own attempts to conceptualise the theoretical space and follow appropriate methods 
(please also refer to Section 8.5). For example, drawing on multi-sited ethnography and 
case studies proved useful in my study as it helped to focus data collection activities 
without neglecting local contingencies and macro-enviro mental factors. In relation to 
theory, there are a number of relevant critical reflections which I will outline in turn. 
 
In social research, theory plays an important role in building on existing knowledge by 
helping to describe and explain the complexity and dynamic nature of social 
reality.(326) In my study, drawing on theory helped me to apply present knowledge in 
the field to the real world and then use this to build on existing frameworks. Theory also 
guided my data collection activities, particularly in relation to theoretical sampling (see 
Chapter 4).  
 
More specifically, I utilised several existing theor tical and methodological frameworks, 
which informed my data collection, analysis and interpretation. Different frameworks 
have contributed to these different stages of my study in different ways. For example, 
whilst ANT was extremely helpful in conceptualising the space of my study and 
ensuring a theoretically informed focus of data collection activities, it was less helpful in 
analysing and interpreting my findings. Similarly, other frameworks (including Strong 
Structuration Theory, the Social Shaping of Technology, Social Psychology, 
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Normalisation Process Theory, and the Theory of the Diffusion of Innovations), were 
helpful in interpreting my findings and in drawing conclusions but less so in relation to 
theoretically informed sampling. This possibly also reflected the way I had approached 
theoretical considerations, namely by examining one framework in depth (ANT), 
distilling its contributions and limitations, and then beginning to think about how other 
frameworks may help to address these.  
 
By drawing on a combination of theoretical considerations selectively, I developed a 
methodological framework that helped to guide both data collection and interpretation 
(Chapter 4). Throughout this process, I was careful in outlining how the different 
perspectives fitted together.(326) Drawing exclusively on one framework may have left 
me prone to “force fitting” my findings into existing theories (which themselves have 
often emerged out of a particular context and may be restrictive). Instead, the approach I 
employed allowed for critical reflection (including that of the usefulness of theories 
themselves) and new findings to emerge that were not necessarily considered in each 
separate framework.(326;327) This is particularly relevant when considering the subject 
of my study, namely a national implementation scenario, of which no theoretical 
frameworks existed as it had simply not been attempd to be implemented and 
evaluated anywhere else in the world. Based on my methodological framework and my 
emerging findings, I developed models proposing potential causal pathways involved, 
beginning to translate specific instances observed into more general theoretical concerns 
(e.g. Chapters 7, 8 and 9).(327) Naturally, my propositions now need to be tested in 
other settings. 
 
During this process, and entirely based on my own experiences, I found some theoretical 
frameworks more helpful than others. For example, ANT was useful in conceptualising 
the interrelated nature of social and technical dimensions and the active role of the 
technology in the micro-environment. It was less usef l in considering macro-
dimensions and in explaining how observed effects came about. Drawing on the other 
frameworks helped to place these micro-processes into context, explaining the role of 
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internal structures of human agents. They also helped to conceptualise the environment 
in which these sociotechnical processes were situated (i.e. organisational and macro-
environmental).  
 
In many ways, these other frameworks were, however, referring to similar additional 
dimensions that ANT had difficulty accounting for. For example, internal structures of 
agents were accounted for in a relatively similar wy in Strong Structuration Theory, 
Greenhalgh and Stones’ model, Social Psychology, and the Theory of the Diffusion of 
Innovations; whilst environmental factors were explained in Strong Structuration 
Theory, the Social Shaping of Technology, Normalisation Process Theory and the 
Theory of the Diffusion of Innovations. This begs the question whether some aspects of 
frameworks were actually needed in interpreting my data. For example, the more general 
considerations surrounding Social Psychology were oft n already implied in other 
theories. Similarly, part of Greenhalgh and Stones’ model was concerned with a deeper 
emphasis on the technological dimension already included in Strong Structuration 
Theory and the Social Shaping of Technology. It did therefore not contribute much in 
the context of my study. On the other hand, drawing o  both Social Psychology and 
Greenhalgh and Stones’ model sensitised me to the importance of individual attitudes 
and a questioning of how the technology has emerged, which may not have been 
obvious when drawing on the more inclusive frameworks alone.  
 
The argument outlined above also led me to reflect as o whether specific frameworks 
are needed for technology implementation as opposed to the more general frameworks 
focusing on innovation. Based on my experiences, frameworks focusing on technology 
are not inclusive enough (e.g. ANT and the Social Shaping of Technology focus on 
technology and may neglect the internal structures of agents), whilst the more inclusive 
models are not specific enough when considering technology implementation. The latter 
may include the Theory of the Diffusion of Innovations as technology does have 
inherent characteristics that may differ from other innovations (e.g. hardware and 
software components); and Normalisation Process Theory as attitudes of individual 
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agents in the healthcare setting seem to be important and do not necessarily result in 
coherent collective action (every person dealt with the system differently e.g. some 
resisted use altogether and some employed a range of different workarounds). 
 
I also somewhat struggled with the descriptive nature of some of the theoretical 
frameworks. They certainly helped me to describe what was going on and also allowed 
me to conceptualise the space, but did they really help me to explain? On reflection, they 
facilitated specifying relationships by giving me potential starting points in terms of 
what to look at in the context of my study, which in turn helped to build explanatory 
models based on my findings. These explanations were n cessarily reflecting my own 
values and the socio-political environment (see Section 8.2.4).(327) For example, my 
background as a health services researcher, and the focus on outputs in the form of 
strategic recommendations that often characterises such research as opposed to theory 
building, in some ways presented me with tensions. I was in many ways simply not used 
to thinking in explicitly theoretical terms, drawing on such frameworks more implicitly. 
Here, I found one tension particular difficult to resolve: the simple dichotomy of 
“success” and “failure” and the often simplistic associated focus on facilitators and 
barriers (e.g. Normalisation Process Theory) as well as a linear view of the 
implementation process (e.g. the Theory of the Diffus on of Innovations). These 
dichotomies also permeated different theoretical frmeworks with some emphasising 
complexity (e.g. ANT, Social Shaping of Technology), whilst others attempted to 
conceptualise implementation and adoption on a temporal basis (e.g. the Theory of the 
Diffusion of Innovations, Normalisation Process Theory). One might argue that this may 
in fact contribute to neglecting process-related issue . Nevertheless, most scholars 
(myself included) have found this dichotomy necessary to conceptualise the space, 
despite acknowledging that it is far too simplistic. A similar issue arises when 
considering the interrelated nature of social and technical dimensions, whilst still 
conceptualising these as two distinct entities (seeChapter 2 and Section 8.2 above). This 
illustrates the more general tension between simplificat on and the complexity of social 
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reality. After all, what use is a model if it is too complex and detailed? Lewis Carroll’s 
paradox of the complete map illustrates this:(328) 
 
“And then came the grandest idea of all! We actually made a map of the country, on the 
scale of a mile to the mile!"  
"Have you used it much?" I enquired.  
"It has never been spread out, yet," said mein Herr: "the farmers objected: they said it 
would cover the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the country 
itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well”.  
8.5 Reflections on strengths and limitations of my study 
When considering the strengths and limitations of my study, it is important to highlight 
that it was conducted as part of a larger evaluation project investigating the 
implementation and adoption of the NHS CRS in secondary care.(33) This can be 
viewed as a strength as it helped me to contextualise my work and test my emerging 
findings through continuous discussion with colleagues. The wider project was looking 
at a range of software and outcome measures (includi g quantitative ones), whilst I 
focussed on the way Lorenzo was integrated within everyday work practices of users 
within the complex environment of the NPfIT. The time allocated for intensive analysis 
activity reflected the nature of my in-depth work with a focus on theorising of the 
complex relationships that shaped developments on the ground. The broader project was, 
on the other hand, more concerned with policy recommendations. 
 
Arising from these arrangements were also some issus that I found relatively difficult to 
cope with during the conduct of my research. Primarily, this related to a feeling of 
having to separate the two projects conceptually. Despite attempts to capture my ideas 
and clearly label them as such, I have to acknowledge the role of the wider team in 
shaping my thinking. I am deeply grateful for this stimulating environment. 
 
Another central issue I had to cope with was the definition of “success”, which reflected 
my (and possibly a general human) tendency to categorise and thereby make potentially 
transferable inferences to other settings (see also Section 8.4.2). Despite my initial 
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attempt to focus on process issues17, I found myself implicitly judging the “success” or
“failure” of implementations (which also became clear in the cross-case comparisons in 
Chapter 7). However, I attempted to keep a balance between the study of local processes 
(acknowledging that I focussed on early implementations), with the more practical 
concerns resulting in potentially transferable lesson  to other settings (see Chapter 9). In 
doing so, employing qualitative methodology that was informed by relevant theory 
allowed me (at least to some extent) to go beyond the simple dichotomy of “success” 
and “failure”, helping me to explore the more subtle underlying tensions influencing 
implementation and adoption. 
8.5.1 Strengths 
My study allowed me to gain an insight into the first “top-down” implementation of 
nationally procured and built-as-implemented Lorenzo software in a range of English 
specialist healthcare settings. Throughout my work, I published a range of outputs, 
which were peer-reviewed. These were based on respective parts of this thesis and can 
be viewed in Appendix 9. The flexible and emergent qualitative approach informed by 
ethnographic principles was well suited to study the complex technological systems and 
surrounding contexts and processes.(329) It allowed m  to try out and test emerging 
results by constantly ‘zooming’ in and out (e.g. from a certain pertinent point to the 
whole, from micro- to macro-contexts).(329) Accordingly, I achieved a comprehensive 
picture of implementation, without neglecting either, the more subtle micro-factors or 
the more overarching macro-factors, as well as relationships between these. 
 
Other strengths of my study include its longitudinal ture and theoretical grounding. 
The longitudinal dimension contributed to obtaining a comprehensive multi-faceted and 
nuanced appreciation of the local consequences of implementation; whilst the 
                                                
17 The following field notes that I have written early on in my research illustrate this: “The definition of 
“success” is relatively irrelevant when studying process issues. I am expecting that every human actor
defines success for themselves according to differing criteria. It is not up to me to judge whether the
implementation was successful in line with specified criteria but in line with my aim, my analytical focus 
will be on sense making activities, negotiation anddiffering actor perspectives/behaviours.”  
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theoretically driven approach to design, data generation and analysis should allow 
transferability of findings beyond the immediate context of the three Trusts studied. The 
theoretically-based methodology developed during the course of my research, may now 
also be applied to other settings. 
 
My research was further strengthened through purposive sampling ensuring that case 
study sites varied in demographics (e.g. community, mental health, and acute), whilst 
being faced with the same phenomenon of interest (i.e. implementing the same 
software). Within case studies, data were obtained from a variety of sources covering a 
range of stakeholder perspectives. In attempting to cover the national context, whilst still 
retaining the importance of local factors in shaping the subtleties of reality, I drew on a 
combination of the case study approach and multi-sited ethnography to reflect the 
important dynamics within and across Trusts implementing Lorenzo. Once I had 
achieved an in-depth appreciation of context within cases, I compared findings across 
case studies allowing for transferable lessons to be drawn. Case study findings as well as 
wider transferable lessons were discussed at length with my supervisors, which helped to 
refine ideas and expand propositions. In relation t the main findings and given the 
timelines I had to adhere to, I believe that I reached saturation in relation to early 
implementation and adoption for the period of time I was in the field. This field is 
however extremely dynamic and the circumstances surrounding implementations have 
changed over time.  
 
I was further able to provide formative feedback to Trusts on various fronts, for example 
relating to emerging concerns amongst staff on the ground and potential early barriers to 
local and national implementation of Lorenzo. This elped me to validate my findings 
by testing emerging ideas and discussing interpreted m anings with participants. 
8.5.2 Limitations 
The main issue for me was gatekeeper influence at all levels. This resulted in restricted 
access to some stakeholders including healthcare professionals (carefully and 
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appropriately ‘guarded’ by Service Leads and IT Managers), as well as Trusts 
themselves (where some of my contacts were understandably reluctant to pass on details 
of key individuals within the Trust who were already extremely busy with 
implementation activities). This was further complicated by a generally (and again 
understandably) low prioritisation of my study in participating Trusts, whose main 
concern was to run an organisation and provide appropriate patient care. My strategy to 
deal with these difficulties was to be persistent without being irritating. Whilst giving 
participants time to respond, I would follow up initial email contacts with phone calls.  
 
The nature and depth of data collected at different case study sites varied due to these 
issues with access, time of data collection often influenced by politically set deadlines, 
and cooperation of gatekeepers, to name but a few. I not only had difficulties accessing 
participants in the Trusts themselves, but was also f ced with a general lack of access to 
some wider stakeholder groups such as developers and governmental stakeholders, most 
likely due to the highly politically charged environment, commercial sensitivities and 
(again) different priorities. This environment also meant that once I did get hold of 
stakeholders, some seemed hesitant to give honest opinions, particularly in relation to 
sensitive commercial information. I addressed this by encouraging participants to speak 
‘off the record’ and offering to switch off the recording equipment. 
 
In addition to these practical issues, I also encoutered some more conceptual 
challenges. Studying complex systems is difficult and necessitated some simplifications 
on my part (as also outline above).(187) As recommended by Law and Mol, I attempted 
to tell a story of my interpretations of the field as experienced by various participants 
(and of course influenced by my presence and methods).(330) In doing so, I focussed on 
particular issues that I found most pertinent and most interesting, whilst necessarily 
having neglected others. I therefore acknowledge that my picture is necessarily 
incomplete and presents a snapshot of a particular time and particular places. In relation 
to space, for example, my focus on specific organisations may mean that my findings 
lack transferability to other contexts as these organisations may not be reflective of sites 
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in the wider NHS.(187;330) Nevertheless, my findings are consistent with previous 
literature on technology adoption, as well as emerging findings from other organisations 
as part of the larger evaluation project, pointing to the likely transferability to other 
settings.(33)  
 
Despite these challenges, I attempted to tell a coherent story, carefully questioning my 
own assumptions throughout the process and constantly es ing emerging ideas against 
reality by feeding back emerging findings to participants. This process, in combination 
with discussion of emerging findings with my supervisors, helped to ensure 
confirmability and credibility.(172;190)  
 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that my study focused on early implementation 
and adoption only, which is arguably the most turbulent time of any IT implementation. 
However, despite the ability to track processes during early implementation, the more 
embedded use of technologies and insight into longer term benefits were beyond the 
scope of my study. I told a story that is, unfortunately, only partially complete. My 
theoretical propositions need to be tested over time and in other organisations.(331) 
8.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has integrated my findings (outlined in Chapters 6 and 7) with the more 
recent literature and the theoretical frameworks. Factors identified in my literature 
review (Chapter 2) continue to be important, yet often difficult to realise, particularly in 
relation to large-scale implementations of complex systems.  
 
I outlined how drawing on my own methodological sociotechnically informed approach 
allowed exploring the experiences of users and the consequences of Lorenzo for their 
work practices as well as general organisational functioning in the complex environment 
of a national EHR implementation (see Chapter 4). By examining both micro-and 
macro-environments, my findings help to explain why t e implementation and adoption 
of Lorenzo progressed more slowly than anticipated. There were particular challenges 
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associated with the national implementation of centrally procured software which had 
significant consequences for technological design, adoption and spread within and 
across organisations. I discussed these consequences for the shaping of the technology 
itself, as well as for local implementation and adoption activities (and vice versa). In 
doing so, the ways in which the technology affected the delivery of care, professional 
working and larger organisational functioning was explored.  
 
Despite these insights, some important tensions have remained. These included the 
inscribed technological properties and power relationships characterising national 
implementations on a macro-scale, and the incompatibility of technology and ‘caring’ on 
a micro-scale. The chapter has concluded with a critical reflection on the theoretical and 
methodological framework outlining the strengths and limitations of my study.  
 
Having discussed the theoretical contributions of my study, the next chapter will explore 
the implications for future research and how my findings may be practically applied to 
other contexts. In doing so, potentially transferable lessons for similar national and 
international ventures will be outlined.  
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Chapter 9: Implications and recommendations for 
further work 
9.1 Introduction 
I set out to explore and understand the views and experiences of users as well as 
organisational consequences of introducing Lorenzo and how these evolved over time in 
the complex environment of a national EHR implementation. I have, in the previous 
chapters, drawing on relevant theoretical frameworks, discussed the underlying 
mechanisms of why the implementation and adoption of Lorenzo proceeded much 
slower than originally anticipated paying attention t  local, organisational and macro-
environmental factors.  
 
Chapter 8 had a theoretical focus in attempting to explain underlying mechanisms in line 
with existing frameworks and my emerging findings. The current chapter has a more 
practical focus drawing on these theoretical insight , namely to make recommendations 
as to what could be done next, relating to local and national strategic considerations 
surrounding the English venture but also in relation t  potentially transferable lessons 
for similar international efforts. My focus on exploring the micro-processes between 
social and technical dimensions without neglecting he wider macro-environment helped 
me to construct a theoretical model to conceptualise this (Figure 9.1).  
9.2 Practical implications for EHR implementations 
Although my findings have shed light on many dimensio , it is impossible to be 
prescriptive in relation to maximising the chances of “successful” local and national 
EHR implementation (i.e. an implementation that most stakeholders are happy with). 
There are obvious tensions surrounding the definitio  of “successful” in itself, as it 
clearly depends on the viewpoint of the observer.(34) This is exacerbated by the 
complexity and advanced functionality of an EHR system such as Lorenzo.  
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Nevertheless, despite the inability to predict exactly which factors may apply to other 
settings and to what extent, my work suggests that some dimensions are more significant 
than others. These are illustrated with the help of a theoretical model derived from the 
insights obtained in my analysis outlined in Chapter 7 (Figure 7.1). In order to promote 
the practical applicability of my findings, I will attempt to distil the most important 
potentially transferable theoretical insights for national EHR implementations in the 
following sections. It is, however, important to keep in mind that these implications are 
based on my experiences from studying Lorenzo in selected sites only. They are also 
based on the English context with the particularities of its nationally funded health 
service and may therefore not be directly transferabl  to other settings. 
9.2.1 Software characteristics and user involvement  in shaping 
technology 
Firstly, my findings show that the most important pre-requisite for implementing 
complex IT systems is the existence of software that is usable, or which can be ‘made 
usable’, and which can be adapted over time to suit the evolving needs of a variety of 
user groups. It also needs to be perceived by users and organisations as being ‘better’ 
than the system that was previously operational, or at least worth the extra effort by 
yielding tangible benefits to patients and organisation l stakeholders. In my case studies, 
this was unfortunately not always the case, resulting in frustration and, in some 
instances, resistance of users. 
 
One way to achieve this system usability is by consulting users and incorporating their 
suggestions in software design (as illustrated by the more satisfied users in Site H where 
this was present). Creating “token user involvement”, which may involve listening to 
concerns but not addressing these in technological and/or strategic developments, is 
unlikely to engage users (as demonstrated in Site B). Local clinical leads can be an 
effective means to achieving user involvement due to their increased contact with the 
target group (see Site H). If systems are resisted by users, there is a need to seek to 
understand why this is the case, as it may be due to sers finding it difficult to cope with 
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change (as managers tended to suggest), but it may also be a result of inadequate 
technology, as was the case in Sites B and Q. 
 
This essential consideration of user involvement in shaping technological developments 
is unfortunately far too often overlooked, particularly in the context of large-scale 
ventures such as the NPfIT in which the political, technical, economic and other 
considerations seem to crowd this dimension of planning. The results from my case 
studies, however, indicate that any technological development needs to begin, be shaped 
and be embedded with the user in constant focus. Other issues arising during the process 
of implementation are important, but secondary. 
9.2.2 Realistic timelines, expectations and balanci ng the vision 
Secondly, and intimately connected to the local, there is a need to manage expectations 
of a grand vision with what is realistically achievable. Here, ‘strategic optimism’ is 
suitable for getting an initiative ‘off the ground’, but can, if sustained and not matched 
with reality, lead to disillusioned stakeholders. In my study this was illustrated across 
case study sites by stakeholders’ perceptions that ambitious timelines have hampered 
local implementation progress, with expectations far exceeding what was realistically 
achievable. Again, managing this vision should begin with the user, before moving on to 
more general organisational and also national expectations (admittedly challenging in 
the context of a political implementation effort). For example, in line with findings from 
across my case studies, there is a need to communicate that benefits may take a long 
time to realise, and that using an electronic system is likely to slow down individual 
work practices.  
 
Communicating consistent messages as to what exactly the functionality will consist of 
is important in this context, so that appropriate organisational plans can be made to 
accommodate the change. This has unfortunately not always been the case with Lorenzo 
as it was built whilst being implemented, leading to confusion amongst organisational 
stakeholders across case studies as to what to expect.  
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9.2.3 Relationship building on all levels 
Thirdly, my findings have illustrated the importance of aligning efforts of various 
stakeholder groups in order to facilitate implementation and adoption. This should, 
again, begin by building relationships between users and their immediate (micro) 
environment, including for example managers and developers, who ideally incorporate 
suggested software changes quickly in order to prevent frustration. Once these 
relationships are stable, extra-organisational relationship building can begin. As 
illustrated across case studies, important parties here include governmental stakeholders, 
the media, LSPs, SHAs and local health communities.  
 
However, in my case studies, local relationship building between suppliers, managers 
and users was often difficult and to some extent inhibited by central contracts. The 
increasing strategic move towards more local autonomy in decision making should help 
to address this, but relationship building between “different worlds” is of central 
importance. As my case studies show, this can be facilitated by designated support and 
close involvement of clinical leads. 
9.2.4 Balancing overall progress with allowing loca l coping 
In any national implementation, there is likely to be a tension between the need to show 
progress in terms of scale and an incremental impleentation approach to allow for local 
coping with the technological change to occur. My findings indicate that in order to 
allow for this, a small-scale and incremental approach is necessary but this takes time. 
Pressure to show progress too quickly can result in unintended consequences at 
individual and organisational level (e.g. workarounds and disturbed organisational 
functioning). These, in turn, can inhibit progress at national level and threaten overall 
implementation by slowing down ambitious timelines (see Chapter 7). It is therefore 
important that appropriate time and resources are allocated to allow for this process of 
local coping. 
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9.2.5 Central guidance whilst retaining some degree  of local 
autonomy 
Once the new systems satisfy user and organisational needs, considerations can move 
towards standards for larger scale interoperability. Although my findings in case studies 
have not directly shed light on how this can be achieved, interoperability is an important 
issue to consider as it is the driver of many anticipated benefits expected from large-
scale implementations of complex EHR systems (e.g. secondary uses).(332;333) 
However, my findings indicate that local technology adoption needs to occur first, as a 
primary focus on interoperability may compromise local software usability and hence 
adoption. Throughout this process, there is also a need to allow flexibility for 
customisation and adaptation to allow tailoring systems to local needs. In order to bring 
benefits to local stakeholders, the next step should focus on connecting local and natural 
groupings of healthcare organisations. This can help ironing-out early problems before 
attempting wider roll-outs. A certain amount of coherent political guidance is 
nevertheless important and, as my case studies indicate, desired by local organisations.  
9.2.6 Potentially transferable lessons from my find ings - what is 
important when considering national EHR implementat ions? 
My findings have implications not only for the future direction of EHR implementations 
in England, but possibly also for other countries currently actively pursuing plans to 
implement national EHRs. Arguably, a balance needs to be struck between localised 
input and standardisation to achieve large-scale int roperability. My case studies 
indicate that despite nationally led strategies aiming to optimise technical integration and 
interoperability, there is a danger that these system  are not accepted and used by end-
users as local motivations for use may be neglected. Conversely, and although untested 
in my study, it may be speculated that if the emphasis is solely on building systems 
arising from local need, these may be used, but major issues may arise when attempting 
to integrate systems on a larger scale. Nevertheless, in light of my findings, and the need 
to build on user informed system design to ensure use, integration of systems appears 
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secondary and local benefits may still be realised even if national systems integration is 
initially not achieved.  
 
In line with the question in the heading of this section, the answer arising from my case 
studies is therefore probably the user and the technology. Only when these micro-factors 
are attended to, will a system be able to satisfy organisational (e.g. management and 
small-scale information sharing), local health economy (e.g. local information sharing) 
and national needs (e.g. interoperability and secondary uses). However, as evidenced in 
the English approach, there is a danger that an initial focus on interoperability in large-
scale EHR initiatives may cloud this essential consideration of user involvement in 
shaping technological developments. This in turn should be reflected in the design of the 
technology building on user requirements first. Focusing principally on interoperability 
in the English approach by procuring national software with limited customisability 
illustrates a lack of appreciation of local factors and in particular the dynamic interplay 
between the local and the national context. I have attempted to illustrate my propositions 
graphically in Figure 9.1 below. 
 
It is however important to consider the drivers for national ventures. The main danger 
here is that if efforts are too localised, there may be no coherent approach to 
implementation, resulting in potentially compromised interoperability. Achieving a 
balance between the two is therefore crucial and needs to be taken into account in any 
governmental strategic direction relating to national EHR implementations.  
Chapter 9: Implications and recommendations for further work 
 
 277 
Figure 9.1: The outwards movement from local technol gy adoption to national 
integration 
 
Note: A graphical representation of factors that seem to be most important when considering national 
EHR implementations derived from my findings. This illustrates the outward movement from user needs, 
which need to be reflected in the technological design before considering other requirements such as 
organisational needs and national interoperability. 
9.3 Implications for English policy and local organ isations 
There are many potential implications for policy and practice arising from my research, 
but having outlined the more general implications for national EHR implementations 
above, I will now discuss some more specific potentially transferable issues for the 
broader English context. This will also involve discu sing the role of and implications 
for local organisations. These deliberations are based on the theoretical model outlined 
above (Figure 9.1).  
 
Overall, my findings have shown that in case study sites a significant cultural change 
was required to adopt Lorenzo and that local progress in software development and 
implementation scale was influenced by broader politica  and economic changes. The 
National integration and SUS 
Local integration within the 
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assumption that EHRs improve the quality and efficien y of care (see chapter 1) has not 
been substantiated in the period of time I was in the field, with in some cases potentially 
adverse consequences for patients as the system was often not viewed as fit for purpose 
by its users. Ensuring continued national support and the development of internal 
organisational expertise that could be retained, was identified as an important facilitator 
for local progress. In doing so, engaging organisation l stakeholders as they work to 
accommodate the new technology over time is extremely i portant.  
 
More specifically, my findings indicate that efforts in the short-term should focus on 
making the software work optimally in selected pilot sites, as opposed to trying to 
achieve too much too quickly in terms of scale. As alluded to above, this is most likely 
best achieved by focusing on local health communities initially before paying attention 
to larger geographical clusters. Here, efforts need to be accompanied by the realisation 
that relationship building locally needs to occur beforehand so that the implementation 
of EHRs that can be shared between settings is chara terised by teamwork as opposed to 
competition between healthcare organisations. 
 
Commercially procured software systems such as Lorenz  can prove challenging to 
integrate into complex organisations as they need to be extensively customised to meet 
users’ needs. Despite the original intention to address these often well-known issues 
with user engagement by developing Lorenzo software from scratch in collaboration 
with users, this approach did not seem to work due to the complex environment in which 
this “co-creation” was taking place. Implementations therefore need to be locally driven 
and organisations should not be asked to replace syst ms that work for them, but rather 
to change systems to meet an identified need. This does not mean that national 
implementations are redundant as some coherent strategy is needed to achieve system 
interoperability, but these should build on local developments. Trusts, on the other hand, 
need to realise that actively participating in centrally led strategies is important and may 
require some sacrifices locally for the benefit of wider system interoperability (e.g. 
replacing an existing system that does not allow exchanging data with other systems).  




Despite these initial negative experiences of the “co-creational” model of Lorenzo in 
case study sites, an essential property of software should be flexibility and 
developability (characterised by user input in design), so that it can fit within local 
processes as well as having the potential to evolve in the future according to needs. 
Here, it is important to achieve a balance between ma agerial large-scale benefits (both 
within and across organisations) and clinical small-scale benefits as managerial benefits 
can only be realised if the system is used, whilst clinical benefits motivate users. A 
similar balance needs to be achieved between short-term and long-term benefits, as 
short-term benefits (for local organisations and users) are extremely important to get the 
software used initially. Conversely, local organisations and users also need to realise that 
in the short-term some dis-benefits (such as increased workloads) are to be expected. 
There is therefore a need for more realistic expectations in relation to progress amongst 
all stakeholders. It is particularly important to recognise that systems will need time to 
become embedded and that technological and social dimensions are likely to evolve 
together over time in sometimes unanticipated ways.  
 
There is further a need to understand that different stakeholders have different objectives 
and values, some focusing on improving healthcare efficiency, some on improving the 
quality of care, and some surrounding commercial or p litical interests. The focus 
should not be on attempting to streamline these, but on seeking alignment where 
possible to realise a common vision. In doing so, building relationships and improving 
channels of communication between users, organisations and suppliers will become 
increasingly important. This will also require an active effort by local organisations and 
users, for example, allowing developers to shadow “real life” hospital work to help 
developers gaining a deeper insight into the reality of clinical care. A fundamental pre-
requisite here is that software changes requested by organisations are incorporated in 
design as promptly as possible. In order to achieve this, local organisations need input in 
strategic decision making, which was in my case studies not possible due to restrictions 
imposed by national contracts. Alternatively, there th refore seems to be merit in 
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focusing on a larger range of software providers with smaller contracts (as was, at the 
time of writing, happening). 
 
To ensure consistency and focus on the task at hand, co stant changes in governmental 
stakeholders, policies, public sector reforms and structures surrounding the national IT 
strategy need to stop. As my findings indicate, this can detract from focusing local 
implementation efforts appropriately and result in frustration amongst those on the 
ground.  
 
Overall and based on my findings, I would therefore advocate that local efforts focus on 
small-scale implementation of nationally approved systems, acknowledging that this 
may require hard work. This approach will ensure that systems are used with the 
potential to be customised locally, whilst keeping i  mind interoperability considerations 
for later in the national implementation process. 
9.4 Implications for future research 
Having outlined the implications for similar national ventures, English policy and local 
organisations, I will now discuss the implications of my work for future research. In 
helping to theorise about potentially transferable lessons, empirical research 
investigating national EHR implementations, policies and local consequences is likely to 
become increasingly important.  
 
Most importantly, the theoretical and methodological models developed during the 
course of my research need to be tested in other contexts in order to explore whether my 
findings are transferable and whether the models need to be modified. This is most likely 
to take the shape of qualitative enquiry as the focus of these models was on investigating 
process issues. It does, however, not preclude the inclusion of quantitative 
measurements, such as for example assessing system impact on proxies of quality and 
efficiency of care, or economic implications. 
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There is also still a need for more longitudinal work investigating EHR initiatives, 
following implementation efforts in changing contexts and over longer periods of time 
than was possible in my research.(334) This will require funding bodies to allocate the 
necessary resources to allow deeper insights to be btained into the way technologies 
become embedded and are made to work within and across organisations.(42;92;95;138)  
 
Research should also increasingly draw on internatio l developments and lessons from 
other industries, both in relation to new software developments and implementation 
strategies. Despite different contexts, there may be value in pulling lessons learned 
together, applying them to EHR implementations and devising a risk mitigation strategy 
or toolkit for national large-scale ventures. This could then help to guide national 
strategic efforts through the stages of planning, implementation and maintenance. It 
might also include ways to build relationships between industry suppliers and healthcare 
providers. Internationally, this relationship has so far received limited attention and 
should be guided by efforts to align commercial and public sector interests through 
teamwork and collaboration.  
 
More generally, although the overall NPfIT was guided by a grand vision, a lack of 
attention was paid to potential future scenarios if this vision was to be realised. Here, it 
is important to map potential risks and plan for mitigating action. A critical perspective, 
characterised by questioning of often deeply-engraied assumptions and paying attention 
to power dynamics can be extremely valuable in this respect.(96;260;320-322) This may 
include questioning the common view that technology is inherently “good” and 
considering what “success” would imply for a variety of stakeholders and their 
relationships. For example, holding all health information electronically on a national 
database may have implications for the national security of the country.(335) Similarly, 
the concern that technology will replace the ‘human touch’ is still prevalent and efforts 
should focus on how the two can be made to co-exist.  
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Some have argued that the true innovation is not going t  be inherent to the technology 
itself but ways in which actors organise themselves to deliver care.(336) Detailed work 
process mapping in relation to new technologies, whilst exploring options for innovation 
in the way care is delivered should therefore be central to future efforts. This is strongly 
supported by the results of my study and should be accompanied by the realisation that 
automation without re-designing services will magnify existing problems. In this 
context, there is also an increasing need to map the changing needs of the NHS and to 
theorise about how emerging technologies can be designed to meet these. In the short-to-
medium term, efforts should be coupled with the often neglected long period of 
transition from paper to electronic records. The hybrid stage where both physical and 
electronic records coexist (or different electronic systems), is often neglected in both 
research and implementation activities, but nevertheless often has significant 
consequences for those on the ground. 
9.5 Chapter summary 
My main aim was to explore the views and experiences of users as well as organisational 
consequences of introducing Lorenzo and how these evolved over time in the complex 
environment of a national EHR implementation. This chapter has, building on Chapter 8, 
been concerned with the more practical implications f my study. In doing so, I 
attempted to narrow the theory-practice gap by proposing a theoretical model based on 
my findings, which may be practically applied to similar international ventures.  
 
Naturally a range of other factors are important, but I attempted to distil those that are 
most pertinent to large-scale national EHR implementation efforts. To date, no 
comparable model exists as these national ventures are till in their infancy, but the need 
to construct theory-informed frameworks will be of increasing importance in order to 
learn from experiences. Building on this model, I discussed the implications for English 
policy and local organisations, as well as future research. 
 
The next chapter will summarise my findings and draw overall conclusions. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions 
 
I began this work in the context of the difficulties and opportunities surrounding the 
implementation of large-scale EHR systems in healthc re. These are often characterised 
by the complex social and technical processes involved in integrating EHRs within work 
practices of users and more general organisational fu ctioning. The national “top-down” 
implementation of Lorenzo software in England provided a unique opportunity to study 
these processes, as the system was not only nationally procured but also developed from 
scratch in collaboration with the NHS. This “co-creational” approach was intended to 
address potential problems with user engagement. My focus was therefore on exploring 
the views and experiences of users as well as the organisational consequences of 
introducing Lorenzo and how these evolved over time in the complex environment of a 
national EHR implementation.  
 
I developed a methodological framework based on a sociotechnical ANT-based 
approach to achieve my aims practically (as described n Chapter 4). Here, I searched for 
approaches that could address ANT’s shortcomings and found some more helpful than 
others. Drawing on multi-sited ethnography and case studies proved useful as it helped 
to focus data collection activities without neglecting local contingencies and macro-
environmental factors. Other frameworks helped to place micro-processes into context, 
by explaining the role of internal structures of human agents, and conceptualising the 
environment in which sociotechnical processes were situated and unfolded over time 
(Strong Structuration Theory, the Social Shaping of Technology, and the Theory of the 
Diffusion of Innovations).  
 
Based on my analysis, I developed models, identifyig mechanisms that contributed to 
local and national developments over time (Chapters 7 and 8), taking into account the 
interrelated and situated nature of various model components.  
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Overall, my findings helped to explain, why the initially anticipated ‘full integration’ of 
NHS CRS software was far from being realised, with only a handful of Lorenzo 
implementations at the time I completed data collection.(337;338) These 
implementations have not only been on a more limited scale than originally planned but 
also with more limited functionality.  
 
The technical design of the nationally procured software and the resulting negative local 
effects for users and organisations seemed to have shaped overall national 
implementation progress. In addition, and contrary to many inherent assumptions 
relating to the anticipated positive consequences of EHR systems for the quality and 
efficiency of care, my results suggest that Lorenzo may in fact have had a negative 
effect on such measures. Nevertheless, my focus on early implementation and adoption 
meant that I was not able to investigate the more embedded use of systems with full 
functionality. This may well have shown more positive results.  
 
Developments over time played an important part in my research and contrasting 
experiences and perceptions of different stakeholders proved useful in illustrating the 
dynamic nature of implementation and adoption processes. I discussed how the interplay 
between social (macro-, individual and organisational) and technical factors was central 
to implementation progress. Developments were situated in and shaped by macro-
environmental factors characterised by the vision t create nationally interoperable 
EHRs. These arrangements resulted in politically-driven and unrealistic implementation 
timelines as well as centrally managed contracts, which often prohibited local input in 
decision making. The consequences for users (who found it difficult to integrate Lorenzo 
within their work practices) and organisations (which were often not ready for externally 
imposed changes) were significant.  
 
These theoretical insights, although based on Lorenz  implementations in selected 
English case study sites, allowed me to develop a model of potentially transferable 
lessons to other settings and in particular national EHR implementation efforts. In this 
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context, I argued that based on my findings the most important pre-requisite for EHR 
implementation seems to be use of the technology, no matter on what scale. Here, 
progress in software development (including resolving ssues with system usability) 
needs to be realised first before tackling progress in terms of deployment scale. 
Otherwise there is a danger that local issues comprise national implementation 
progress. In order to achieve this, there is need to realise visible short-term and long-
term benefits to users, organisations and patients. Such benefits had not materialised in 
any of the three Trusts studied during my data colle tion as Lorenzo was perceived to 
lack usability and significantly changed local work practices. Sufficient time and 
resources need to be allocated to allow users and organisations to cope with change and 
deal with emerging challenges and consequences resulting from technology 
introduction; before considering issues surrounding systems interoperability, scale and 
secondary uses of data. This needs to be combined with adequate training and support 
structures involving ongoing and two-way communication between system developers, 
implementers and users.  
 
Overall, the national implementation of Lorenzo should be viewed as a valuable learning 
experience for all involved. It is now of central importance to share lessons learned. The 
approach of “co-creating” national software with strong user involvement initially 
seemed reasonable, but struggled to deliver due to the different requirements in the NHS 
and the restraining macro-environment. Interoperability and large-scale information 
sharing remain nevertheless desirable and a coherent national strategy is needed to 
achieve this. It is important to recognise that we ar just at the beginning of a long 
journey to achieve this aim and experiences such as t e Lorenzo venture are part of the 








 (1)  Emmerson C, Frayne C, Goodman A. Pressures in UK healthcare: challenges 
for the NHS. 2002. The Institute for Fiscal Studies.  
 
 (2)  Mort M, Smith A. Beyond Information: Intimate Relations in Sociotechnical 
Practice. Sociology 2009; 43(2):215-231. 
 (3)  Mort M, Finch T, May C. Making and Unmaking Telepatients: Identity and 
Governance in New Health Technologies. Science Technology Human Values 
2009; 34(1):9-33. 
 (4)  Black A, Car J, Pagliari C, Anandan C, Cresswell K. The Impact of eHealth on 
the Quality and Safety of Health Care: A Systematic Overview. PLoS 
Medicine 2011; 8(1):e1000387. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000387. 
 (5)  Car J, Anandan C, Black A, Cresswell K, Pagliari C, McKinstry B et al. The 
Impact of eHealth on the Quality and Safety of Healthcare - A systematic 
overview and synthesis of the literature. Report fo the NHS Connecting for 
Health Evaluation Programme. 2008.  
 
 (6)  Massaro TA. Introducing physician order entry at a major academic medical 
center: 1. Impact on organizational culture and behaviour. Academic Medicine 
1993; 68:20-25. 
 (7)  Sicotte C, Denis JL, Lehoux P. The Computer Based Patient Record: A 
Strategic Issue in Process Innovation. Journal of Medical Systems 1998; 
22(6):431-443. 
 (8)  Southon G, Sauer C, Dampney K. Lessons from a failed information systems 
initiative: issues for complex organisations. Interational Journal of Medical 
Informatics 1999; 55(1):33-46. 
 (9)  Coiera E. Building a National Health IT System from the middle out. Journal 
of the American Medical Informatics Association 2009; 16(3):271-273. 
 (10)  Singleton P, Pagliari C, Detmer DE. Critical Issues for electronic health 
records. 2009. The Nuffield Trust.  
 






hServiceCirculars/DH_4005016 (Last accessed 17/12/07). 1998. London, 
Department of Health.  
 
 (12)  Department of Health. The NHS plan: a plan for investment, a plan for reform. 
2000. London, Department of Health.  
 
 (13)  Department of Health. Delivering 21st century IT support for the NHS: 
national strategic programme. 2002. London, Departmen  of Health.  
 
 (14)  House of Commons Health Committee. The Electronic Patient Record. 2007. 
London, The Stationery Office.  
 
 (15)  Austin CJ, Hornberger KD, Shmerling JE. Managi g information resources: a 
study of ten healthcare organizations. Journal of Healthcare Management 2000; 
45(4):229-238. 
 (16)  Beuscart-Zephir MC, Anceaux F, Crinquette V, Renard JM. Integrating users' 
activity modelling in the design and assessment of hospital electronic patient 
records: The example of anaesthesia. International Journal of Medical 
Informatics 2001; 64(2-3):157-171. 
 (17)  Giuse DA, Kuhn KA. Health information systems challenges: The Heidelberg 
conference and the future. International Journal of Medical Informatics 2003; 
69(2-3):105-114. 
 (18)  Nikula RE. Why implementing EPR's does not bring about organizational 
changes--a qualitative approach. Studies in Health Technology and Informatics 
2001; 84:666-669. 
 (19)  Van Ginneken AM. The computerized patient reco d: balancing effort and 
benefit. [Review] [104 refs]. International Journal of Medical Informatics 
2002; 65(2):97-119. 
 (20)  Fenton SH, Giannangelo K, Stanfill M. Essential people skills for EHR 
implementation success. Journal of Ahima 2006; 77(6):60. 
 (21)  Duggan C. Implementation evaluation. HIM professionals share their 
experiences bringing health IT online. Journal of Ahima 2006; 77(6):52-55. 
 (22)  Bossen C. Test the artefact-Develop the organization. The implementation of 





 (23)  Dagroso D, Williams PD, Chesney JD, Lee MM, Theoharis E, Enberg RN. 
Implementation of an obstetrics EMR module: overcoming user dissatisfaction. 
Journal of Healthcare Information Management 2007; 21(1):87-94. 
 (24)  De Mul M, Berg M, Hazelzet JA. Clinical information systems: CareSuite from 
Picis. Journal of Critical Care 2004; 19(4):208-214. 
 (25)  Doebbeling BN, Chou AF, Tierney WM. Priorities and strategies for the 
implementation of integrated informatics and communications technology to 
improve evidence-based practice. Journal of General Internal Medicine 2006; 
21(SUPPL. 2):S50-S57. 
 (26)  Hendy J, Reeves BC, Fulop N, Hutchings A, Masseria C. Challenges to 
implementing the national programme for information technology (NPfIT): a 
qualitative study. British Medical Journal 2005; 331(7512):331-336. 
 (27)  Keshavjee K, Bosomworth J, Copen J, Lai J, Kucukyazici B, Lilani R et al. 
Best practices in EMR implementation: a systematic review. AMIA Annual 
Symposium Proceedings/AMIA Symposium 2006;982. 
 (28)  Ovretveit J, Scott T, Rundall TG, Shortell SM, Brommels M. Improving 
quality through effective implementation of information technology in 
healthcare. International Journal for Quality in Health Care 2007;(5):259-266. 
 (29)  Puffer MJ, Ferguson JA, Wright BC, Osborn J, Anshus AL, Cahill BP et al. 
Partnering with clinical providers to enhance the effici ncy of an EMR. Journal 
of Healthcare Information Management 2007; 21(1):24-3 . 
 (30)  Scott JT, Rundall TG, Vogt TM, Hsu J. Kaiser Permanente's experience of 
implementing an electronic medical record: A qualitative study. British 
Medical Journal 2005; 331(7528):1313-1316. 
 (31)  Sicotte C, Pare G, Moreault M-P, Paccioni A. A Risk Assessment of Two 
Interorganizational Clinical Information Systems. Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association 2006; 13(5):557-566. 
 (32)  Snyder R, Weston MJ, Fields W, Rizos A, Tedeschi C. Computerized provider 
order entry system field research: The impact of contextual factors on study 
implementation. International Journal of Medical Informatics 2006; 
75(10):730-740. 
 (33)  Cresswell K, Ali M, Avery A, Barber N, Cornford T, Crowe S et al. The Long 
and Winding Road…An Independent Evaluation of the Implementation and 
Adoption of the National Health Service Care Records Service (NHS CRS) in 




http://www.haps.bham.ac.uk/publichealth/cfhep/005.shtml (Last accessed: 
09/05/2011). 2011.  
 
 (34)  May C, Ellis NT. When protocols fail: technical evaluation, biomedical 
knowledge, and the social production of `facts' about a telemedicine clinic. 
Social Science and Medicine 2001; 53(8):989-1002. 
 (35)  Greenhalgh T, Stramer K, Bratan T, Byrne E, Mohammad Y, Russell J. 
Introduction of shared electronic records: multi-site case study using diffusion 
of innovation theory. British Medical Journal 2008; 337:1786. 
 (36)  Cooper R, Zmud R. Information Technology Implementation Research: A 
Technological Diffusion Approach. Management Science 1990; 36(2):123-139. 
 (37)  Leu MG, Cheung M, Webster TR, Curry L, Bradley EH, Fifield J et al. Centers 
speak up: The clinical context for health information technology in the 
ambulatory care setting. Journal of General Internal Medicine 2008; 23(4):372-
378. 
 (38)  Lorenzi NM, Smith JB, Conner SR, Campion TR. he Success Factor Profile 
for clinical computer innovation. Studies in Health Technology and Informatics 
2004; 107:1077-1080. 
 (39)  Walker AR. Case study: leading change across two sites: introduction of a new 
documentation system. Nursing Leadership 2006;(4):34-40. 
 (40)  Aarts J, Doorewaard H, Berg M. Understanding Implementation: The Case of a 
Computerized Physician Order Entry System in a Large Dutch University 
Medical Center. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 
2004; 11(3):207-216. 
 (41)  Pare G. Implementing clinical information systems: A multiple-case study 
within a US hospital. Health Services Management Research 2002; 15(2):71-
92. 
 (42)  Yusof MM, Kuljis J, Papazafeiropoulou A, Stergioulas LK. An evaluation 
framework for Health Information Systems: human, organization and 
technology-fit factors (HOT-fit). International Journal of Medical Informatics 
2008; 77(6):386-398. 
 (43)  Ammenwerth E, Iller C, Mahler C. IT-adoption a d the interaction of task, 
technology and individuals: A fit framework and a cse study. BMC Medical 




 (44)  Pare G, Sicotte C, Jaana M, Girouard D. Prioritizing the risk factors 
influencing the success of clinical information system projects. A Delphi study 
in Canada. Methods of Information in Medicine 2008; 47(3):251-259. 
 (45)  Ash JS, Fournier L, Stavri PZ, Dykstra R. Principles for a successful 
computerized physician order entry implementation. AMIA Annual 
Symposium Proceedings 2003;36-40. 
 (46)  Callen JL, Braithwaite J, Westbrook JI. Contextual Implementation Model: A 
Framework for Assisting Clinical Information System Implementations. 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 2008; 15(2):255-262. 
 (47)  Ludwick DA, Doucette J. Adopting electronic medical records in primary care: 
Lessons learned from health information systems imple entation experience in 
seven countries. International Journal of Medical Informatics 2009; 78(1):22-
31. 
 (48)  Moen A. A nursing perspective to design and implementation of electronic 
patient record systems. Journal of Biomedical Informatics 2003; 36(4-5):375-
378. 
 (49)  Vishwanath A, Scamurra DS. Barriers to the adoption of electronic health 
records: Using concept mapping to develop a comprehensive empirical model. 
Health Informatics Journal 2007; 13(2):119-134. 
 (50)  Yasnoff WA, Humphreys BL, Overhage JM, Detmer DE, Brennan PF, Morris 
RW et al. A consensus action agenda for achieving the national health 
information infrastructure. Journal of the American Medical Informatics 
Association 2004; 11(4):332-338. 
 (51)  Tonnesen AS, LeMaistre A, Tucker D. Electronic medical record 
implementation barriers encountered during implementation. Proceedings 
AMIA Annual Symposium 1999;624-626. 
 (52)  Rose AF, Schnipper JL, Park ER, Poon EG, Li Q, Middleton B. Using 
qualitative studies to improve the usability of an EMR. Journal of Biomedical 
Informatics 2005; 38(1):51-60. 
 (53)  Sprague L. Electronic health records: How close? How far to go? NHPF Issue 
Brief 2004; 800:1-17. 
 (54)  Jaspers MW, Peute LW, Lauteslager A, Bakker PJ. Pre-post evaluation of 
physicians' satisfaction with a redesigned electronic medical record system. 




 (55)  Karsten H, Laine A. User interpretations of future information system use: a 
snapshot with technological frames. International Journal of Medical 
Informatics 2007; 76:S136-S140. 
 (56)  Lium JT, Tjora A, Faxvaag A. No paper, but the same routines: A qualitative 
exploration of experiences in two Norwegian hospitals deprived of the paper 
based medical record. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2008; 
8(2). 
 (57)  Johnson CM, Turley JP. The significance of cgnitive modeling in building 
healthcare interfaces. International Journal of Medical Informatics 2006; 
75(2):163-172. 
 (58)  Saigh O, Triola MM, Link RN. Brief report: Failure of an electronic medical 
record tool to improve pain assessment documentatio. J urnal of General 
Internal Medicine 2006; 21(2):185-188. 
 (59)  Da've D. Benefits and barriers to EMR implementation. Caring 2004; 
23(11):50-51. 
 (60)  Van der Meijden MJ, Tange H, Troost J, Hasman A. Development and 
implementation of an EPR: how to encourage the user. International Journal of 
Medical Informatics 2001; 64(2):173-185. 
 (61)  Townes PG, Benson DS, Johnston P, Vaughn C. Making EMRs really work: 
the Southeast Health Center experience. Journal of Ambulatory Care 
Management 2000; 23(2):43-52. 
 (62)  Clemmer TP. Computers in the ICU: where we started and where we are now. 
Journal of Critical Care 2004;(4):201-207. 
 (63)  Miranda D, Fields W, Lund K. Lessons learned during 15 years of clinical 
information system experience. Computers in Nursing 2001;(4):147-151. 
 (64)  Lu Y-C, Xiao Y, Sears A, Jacko JA. A review and a framework of handheld 
computer adoption in healthcare. International Journal of Medical Informatics 
2005; 74(5):409-422. 
 (65)  Crosson JC, Stroebel C, Scott JG, Stello B, Crabtree BF. Implementing an 
electronic medical record in a family medicine practice: communication, 
decision making, and conflict. Annals of Family Medicine 2005; 3(4):307-311. 
 (66)  Bali RK, Wickramasinghe N. Achieving successful EPR implementation with 
the penta-stage model. International Journal of Healthc re Technology and 




 (67)  Bates DW, Ebell M, Gotlieb E, Zapp J, Mullins HC. A proposal for electronic 
medical records in U.S. primary care. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association 2003; 10(1):1-10. 
 (68)  Granlien MF, Hertzum M, Gudmundsen J. The gap between actual and 
mandated use of an electronic medication record three years after deployment. 
Studies in Health Technology and Informatics 2008; 136:419-424. 
 (69)  Quinzio L, Junger A, Gottwald B, Benson M, Hartmann B, Jost A et al. User 
acceptance of an anaesthesia information management system. European 
Journal of Anaesthesiology 2003; 20(12):967-972. 
 (70)  Halamka J, Aranow M, Ascenzo C, Bates DW, Berry K, Debor G et al. E-
Prescribing Collaboration in Massachusetts: Early Experiences from Regional 
Prescribing Projects. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 
2006; 13(3):239-244. 
 (71)  Kelly CS. Perinatal computerized patient reco d and archiving systems: pitfalls 
and enhancements for implementing a successful computerized medical record. 
Journal of Perinatal and Neonatal Nursing 1999; 12(4):1-14. 
 (72)  Goroll AH, Simon SR, Tripathi M, Ascenzo C, Bates DW. Community-wide 
Implementation of Health Information Technology: The Massachusetts eHealth 
Collaborative Experience. Journal of the American Medical Informatics 
Association 2009; 16(1):132-139. 
 (73)  Erdley WS, Sackett K, Pope R. Tech versus Touch: Narrowing the great 
divide. Online Journal of Nursing Informatics 2003; 7(2):26-33. 
 (74)  Yarbrough AK, Smith TB. Technology acceptance among physicians: A new 
take on TAM. Medical Care Research and Review 2007; 64(6):650-672. 
 (75)  Pagliari C. Implementing the National Programme for IT: What can we learn 
from the Scottish experience? Informatics in Primary Care 2005; 13(2):105-
111. 
 (76)  Keddie Z, Jones R. Information communications technology in general 
practice: Cross-sectional survey in London. Informatics in Primary Care 2005; 
13(2):113-123. 
 (77)  Mannan R, Murphy J, Jones M. Is primary care ready to embrace e-health? A 
qualitative study of staff in London primary care tust. Informatics in Primary 
Care 2006; 14(2):121-131. 
 (78)  Mehta NB, Partin MH. Electronic health records: a primer for practicing 




 (79)  Department of Health. Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS. 2010. The 
Stationery Office.  
 
 (80)  Davidson SM, Heineke J. Toward an Effective Strategy for the Diffusion and 
Use of Clinical Information Systems. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association 2007; 14(3):361-367. 
 (81)  Pendergast DK, Buchda VL. Charting the course. A quality journey. Nursing 
Administration Quarterly 2003; 27(4):330-335. 
 (82)  Smaltz DH, Callander R, Turner M, Kennamer G, Wurtz H, Bowen A et al. 
Making sausage--effective management of enterprise-w d  clinical IT projects. 
Journal of Healthcare Information Management 2005; 2:48-55. 
 (83)  Nagle LM. Infoway's EHR user engagement strategy. Nursing Leadership 
2007;(2):31-33. 
 (84)  Adler KG. How to successfully navigate your EHR implementation. Family 
Practice Management 2007; 14(2):33-39. 
 (85)  James D, Hess S, Kretzing JE, Jr., Stabile ME. Showing "what right looks 
like"--how to improve performance through a paradigm shift around 
implementation thinking. Journal of Healthcare Information Management 
2007; 21(1):54-61. 
 (86)  Morrison C, Jones M, Blackwell A, Vuylsteke A. Electronic patient record use 
during ward rounds: A qualitative study of interaction between medical staff. 
Critical Care 2008; 12(6). 
 (87)  Jones M. Learning the lessons of history? Electronic records in the United 
Kingdom acute hospitals, 1988-2002. Health Informatics Journal 2004; 
10(4):253-263. 
 (88)  Delany R. Smiling all the way. Healthcare Review Online 2004; 8(2). 
 (89)  McGowan JJ, Cusack CM, Poon EG. Formative evaluation: a critical 
component in EHR implementation. Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association 2008; 15(3):297-301. 
 (90)  Williams T, May C, Mair F, Mort M, Gask L. Normative models of health 
technology assessment and the social production of evidence about telehealth 
care. Health Policy 2003; 64(1):39-54. 
 (91)  May C, Mort M, Williams T, Mair F, Gask L. Health technology assessment in 





 (92)  May C. A rational model for assessing and evaluating complex interventions in 
health care. BMC Health Services Research 2006; 6(8):1-11. 
 (93)  Ash JS, Gorman PN, Lavelle M, Payne TH, Massaro TA, Frantz GL et al. A 
cross-site qualitative study of physician order entry. Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association 2003; 10(2):188-200. 
 (94)  Rose J, Jones M, Truex D. Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems. 
Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems 2005; 17(1):133-152. 
 (95)  Greenhalgh T, Stramer K, Bratan T, Byrne E, Russell J, Potts HWW. Adoption 
and non-adoption of a shared electronic summary record in England: a mixed-
method case study. British Medical Journal 2010; 34(4):c3111. 
 (96)  Blakie N. Approaches to Social Enquiry. Polity Press, 1993. 
 (97)  Butler T. Towards a hermeneutic method for interpretive research in 
information systems. Journal of Information Technology 1998; 13(4):285-300. 
 (98)  Klein HK, Myers MD. A Set of Principles for Conducting and Evaluating 
Interpretive Field Studies in Information Systems. MIS Quarterly 1999; 
23(1):67-94. 
 (99)  Williams M, May T. Introduction to the Philos phy of Social Research. 
Routledge, 1996. 
 (100)  Myers MD. Qualitative research in information systems. MIS Quarterly 1997; 
21(2):241-242. 
 (101)  Law J, Mol A. Complexities - social studies of knowledge practices. Duke 
University Press, 2002. 
 (102)  Mitchell VL, Nault BR. The emergence of functional knowledge in 
sociotechnical systems. Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary, 
Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Available online at: 
http://www.haskayne.ucalgary.ca/haskaynefaculty/files/haskaynefaculty/emerg
ence.pdf (Last accessed: 31/10/2008). 2003.  
 
 (103)  Association for Information Systems. Theoris used in IS research. Actor-
Network Theory. Available from: 
http://home.aisnet.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=212 (Last 
accessed: 12/12/2008). 2008.  
 
 (104)  Harrison MI, Koppel R, Bar-Lev S. Unintended Consequences of Information 
Technologies in Health Care--An Interactive Sociotechnical Analysis. Journal 




 (105)  Czarniawska B. A Golden Braid: Allport, Goffman, Weick. Organization 
Studies 2006; 27(11):1661-1674. 
 (106)  Berg M. Patient care information systems and health care work: a 
sociotechnical approach. International Journal of Medical Informatics 1999; 
55(2):87-101. 
 (107)  Chiasson M, Reddy M, Kaplan B, Davidson E. Expanding multi-disciplinary 
approaches to healthcare information technologies: What does information 
systems offer medical informatics? International Journal of Medical 
Informatics 2007; 76(Supplement 1):S89-S97. 
 (108)  Doolin B, Lowe A. To reveal is to critique: actor-network theory and critical 
information systems research. Journal of Information Technology 2002; 17:69-
78. 
 (109)  Prout A. Actor-network theory, technology and medical sociology: an 
illustrative analysis of the metered dose inhaler. Sociology of Health and 
Illness 1996; 18(2):198-219. 
 (110)  Mol A. Ontological Politics: a Word and Some Questions. In: Law J, Hassard 
J, editors. Actor Network and After. Oxford and Keele: Blackwell and the 
Sociological Review, 1999: 74-89. 
 (111)  Miettinen R. The Riddle of Things: Activity Theory and Actor-Network 
Theory as Approaches to Studying Innovations. Mind, Culture and Activity 
1999; 6(3):170-195. 
 (112)  Law J. Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering, Strategy and 
Heterogeneity. Systems Practice 1992; 5:379-393. 
 (113)  Latour B. Reassembling the social: an introduction to Actor-Network Theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 (114)  Callon M. Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication of the 
scallops and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. In: Law J, editor. Power, Action 
and Belief. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986: 19 -233. 
 (115)  McLean C, Hassard J. Symmetrical Absence/Symmetrical Absurdity: Critical 
Notes on the production of Actor Network Theory. Journal of Management 
Studies 2004; 41(3):493-519. 





 (117)  Law J. The manager and his powers. 1997. published by the Centre for Science 
Studies, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK.  
 
 (118)  Law J. After ANT: Complexity, Naming and Topology. The Sociological 
Review 1998; 46(S):1-14. 
 (119)  Doolin B, McLeod L. Towards critical interpretivism in IS research. In: 
Howcroft D, Trauth E, editors. Handbook of Critical Information Systems 
Research: Theory and Application. Cheltenham: Edwar Elgar, 2005: 244-271. 
 (120)  Kaghan WN, Bowker GC. Out of machine age?: complexity, sociotechnical 
systems and actor network theory. Journal of Engineer g and Technology 
Management 2001; 18(3-4):253-269. 
 (121)  Cordella A, Shaikh M. From Epistemology to Ontology: Challenging the 
Constructed Truth of ANT. Available from: 
http://is2.lse.ac.uk/WP/PDF/wp143.pdf (Last accessed 05/03/2009). 2006.  
 
 (122)  Berg M, Bowker G. Toward a Sociology of an Artifact. The Sociological 
Quarterly 1997; 38(3):513-537. 
 (123)  Berg M. Accumulating and Coordinating: Occasions for Information 
Technologies in Medical Work. Computer Supported Cooperative Work 1999; 
8(4):373-401. 
 (124)  Berg M, Langenberg C, Berg I, Kwakkernaat J. Considerations for 
sociotechnical design: experiences with an electronic patient record in a 
clinical context. International Journal of Medical Informatics 1998; 52(1-
3):243-251. 
 (125)  Berg M. Implementing information systems in health care organizations: myths 
and challenges. International Journal of Medical Informatics 2001; 64(2-
3):143-156. 
 (126)  Ekbia H. How IT Mediates Organizations: Enron and the California Energy 
Crisis. Journal of Digital Information 2004; 5(4). 
 (127)  Hall E. The 'geneticisation' of heart disease: a network analysis of the 
production of new genetic knowledge. Social Science and Medicine 2005; 
60(12):2673-2683. 
 (128)  Whitley EA, Pouloudi A. Studying the translations of NHSnet. Journal of End 




 (129)   Tatnall A, Gilding A. Actor-Network Theory and Information Systems 
Research. 10th Australasian Conference on Information Systems (ACIS). 
Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington, 1999. 
 (130)  Lowe A. After ANT - An illustrative discussion of the implications for 
qualitative accounting case research. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal 2001; 14(3):327-351. 
 (131)  Gad C, Jensen CB. On the Consequences of Post-ANT. Science Technology 
Human Values 2009. 
 (132)  Rydin Y. Actor-network theory and planning theory: A response to Boelens. 
Planning Theory 2010; 9(3):265-268. 
 (133)  Berg M. Practices of reading and writing: the constitutive role of the patient 
record in medical work. Sociology of Health and Illness 1996; 18(4):499-524. 
 (134)  Singleton V, Michael M. Actor-Networks and Ambivalence: General 
Practitioners in the UK Cervical Screening Programme. Social Studies of 
Science 1993; 23(2):227-264. 
 (135)  Bloomfield BP. The Role of Information Systems in the UK National Health 
Service: Action at a Distance and the Fetish of Calcul tion. Social Studies of 
Science 1991; 21(4):701-734. 
 (136)  Latour B. On actor-network theory: a few clarifications. Soziale Welt, 1997. 
 (137)  Harbers H, Koenis S. The Political Eggs of the Chicken Debate, Available 
from: http://www.easst.net/review/march1996/harbers (Last accessed: 
20/11/09). 2009.  
 
 (138)  Williams R, Edge D. The social shaping of technology. Research Policy 1996; 
25(6):865-899. 
 (139)  Wacker JG. A definition of theory: research guidelines for different theory-
building research methods in operations management. Journal of Operations 
Management 1998; 16(4):361-385. 
 (140)  Greenhalgh T, Potts H, Wong G, Bark P, Swinglehurst D. Tensions and 
Paradoxes in Electronic Patient Record Research: A Systematic Literature 
Review Using the Meta-narrative Method. The Milbank Quarterly 2009; 
87(4):729-788. 
 (141)  Greenhalgh T, Stones R. Theorising big IT programmes in healthcare: Strong 





 (142)  Reeves S, Albert M, Kuper A, Hodges BD. Why use theories in qualitative 
research? British Medical Journal 2008; 337(3):949. 
 (143)  Law J. Heterogeneities. 1997. Lancaster, UK, published by the Centre for 
Science Studies, Lancaster University.  
 
 (144)  Ortlipp M. Keeping and Using Reflective Journals in the Qualitative Research 
Process. The Qualitative Report 2008; 13(4):695-705. 
 (145)  Walsham G. Actor-Network Theory and IS Research: Current Status and 
Future Prospects. Information Systems and Qualitative Research. London: 
Chapman and Hall, 1997. 
 (146)  Ajzen I, Fishbein M. Understanding attitudes and predicting social behaviour. 
Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980. 
 (147)  Association for Information Systems. Theoris used in IS research. Available 
from: 
http://home.aisnet.org/searchsite.cfm?searchvalue=social+psychology&submit
=+Search+ (Last accessed: 15/12/2008). 2008.  
 
 (148)  Davis FD. A Technology Acceptance Model for empirically testing new end-
user information systems: theory and results. Doctoral Dissertation, Sloane 
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1989.  
 
 (149)  Taylor S, Todd P. Understanding information technology usage: A test of 
competing models. Information Systems Research 1995; 6(2):144-176. 
 (150)  Rogers E. Diffusion of innovations. New York: Free Press, 1983. 
 (151)  Greenhalgh T, Robert G, Macfarlane F, Bate P, Kyriakidou O. Diffusion of 
Innovations in Service Organizations: Systematic Review and 
Recommendations. Milbank Quarterly 2004; 82(4):581. 
 (152)  May C, Finch T, Mair F, Ballini L, Dowrick C, Eccles M et al. Understanding 
the implementation of complex interventions in health care: the normalization 
process model. BMC Health Services Research 2007; 7(1):148. 
 (153)  Atkinson P, Hammersley M. Ethnography and participant observation. 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994. 
 (154)  Williams R, Pollock N. E-Infrastructures: How Do We Know and Understand 
Them? Strategic Ethnography and the Biography of Artefacts (May 27, 2010). 





 (155)  Knoblauch H. Focused ethnography. Available from: http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/viewArticle/20/43 (Last accessed: 
07/107/2009). Forum: Qualitative Social Research 2005; 6(3). 
 (156)  Pollock N, Williams R. Beyond The ERP Implementation Study: A New 
Approach To The Study Of Packaged Information System : The Biography Of 
Artifacts Framework, ICIS 2009. 
 (157)  Hannerz U. Being there... and there... and there! Reflections on Multi-Site 
Ethnography. Ethnography 2003; 4(2):201-216. 
 (158)  Marcus GE. Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-
Sited Ethnography. Annual Review of Anthropology 1995; 24(1):95-117. 
 (159)  Nadai E, Maeder C. Fuzzy Fields. Multi-Sited Ethnography in Sociological 
Research. Available from: http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/viewArticle/22/47 (Last accessed: 
07/107/2009). Forum: Qualitative Social Research 2005; 6(3). 
 (160)  Sørensen KH, Levold N. Tacit Networks, Heterog neous Engineers, and 
Embodied Technology. Science Technology Human Values 1992; 17(1):13-35. 
 (161)  Hine C. Multi-sited Ethnography as a Middle Range Methodology for 
Contemporary STS. Science Technology Human Values 2007; 32(6):652-671. 
 (162)  Bruni A. Shadowing Software and Clinical Records: On the Ethnography of 
Non-Humans and Heterogeneous Contexts. Organization 2005; 12(3):357-378. 
 (163)  Browning LD, Sornes JO. The Challenge of Doing Corporatized Research: An 
Ethnography of ICT Use. Qualitative Inquiry 2008; 14(7):1223-1244. 
 (164)  Østerlund C. Mapping medical work: documenting practices across multiple 
medical settings. Journal of the Center for Information Studies (Japan) 2004; 
3:35-43. 
 (165)  Østerlund C. Two Doctors' Documenting Practices: How the Indexical 
Centering of Medical Records Integrates the Encoding, Communication and 
Coordination of Patient Care. Paper presented at the second annual meeting of 
the Document Academy (DOCAM '04) at the School of Information 
Management and Systems, University of California, October 23, Berkeley. 
2004.  
 





 (167)  Flyvbjerg B. Five Misunderstandings about Case Study Research. Qualitative 
Inquiry 2006; 12(2):219-245. 
 (168)  Yin R. Case Study Research, Design and Methods. Sage Publications, 2009. 
 (169)  Anderson RA, Crabtree BF, Steele DJ, McDaniel RR, Jr. Case Study Research: 
The View From Complexity Science. Qualitative Health Research 2005; 
15(5):669-685. 
 (170)  Mays N, Pope C. Qualitative research in healt  care: Assessing quality in 
qualitative research. British Medical Journal 2000; 320(7226):50-52. 
 (171)  Green J, Britten N. Qualitative research and evidence based medicine. British 
Medical Journal 1998; 316(7139):1230-1232. 
 (172)  Lincoln YS, Guba EG. Naturalistic inquiry. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 
1985. 
 (173)  Burnard P. The telephone interview as a data collection method. Nurse 
Education Today 1994; 14(1):67-72. 
 (174)  Fenig S, Levav I, Kohn R, Yelin N. Telephone vs face-to-face interviewing in 
a community psychiatric survey. American Journal of Public Health 1993; 
83(6):896-898. 
 (175)  Kaplan B. Addressing Organizational Issues into the Evaluation of Medical 
Systems. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 1997; 
4(2):94-101. 
 (176)  Blignaut PJ, McDonald T, Tolmie CJ. Predicting the learning and consultation 
time in a computerized primary healthcare clinic. Computers Informatics 
Nursing 2001; 19(3):130-136. 
 (177)  O'Cathain A, Sampson FC, Munro JF, Thomas KJ, Nicholl JP. Nurses' views 
of using computerized decision support software in NHS Direct. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 2004; 45(3):280-286. 
 (178)  Ellis CD, Quiroga C, Shin SY, Pina RJ. GIS and Human-centered Systems 
Design: Using Ethnographic Data Collection and Analysis Methods to Design 
a Utility Permitting Support System. URISA Journal 2003; 15. 
 (179)  Ash J, Berg M. Report of conference Track 4: socio-technical issues of HIS. 




 (180)  Procter R, Williams R. HCI: Whose Problem Is It Anyway? 385-396. 1992. 
Proceedings of the IFIP TC2/WG2.7 Working Conference on Engineering for 
Human-Computer Interaction.  
 
 (181)  Dourish P, Fitzpatrick G. "Repairing" the machine: a case study of the 
evaluation of computer aided detection tools in breast screening. 03 Sep 14; 
Helsinki, Finland: Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. 
 (182)  Hignett S, Wilson JR. The role for qualitative methodology in ergonomics: a 
case study to explore theoretical issues. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics 
Science 2004; 5(6):473-493. 
 (183)  Abbott S, Shaw S, Elston J. Comparative analysis of health policy 
implementation. Policy Studies 2004; 25(4):259-266. 
 (184)  Appleton JV, Cowley S. Analysing clinical practice guidelines. A method of 
documentary analysis. Journal of Advanced Nursing 1997; 25(5):1008-1017. 
 (185)  May T. Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process. Buckingham, 
Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2001. 
 (186)  Prior L. Using documents in social research. London: Sage, 2003. 
 (187)  Mason J. Qualitative Researching. London: Sage, 2002. 
 (188)  Winthereik B, de Bont A, Berg M. Accessing the World of Doctors and their 
Computers: Making Available Objects of Study and the Research Site through 
Ethnographic Engagement. Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems 
2002; 14:47-58. 
 (189)  Stake RE. The Art of Case Study Research. London: SAGE Publications, 1995. 
 (190)  Miles MB, Huberman AM. Qualitative Data Analysis. Thousand Oaks: CA: 
Sage, 1994. 
 (191)  Ritchie J, Lewis J. Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science 
Students and Researchers. London: Sage, 2003. 
 (192)  Coffey A, Atkinson P. Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary 
Research Strategies. Thousand Oaks, London: Sage, 1996. 
 (193)  Warner J. Inquiry reports as active texts and their function in relation to 





 (194)  Plummer K. The moral and human face of life stories: reflexivity, power and 
ethics. Documents of Life – 2. London: Sage, 2001: 204-230. 
 (195)  Nairn K, Munro J, Smith AB. A counter-narrative of a 'failed' interview. 
Qualitative Research 2005; 5:221-244. 
 (196)  Munro A, Lesley H, Rainbird H, Leisten R. Power at work: Reflections on the 
research process. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 2004; 
7:289-304. 
 (197)  Finch J. "It's great to have someone to talk to": ethics and politics of 
interviewing women. In: Bell C, Roberts H, editors. Social Researching: 
Politics, Problems and Practice. London: Routledge, 1984: 70-85. 
 (198)  Cupples J. The field as a landscape of desire: ex and sexuality in geographical 
fieldwork. Area 2002; 31:382-390. 
 (199)  Davidson J. "Joking apart …": a "processual" approach to research self-help 
groups. Social and Cultural Geography 2001; 2:163-18 . 
 (200)  Einagel V. Telling stories, making selves. In: Bondi L, editor. Subjectivities, 
Knowledges and Feminist Geographies: The Subjects and Ethics of Social 
Research. Boulder, Colorado: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002: 223-235. 
 (201)  Oakley A. Interviewing women: a contradiction in terms? In: Roberts H, 
Keegan P, editors. Doing Feminist Research. Routledge, 1981: 30-61. 
 (202)  Reinharz S. Who am I? The need for a variety of selves in the field. In: Hertz 
R, editor. Reflexivity and Voice. London: 1997: 3-20. 
 (203)  Berger P, Luckmann T. The Social Construction of Reality. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 2009: 43-48. 
 (204)  Mauthner N, Doucet A. Reflexive accounts and accounts of reflexivity in 
qualitative data analysis. Sociology 2003; 37:413-431. 
 (205)  Pillow W. Confession, catharsis, or cure? Rethinking the uses of reflexivity as 
methodological power in qualitative research. Qualitative Studies in Education 
2003; 16(2):175-196. 
 (206)  Wilkins R. Taking it personally: a note on emotions and autobiography. 
Sociology 1993; 27:93-100. 
 (207)  Bondi L. The place of emotions in research: from partitioning emotion and 




Bondi L, Smith M, editors. Emotional Geographies. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005: 
231-246. 
 (208)  Young E, Raymond L. Fieldworker feelings as data; "emotion work" and 
"feeling rules" in first person accounts of sociological fieldwork. In: James V, 
Gabe J, editors. Emotions and the Sociology of Health. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996: 97-113. 
 (209)  Oerton S. 'Touch talk': the problems and paradoxes of embodied research. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 2004; 7:305-322. 
 (210)  Maynard M. Feminists' knowledge and the knowledge of feminisms: 
epistemology, theory, methodology and method. In: May T, Williams M, 
editors. Knowing the Social World. Open University Press, 1998: 120-137. 
 (211)  Birch M, Miller T. Inviting intimacy: the interview as therapeutic opportunity. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 2000; 3:189-202. 
 (212)  Vivat B. Situated ethics and feminist ethnography in a west of Scotland 
hospice. In: Bondi L, editor. Subjectivities, Knowledges and Feminist 
Geographies: The Subjects and Ethics of Social Research. Boulder, Colorado: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2002: 236-252. 
 (213)  Barbour RS. Checklists for improving rigour in qualitative research: a case of 
the tail wagging the dog? British Medical Journal 2001; 322(7294):1115-1117. 
 (214)  Malterud K. Qualitative research: standards, challenges, and guidelines. Lancet 
2001; 358(9280):483-488. 
 (215)  Gagnon YC. The Case Study As Research Method: Implementation Guide. 
Quebec: Presses de l'Universite du Quebec, 2010. 
 (216)  eHealth Insider. Burnham defends NPfIT but c s £600m. Available from: 
http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/ehi/5454. (Last accessed: 19/01/2011). 2009.  
 
 (217)  The Guardian. NPfIT goes to the country. Available from: 
http://www.smarthealthcare.com/england-patient-records (Last accessed: 
18/01/2011). 2011.  
 
 (218)  Certification Commission for Health Information Technology. Available from: 
http://www.cchit.org/ (Last accessed: 18/01/2011). 2011.  
 
 (219)  Cabinet Office. Government ICT Strategy. Available from: 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/government-ict-strategy (Last 





 (220)  National Audit Office. The National Programme for IT in the NHS: an update 
on the delivery of detailed care records systems. Available from: 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1012/npfit.aspx (Last accessed: 
18/05/2011). 2011.  
 
 (221)  Public Accounts Committee. The National Programme for IT in the NHS: an 
update on the delivery of detailed care records system . Available from: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1070/
1070.pdf (Last accessed: 05/08/2011). 2011.  
 
 (222)  2020Health. Fixing the NHS IT. 2010.  
 
 (223)  Eason K. Local sociotechnical system development in the NHS National 
Programme for Information Technology. Journal of Information Technology 
2007; 22(3):257-264. 
 (224)  Robertson A, Cresswell K, Takian A, Petrakaki D, Crowe S, Cornford T. 
Implementation and adoption of nationwide electronic health records in 
secondary care in England: qualitative analysis of interim results from a 
prospective national evaluation. British Medical Journal 2010; 341:c4564. 
 (225)  Williams R. The Political and Feminist Dimensions of Technological 
Determinism. Does Technology Drive History: The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994. 
 (226)  Ferneley E, Sobreperez P. Resist, comply or workaround? An examination of 
different facets of user engagement with information systems. Eur J Inf Syst 
2006; 15(4):345-356. 
 (227)  Richman J. Technology and Medicine. Medicine and Health. London: 
Longman, 1987. 
 (228)  Cooper S. Technoculture and critical theory: in the service of the machine? 
London: Routledge, 2002. 
 (229)  Gagnon MP, Legare F, Labrecque M, Fremont P, Pluye P, Gagnon J et al. 
Interventions for promoting information and communicat on technologies 
adoption in healthcare professionals. Cochrane Database 2009;(1):CD006093. 
 (230)  Boonstra A, Broekhuis M. Barriers to the acceptance of electronic medical 
records by physicians From systematic review to taxnomy and interventions. 




 (231)  Stevenson JE, Nilsson GC, Petersson GI, Johansson PE. Nurses experience of 
using electronic patient records in everyday practice in acute/inpatient ward 
settings: A literature review. Health Informatics Journal 2010; 16(1):63-72. 
 (232)  Berg M, Aarts J, van der LJ. ICT in health care: sociotechnical approaches. 
Methods of Information in Medicine 2003; 42(4):297-301. 
 (233)  Lee TT. Adopting a personal digital assistant system: application of Lewin's 
change theory. Journal of Advanced Nursing 2006; 55(4):487-496. 
 (234)  Bartlett ES, Maley JE, Fajardo LL. Radiology residency eCurriculum 
developed in-house: evaluation of benefits and weakn sses. Academic 
Radiology 2003; 10(6):657-663. 
 (235)  Federal Aviation Administration. Chapter 17: Human Factors Engineering and 
Safety Principles and Practices, FAA System Safety Handbook. 2000.  
 
 (236)  Mair FS, May C, Finch T, Murray E, Anderson G, Sullivan F et al. 
Understanding the implementation and integration of e-health services. Journal 
of Telemedicine and Telecare 2007; 13(1):36-37. 
 (237)  Hartswood M, Procter R, Rouchy P, Rouncefield M, Slack R, Voss A. 
Working IT out in medical practice: IT systems design and development as co-
realisation. Methods of Information in Medicine 2003; 42:392-397. 
 (238)  Shekelle PG, Morton SC, Keeler EB. Costs and benefits of health information 
technology. Evidence Report Technology Assessment 2006;(132):1-71. 
 (239)  NHS Connecting for Health. Dictionary of Medicines and Devices. Available 
from: http://www.dmd.nhs.uk/ (Last accessed: 28/04/2 11). 2011.  
 
 (240)  Cabinet Office CIU. E-Government Interoperability Framework. Part Two: 
Technical Policies and Specifications. 2002. London, Cabinet Office. 
  
 (241)  National Health Service UK. Integrated care records service: output based 
specification version 2. 2003. London, National Health Service.  
 
 (242)  Johnson C. Case Studies in the Failure of Healthcare Information Systems. 
Available from: 
http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/AHRQ/case_study.pdf (Last 
accessed 14/12/09). 2009.  
 
 (243)  Bjørn P, Burgoyne S, Crompton V, MacDonald T, Pickering B, Munro S. 




templates for healthcare professionals. European Journal of Information 
Systems 2009;1-14. 
 (244)  European Commission. Interoperable eHealth is Worth it. Securing benefits 
from Electronic Health Records and ePrescribing. 2010.  
 
 (245)  Terraz O, Wietlisbach V, Jeannot JG, Burnand B, Froehlich F, Gonvers JJ et al. 
The EPAGE internet guideline as a decision support tool for determining the 
appropriateness of colonoscopy. Digestion 2005; 71(2):72-77. 
 (246)  Ipsos MORI. Ipsos MORI survey. 2005.  
 
 (247)  Brennan S. The biggest computer programme in the world ever! How's it 
going? Journal of Information Technology 2007; 22(3):202-211. 
 (248)  McKenna E. Business Psychology and Organisational Behaviour: A Student's 
Handbook. Psychology Press, 2000. 
 (249)  Salinsky J. The Last Appointment: Psychotherapy in General Practice. East 
Sussex: The Book Guild, 1993. 
 (250)  Fahrenwald NL, Bassett SD, Tschetter L, Carson PP, White L, Winterboer VJ. 
Teaching Core Nursing Values. Journal of Professional Nursing 2001; 
21(1):46-51. 
 (251)  Rassin M. Values grading among nursing students - Differences between the 
ethnic groups. Nurse Education Today 2010; 30(5):458- 63. 
 (252)  May C, Gask L, Atkinson T, Ellis N, Mair F, Esmail A. Resisting and 
promoting new technologies in clinical practice: the case of telepsychiatry. 
Social Science and Medicine 2001; 52(12):1889-1901. 
 (253)  May C, Rapley T, Moreira T, Finch T, Heaven B. Technogovernance: 
Evidence, subjectivity, and the clinical encounter in primary care medicine. 
Social Science and Medicine 2006; 62(4):1022-1030. 
 (254)  Heath I, Hippisley-Cox J, Smeeth L. Measuring performance and missing the 
point? British Medical Journal 2007; 335(7629):1075-1076. 
 (255)  Fitzpatrick M. The tyranny of health. Londo: Routledge, 2001. 
 (256)  Maben J, Latter S, Clark JM. The sustainability of ideals, values and the 
nursing mandate: evidence from a longitudinal qualitative study. Nursing 




 (257)  Cresswell K, Sheikh A. The NHS Care Record Service (NHS CRS): 
recommendations from the literature on successful implementation and 
adoption. Informatics in Primary Care 2009; 17(3):153-160. 
 (258)  Sauer C, Willcocks L. Unreasonable expectations - NHS IT, Greek choruses 
and the games institutions play around mega-programmes. Journal of 
Information Technology 2007; 22:195-201. 
 (259)  Chaudhry B, Wang J, Wu S, Maglione M, Mojica W, Roth E et al. Systematic 
review: impact of health information technology on quality, efficiency, and 
costs of medical care. Annals of Internal Medicine 2006; 144(10):742-752. 
 (260)  Doolin B. Power and resistance in the impleentation of a medical 
management information system. Information Systems Journal 2004; 14:343-
362. 
 (261)  Kreps D, Richardson H. IS Success and Failure—The Problem of Scale. 
Political Quarterly 2007; 78(3):439-446. 
 (262)  Vogelsmeier AA, Halbesleben JRB, Scott-Cawiezell JR. Technology 
Implementation and Workarounds in the Nursing Home. Journal of the 
American Medical Informatics Association 2008; 15:114-119. 
 (263)  Koppel R, Wetterneck T, Telles JL, Karsh BT. Workarounds to Barcode 
Medication Administration Systems: Their Occurrences, Causes, and Threats 
to Patient Safety. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 
2008; 15(4):408-423. 
 (264)  Spear SJ, Schmidhofer M. Ambiguity and Workarounds as Contributors to 
Medical Error. Annals of Internal Medicine 2005; 142(8):627-630. 
 (265)  Collin S, Reeves BC, Hendy J, Fulop N, Hutchings A, Priedane E. 
Implementation of computerised physician order entry (CPOE) and picture 
archiving and communication systems (PACS) in the NHS: quantitative before 
and after study. British Medical Journal 2008; 337(2):939. 
 (266)  Eisenberg E. Karl Weick and the Aesthetics of Contingency. Organization 
Studies 2006; 27(11). 
 (267)  Eason K. User responses to electronic care record systems - A sociotechnical 
systems perspective. Presentation given at the University of Edinburgh, 
Department of General Practice on the 14/10.09. 2009.  
 
 (268)  Brock S. A balanced approach to IT project management: Proceedings of the 




scientists and information technologists on Enablement through technology, 
2003. 
 (269)  Dalcher D, Drevin L. Learning from information systems failures by using 
narrative and ante-narrative methods. ACM International Conference 
Proceeding Series 2003; 47. 
 (270)  Bendoly E, Speier C. Silver Bullet Junkies and the Codifiers That Love Them: 
Behavioral Roots Behind a Legacy of Bad Modeling and Use. Decision 
Sciences 2008; 39(2). 
 (271)  Klein K, Sorra J. The challenge of innovation implementation. Academy of 
Management Review 1996; 21(4):1055-1080. 
 (272)  Catwell L, Sheikh A. Information technology (IT) system users must be 
allowed to decide on the future direction of major national IT initiatives. But 
the task of redistributing power equally amongst stakeholders will not be an 
easy one. Informatics in Primary Care 2009; 17(1):1-4. 
 (273)  Webster A. Innovative Health Technologies and the Social: Redefining Health, 
Medicine and the Body. Current Sociology 2002; 50(3):443-457. 
 (274)  Patel N, Dittrich V. Deferred System's Design: Developing Context-Aware 
Information Systems for Dynamic Environments. European Conference on 
Information Systems, Gdansk, Poland. 2002.  
 
 (275)  Jakobs K, Procter R, Williams R. Standardisation and Implementation of 
Information Technology. 2001. Proceedings of the International Resource 
Management Association.  
 
 (276)  Stewart J, Williams R. The Wrong Trousers? Beyond the Design Fallacy: 
Social Learning and the User. In: Rohracher H, editor. User involvement in 
innovation processes. Strategies and limitations from a socio-technical 
perspective. Munich: Profil-Verlag, 2005. 
 (277)  Greenhalgh T, Macfarlane F, Maskrey N. Getting a better grip on research: the 
organizational dimension. InnovAiT 2010; 3(2):102-107. 
 (278)  Bates DW, Gawande AA. Improving Safety with Information Technology. 
New England Journal of Medicine 2003; 348(25):2526-2534. 
 (279)  Murphy MF, Staves J, Davies A, Fraser E, Parker R, Cripps B et al. How do 
we approach a major change program using the example of the development, 
evaluation, and implementation of an electronic transfusion management 




 (280)  Symon G, Long K, Ellis J. The coordination f work activities: cooperation 
and conflict in a hospital context. Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
1996; 5:1-31. 
 (281)  Østerlund C, Carlile P. Relations in Practice: Sorting Through Practice 
Theories on Knowledge Sharing in Complex Organizations. The Information 
Society 2005; 21(2):91-107. 
 (282)  Herbert I, deLusignan S. Further changes are needed if the National Care 
Record Service (NCRS) implementation is to succeed. Informatics in Primary 
Care 2009; 17(3):161-164. 
 (283)  Oakland J. Total Quality Management. London: Heinemann, 1989. 
 (284)  Mosse D. The Making and Marketing of Participatory Development. In: van 
Ufford PQ, Giri AK, editors. Moral Engagement and Interventions in 
Development: Contingencies and Beyond. London: Routledge, 2004. 
 (285)  Räisänen C, Linde A. Technologizing Discourse to Standardize Projects in 
Multi-Project Organizations: Hegemony by Consensus? Organization 2004; 
11(1):101-121. 
 (286)  Berwick DM. Improvement, trust, and the healthcare workforce. Quality and 
Safety in Health Care 2003; 12(suppl 1):i2-i6. 
 (287)  Chesbrough H. Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2003. 
 (288)  Finn R, Learmonth M, Reedy P. Some unintended effects of teamwork in 
healthcare. Social Science and Medicine 2010; 70(8):1148-1154. 
 (289)  Westbrook JI, Braithwaite J, Georgiou A, Ampt A, Creswick N, Coiera E et al. 
Multimethod Evaluation of Information and Communicat on Technologies in 
Health in the Context of Wicked Problems and Sociote hnical Theory. Journal 
of the American Medical Informatics Association 2011; 4(6):746-755. 
 (290)  Checkland P. Systems thinking, systems practice. Chichester: Wiley, 1981. 
 (291)  Computerworld UK. Health CIO says NHS IT scheme has been "value for 
money". Available from: http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/the-tony-collins-
blog/2010/09/health-cio-says-nhs-it-scheme-has-been-value-for-
money/index.htm. (Last accessed: 19/01/2011). 2011.  
 
 (292)  Committee of Public Accounts. The National Programme for IT in the NHS: 






 (293)  Hayes G. Independent Review of NHS and Social Care IT. 2009.  
 
 (294)  The King's Fund. Technology in the NHS - Transforming the patient's 
experience of care. 2008.  
 
 (295)  Dixon A, Ham C. Liberating the NHS: The right prescription in a cold climate? 
2010. The King's Fund, London.  
 
 (296)  Garside P. Are we suffering from change fatigue? Quality and Safety in Health 
Care 2004; 13(2):89-90. 
 (297)  BMA. BMA evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee Inquiry into 'A Surveillance Society'. 2008.  
 
 (298)  Royal College of General Practitioners. Informing shared clinical care Final 
(reference) report of the Shared Record Professional Guidance project. 2009.  
 
 (299)  British Computer Society. The Way Forward for NHS Health Informatics 
Where should NHS Connecting for Health (NHS CFH) go from here? 2006.  
 
 (300)  Department of Health. Health Informatics Review Report - Darzi Review. 
2008.  
 
 (301)  National Audit Office. The National Programme for IT in the NHS: Progress 
since 2006. 2008. Department of Health.  
 
 (302)  eHealth Insider. An independent sector perspective on healthcare IT. 2008.  
 
 (303)  Anderson R. Database State - A report commissioned by the Joseph Rowentree 
Reform Trust Ltd. 2009.  
 
 (304)  Keen J. Should the National Health Service have an information strategy? 
Public Administration 1994; 72(1):33-53. 
 (305)  Certification Commission for Health Information Technology Website. 
Available from: http://www.cchit.org/ (Last accessed 18.06.10). 2010.  
 
 (306)  The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. 
Department of Health and Human Services: 2010. Available from: 
http://healthit.hhs.gov (Last accessed 18.06.10). 2010.  
 
 (307)  The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. 
Department of Health and Human Services: 2010. Available from: 





 (308)  Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. Health 
Information Technology: Initial Set of standards, Implementation 
specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record 
Technology (Interim Final Rule). Department of Health and Human Services. 
Available from: http://www.scribd.com/doc/26297852/Health-Information-
Technology-Initial-Set-of-Standards-Implementation-Specifications-and-
Certification-Criteria (Last accessed: 18/06/10). 209.  
 
 (309)  Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. The 
ONC-Coordinated Federal Health IT Strategic Plan: 2008-2012. Department of 
Health and Human Services: 2008 Available from: 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/resources/HITStrategicPlan.pdf (Last accessed: 
18/06/10). 2010.  
 
 (310)  Australian Government. A national health and hospitals network for Australia's 
future. Delivering better health and better hospitals. Available at: 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/yourhealth/publishing.nsf/Content/report-
redbook/$File/HRT_report3.pdf. 2010.  
 
 (311)  Department of Health and Ageing. Building a 21st Century Primary Health 






 (312)  Department of Health and Ageing. Health Identifiers Service. 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/5137E02F0841
2623CA2575ED008386B8/$File/20100202%20HI%20SERVICE%20-
%20FAQs.pdf (Last accessed: 13/09/10). 2010.  
 
 (313)  Kaiser Permanente. Connected for Health: using electronic health records to 
transform care delivery. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010. 
 (314)  eHealth Insider. Lorenzo has just 174 'regular users'. Available from: 
http://www.ehi.co.uk/News/EHI/5341/lorenzo_has_just_174_%27regular_user
s%27. (Last accessed: 20/01/2011). 2009.  
 
 (315)  Coiera E. Four rules for the reinvention of health care. British Medical Journal 
2004; 328(7449):1197-1199. 
 (316)  Dennett D. Things about things. In: Branquiho J, editor. The foundations of 




 (317)  Braithwaite J, Runciman WB, Merry AF. Towards safer, better healthcare: 
harnessing the natural properties of complex sociote hnical systems. Quality 
amd Safety in Health Care 2009; 18(1):37-41. 
 (318)  Davis FD, Bagozzi RP, Warshaw PA. User acceptance of computer 
technology: a comparison of two theoretical models. Management Science 
1989; 35(8):982-1003. 
 (319)  Association for Information Systems. Qualitative Research in Information 
Systems. Available from: http://www.qual.auckland.ac.nz/ (Last accessed: 
15/09/10). 2010.  
 
 (320)  Howcroft D, Trauth E. Handbook of Critical Information Systems Research, 
Theory and Application. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward 
Elgar, 2005. 
 (321)  Doolin B. Information technology as disciplinary technology: being critical in 
interpretive research on information systems. Journal of Information 
Technology 1998; 13(4):301-311. 
 (322)  Bloomfield BP, Best A. Management consultants: systems development, power 
and the translation of problems. The Sociological Review 1992; 40(3):533-560. 
 (323)  Noam Chomsky's political views. Available from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noam_Chomsky%27s_political_views (Last 
accessed: 18/03/2011). 2011.  
 
 (324)  Michel Foucault. Available from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault (Last accessed: 18/03/2011). 
2011.  
 
 (325)  Heath I, Rubinstein A, Stange KC, Driel ML. Quality in primary health care: a 
multidimensional approach to complexity. British Medical Journal 2009; 
338(1):1242. 
 (326)  Thompson N. Theory and Practice in Health and Social Welfare. Buckingham: 
Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1995. 
 (327)  Silverman D. Qualitative Methodology and Sociology. Aldershot: Gower 
Publishing Company Limited, 1985. 
 (328)  Carroll L. Sylvie and Bruno Concluded. Lond: Macmillan, 1893. 
 (329)  Agar M. We Have Met the Other and We're All Nonlinear: Ethnography as a 




 (330)  Gabriel Y. Storytelling in Organizations, Facts, Fictions, and Fantasies. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 (331)  George A, Bennett A. Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences. Massachusetts. London, England: MIT Press Cambridge, 2005. 
 (332)  eHealth Insider. Granger secures commitment to fund NPfIT. Available from: 
http://www.ehi.co.uk/news/ehi/591 (Last accessed: 18/0 /2011). 2011.  
 
 (333)  Craig D. Plundering the Public Sector. How New Labour are letting 
consultants run off with £70 billion of our money. London: Constable, 2006. 
 (334)  Czarniawska-Joerges B, Wolff R. Leaders, Managers, Entrepreneurs on and off 
the Organizational Stage. Organization Studies 1991; 12(4):529-546. 
 (335)  eWeek Europe. Coordinated Cyber-Attack Could Create 'Perfect Storm'. 
Available from: http://www.eweekeurope.co.uk/news/coordinated-cyber-
attack-could-create-perfect-storm-18276. (Last accessed: 19/01/2011). 2011.  
 
 (336)  Chesbrough H. Business model innovation: it's not just about technology 
anymore. Strategy and Leadership 2007; 35(6):12-17. 
 (337)  Making IT Happen. Available from: 
http://elanhealth.co.uk/imm/PDF/npfit_overview.pdf. (Last accessed: 
19/01/2011). 2011.  
 
 (338)  MP's letter to Health CIO Christine Connelly in full. Available from: 
http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/the-tony-collins-blog/2011/01/mps-letter-






Acute Trust A Trust that provides secondary care 
services 
Adoption The process of starting to use a new 
technology either on an individual or a 
group level 
Accident and Emergency (A&E) 
 
Part of the hospital that provides initial care 
for patients with acute problems 
Ambulance Trust A Trust providing emergency services 
Approval to Proceed (ATP)   The formal approval to begin the go-live in 
the EA phase 
Authenticated¹ Confirmation following user 
authentification that the end user is actually 
the person he/she purports to be 
Bandwidth¹ An industry standard term to measure the 
amount of data that can be sent through a 
network or modem connection. The more 
bandwidth, the more information that can be 
transferred at one time. 
Benefits realisation The process of achieving benefits o  a 
particular project as detailed in the business 
case 
“Big-bang” implementation  The whole organisation moves to a new 
system at the same time 
Business case 
 
A document outlining the reasons for 




Initiating organisational change that affects 
the way the organisation operates 
Business Change Analyst Person charged with identifying 
organisational needs and ways of addressing 
them 
Business as usual 
 
A state the organisation achieves after 
implementing change that is characterised 
by enabling the organisation to function as 
was the case before the change 
“Bottom-up” change 
 
This is localised change that originates from 
local stakeholders rather than change 
initiated by management 
British Telecom (BT)  BT is the LSP for Cerner Millennium and 
also provides Spine and N3 functionality 
NHS Care Records Service (NHS CRS)
  
The EHR planned to be introduced as part of 




across care settings, consisting of the SCR 
(to be shared nationally) and the DCR (to be 
held locally) 
Case/Site An NHS institution in which was being 
implemented during my data collection. 
This refers to the Trust and may also include 
its immediate environment (e.g. 
management, implementation team 
members, other Trust staff including users 
of the technology), may have several sites 
(e.g. hospitals) within it 
Cerner Millennium 
 
EHR software produced by Cerner in the US 
and implemented through BT in the UK as 
part of the National Programme. It was 
originally an American billing system. 
Change management A managed approach to introducing change  
Choose and Book (C&B) ¹ One of NPfIT’s headline deliverables. An e-
booking system operating across the NHS to 
give patients more choice and control over 
hospital appointments. 
Clinical documentation (CDC) Documenting of care procedures, treatments 
and future plans. NHS CRS software 
allowed this to be done electronically 
through Clinical Documentation forms. 
Cluster 
 
A grouping – in the context of the National 
Programme, this refers to a geographical 
grouping of areas that implemented different 
types of EHR software. They include 
London, the South and the NME region of 
the country. The term was initially used by 
NHS CFH but later replaced by 
‘geographical region’.  
Coding 
 
The process of structuring information for 
statistical analysis purposes. This is often 
not visible to the end-user. 
Computerised (electronic) decision 
support systems (CDSS) ¹ 
Software applications that integrate patient 
data (input) with a knowledge-base and an 
inference mechanism to produce patient 
specific outputs in the form of care 
recommendations, assessments, alerts and 
reminders to actively support practitioners 
in clinical decision-making 
Computerised medical record¹  
 
This involves transferring paper documents 




through handwriting or transcription and is 
transferred into digital form with image 
scanning, optical character recognition 
scanning, or hybrid systems of these. 
Computerised patient record¹ 
 
A record, in electronic form, that is 
comprised of individual patient information 
that resides in a system capable of providing 
access to complete and accurate patient data, 
alerts, reminders, clinical decision support 
systems, links to medical knowledge, and 
other aids. 
Computerised physician order entry 
(CPOE)¹ 
 
Denotes the use of computers to enter, 
modify, review and output or communicate 
orders such as prescriptions, laboratory tests 
or radiological images, or referrals 
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC)¹ 
 
The LSP for the North West and West 
Midlands Cluster and North East and 
Eastern Clusters, delivering software 
developed by its main subcontractor iSOFT 
Continuity of care record¹ 
 
An evolving standard for a core (summary) 
electronic record that can be accessed by 
and added to by multiple health 
professionals caring for a patient, so as to 
support integrated and current care 
Customisation 
 
The ability of a user or organisation to tailor 
a system to their needs. 
Data cleansing 
 




Transfer of data between two systems e.g. 
from iPM to Lorenzo 
Data quality Refers the data’s fitness for purpose 
including completeness, validity, 
consistency, timeliness and accuracy. 
Department of Health (DH) A central governmental body managing the 




A minimum of 45 day deployment 
verification period throughout which the 
software, management and the impact on the 
organisation is assessed against a set of pre-
defined verification criteria (both technical 
and non-technical). This stage represents the 
transition of support from the project team 







Those that produce the software and as part 
of this write and manage the code including 
iSOFT (Lorenzo), CSE Healthcare (RiO) 
and Cerner (Millennium) 
Detailed care record (DCR)¹ All notes taken from a patient by healthcare 
professionals can be considered as the 
patient’s DCR. The degree to which this 
record is accessible by a healthcare 
professional depends on whether they are 
providing the patient with care, their role in 
the treatment given and the patient’s own 
wishes. 
Digital medical record¹ 
 
A less-known term that stands for a vision 
of web-based medical records 
Early Adopter (EA) 
 
Trusts that pilot Lorenzo in a clinical 
environment and work with the developers 
(iSOFT) and the LSP (CSC) to make it fit 




A relatively recent term for healthcare 
practice which is supported by electronic 
processes and communication. The term is 
inconsistently used: some would argue it is 
interchangeable with healthcare informatics, 
while others use it in the narrower sense of 
healthcare practice using the Internet. The 
term can encompass a range of services that 
are at the edge of medicine, healthcare and 
IT. 
Electronic discharge summary 
 
Electronic system that produces a hospital 
discharge summary that can be sent to other 
care settings 
Electronic health record (EHR) Also referred to as Electronic Patient 
Record. This is a compilation of patient 
information in digital format that can be 
shared between care settings. May also have 
additional functionality. 
Electronic medical record¹ 
 
An electronic healthcare information system 
regarding one patient 
Electronic patient record¹  The concept grew out of the computerised 
patient record concept and, for a while, was 
the main term used. Now, some consider 




patient record term; however, an increasing 
number of individuals state that the 
electronic patient record vision differs from 
the computerised patient record. 
Electronic prescription service (EPS) One of the NPfIT headline deliverables 
allowing electronic transfer of prescriptions 
from prescribers to dispensers 
Floorwalker A person with technical expertise supporting 
settings that have implemented new 
functionality by being present in the setting 
Foundation Trust 
 
Currently there are 129. These Trusts have 
increased responsibility and are accountable 
directly to the DH. 
Handhelds 
 
Portable devices with the capability to hold 
EHR software 
Healthcare professional Refers to clinical staff only such as doctors, 
nurses, allied health professions etc. 
Hospital information system¹ 
 
Integrated, computer-assisted systems 
designed to store, manipulate, and retrieve 
information concerned with the 
administrative and clinical aspects of 
providing medical services within the 
hospital. Used to store and retrieve patient 
information. This integrated computer-based 
system may include or be linked to 




The process of introducing a new system 
within an organisation (from planning 
through to routine use) 
Implementation team 
 
Those individuals within a Trust that 
manage the implementation of a new system 
locally 
Information technology (IT)¹ 
 
Defined by the Information Technology 
Association of America as “the study, 
design, development, implementation, 
support or management of computer-based 
information systems, particularly software 
applications and computer hardware.” 
Integrated clinical pathway (ICP) Used in different contexts with different 
meanings. From a technical perspective, in 
the context of the NHS CRS, it was used to 
refer to automated workflows along a 




clinical and administrative work. 
Interface¹ The connection between two devices; 
applies to both hardware and software. May 
also refer to what is visualised on a screen – 
what the user will see and use to interact 
with the software. 
Interim system/solution 
 
An electronic system with basic 
functionality designed to deliver some early 
benefits to Trusts but planned to be 




The existing organisational systems present 
on top of which a new system is introduced. 
This may include hardware or existing 
software systems. 
Integrated care record¹ 
 
A record that contains information from 
multiple providers of the patient’s care. 
Varies in how the information is integrated 
(e.g. centralised data storage versus linkage 
to federated data stores), how much 
information is integrated (detailed or 
summary), and the scope and providers of 
the information (e.g. an integrated diabetes 




A system’s ability to work along side each 
other in an integrated way 
iPM   The interim PAS supplied by CSC. This 
eventually gets replaced with the Lorenzo 
PAS. 
iSOFT The developer of Lorenzo, managed through 
CSC. 
Legacy system An old software system that is still used 
Role-based access 
 
Security of accessing EHRs in England is 
based on legitimate relationships. This 
means that only users who have legitimate 
relationships with particular patients have 
the authority to access their records. 
Local Service Provider (LSP) These hold contracts wi h NHS CFH and are 
responsible for delivering software solutions 
on the ground 
Longitudinal health record¹ Occasionally used to describe the EHR 
Lorenzo Regional Care 
 
EHR software produced by iSOFT and 




National Programme. It was intended to be 
an integrated system designed by the NHS. 
Mental health Trust A Trust that provides mental health services 
National Health Service (NHS)  The NHS in the UK was established in 1948 
with the aim to provide “free” national care 
for all. Funding is obtained from the 
taxpayer and managed by the DH. 
National Programme for IT (NPfIT)¹ 
 
Is responsible for procurement and delivery 
of the multi-billion pound investment in new 
information and technology systems in the 
NHS 
NHS Connecting for Health (NHS CFH)¹ 
 
Supported the NHS to deliver better, safer 
care to patients, via new computer systems 
and services, that link GPs and community 
services to hospitals 
Order communications 
 
Tool in Lorenzo that allows the electronic 
ordering of tests (e.g. from pathology) 
Patient administration system (PAS) 
 
A basic electronic system in a hospital that 




Tool in Lorenzo that allows the user to 
create and manage patient lists 
Personal demographics service (PDS) 
  
 
Holds demographic patient information and 
patients’ NHS number. It is a component of 
the Spine, which means that this information 
is planned to be shared nationally. 
Personal digital assistants (PDAs)¹ 
 
Handheld computers also known as pocket 
computers or palmtop computers 
Personal health record 
 
Recording of pertinent information 
concerning patient’s illness or illnesses 
Picture archiving and communications 
system (PACS)¹ 
 
One of NPfIT’s headline deliverables. A 
system capable of acquiring, transmitting, 
storing, retrieving, and displaying digital 
images and relevant patient data from 
various imaging sources.  
Pilot 
 
A small-scale preliminary test to see if 
something works, before rolling it out on a 
larger scale 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) A Trust that provides primary care services 
Process mapping 
 
Analysis and outline (typically in a flow 
chart) of a business process resulting in a 
visual concept of the steps involved to 
accomplish a particular task 




 clinical and non-clinical activity 
Product Specialist 
 
Those with intimate knowledge of the 
product (e.g. software) 
Project Initiation Document (PID) 
 
A written plan of an organisational project. 
Typically follows a structured format 
outlining present and future states, 
anticipated benefits, anticipated resources 
and an approximate timeline. 
Requests and results (R&R)  
 
Functionality that allows electronic requests 
and receiving of results in hospitals. 
Typically these include radiology, 
endoscopy and pathology. 
Roll-out¹ 
 
The period and activities of progressively 
going live with the software system (i.e. 
switching it on) in each geographical cluster 
starting with the EAs 
Secondary uses (service) 
 
Collection of data held in EHRs on a 
national level and use of this data for 
reporting of national trends and statistical 
analysis 
SmartCard An identity authentication chip card that is 
inserted into a piece of hardware so that the 
user is able to see relevant parts of the 
record 
Soft-landing Deploying systems on a small scale, running 
the clinical process in parallel with existing 
systems and paper initially 
Software build Different versions of the software a
released by the developer. These typically 
present an improvement on the previous 
version. 
Software fixes Minor changes are made to the solution by 




Different components of the software with 
increasing capabilities. These are designed 
to be implemented sequentially in order to 
promote stepwise change. 
Spine¹ 
 
The name given to the national database of 
key information about a patient’s health and 
care and forms the core of the NHS CRS. It 
will include patient information like NHS 
number, date of birth, name and address, 




adverse drug reactions and major treatments. 
Standardisation Complying with a certain standard (i.e.
software requirements necessary for 
achieving interoperability between systems) 
Strategic Health Authority (SHA) 
  
 
At a local level the English NHS is managed 
through 10 SHAs, whose responsibility it is 
to ensure that national plans are 
implemented locally and that local needs are 
reflected in policy developments. 
Summary care record (SCR)¹ 
 
A key element of the NHS CRS. The GP 
summary will be the main or only active 
part of the SCR. Over time, a SCR will be 
built up from selected information in a 
patient’s DCR. The SCR can be seen by 
authorised healthcare professionals treating 




Software typically performs better after an 
upgrade than it did before an upgrade 
Task management functionality 
 
Tool in Lorenzo that helps the user to 




This is hierarchically imposed change 
initiated by management 
Trust A semi-autonomous public sector 
organisation providing services for the NHS 
within a certain geographical area. It can 




A committee in a Trust that has decision-
making powers 
Trust staff  
 
Refers to all Trust staff including IT, 
administrative, and all other staff. It also 
includes healthcare staff 
Virtual private network¹ 
 
A communications network connecting 
different systems 
‘Workaround’ Behaviour employed by users to overcome a 
perceived limitation in a technical system 
Workflow 
 
A chain of steps/activities involved to 
accomplish a particular task 






Appendix 1: Detailed search histories from the lite rature review 
 
Search history Medline 
# Searches Results 
1 *Medical Records Systems, Computerized/og [Organization & 
Administration] 
1621 
2 *Hospital Information Systems/og [Organization & Administration] 1570 
3 "Electronic Health Record".mp. 517 
4 "Electronic patient record".mp. 479 
5 "Computerised medical record".mp. 11 
6 "Computerized medical record".mp. 185 
7 "Electronic medical record".mp. 1143 
8 "Computer-based medical record".mp. 45 
9 "Digital medical record".mp. 3 
10 "Integrated care record".mp. 0 
11 "Longitudinal health record".mp. 5 
12 "Continuity of care record".mp. 11 
13 "Personal health record".mp. 85 
14 Implementation.mp. 59625 
15 *"Diffusion of Innovation"/ 4195 
16 Initiation.mp. 118776 
17 Adoption.mp. 15871 
18 Adaptation.mp. 157470 
19 Acceptance.mp. 48292 
20 Routinisation.mp. 6 
21 Routinization.mp. 86 
22 Infusion.mp. 159378 
23 6 or 11 or 3 or 7 or 9 or 12 or 2 or 8 or 1 or 4 or 13 or 10 or 5 5144 
24 21 or 17 or 20 or 15 or 14 or 22 or 18 or 16 or 19 550454 
25 24 and 23 1036 
 
Search history Embase 
# Searches Results 
1 *Electronic Medical Record/ 1268 
2 *Medical Information System/ 2756 
3 *Hospital Information System/ 391 
4 "Electronic Health Record".mp. 270 
5 "Electronic patient record".mp. 271 
6 "Computerised medical record".mp. 10 




8 "Computer-based medical record".mp. 21 
9 "Digital medical record".mp. 3 
10 "Integrated care record".mp. 1 
11 "Longitudinal health record".mp. 2 
12 "Continuity of care record".mp. 2 
13 "Personal health record".mp. 52 
14 Implementation.mp. 46254 
15 Diffusion.mp. 75970 
16 Initiation.mp. 111929 
17 Adoption.mp. 11187 
18 Adaptation.mp. 69096 
19 Acceptance.mp. 23475 
20 Routinisation.mp. 3 
21 Routinization.mp. 55 
22 Infusion.mp. 154943 
23 6 or 11 or 3 or 7 or 9 or 12 or 2 or 8 or 1 or 4 or 13 or 10 or 5 4714 
24 21 or 17 or 20 or 15 or 14 or 22 or 18 or 16 or 19 481800 






Appendix 2: Summary of papers included in the liter ature review 
 
Author Year Setting Design Findings Quality 
considerations18 
Adler 2007 Primary care 
(US paper) 




what he calls the 
“three T’s” – team, 
tactics and 
technology 




paper may be 
applicable to UK  
Dagroso et al 2007 US secondary 
care 
Reflections on the implementation of an 
obstetrics system, conclude with a range 
of recommendations for successful 
implementation 










paper may be 
applicable to UK  
Dave 2004 General (US 
paper) 
Discussion paper Barriers to EHR 
adoption: people do 
not like change 
Difficult to judge 
quality as 
discussion paper, 
                                                
18 Please note that this contains an indication of the quality considerations of studies that constitute original research. The others were reflections of 













paper records is 
difficult 
although US 
paper may be 
applicable to UK  
Delany 2004 New Zealand 
secondary care 
Reflections on EHR implementation Identifies factors 




commitment to the 
introduction of the 






change needs to be 
incremental 







Zealand this may 
be applicable to 
UK  
De Mul et al 2004 Dutch 
intensive care 
unit system 
















paper may be 




took more than 
double the time 
than originally 
planned, user input 
and extensive 
testing, training, 








practices before the 
system was 
introduced and a 
recognition that 
these vary across 
individuals and 
wards, only then 
can the system be 





























paper may be 
applicable to UK  
Fenton et al 2006 General (US 
paper) 
Summary of issues critical for EHR 











paper may be 
applicable to UK  
Granlien et al 2008 Danish 
hospitals 
Reflect on the implementation of an 
EHR 
Outline barriers to 
adoption: even 
managers seem to 
be unclear what 
exactly barriers to 
use are, systems 
were reported to be 
slow and not very 
user-friendly, lack 
of support and 
training identified 
amongst users 






paper may be 
applicable to UK  
Hendy et al 2005 UK, focus on 
NHS CRS 
Interviews with secondary care 
managers and clinicians about barriers to 







implement the NPfIT from merging, 
concern about lack 
of communication 
of goals of the 
NPfIT, financial 
and staffing 
resources were a 
major concern, fear 
the loss of existing 
IT systems, lack of 
tangible benefits for 
staff on the ground, 
concerns about 
timelines set by 








first phase of a 
longitudinal 
study but no 
follow-up data 
reported 
Jones 2005 EHRs in UK 
acute hospitals 
Reflections on the introduction of EHRs 
and outline of lessons learned 
Lack of 
dissemination and 
sharing of lessons 
learned over the 
years, secondary 
care lagging behind 
primary care, IT 
investments in 
hospitals are 
















technical factors are 
only a small part of 
successful 
implementation, 
need more realistic 
targets for people to 
regain belief in the 
Programme, need 





2007 General (US 
paper) 
Discussion paper outlining barriers to 
EHR use 
Initial cost of the 
system, difficulties 
importing existing 








paper may be 










n in German 
hospital 
Develop a sociotechnical model ("Fit 
between Individuals, Task and 
Technology") that can be used to analyse 
adoption of technology in clinical 
settings, re-analyse three case studies 
with this model 
Outline 
interventions that 
can facilitate fit: 
users/individuals 





(changes to the 
technology itself), 
task/organisational 
This is a 
retrospective 













Austin et al  2000 Healthcare IT 
implementatio
ns in US 
Analyses of successful management 
activities across several organisations 
Careful planning 
(this needs to be 
regularly updated 
and in line with the 
overall business 
strategy of the 
organisation), user 
focus (active 
involvement in all 
parts of the 
implementation 
process by different 




competent staff to 
manage the 
introduction of the 
system, integration 
of the system 
(develop standards 
for interfacing and 
integration), 





















on a Likert scale, 











teams need to 
include individuals 







2008 Primary care 
EHR 
implementatio
ns in US and 
UK 
Describe a model developed from 






recognition of the 











(does not state 
numbers) in 






Zephir et al 




ists in France 
Analyse and model anaesthetists’ work 
practices with the help of observations 
and interviews before the EHR was 
introduced, they use the findings of this 
to make recommendations of how the 
technology needs to support work 
practices, 
authors then apply the recommendations 
to an existing anaesthesiology system 
Detailed analysis of 
existing work 
practices can be 
used to adapt 
systems, improve 
usability and lead to 
increased adoption, 
only if systems 
support user activity 
will they be readily 
Interviews, video 
and audio 
recording of 13 
anaesthesiologist
s in 50 
consultations 















notes, may be 
applicable to UK 
context 
Bates et al 2003 EHRs in US 
primary care 





initial cost and time 
it takes to obtain 
visible benefits, 
variability in 
vendors and lack of 
shared standards 









paper may be 
applicable to UK 
Bossen 2007 Describes pilot 
implementatio
n of electronic 
medication 
Case study, data on adoption collected 
through observations and interviews 












plan (part of a 
national EHR 
implementatio




difficult to integrate 
use of the system 







users were involved 



















and six nurses 
after the pilot, 
may be 
applicable to UK 
Callen et al  2008 Describes the 
contextual 
implementatio





Observations and interviews with key 
stakeholders in Australian teaching 
hospitals that had implemented a 






























considered together wards) over a 
period of two 
years, may be 
applicable to UK 
Aarts et al 2004 CPOE 
implementatio
n in a Dutch 
hospital 
Describe in-depth qualitative study of a 
CPOE implementation in a Dutch 










does not follow a 
pre-determined 
plan, notion of 
success and failure 
as being relative to 
the degree of “fit” 
between the 









team and users, 






















applicable to UK 
Ash et al 2003 CPOE 
implementatio
n (US study) 
Developed principles to guide CPOE 
implementation with the help of an 
expert consensus study combined with 
interviews and observations in four 
successful CPOE implementation sites 
12 principles along 





















interviews in the 
four sites, no 
indication of 
numbers, may be 
applicable to UK 
Clemmer 2004 EHR adoption 
in Intensive 
Care Unit (US 
paper) 
Discussion paper on EHR adoption Systems often 
viewed as too slow 





need to meet user 
needs, cultural 




paper may be 









have been with 
systems that are 
created “in house” 
and those where 
there is a close 
relationship with 
suppliers 
Crosson et al 2005 Describes 
implementatio
n of an EHR in 
a general 
practice in the 
US 
Case study, data collected through 
combination of interviews with 





amongst staff in 
relation to the 
perceived 
usefulness of the 
system, lack of 
goals, lack of 
communication 
between practice 
staff which led to 
not using the 
system to its full 
potential and slower 
work practices, lack 
of collaborative 
approach and 

























lack of involvement 
of team in decision 
making (“top-
down”), lack of 
effective training 
returned one 
year later but it 













2007 General (US 
paper) 
Describe a framework of factors 
influencing diffusion of IT in US 
healthcare 
Recommend where 
to focus research 
efforts: real benefits 
can only be realised 





systems: for an 
innovation to spread 
quickly it may have 
to be supported by a 
national strategy, 
immediate benefits 
are often not visible 
to users, leadership 
and incentives are 




paper may be 






systems are often 
not used or not used 
to full potential, 
facilitators for use 
can include the 
influence of 
respected peers, 
technology needs to 
be adapted to the 
context of use 







2006 US healthcare Review of IT implementation in US 
healthcare 
IT implementation 
in healthcare needs 













paper may be 
applicable to UK 
Goroll et al 2009 US primary 
care 
Describes the efforts of the 
Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative to 










work towards a state-wide EHR 
Included representatives from 
government, patients, hospitals, 
industry, and professional organisations 
Three communities were chosen as early 
implementers  







Barriers to adoption 




















paper may be 
applicable to UK 




ns in the US 
Data collected through interviews and 
focus groups with key stakeholders 
 























approach with all 
stakeholders 
working together is 
most effective 
interviews/focus 




paper may be 
applicable to UK 
Erdley et al 2003 IT in US 
prenatal care 
Reflections on the introduction of IT 
system in US prenatal care, users were 
nurses 
Notion of “social 
informatics” – if 




needs to pay 
attention to the 
context of use and 




User involvement in 
design can close the 
“design reality 
gap”, close and 
Difficult to judge 
quality as 

















2008 Looked at 
introduction of 
SCR (in UK 
primary care) 
Case study of four EA sites, 
combination of 
interviews/observations/surveys/docume




change model needs 
to be appropriate 
(doubt that NHS 
CFH’s one is as it is 
“top-down” and 
may not leave 






efficient), a degree 
of autonomy for 
users, skilled staff, 
good training 
(especially hands-
on and one-to-one), 
new routines as a 
result of introducing 
the technology need 


















1500 hours of 
observation, 









and roles of users, 
efficient sharing of 
information 


























Report findings from an IT Working 
Group conference 2002 
Need to pay more 
attention to social 
factors: 
interoperability 
means that systems 
have to a certain 
degree to be 
standardised but 
standardised 
systems often do 




need to facilitate 
communication, 
designers need to 
design systems that 












technology needs to 
work for a variety 
of users with 
different needs, 
implementation 




of working and 
communication), 
system needs to be 
flexible by tailoring 
design/communicati
on to a specific 
activity rather than 





James et al 2007 General (US 
paper) 
Report on successful implementation of 





team worked with 
the users to plan for 
changes in work 
practices that would 
Difficult to judge 
quality as 
reflections on IT 
implementations, 
may be 




come with the 
introduction of the 
system, aligned 
organisational and 
project goals, used 
both formal and 
informal leaders in 
decision making, 
developed a process 
to capture progress, 
addressed gaps in 
knowledge and 
understanding 
among users, IT 
team aimed at 
understanding the 
clinical context of 
use, collaborative 









of success with both 
quantitative and 
qualitative means 






an old EHR system in the Netherlands 
through standardised questionnaires 
given to clinicians 
is influenced to a 









and after its 
redesign, 
questionnaires 








usability issues  
 
May be 
applicable to UK 
Johnson and 
Turley 
2006 US healthcare Study in US to explore how cognitive 
needs of clinicians and nurses differ and 
how this should inform the design of an 
EHRs, cognitive task analysis (where 
participants had to look at different cases 
on the EHR and were instructed to think 
aloud) 
Nurses tended to 
view the patient in 
observational terms 




clinicians tended to 
view the patient in 
causal terms (e.g. in 
Purposeful 




asked to think 
out loud when 
interpreting 
medical cases 










models, IT design 










cases for a total 
of 96 case 
reviews, given 
one training case 
and two 
gastrointestinal 




Narrow focus as 











Interviews with healthcare staff 
(administrative, clinical and project 
team) in Finish hospital 
“Technological 
frames” across user 
groups seem to be 
relatively similar 
with some minor 
differences, each 
user has his/her 
own perspective of 
the system in the 













own work, these 
frames develop over 
time and should be 





2005 UK primary 
care 
Questionnaire examining IT use Barriers to 
implementation and 
adoption were: cost, 
lack of training time 
and technical 
support, attitudes of 
colleagues, view 
that systems do not 
easily integrate with 
secondary care and 
other practices, lack 
of support from the 
PCT, concerns 
about impact on 




concerns and lack 





sent to a random 
sample of GPs 
across all 32 
PCTs in London, 
conducted a non-
response follow-
up of 40 non-
responding 











may fail to 
capture full 





Kelly 1999 US perinatal 
computerised 
patient records 
Advice for organisations on how to 
select/introduce an IT system 
Barrier to 
implementation is 
lack of universally 
agreed standards 
and lack of 
interfacing, 
acceptance can be 
facilitated by the 
system meeting 
users’ needs, 
training needs to 




champions, need to 
listen to concerns 
and incorporate 
users’ suggestions 
for improvement to 
facilitate ownership, 
goals need to be 
reasonable and 
deadlines adhered 
to, can run paper 
and computer 
parallel initially to 
allow staff to get 
used to new system, 
staff need to 





paper may be 





benefits the new 
system is likely to 
bring 
Tonnesen et al 1999 US primary 
and secondary 
care 
Emerging issues and lessons learned 
from an EHR implementation 
Software did not 
perform to expected 
standards, 
organisation was 
dependent on the 




should not be 
underestimated, 
clinical input was 
crucial but as 
clinicians were busy 
difficult to obtain, 
IT support and 
training important, 
system needs to be 
tailored to 
individual needs, 
user frustration due 
to technical 
problems, users 
need to be clear 
about the value of 
the system to them 
and the organisation 






paper may be 




as a whole, users 
were concerned 
about privacy and 
security  
Rose et al 2005 EHR in US 
primary care 
Qualitative study to inform the usability 
of an EHR, combination of task analysis 
and focus groups with clinicians and 
some nurses, formative and summative 
Users found the 
EHR difficult to use 
and navigation was 
too complicated and 
not in line with 
existing workflows, 
felt that EHR access 
needed to be 
quicker, problems 
resulted in feelings 
of frustration, users 
had developed 
‘workarounds’ that 
were in some 
instances stated to 
have adverse effects 
on patient safety 
 
Five physicians 
and two nurses 
were observed 
individually 
in their clinical 
workplace using 
the system for 30 




to think aloud), 








applicable to UK 
Snyder et al 2006 CPOE system 
in three US 
hospitals 
Investigated environmental factors that 
influenced evaluation of a CPOE system 
in three US hospitals, interviewed 
research team members as to what 
contextual factors impacted on study 
Factors identified 
by interviewees:  
implementation of 
the system and 
associated timelines 
and processes were 
Parallel to this 
qualitative study 








did not follow pre-
determined patterns, 
changes in work 
practices of users, 
differences in the 
organisational 
context of the 
hospital itself or 
















they were also 
planning to 
assess the impact 
of the system on 
medication 
errors pre- and 
post-
implementation, 
these results are 




five members of 











one hour and 
were conducted 







applicable to UK 
but close focus 
on evaluation as 
opposed to 
implementation 
Sprague 2004 General (US 
paper) 
Discussion paper on EHR 
implementation 
Barriers to adoption 
of EHRs: initial 
cost of the system, 




concerns (EHRs are 
still immature and 
constantly 
developing, supplier 








experiences of IT 
implementation, 
technology cannot 
prevent error – 
garbage in garbage 





paper may be 




out, failure if 
technology and 
workflows do not 
align), legal issues 




Townes et al 2000 US ambulatory 
care 
Case study of EHR implementation in 
US ambulatory care 
Everyone needs to 
have a clear 
understanding of 
what the expected 
benefits of 











from support staff, 
need to be clear that 
implementation will 
involve learning, 
should try to limit 
free text entry and 
maximise 






paper may be 









on site for support, 
training needs to be 
thorough and 
should try to allow 





Meijden et al 
2001 EHR in Dutch 
teaching 
hospital 
Investigated attitudes of future users of 
an EHR for stroke patients before it was 
implemented in a teaching hospital 
through a combination of questionnaires 







with paper records 
but some problems 
identified, all 
thought that EHR 
would improve the 
cited negative 
aspects of paper 
records, 
inexperienced users 
more positive than 
experienced 
participants 






















reliability were high 
on participants’ list 
No expectations of 
any negative effects 
of introduction of 
system, cited many 
positive 
expectations of new 
system including 
legibility and more 
efficient data entry 
Did anticipate new 
system to have 
large impact on 
communication and 
reporting 
Did not expect that 
work practices and 
patient care would 
change significantly 









was sent to 65 






and 42 nurses) 
 
Three months 





were held with 
two residents, 
four 




nurse and the IT 




















Developed a framework based on review 
of qualitative implementation literature, 
followed principles of systematic 
review, 125 included articles 
People/processes 
and technology are 
involved in 
implementation, 






implementation is a 
dynamic and 
evolving learning 
















January 1985 to 
May 2006 











articles from a 




implementation Over 50 of these 
passed the 
inclusion/exclusi
on criteria and 







UK, based on 
qualitative 
studies only 





Qualitative study examining how 
adoption of an ambulatory EHR can be 
facilitated through integration of the 
system into clinical work practices 
Interviews with implementation leaders, 
suppliers and users 
Adoption is difficult 
to measure, lack of 
agreed definition of 
what EHRs are 
Understanding how 
the system fits in 
with existing work 








eight sites  
Visits lasted 
between two and 







applicable to UK 





n in two 
Norwegian 
hospitals 
physicians) looking at changes in 
workflow following EHR introduction in 




There is still a risk 
of unintended 
consequences, the 
success of the 
implementations 
was due to attention 
to local contexts 




users need to be 
committed to 












need to understand 
the need for and 





25 and 45 
minutes, topic 






























Lorenzi et al 2004 EHR 
implementatio




Describe an EHR implementation 
“success factor profile” based on 
experiences of EHR implementation in a 







extend to which 
locally developed 
processes can be 











team) Likelihood of 
success 
Realistic 
expectations need to 
be balanced with 
vision 






paper may be 
applicable to UK 
Walker 2006 Canadian 
hospital 
Case study discussing the introduction 
of a documentation system 
Strong nursing 
leadership was a 
critical success 
factor, training, 













ownership of the 
new system by 







successful as they 






resources initially to 
support the 
implementation and 
give nurses the 
opportunity to get 
used to the system 






applicable to UK 













device, PDA not 
integrated with the 
hospital EHR, non 




repair), devices too 
delicate (fear of 
breaking), security 
and speed, technical 
issues, negative 
patient perception 





needed but not 
available in the 
device, preference 

















to PDAs only 
 
May be 




paper, lack of 
established need to 








Canadian review of EHR adoption in 
primary care looking at articles from a 
range of countries with a view to 








important that the 
new system fits in 
with existing 
organisational goals 
and practices  
 
Barriers were 
identified to be: 
perceived negative 





























3700 article titles 
and 86 articles 




work, may be 









Mannan et al 2006 Primary care 
staff in 
England 
Interviews and observations of primary 
care staff in England in relation to 
eHealth initiatives, interviews to explore 






that technology has 
the potential to 
improve care, some 
concerns e.g. 
regarding data loss 
 
Concerns that the 
introduction of 
technology will 
adversely impact on 
work practices and 
workload, felt that 
training was crucial 
 
Felt that cost of the 
Programme may be 
a barrier to 
implementation, felt 
they needed more 
information on 
NHS CFH, felt that 




IT staff used to 





A doctor, nurse, 
practice manager 
and receptionist 






by 30 minutes 
observations of 







come as the old 
generation of users 
would retire and the 
younger generation 




2008 General (US 
paper) 
Discussion paper on EHR adoption Formative 
evaluation activities 






period are crucial 




can reduce the risk 
of failure as 
problems are 
identified early 




paper may be 
applicable to UK 
Miranda et al  2001 Nursing IT 
system in US 
secondary care 
Describe implementation of a Nursing 
IT system in US secondary care 
Lessons learned: 





if possible achieve 
consensus and 






paper may be 




address concerns as 
early as possible 
Realistic 
expectations – 
otherwise there will 





can result in 
frustration, 
acknowledge that 







better as changes 
are incremental and 
it is easier for users 
to get used to them 
Work practices 
need to be 
redesigned and not 









changes need to be 
incorporated 
Project leader needs 
to have excellent 
communication and 
team leading skills 
Moen 2003 General 
(Norwegian 
paper) 
Describes EHR implementations from a 
nursing perspective 
Nurses handle large 
amounts of 
information and 
present a large 
group of EHR 




system design so 
that the system can 
meet nursing needs 
in terms of context 
and individual work 
practices 
Nursing leadership 
is important when 
implementing an 
EHR, this should 
begin with input in 
system design and 
continue throughout 
implementation 










Morrison et al  2008 Intensive care 
EHR in the 
UK 
Investigated impact of intensive care 
EHR on multi-disciplinary healthcare 
team with a qualitative study consisting 
of interviews, observations and video 
tapes of ward rounds  
Found that group 
formation during 
the ward round and 
communication and 
interaction patterns 
changed with the 
introduction of the 
EHR, Findings 
from the study were 










at three time 
points during the 
observation 
period over 13 
months: prior to 
deployment of 
the EHR, four 
months after, and 
one year after 
deployment 
 








discussed in the 
implementation 








present were also 
carried out at the 





Nagle 2007 EHR use in 
Canada 
Reports on a Canadian government 
imitative to promote EHR use and to 
promote healthcare professional 
engagement, conducted focus groups 
with nurses/physicians/pharmacists 
Nurses stated that: 
there was a lack of 
engagement 
activities, usability 
issues and systems 
not aligned with 
needs, lack of 
educational focus, 
privacy concerns, 
other priorities for 
money allocated to 
EHR initiatives, the 
need to promote an 
understanding of 
the value of EHRs 
amongst nurses 
 




different groups of 
There is no 
information on 
the actual 














networks with a 
view to discuss 
lessons learned, the 
development of 




Nikula 2001 EHR 
implementatio
n in two 
Swedish 
hospitals 
Qualitative study at two Swedish 
hospitals with EHRs, interviews with 























Lack of methods 
 
May be 




future seems to be 
mainly present in 
managers and not 
clinicians, authors 
argue that vision 




Clinicians had little 
involvement in the 
implementation 
process 
Ovretveit et al 2007 EHR 
implementatio
n in a Swedish 
teaching 
hospital  
Interviews with doctors, nurses, 
managers and documentary analysis, 





may be facilitated 
by: involvement of 
users in system 
selection, 


























heads of clinics, 
one instructor, 












system to some 
extend (but still 






New system needs 
to meet different 
user needs and 
increase 
productivity and 
quality of care, 
needs to be 
supported by staff 
and in line with 
organisational 
goals, needs to have 
more advantages 
than disadvantages, 
need adequate time 
and resources for 
doctors and one 
secretary), half 













There are no 
detailed methods 










Pagliari 2005 General (UK 
paper) 
Recommendations for successful 
implementation of NPfIT drawing on the 
evaluation of the implementation of the 
Scottish Electronic Clinical 
Communications Implementation 
Programme 
Author argues that 
it is in the very 
nature of IT 
programmes that 
they take longer and 
cost more than 
anticipated, 










































feedback as well as 
openness about 
processes is needed, 
politics/non-
sufficient planning 





Pare 2002 Three IT 






system and an 
electronic 
patient 
Case study of the introduction of three 
IT systems in hospital, interviews with 
users and implementation teams, 
supplemented by observations and 
collection of documents 
All cases had a 
vision and a desired 
end-state, activities 
were carried out to 
achieve this state 
 
Goals are more 
likely to be 
achieved if actors 








users over a 







motivated: this was 
addressed by 
utilising training 
that was tailored to 
user needs, user 
opinions were 
incorporated, lack 
of motivation can 
be a barrier to 
implementation, 
implementation 
team needs to be 
competent  
 




context can either 
facilitate or inhibit 
implementation and 
functioning of the 
















































Large number of 
interviews, no 
detailed methods 






applicable to UK 
Pare et al 2008 IT 
implementatio
n in Canada 
Literature review and Delphi study with 
project managers in Canada examining 
the risks of IT implementation in 
healthcare 
From literature 
review the authors 
identified the 
following 
dimensions of risk 
factors: technology 









In addition, the 
panel identified 
another two risk 
factors: attitudes of 
Ranking-type 
Delphi survey 
over a three 







session to get as 
many risk factors 
as possible, the 
resulting list was 
circulated to all 
participants and 
they were asked 






team members and 
external factors 
such as policy 
changes 
 
Panel ranked lack 
of project champion 




factors tended to be 
ranked at the 
bottom of the list 
importance on a 
seven point 







applicable to UK 
Pendergast and 
Buchda 
2003 Nursing EHR 
implementatio
n in US 
hospital 
Descriptive case study of the opening of 
a new US hospital, this included a 
nursing EHR implementation, focus 
groups with patients and nurses 
Lessons learned: 
flow diagrams are 









need to note down 
all assumptions, a 
clear vision is 
crucial, micro-
managing will not 






paper may be 
applicable to 
UK, despite 
stating that they 
have done 
interviews and 
focus groups the 






work and people 
need to be 
empowered, need to 
understand 




Puffer et al  2007 Implementatio
n of EHR in 
US hospital 
Observations and interviews with 
physicians to improve acceptance of 
EHR amongst healthcare staff and 
improve integration of EHR into work 
practices to better meet user needs 
Themes identified: 
training, existing 
work practices need 
to be changed to 
accommodate the 
new system, should 




if information was 
easily viewed with 
a minimum number 
of screens, 
participants felt that 
integration of 
systems could make 






Two phases (one 
focusing on 
outpatients and 



























and areas for 
improvement (e.g. 
training and design) 
throughout 
implementation 
validate and rank 
the results,  
formative 
evaluation 




applicable to UK 
Quinzio et al 2003 Anaesthesia 
information 
management 
System in a 
German 
hospital 
Survey about user acceptance of an 
anaesthesia information management 
system in a German hospital after the 
system had been used for a period of 
five years 
Users were satisfied 
with system and felt 
that it was better 
than paper  
 




were more satisfied 
with and more 
accepting of the 
new system 
Some users stated 
that the positioning 
of computers had an 
impact on the 
consultation  




A 75 item 
questionnaire 
(five-point Likert 
scale items) was 
returned by 44 
anaesthesiologist
s and 24 
















Van Ginneken 2002 General 
(Dutch paper) 
Discussion paper: in relation to EHR 
implementation one needs to consider 
the alignment of relative efforts and 
benefits, efforts will only be invested if 
resulting benefits are motivation enough 
Important that the 
relationship of 
benefits and efforts 
is relatively equal 
for all stakeholders  
Interfaces and 
design of the 
system are crucial 
factors for 
facilitating adoption 
Parallel paper and 
electronic systems 
should not be used 
as this compromises 
the potential 
benefits of both and 
introduces extra 
workload for staff 
Data entry is 
challenging as it 
involves most time 
and has effect on 
relationship with 
patient 
System needs to be 
flexible enough to 




context may be 










important to track 
progress and sustain 
commitment  
Need collaboration 






important and needs 
to be supported by 
organisation 
User involvement in 
decision making  
Vishwanath 
and Scamurra 
2007 General (US 
paper) 
Developed a model of EHR adoption 
barriers based on quantitative evidence, 
started with brainstorming of barriers 
which were then rated by physicians and 








most attention in 
literature but 














this category is 
much broader than 
initially thought 
Argue that not one 
single barrier is 
responsible for 
failure but often a 
combination of 
many, therefore 









are secondary to 
cost and technology 
issues 





asked to perform 
a rating exercise 
 
Then another 







such as security 
officers, network 







applicable to UK 
Saigh et al 2006 EHR in US 
hospital 
Case study of failed implementation of 
electronic pain assessment as part of an 
EHR in US hospital, survey of 
healthcare staff (six months before and 
six months after the introduction of the 
System use was 
mandatory, no 
training received, 
lack of awareness 
that it would be 
Cross-sectional 







system), chart review and observations introduced 
Almost half of the 
users viewed the 
system as difficult 
to use and the 
majority believed it 
did not result in 
changes to practice 
or improvements of 
care 
Users did not like 
the interface, took 
too long to enter 
data 
Conclude that 
users’ needs need to 
be evaluated before 



















sent to all staff, 




applicable to UK 
Scott et al 2005 EHR 
introduction in 
US 
Interviews with primary and secondary 
care clinicians and managers in US just 





unhappy with the 
choice of the new 
system (cost, lack 







nine project team 







current EHR system 
were influencing 
attitudes to new 
system 
Participants felt that 
feedback was not 
sought by 
management which 




leadership is needed 
for implementation 
Some resistance to 
system emerged and 
resulted in change 








Sicotte et al 2006 IT 
implementatio
n in Canada 
Developed a model that identifies risk 
factors to successful implementation of 
“interorganisational clinical information 
systems” and applied this to two 
longitudinal case studies (over 2-3 





existence of the 
following risk 














studies on the 
basis of this (one 
over a two year 






In one case study 
use of the system 
was relatively high, 
whilst in the other 
use was relatively 
low, authors 
analyse the results 
in light of each of 
the risk factors 
period) 
 
In both cases 
semi-structured 
interviews 
were carried out 
with users and 
project team 
members (a total 





attitudes to the 
new system were 
administered 




with the help of 
the log history of 
the systems, 
observations of 















applicable to UK 








Descriptive case study of 
implementation planning of US 
secondary care clinical IT systems 
Important factors:  
Need to focus 
efforts on user 
involvement and 
implementation 














paper may be 
applicable to UK  
Yarbrough and 
Smith 
2007 General (US 
paper) 
Systematic literature review on 









systems in relation 





























Yasnoff et al 2004 General (US 
paper) 
Present results of a consensus meeting of 
the US National Health Information 
Infrastructure Coordination Group 
(consisting of IT and healthcare 
representatives), group concerned with 
introducing technology that connects 
different areas of healthcare 
electronically (such as EHRs), identified 
facilitators for implementation 
Management: 
government and the 
private sector need 
to work together to 
achieve goals and 





for both the initial 
implementation, 
purchase of the 










eight groups to 
have facilitated 
discussions, each 
produced a series 
of 
recommendation
s that were then 
examined and 
assigned to 





UK, but not 
















Yusof et al 2008 Imaging 
system in UK 
primary care 
Review of evaluation methods for IT 
systems in healthcare, propose new 
evaluation framework and use model to 
evaluate introduction of imaging system 
in UK primary care setting, qualitative 
case study with formative evaluation, 
interviews with staff and patients, 
observations and documentary analysis 
Model includes 
organisational 







willingness to learn 
most important, rest 
can be achieved 
with training, 









collected over a 





s and other 
healthcare and 
IT staff, some 
collection of 
documents but 





















work practices, time 
















Appendix 3: Information sheets 
Interview information sheet 
I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh and would like to invite you to take 
part in my research. Please take time to read this information sheet before deciding 
whether to take part. This describes the goals of the s udy and what I will be asking you 
to do. This information sheet also indicates how I ill collect, store and use the data 
collected. I appreciate you are busy and would like to thank you in advance for taking 
the time to read this leaflet and consider this request. 
 
Purpose of the study 
The way patient information in hospitals is stored is changing with the introduction of 
Lorenzo. The purpose of the study is to explore theexperiences, attitudes and 
organisational consequences of implementation.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you are a member of healthcare staff working at a setting 
that has introduced Lorenzo. I would like to investigate the acceptability of the new 
system and invite you to be interviewed in order to gain insights into your 
views/opinions and experiences surrounding Lorenzo.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you whether you wish to take part in an interview. If you decide to take part 
you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. If you do decide 
to take part you will need to complete the consent form and should also keep this 
information sheet. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
I would like to invite you to be interviewed a maximum of two times throughout the 
implementation period of Lorenzo (over approximately one year). However, if you 
prefer to be interviewed only once I will be very happy to arrange this. Interviews will 
take around 30 minutes each. For convenience, I will also give you the opportunity to 
conduct these interviews over the phone. 
 
The interviews will be audio-taped, with your permission, and a written account of the 
interview will be produced for analysis purposes. This will have a unique participant 
number on it, but will not have your name or telephone number on it. All data obtained 
from the interviews will be used only for this study. You will be free to stop the 
interview at any time, should you wish and I will destroy the audiotape if you ask us to 





What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
Taking part in an interview will take up some of your time. There are no risks involved 
in participating. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The implementation of Lorenzo is a reality, with considerable time and resources 
devoted to its development. My PhD research aims at discovering how the system is 
received and adopted on the ground, and also to disc ver how best to support its use in 
hospitals. Your participation in this research will help me to assess how usable Lorenzo 
is, what the challenges associated with introducing it are, and help me to determine 
whether it meets your needs. I am planning to disseminate my findings through my 
professional connections with the NHS CFH Evaluation Programme and this will 
ultimately inform the implementation strategy of national electronic health records in 
England. 
 
Will my participation in the research remain confidential? 
Yes. Transcripts from the interviews will be anonymised, and anything you say during 
an interview will be confidential.  
 
What will happen to the results of this research? 
The results of this research will be written up in a thesis and may help to inform health 
policy on implementing electronic health records in hospitals. The results of this study 
will be published in relevant journals and presented at conferences. No individual 
participant or hospital will be identifiable in any of the published material.  
 
Who is organising and funding this research? 
The research is organised by the University of Edinburgh. My PhD is funded by the 
Medical Research Council.  
 
What can I do if I have a complaint about the study? 
If you have any concerns or questions about this study, please raise these with me. My 
supervisors are Professor Aziz Sheikh and Dr Allison Worth at the University of 
Edinburgh. They can also be contacted, should you have a complaint about my research.  
 
Who do I contact for further information? 
For further information about this study please contact me or my supervisors in the first 
instance: 
 
Kathrin Cresswell (nee Beyer), PhD student, Centre for Population Health Sciences, The 
University of Edinburgh, Room 115, Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 
9AG. Tel: (0131) 650 9241, email: Kathrin.Beyer@ed.ac.uk 
 
Contact details of my first PhD supervisor: Professor Aziz Sheikh, Centre for Population 




Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 651 4151; Fax: 0131 650 9119; email: 
aziz.sheikh@ed.ac.uk 
 
Contact details of my second PhD supervisor: Dr Allison Worth, Centre for Population 
Health Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, 
Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 650 9463; Fax: 0131 650 9119; email: 
Allison.Worth@ed.ac.uk 
 
If you wish to contact an independent person, please contact:  
 
Dr Ann Robertson, Centre for Population Health Scien es, The University of Edinburgh, 
Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 650 9459; Fax: 0131 
650 9119; email: A.R.R.Robertson@ed.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for considering this 
request. 
Observation information sheet 
I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh and would like to invite you to take 
part in my research. Please take time to read this information sheet before deciding 
whether to take part. This describes the goals of the s udy and what I will be asking you 
to do. This information sheet also indicates how I ill collect, store and use the data 
collected. I appreciate you are busy and would like to thank you in advance for taking 
the time to read this leaflet and consider this request. 
 
Purpose of the study 
The way patient information in hospitals is stored is changing with the introduction of 
the NHS Care Records Service (NHS CRS). The purpose of the study is to explore the 
adoption of Lorenzo among healthcare professionals and its integration with existing 
work practices.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you are a healthcare professional working at a setting 
that has introduced Lorenzo. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you whether you wish to take part. If you decide to take part you are still free 
to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. If you do decide to take part you 
will need to complete the consent form and should also keep this information sheet. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
I wish to observe the setting you are working in for a total of 15 hours (over a period of 




in particular how healthcare professionals are working with it. I also want to explore any 
problems that may arise during use (e.g. how it faclit tes or inhibits your work).  
 
During my observations, I will watch Lorenzo related activities and will make notes. 
These notes will later be typed up and used for analysis. I will aim at observing as 
unobtrusively as possible in order not to interfere with your care activities and do have 
experience of conducting observations at busy hospital wards.  
 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
Taking part in this research does not carry any risks. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The implementation of Lorenzo is a reality, with considerable time and resources 
devoted to its development. My PhD research aims at discovering how the system is 
received and adopted on the ground, and also to disc ver how best to support its use in 
hospitals. Your participation in this research will help me to assess how usable Lorenzo 
is, what the challenges associated with introducing it are, and help me to determine 
whether it meets your needs. I am planning to disseminate my findings through my 
professional connections with the NHS CFH Evaluation Programme and this will 
ultimately inform the implementation strategy of national electronic health records in 
England. 
 
Will my participation in the study remain confidential? 
Yes. Notes from the observations will be anonymised, and anything you say during the 
observation will be confidential.  
 
What will happen to the results of this research? 
The results of this research will be written up in a thesis and may help to inform health 
policy on implementing electronic health records in hospitals. The results of this study 
will be published in relevant journals and presented at conferences. No individual 
participant or hospital will be identifiable in any of the published material.  
 
Who is organising and funding this research? 
The research is organised by the University of Edinburgh. My PhD is funded by the 
Medical Research Council.  
 
What can I do if I have a complaint about the study? 
If you have any concerns or questions about this study, please raise these with me. My 
supervisors are Professor Aziz Sheikh and Dr Allison Worth at the University of 
Edinburgh. They can also be contacted, should you have a complaint about my research.  
 
Who do I contact for further information? 






Kathrin Cresswell (nee Beyer), PhD student, Centre for Population Health Sciences, The 
University of Edinburgh, Room 115, Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 
9AG. Tel: (0131) 650 9241, email: Kathrin.Beyer@ed.ac.uk 
 
Contact details of my first PhD supervisor: Professor Aziz Sheikh, Centre for Population 
Health Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, 
Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 651 4151; Fax: 0131 650 9119; email: 
aziz.sheikh@ed.ac.uk 
 
Contact details of my second PhD supervisor: Dr Allison Worth, Centre for Population 
Health Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, 
Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 650 9463; Fax: 0131 650 9119; email: 
Allison.Worth@ed.ac.uk 
 
If you wish to contact an independent person, please contact:  
 
Dr Ann Robertson, Centre for Population Health Scien es, The University of Edinburgh, 
Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 650 9459; Fax: 0131 
650 9119; email: A.R.R.Robertson@ed.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for considering this 
request. 
Brief information sheet for patients, visitors and other staff (non-
healthcare e.g. cleaners) 
I am a PhD student at the University of Edinburgh and would like to let you know you 
about some research that is happening in this hospital. I am observing healthcare staff as 
they use computers in their work. Permission to undertake this work has been granted by 
the Chief Executive at this hospital. 
 
Why is the research being done? 
The way hospitals store notes about you and your care is changing with the introduction 
of a computer system called the NHS Care Records Service (NHS CRS). This is an 
electronic system that can hold information about patients such as test results, notes 
from consultations and hospital stays, x-rays and medications you are taking. At the 
moment a lot of this information is stored either on l cal computer systems in individual 
hospitals or on paper records. This makes sharing between different settings (such as 
between different hospitals) very difficult. The introduction of the NHS CRS means that 
patient records, which hold information about patients, will soon be electronic and 
centrally stored. This should make access and sharing of information between different 
care settings easier. For example, if you (as a patient) are admitted to a hospital that you 
have never been to before, doctors will be able to check your electronic records for any 




affect the way you need to be treated. I am investigating how this new system is 
included into the day-to-day work of healthcare staff. 
 
What will this research mean for you?  
I will be based on the here for either half or a whole day. I will watch how healthcare 
staff uses the new computer system and I will make not s about their behaviour. If I am 
watching your care or related activities, I will ask for your permission (verbally) at the 
time. You are free to refuse, without giving a reason. Any information that I collect 
while observing will be related to healthcare workers only – I will not take notes of any 
personal information relating to you as a patient, visitor or member of other staff 
working in this setting.  
 
What will happen if you don’t want to be observed? 
If you do not want to be involved in this study at all please either tell the doctor, nurse or 
the reception staff. Alternatively you may tell me directly if you wish. Your decision 
will be treated with respect and entirely without prejudice and no notes will be made 
about you or your care as part of this study.  
 
Who can you contact for further information? 
For further information about this study please contact me or my supervisors in the first 
instance: 
 
Kathrin Cresswell (nee Beyer), PhD student, Centre for Population Health Sciences, The 
University of Edinburgh, Room 115, Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 
9AG. Tel: (0131) 650 9241, email: Kathrin.Beyer@ed.ac.uk 
 
Contact details of my first PhD supervisor: Professor Aziz Sheikh, Centre for Population 
Health Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, 
Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 651 4151; Fax: 0131 650 9119; email: 
aziz.sheikh@ed.ac.uk 
 
Contact details of my second PhD supervisor: Dr Allison Worth, Centre for Population 
Health Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Medical School, Teviot Place, 
Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 650 9463; Fax: 0131 650 9119; email: 
Allison.Worth@ed.ac.uk 
 
If you wish to contact an independent person, please contact:  
 
Dr Ann Robertson, Centre for Population Health Scien es, The University of Edinburgh, 
Medical School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9AG. Tel: 0131 650 9459; Fax: 0131 
650 9119; email: A.R.R.Robertson@ed.ac.uk 
 




Appendix 4: Consent forms 
Interview consent form 
Please tick all the boxes if you agree with the statement. If you don’t feel able to 
tick all the boxes, or if you change your mind at any point, I will not include you in 
the research.  
 Tick  
I have read the information sheet and asked any questions I want, which were 
answered to my satisfaction (Please note that the information sheet gives the 
names of people you can contact to discuss the study) 
 
I have been informed of the objectives of the study, m  role within it, and the 
tasks I am expected to undertake 
 
I understand that I will be participating in a study to investigate my perceptions 
and experiences of Lorenzo 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time and without 
giving a reason for withdrawing 
 
I have been reassured that the procedures adopted by he researcher to ensure my 
anonymity as a participant will be maintained 
 
I understand that the researcher will agree to erase my contribution to the 
audiotape of the interview should I request this 
 
I have been provided with the contact details of the research team and have 
details of the complaints procedure that I can use if I wish to 
 
I am happy to be quoted (for example, when the resea ch is published) so long as 
my name isn’t mentioned. [if not happy to be quoted, leave blank] 
I agree to participate in the study  
  
Name of participant (capitals): ……………………………………. 
 
Signed: ……………………………………    Date: ……………….. 
 
I would prefer a face-to-face/telephone interview     [please delete as appropriate] 
 






Observation consent form 
Please tick all the boxes if you agree with the statement. If you don’t feel able to 
tick all the boxes, or if you change your mind at any point, I will not include you in 
the research.  
 
 Tick 
I have read the information sheet and asked any questions I want, which were 
answered to my satisfaction (Please note that the information sheet gives the 
names of people you can contact to discuss the study) 
 
I have been informed of the objectives of the study, m  role within it, and the 
tasks I am expected to undertake 
 
I understand that I will be participating in a study to investigate the adoption of 
Lorenzo and its integration into work practices 
 
I understand that I do not have to take part. If I do take part I may withdraw at 
any time, without giving a reason and without affecting me in any way. 
 
I understand that a researcher will observe everyday working practice in the 
setting I work in. I understand that the researcher may make notes during the 
observation period which will be anonymised and typed up. I give permission 
for the researchers to have access to this information for analysis. I agree to be 
observed. 
 
I understand that my taking part in the study and the content of the observation 
will be kept confidential and data resulting from the observation will be 
anonymised. 
 
I understand that the researcher will agree to erase any notes about me, should I 
request this. 
 
I have been provided with the contact details of the researcher and have details 
of the complaints procedure that I can use if I wish to. 
 
I am happy to be quoted (for example, when the resea ch is published) so long as 
my name isn’t mentioned. [if not happy to be quoted, leave blank] 
 
I agree to participate in the study.  
  
Name of participant (capitals): ..………………………………………. 
 






Appendix 5: Ethical, research and development approv al 
Approval letter from research ethics committee 
 
East London and the City Research Ethics Committee 1
Room 24, 2nd Floor 
Burdett House 





 Telephone: 020 8223 8602  
Mrs Kathrin Cresswell (nee Beyer) 
Centre for Population Health Science 
The University of Edinburgh 
20 West Richmond Street 
EH8 9DX 
02 April 2009 
 
Dear Mrs Cresswell (nee Beyer) 
 
Full title of study: The NHS Care Records Service (NHS CRS) - Exploring the 
healthcare professional adoption and integration into work 
practices 
REC reference number: 09/H0703/24 
 
Thank you for your letter of 27 March 2009, responding to the Committee’s request for further 
information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair.  
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation 
as revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
The Committee has designated this study as exempt from site-specific assessment (SSA). The 
favourable opinion for the study applies to all site  involved in the research. There is no 
requirement for other Local Research Ethics Committees to be informed or SSA to be carried 






Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of the 
study. 
 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation prior to the 
start of the study at the site concerned. 
 
Management permission at NHS sites (“R&D approval”) should be obtained from the relevant 
care organisation(s) in accordance with NHS research governance arrangements. Guidance on 





The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
  
Document   Version   Date   
Letter from Sponsor    29 January 
2009  
Covering Letter    04 February 
2009  
Protocol  2  02 February 
2009  
Application  5     
Brief Information Sheet for Patients, Visitors and other Staff (non-
healthcare e.g. cleaners)  
2  02 February 
2009  
Applicant's checklist    02 February 
2009  
CV - Prof Aziz Sheikh       
Participant Consent Form: Healthcare Staff Observation Consent Form    02 February 
2009  
Participant Information Sheet: In-depth Information Sheet for Healthcare 
Staff  
2  02 February 
2009  
Investigator CV       
Observation Recording Sheet       
Peer Review - Dr B Williams    27 March 2009 
Research Proposal  3  27 March 2009 
Response to Request for Further Information    27 March 2009 










Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
After ethical review 
 
Now that you have completed the application process please visit the National Research Ethics 
Website > After Review  
 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National 
Research Ethics Service and the application procedure. If you wish to make your views known 
please use the feedback form available on the website. 
 
The attached document “After ethical review –guidance for researchers” gives detailed guidance 
on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
 
• Notifying substantial amendments 
• Progress and safety reports 
• Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the light of 
changes in reporting requirements or procedures. 
 
We would also like to inform you that we consult regularly with stakeholders to improve our 
service. If you would like to join our Reference Group please email 
referencegroup@nres.npsa.nhs.uk. 
 
09/H0703/24 Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 











Enclosures: “After ethical review – guidance for researchers”  
 



































Appendix 6: Interview guide 
QUESTIONS ABOUT NHS CRS IN GENERAL 
1. How have you heard about the NHS CRS and how do you feel about its 
introduction into secondary care? 
2. Have you been in contact with any parts of the NHS CRS Programme? In what 
capacity? 
3. Do you believe that the NHS CRS is an appropriate goal for the NHS? 
4. What are your views on the national implementation strategy? 
5. What do you believe would most help to speed up the roll-out of the NHS CRS 
nationwide (facilitators and barriers)? 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT USING LORENZO 
6. Can you tell me what you use Lorenzo for and how it contributes to patient care?  
7. What were your expectations before Lorenzo was put into use and were they 
fulfilled? 
8. What are your overall views on the way the implementation of Lorenzo has been 
managed in this setting? (Probe: is it being rushed, or too drawn out? Do you 
receive enough information, too much, too little? Is the day-to-day support 
adequate and appropriate?) 
9. How disruptive is the associated organisational change, for example in terms of 
learning new routines, new staff recruited, and needing to familiarise yourself 
with new practices? 
10. Has your behaviour/practice changed as a result of the introduction of Lorenzo? 
If so, in what way? Are there any unexpected changes to how you do things 
now? 
11. How are your professional interests as a [doctor/nurse/whatever] 
represented/supported in Lorenzo (i.e. does it mainly support or focus on one 
profession versus any other)?  
12. Do you see Lorenzo influencing your working style as part of a team or as a 
professional? (Prompt: e.g. in the way you communicate and collaborate with 
other health professionals and communicate with patients)?  
13. From your perspective, how does the introduction of Lorenzo affect patient care 
(e.g. in relation to efficiency, safety and convenience)?  
14. Can you tell me what, if any, might be the main benefits to you in your role from 
using Lorenzo? Do you see these benefits now? Are there any clear drawbacks in 
performing your role? 
15. What are, or will be, the hospital wide benefits (i.e. beyond your role and your 
work)?  
16. Do you have any concerns about the introduction of Lorenzo? Can you tell me 
what these are? 
17. Are there any tasks or aspects of care that you feel will become more difficult or 




18. Are there any changes that you would like to see made in how Lorenzo works? 
How could it be improved to be more acceptable and more effective in 
supporting care?  
19. What, if anything, would you miss most about Lorenzo if it were withdrawn? 
20. Are there any benefits you do not see now, but would expect in the future from 
using Lorenzo?  
21. How much time have you spent/or do you expect to spend learning about using 
Lorenzo? If you have received any training could you tell me what type this has 
been and how useful or relevant you have found it? 
22. Did you have any problems when you first started using the system? How were 
these resolved? 
23. Do you have sufficient skills now to use Lorenzo to the maximum benefit?  
24. In what ways do you think Lorenzo will be/is a) better and b) worse than the 
system(s) it replaces? Why? (Probe for how did the ‘old’ one look – paper or mix 
of paper and electronic)?  
25. How do you feel about the soft-landing (gradual introduction) of Lorenzo – is 
this approach appropriate? 
26. How could Lorenzo and the implementation approaches b ing used in this 
hospital be improved to be more acceptable to you and/or more effective in 
supporting care delivery? 
27. Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
 
In order to make the interview guide more user friendly (for both me and the 
interviewee), I experimented with drafting a loose structure interview card. Although the 
aim was to conduct interviews without looking at paper (to keep the natural 
communication flow), I took these loose structures to the interview with me as a backup. 
The following table outlines a loose structure card based on the topic guide above: 
 
Main structure Specific topics and issues 
Confidentiality, aims, thanks Commercial sensitivity of topic, recorded 
Any questions?  
About yourself Role, involvement, do you use the system 
(how, what aspect?) 
Views about the NHS CRS/Lorenzo  
Views about the implementation and 
management of the project 
Main challenges? Adequately addressed? 
Soft-landing appropriate? 
 
Any problems in the use/implementation 
of the system  
Main concerns? 
Training How useful was it? What could have been 
done better? 
Key stakeholders an how they have been 
communicating and collaborating  
LSP, SHA, Trusts, NHS CFH, and DH 




practices (activities that you do on your 
daily basis) 
How do you feel about changes? 
Have old practices and tasks been 
eliminated? 
Any changes in your attitudes over time 
and why? 
 
Any changes in the way in which you 




Impact of Lorenzo on hospital, healthcare, 
society 
 
Would you consider the project to be a 
success?  
Why (not)? 
If given the autonomy what would you do 
differently? 
In Trust and Programme in general 
Any benefits you do not see now, but 
would expect in the future from using 
Lorenzo?  
 
Anything else?  
Thanks, any questions?  
 
At T2 interviews, the topic guide had changed slight y and included the following 
questions: 
 
Main structure Specific topics and issues 
Confidentiality, aims, thanks Commercial sensitivity of topic, recorded 
Any questions?  
What has changed since the last time we 
spoke? 
Increased functionality? Benefits? 
 
Remind of and discuss key issues 
discussed at last interview 
 
Views about the implementation and 
management of the project 
Have these changed over time, why/why 
not? 
Views on the system Has anything changed? Why/why not?
 
Views on the general governmental 
strategy 
 
Retrospective reflections What are the three main lessons learned? 
Recommendations for improvement and 
suggestions on how to take it from here 
Anything else?  






Appendix 7: Observation recording sheet 
During observations, I recorded descriptive elements including the following: 
 
• Description of the setting – layout: positioning of c mputers, beds etc. 
• Description of the actors – the roles of individuals (I will not record names but 
focus on roles) 
• Activities – focus on healthcare professionals and what they were doing during 
the observation (with a focus on activities surrounding the use of computers), if 
they referred to particular activities in interviews I explored these further (if 
applicable), if they felt something was particularly important I explored this in 
detail in follow-up observations (if applicable) 
• Events – recording of particular events e.g. speaking to a patient, recording 
information, speaking to other healthcare professionals 
• Time – recording the sequence of events 
• Goals – recording what the actors wanted to accomplish 





















































































Appendix 9: Contributions to science 
Throughout my work, I published a range of outputs, which have been peer-reviewed. 
These were based on respective parts of this thesis and included the following (full 
versions of selected papers are appended): 
• Literature review 
o Car J, Black A, Anandan C, Cresswell K, Majeed A, McKinstry B, 
Pagliari C, Procter R, Sheikh A (2008).The impact of e-Health on the 
quality & safety of healthcare. A systematic overviw & synthesis of the 
literature, May 2011. Available from: 
http://www.haps.bham.ac.uk/publichealth/cfhep/001_Extension.shtml (In 
collaboration with my supervisor Professor Aziz Sheik , I wrote chapter 
14: Case study: design, implementation and adoption of the NHS Care 
Record Service in secondary care) 
o Black AD, Car J, Pagliari C, Anandan C, resswell K, et al. The Impact 
of eHealth on the Quality and Safety of Health Care: A Systematic 
Overview. PLoS Medicine 2011; 8(1). 
o Cresswell K, Sheikh A. The NHS Care Record Service: 
recommendations from the literature on successful implementation and 
adoption. Informatics in Primary Care 2009; 17: pp.153-60. 
o Sheikh A, McLean S, Cresswell K, Pagliari C, Pappas Y, Car J, Black A, 
Hemmi A, Nurmatov U, Mukherjee M, Anandan C, McKinstry B, Procter 
R, Majeed A (2011). The Impact of eHealth on the Quality and Safety of 
Healthcare. An updated systematic overview & synthesis of the literature. 
In collaboration with my supervisor Professor Aziz Sheikh, I wrote 
Chapter 18: Case study: Lessons in relation to the d sign, 
implementation and adoption of the NHS Care Record Service in 
secondary care. I also contributed to Chapter 17: Importance of 
organisational issues in the implementation and adoption of eHealth 
innovations. 
o Morrison Z, Robertson A, Cresswell K, Crowe S, Sheikh A. 
Understanding contrasting approaches to nationwide implementations of 
electronic health record systems: England, the USA and Australia. 
Journal of Healthcare Engineering 2011; 2(1):25–41. 
• Methodology 
o Cresswell K, Worth A, Sheikh A. Actor-Network Theory and its role in 
understanding the implementation of information technology 
developments in healthcare. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision 
Making 2010; 10:67. [The Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners and has drawn on this article to inform the Australian e-
health environment and the government’s implementation of the 
personally controlled electronic health record] 
o Cresswell K, Worth A, Sheikh A. Implementing and Adopting Electronic 




evaluation study (in press). Clinical Governance: an International 
Journal 2011. 
o Crowe S, Cresswell K, Robertson A, Huby G, Avery A, Sheikh A. The 
Case Study Approach. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2011; 
11:100. 
• Results 
o Robertson A, Cresswell K, Takian A, Petrakaki D, Crowe S, Cornford T, 
Barber N, Avery A, Fernando B, Jacklin A, Prescott R, Klecun E, Paton 
J, Lichtner V, Quinn C, Ali M, Morrison Z, Jani Y, Waring J, Marsden K, 
Sheikh A. Implementation and adoption of nationwide el ctronic health 
records in secondary care in England: qualitative analysis of interim 
results from a prospective national evaluation. British Medical Journal 
2010; 341. 
o Cresswell K, Worth A, Sheikh A. Comparative Case Study Investigating 
Sociotechnical Processes of Change from a National Electronic Health 
Record Implementation. Submitted to PLoS ONE 2011. 
o Robertson A, Cresswell K, Sheikh A (2011). Findings from an 
independent evaluation of England’s national implementation of 
electronic health records in hospitals. Oral presentation at ARM in 
Seattle. 
o Morrison Z, Cresswell K, Marsden K, Fernando B, Sheikh A (2011). 
Utilising a Multi-Level Discourse-Based Theory of Organisational 
Change to Explore the Introduction of Electronic Health Records. The 
27th EGOS Colloquium, 2011: Reassembling Organizations. Sub-theme 
28: Translating Discourses: Text, Change and Organization. 
o Cresswell K, Ali M, Avery A, Barber N, Cornford T, Crowe S, Fernando 
B, Jacklin A, Jani Y, Klecun E, Lichtner V, Marsden K, Morrison Z, 
Paton J, Petrakaki D, Prescott R, Quinn C, Robertson A, Takian A, 
Voutsina K, Waring J, Sheikh A. The Long and Winding Road…An 
Independent Evaluation of the Implementation and Adoption of the 
National Health Service Care Records Service (NHS CRS) in Secondary 
Care in England, May 2011. Available from: 
http://www.haps.bham.ac.uk/publichealth/cfhep/005.shtml 
o Sheikh A, Cornford T, Barber N, Avery A, Takian A, Lichtner V, 
Petrakaki D, Crowe S, Marsden K, Robertson A, Morris n Z, Klecun E, 
Prescott R, Quinn C, Jani Y, Ficociello M, Voutsina K, Paton J, Fernando 
B, Jacklin A, Cresswell K. Implementation and adoption of nationwide 
electronic health records in secondary care in England: final qualitative 
results from a prospective national evaluation in "early adopter" hospitals 
(in press). British Medical Journal 2011. 
o Cresswell K, Robertson A, Sheikh A. Lessons learned from England’s 
national electronic health record implementation: impl cations for the 
international community. Short paper for oral presentation, IHI 2012. 
Miami, FL, USA. 
